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ABSTRACT 
 
THE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF CLIMATE CHANGE: 
A CASE STUDY OF TAIWANESE YOUTH 
 
by 
Shih-Yun Kuo 
 
Global climate change is likely to be the most challenging environmental dilemma of the 
21st century because its impacts on ecosystems and human society are transnational in 
scale and long term in scope. Due to its high scientific complexity and uncertainty and 
high political and economic sensitivity, mitigating the problem will require 
interdisciplinary cooperation and collective and sustained efforts on the part of all nations. 
Sufficient domestic support from both government and the lay public will not only be 
significant to the success of an international climate regime, but also crucial to the 
effectiveness of potential domestic climate policies. 
Such circumstances call for exploration of how the level of the public’s scientific 
understanding of climate change influences choices for climate protective actions and 
support for climate policies. Social scientists have the responsibility to explore how 
people perceive, understand, and respond to global climate change and to investigate the 
roles and interrelationships of various actors (e.g., scientists, citizens, and elected and 
appointed officials) in the policy-making process. Compared with numerous social 
scientific studies of global climate change in North America and Europe, substantially 
fewer investigations have focused on other regions of the world. Therefore, this doctoral 
research presents a case study of domestic climate policy formulation premised on the 
integration of science and citizens in an industrialized Asian society—Taiwan. 
 
This dissertation reports the views of Taiwanese youth with respect to global 
climate change based on data compiled from three empirical studies (i.e., integrated 
assessment focus groups, pre- and post-surveys, and a web-based survey). These studies 
in combination present three primary findings: 1) Most Taiwanese young adults tend to 
endorse pro-climate protection attitudes and behaviors; 2) These young adults display an 
extensive but limited scientific understanding pertaining to the problem; 3) A process of 
experimental participation with scientists enhanced individual scientific understanding 
and policy making. 
Further investigation revealed that these perceptions were grounded in a strong 
sense of ecological citizenship, which is likely influenced by the contemporary 
environmental movement in Taiwan since the 1980s. While this case study finds that 
scientific knowledge is less influential in determining individual behavioral intentions 
than public attitudes toward climate change, the continual enhancement of public ethical 
awareness about global climate change provides a helpful approach for policy makers 
seeking to obtain public support. 
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When Mr. Bob Sheppard, a well-known announcer for the New York Yankees, presented 
the performance of God Bless America during the seventh inning stretch, he always asked 
fans to “offer a moment of silent prayer for the service men and women who are stationed 
around the globe and especially remember those who have lost their lives defending our 
freedom and our way of life.” Every time I heard his introduction, I asked myself the 
same questions: What kind of life styles did these honored soldiers sacrifice their lives to 
defend for us? Vehicles with cheap gasoline, suburban houses with lawns and pools, or 
so-called American dreams? 
Do these pursuits of good living standards merit the sacrifice of thousands of 
human lives and the destruction of the environment? While American dreams have now 
become an ultimate goal for people around the world, what would the environment 
become if everybody on Earth attempted to pursue their American dreams? Perhaps it is 
time to rethink the way of life we need. Perhaps it is time for us to make a decision to 
sacrifice some of our qualify of life and move toward more sustainable lifestyles. 
My family has been a great influence on my value system of material pursuits and 
quality of life, and my viewpoints toward public affairs and environmental matters. 
Therefore, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my beloved family. Without their 
love and unwavering support, this dissertation would not have been possible. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Overview 
Global climate change may be the most pressing environmental problem of the 21st 
century because its impacts on ecosystems and human society are transnational in scale 
and long term in scope.1 It is an issue not only of scientific debate, but one that also 
involves political negotiation, economic development, and societal welfare. In addition, 
this dilemma is relevant to every person on the planet in terms of anthropogenic causes, 
potential impacts on communities, and necessary mitigation and adaptation strategies. 
Therefore, this doctoral research, titled The Public Understanding of Climate Change: A 
Case Study of Taiwanese Youth, explores the relationships among science, the public, and 
politics through an empirical investigation. 
This chapter highlights general concepts of this doctoral research. Section 1.2 
begins with a brief introduction of the objectives, the problem that is addressed, and the 
expected contributions of the investigation. Section 1.3 reviews the evolution of global 
climate change over the past few decades both in terms of scientific understanding and 
political developments. Section 1.4 describes the overall organization of the dissertation 
and Section 1.5 summarizes this chapter. 
 
                                                 
1 The definition of global climate change in this dissertation adopts the usage from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. It refers to any change in climate over time 
whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. Global climate change 
is often shortened as “climate change,” and is often interchangeably used by the term 
“global warming.” 
1 
 2
1.2  Research Overview 
1.2.1  Introduction 
Global climate change has several characteristics that make the issue very difficult for 
policy makers to manage (e.g., scientific complexity and uncertainty, and temporal and 
spatial variability) (Carter, 2001). Mitigating the problem will require multidisciplinary 
cooperation and collective and sustained effort on the part of all nations. In addition, how 
lay people recognize and attempt to resolve the complex scientific-political problem is an 
interesting social scientific subject. Therefore, it is particularly important for social 
scientists to gather knowledge through the initiation of case studies at a local level and to 
share the findings at a global level. 
The research examines and analyzes the public’s understanding of global climate 
change for a specific group (i.e., Taiwanese youth). The study location and study 
population were selected for consideration because of several advantages to the case 
study. The investigation comprises three interrelated constituent studies (i.e., an 
Integrated Assessment (IA) focus-group workshop, a comparative survey, and a 
web-based survey). The field work was conducted in the summer and fall of 2008 and 
involved the participation of 303 Taiwanese young adults. 
This section provides a brief introduction to this doctoral research. Subsection 
1.2.2 describes research objectives of this inquiry. Subsection 1.2.3 explicates the key 
research problem and the contemporary research gap that this project attempts to address 
in studying and resolving climate change. Subsection 1.2.4 explains the significance of 
this case study and highlights a variety of fields to which this research expects to 
contribute. Subsection 1.2.5 concludes this introductory section. 
 3
1.2.2  Research Objectives 
Global climate change is a scientifically complex problem where the identification of 
issues (i.e., collecting scientific evidence) and the formulation of interventions (i.e., 
implementing political actions) involve a wide range of academic disciplines including 
physical science domains (e.g., atmospheric and meteorological science, marine science, 
and environmental science) and social science specializations (e.g., economics, politics, 
and sociology). It appears evident that to effectively mitigate the problem will require 
intense and protracted interdisciplinary cooperation. However, difficult questions exist 
regarding the appropriate degree of urgency to attach to the challenges of a changing 
climate and how best to implement strategies to address them. 
While climate change poses questions pertaining to the human dimensions of 
environmental issues in terms of anthropogenic forces, potential impacts on humans, and 
necessary individual and political mitigation and adaptation strategies, it is a profound 
challenge for social scientists to understand how human society is thinking about and 
reacting to this dilemma. Moreover, it is interesting to explore how various societal actors 
(e.g., scientists, policy makers, and the public) interact and cooperate with each other. 
Under such circumstances, the ultimate objective of this dissertation is to present a case 
study of domestic climate policy making in an industrialized Asian society and the role 
that public understanding plays in the process. It also includes three supplementary goals: 
y To examine the concerns of Taiwanese youth about global climate change in 
terms of their attitudes, scientific knowledge, and behavioral intentions. 
y To investigate the interrelationships among these three elements (i.e., attitudes, 
scientific knowledge, and behavioral intentions). 
y To assess the effectiveness of an experimental participatory exercise (i.e., the 
IA focus groups) in enhancing individual scientific understanding and 
engagement in policy making. 
 4
1.2.3  Problem Statement 
Global climate change refers to long-term changes in the planetary climate system (e.g., 
temperature, precipitation) whether due to natural causes (e.g., alterations in patterns of 
solar radiation) or human forces (e.g., excessive human-made greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions). While the greenhouse effect is a well established natural phenomenon that 
maintains the Earth’s average surface temperature within a relatively comfortable range, 
increasing scientific evidence over recent decades has indicated that human beings have 
significantly altered the climate since the Industrial Revolution (IPCC, 2007a). 
The problem poses profound challenges for policy makers because it embodies 
several typical characteristics of environmental problems (e.g., scientific complexity and 
uncertainty, temporal and spatial variability) (Carter, 2001). To place an environmental 
problem on the political agenda, the foremost process is to ensure the scientific validation 
of claims by collecting sufficient scientific evidence (Hannigan, 1995). Assessment of 
global warming from human emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) was first published by 
Nobel laureate Svante Arrhenius (1896) in the late 19th century, but it was not until the 
1960s that long-term testing of the theory of global warming began. 
Charles Keeling (1961) began to document atmospheric CO2 concentrations on 
Mauna Loa in Hawaii in 1957 and he soon found seasonal fluctuations and an annual rise 
of atmospheric CO2 concentrations. In addition, the Earth’s surface temperatures and 
atmospheric chemical compositions back to one million years ago were reenacted 
through advanced technology (e.g., isotopic measurement) to derive information from 
deep-sea sediment cores and bubbles sealed in ice cores (IPCC, 2007a) (see Section 1.3 
for a detailed introduction of the science of climate change). 
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After several decades of accumulating scientific evidence, the focus of the global 
climate change policy debate began to shift from scientific risk assessment to political 
responses (e.g., establishing an international policy framework with national targets and 
timetables) in the late 1980s (Hempel, 2003).2 Two important international agreements, 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its 
subsidiary Kyoto Protocol, were agreed to during the 1990s as initial steps in trying to 
address the problem by setting national targets and timetables (see Section 1.3 for a 
detailed introduction of the politics of climate change).3 
The UNFCCC required participating countries to voluntarily reduce their GHG 
emissions (without specific targets and timetables) and the Kyoto Protocol further 
targeted industrialized countries (Annex I Parties) to reduce their GHG emissions (by an 
average 5.2% below their 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012). According to the report 
on national GHG inventories (UNFCCC, 2009a), between 1990 and 2007 Annex I Parties 
with economies in transition (EIT) effectively decreased the total aggregate GHG 
emissions excluding emissions/removal from land use, land-use change and forestry by 
37.0%. In contrast, Annex I non-EIT Parties increased their GHG emissions by 11.2% in 
the same period (UNFCCC, 2009a). 
                                                 
2 Hempel (2003) divided the evolution of climate issues and policies into five stages: 1) 
scientific assessment (1950s-1988); 2) agenda setting (1988-1992); 3) policy frameworks 
(1992-1997); 4) national targets and timetables (1997-2012); and 5) contingent 
implementation (early to mid 21st century). 
 
3 The UNFCCC, drafted under the auspices of the United Nations, was signed by 154 
countries in 1992 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. It represented the commitment 
and cooperation of participating states to resolve the problem of global climate change. 
The Kyoto Protocol, finalized in 1997, is an international agreement establishing 
mandatory national targets and timetables to reduce GHG emissions. A total of 183 
countries have ratified the Protocol as of January 2009. 
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The trend in CO2 emissions of the top ten emitters during the period 1971-2007 
displayed in Figure 1.1 reveals that many European countries and the Russian Federation 
have begun to stabilize or even reduce their CO2 emissions (IEA, 2009). However, the 
CO2 emissions of the United States (US) and developing countries such as China and 
India continue to grow. In addition, global CO2 emissions from fuel combustion have 
doubled from 14,095 million tons (Mt) in 1971 to 28,962 Mt in 2007 (IEA, 2009). 
Although at one time many observers thought that political recognition of the problem of 
climate change represented an important landmark, few meaningful results have to date 
been achieved to reduce GHG emissions in countries other than European Union (EU) 
members and EIT countries (IEA, 2009; UNFCCC, 2009a).4 
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Figure 1.1 Carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion in selected countries 
during the period 1971-2007 (IEA, 2009). 
 
                                                 
4 Although the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol can not be evaluated until the 
expiring year—2012, the continual increase of global GHG emissions to date has implied 
the inefficacy of the voluntary-basis of the UNFCCC. 
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One hundred years after the first scientific publication regarding the 
anthropogenic greenhouse effect and ten years after the Kyoto Protocol, the atmospheric 
concentration of human-produced GHGs is still growing, the average global temperature 
continues to increase, and the magnitude of extreme weather events appears to be 
intensifying (IPCC, 2007a; Webster et al., 2005). There is apparently a gap between the 
commitments made by government representatives to international climate treaties in the 
top-down international political negotiation process and the actual compliance of nations. 
Thompson (2006) argues that one of the key political obstacles affecting success 
of international cooperation in the process of negotiation, ratification, and 
implementation of GHG mitigation measures is insufficient domestic support from 
individual nations. On the basis of a comparison of the US and the EU in implementing 
the Kyoto Protocol (i.e., the US withdrew from the accord and the EU led the 
deliberations), Vogler and Bretherton (2006) argue that the fundamental difference of the 
two parties (i.e., US and EU) hinges on the different ways they interpret scientific 
uncertainty and gauge the urgency of the problem—major European countries for the 
most part consider global climate change to be real and to require immediate remedial 
action while this to date has not been the case in the US. 
Based on the example of these two actors in international climate politics, a 
number of questions can be raised to examine several aspects through which a nation 
gives credence to the problem. Does a country, in terms of the government and citizens in 
the society, consider climate change to be a pressing and prioritized problem (i.e., 
problem recognition and political priority)? Does a country identify this issue as its 
responsibility, especially for major contributors of GHG emissions (i.e., blame and 
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responsibility)? Is a country aware of the impacts of climate change, especially for 
populations located in relatively vulnerable areas (i.e., risk perception)? Therefore, it is 
important for social scientists to investigate how different nations, societies, and cultures 
are responding to this global challenge by formulating case studies. 
In addition, improved scientific understanding over the course of the past decades 
has led to a consensus that human activities are very likely the significant driving causes 
that are inducing and accelerating transformations of the climate system and that these 
changes may have substantial impacts on socio-cultural systems (Kerr, 2001; Oreskes, 
2004; IPCC, 2007a). While scientists and environmental advocates continually issue 
warnings about the upcoming climate crisis in both the popular literature and the media 
(e.g., Gelbspan, 1998, 2004; Leggett, 2001; Gore, 2006, 2009), institutional responses 
and political actions—at least thus far—do not seem to correspond with the current view 
in the scientific community. 
Other than an objective scientific construction of knowledge of global warming, 
many scholars have discussed the need to consider other factors involved in the process 
of constructing scientific knowledge. For example, Von Storch (2009) proposes the 
cultural factor and Demeritt (2001) argues for the need to examine social and political 
relations (e.g., trust in knowledge and the experts systems that produce it). Sarewitz 
(2004) further asserts that it is unlikely that science on its own can play an effective role 
in resolving the issue. In the case of global climate change—a scientifically and 
politically complex dilemma, mutual cooperation between science and politics perhaps 
provides a more effective approach. As a result, social science research should play a 
more assertive role in helping to integrate these two domains. 
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Moreover, even if a wide array of energy-efficient products were to be designed to 
reduce CO2 emissions (e.g., hybrid electric vehicles) and even if the efficacy of a GHG 
reduction policy could be expected, the ultimate goal of stabilizing atmospheric GHG 
concentrations will never be achieved if individuals, societies, and governments do not 
choose to take actions to modify behaviors. So the big mystery remains to be solved: 
Why would individuals and societies be willing or reluctant to take actions to mitigate the 
problem? It appears that the answer to global climate change is beyond a simple 
technological fix or a political solution. Thus, social scientists can likely help to bridge 
the different appraisals of laypeople and the scientific and political communities. 
The prospect above suggests that an important task for social scientists is to study 
the human dimensions of climate change and to try to understand how human beings (at 
both a micro-individual level and a macro-societal level) perceive, respond, and expect to 
resolve such a complex global environmental problem. Gore (2009) argues that it is naïve 
for human society to place the burden of solution on individuals alone (i.e., to change 
lifestyle choices) and that it is increasingly important to take further aggressive actions on 
different societal levels (i.e., to change laws and policies). Moreover, individuals’ actions 
are not limited to purely personal responses (e.g., changing light bulbs); they can become 
active participants in the political process. 
Therefore, there are two questions of prominent interest with respect to social 
scientific research with respect to climate change. The first question centers on the factors 
that drive public recognition and understanding of the issue and the extent to which 
ordinary people need to possess scientific knowledge to gain an appreciation of it at an 
individual level. The second question centers on the dynamic interaction between science 
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and the public and how scientific experts communicate global climate change to lay 
audiences. In short, does scientific understanding of climate change enhance public 
willingness to change behavior and to endorse potentially stringent climate policies? Can 
public involvement in the policy-making process with the integration of scientific 
expertise contribute to the development of more effective climate-protection actions? 
It seems apparent that collective efforts from all over the world are essential to 
successfully accomplish a global goal. However, compared with numerous social 
scientific studies of global climate change in North America and Europe, substantially 
fewer investigations have focused on other regions of the world. As the focus of 
mitigation responsibility begins to shift to developing countries in the post-Kyoto period, 
it has become increasingly important to expand this work to include geographic areas 
other than North America and Europe, especially fast growing Asian economies. 
Taiwan is a newly-industrialized society with high mitigation responsibility and 
high vulnerability to global climate change. Even though Taiwan is not a signatory to the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol—thus not obligated to fulfill a GHG mitigation 
responsibility, it is interesting to find that the Taiwanese government has actively initiated 
a series of political responses since 1992. What factors trigger the Taiwanese government 
to take actions to address global climate change? How do Taiwanese people think of this 
challenge? How do scientists interact with the public in the process of communicating 
this scientifically complex problem? Therefore, this research aims to explore these 
questions by presenting a case study of the public understanding of climate change in 
Taiwan (see Chapter 3 for a detailed introduction of the context of this case study). 
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1.2.4  Research Contribution 
This doctoral research is expected to make several contributions. First, compared with 
numerous social scientific studies of global climate change in North America and Europe, 
substantially fewer investigations have focused on other regions of the world. As the 
focus of mitigation responsibility begins to shift to developing countries in the 
post-Kyoto period, it has become increasingly important to expand this work to include 
geographic areas other than North America and Europe. Thus, a case study of Taiwan is 
beneficial in presenting an Asian perspective. 
Second, Taiwan serves as the case study for this dissertation because of several 
noteworthy characteristics. It is a newly-industrialized society with a high mitigation 
responsibility because of its large per capita GHG emissions. In addition, Taiwan is an 
island with high vulnerability to various adverse impacts of climate change. Furthermore, 
Taiwan has a newly democratic system of governance that has begun to encourage public 
engagement in the policy-making process. A case study of Taiwan is advantageous 
because the results can be compared with studies conducted in other countries that may 
share similar characteristics (e.g., high responsibility or high vulnerability). 
Third, the study population of this research constitutes a specific civil society 
group—youth (for a detailed discussion see Section 4.3). The perspective of this 
demographic cohort is significant because young adults are the voices of an insurgent 
generation that will over time assume greater responsibility for implementing policies 
congruent with the aims of sustainable development. Moreover, in the process of 
understanding young people’s opinions about climate change and climate policies, the 
research collects detailed insights and recommendations about the issue. These 
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observations can be beneficial to policy makers in designing more socially acceptable 
policies. 
Finally, the focus of this dissertation is on Taiwan’s multicultural society, one that 
has been influenced by both traditional Chinese and modern western cultures. This facet 
of the investigation is expected to bring to the surface the most notable contribution. 
Given that Taiwan shares a similar ancient culture with China (e.g., Confucianism), this 
case study can be regarded as an exploratory examination that could be useful for guiding 
future social science research on the most populous and economically dynamic country in 
the world. 
 
1.2.5  Concluding Remarks 
Due to its scientific complexity and temporal-spatial variability, global climate change is 
a profound challenge for human beings to confront in the 21st century. Efforts to 
effectively address the problem require cooperation from a variety of disciplines (e.g., 
science, politics, economy, and sociology) and collective and sustained effort on the part 
of all nations. After decades of increasingly more precise scientific validation, the 
scientific community appears to have reached a consensus about the substantial influence 
of human activities on the global climate system. However, the political responses at both 
global and national levels have been insufficient to effectively reduce GHG emissions. 
In an effort to increase contemporary understanding of the public-science nexus 
around global climate change, this doctoral research aims to 1) examine the concerns of 
Taiwanese youth about global climate change in terms of their attitudes, scientific 
knowledge, and behavioral intentions; 2) investigate the interrelationships among these 
three elements (i.e., attitudes, scientific knowledge, and behavioral intention); 3) assess 
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the effectiveness of an experimental participatory exercise (i.e., the IA focus groups) in 
enhancing individual scientific understanding and engagement in policy making. The 
field work for this case study took place in the summer and fall of 2008 and involved the 
participation of 303 Taiwanese young adults. 
This inquiry is expected to provide several contributions. The findings of this case 
study of Taiwan are advantageous because they present various perspectives for further 
comparisons: the views of young adults in a newly-industrialized Asian society with high 
responsibility for and high vulnerability to global climate change. In addition, the 
experimental focus-group exercise offers beneficial insights to policy makers regarding 
lay perspectives on the issue. Finally, the similar cultural background makes this case 
study potentially useful as an exploratory investigation for future social scientific 
research on the human dimensions of climate change in China. 
 
1.3  Background Context 
1.3.1  Introduction 
If the greenhouse effect is a natural phenomenon that maintains the Earth’s average 
surface temperature at a level that is fit for human habitation, why would an increasing 
global average temperature become the most pressing environmental problem in the 21st 
century? If the scientific community agrees with the significance of anthropogenic 
influences on the climate system, why have we not seen strong political determination to 
put forward necessary actions to effectively resolve the problem? The answer to these 
two questions is relatively straightforward: climate change is a complex issue highly 
dependent on societal engagement between scientific information and political processes. 
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Global climate change embodies several characteristics that make it very difficult 
to manage (e.g., scientific complexity and uncertainty, temporal and spatial variability) 
(Carter, 2001). In addition, the primary driving force of climate change—excessive GHG 
emissions due to the fossil-fuel based economy—makes the issue not only one of 
scientific debate, but of political negotiation, economic development, and societal welfare. 
To address the problem, many efforts have been made scientifically (i.e., evidence 
collection and prediction) and politically (i.e., international treaties). 
This section introduces the background of the issue of global climate change from 
the aspects of science and politics. Subsection 1.3.2 explains the science of climate 
change (i.e., the phenomenon, causes, and consequences) by examining the evolution of 
key climate-science research. Subsection 1.3.3 describes international political efforts 
(i.e., international organizations and climate treaties) by reviewing a series of major 
international climate conferences. Subsection 1.3.4 concludes this section. 
 
1.3.2  Climate Science Background—Causes and Consequences 
Climate Change Science Study 
The greenhouse effect is a natural phenomenon in which atmospheric GHGs, such as CO2 
and methane (CH4), reabsorb outgoing infrared radiation so that the Earth’s average 
surface temperature is maintained at a relatively comfortable 15 degrees Celsius (ºC). 
This theory was first raised in the nineteenth century by Joseph Fourier (1824) who 
argued that the Earth would be much colder if it lacked an atmosphere. John Tyndall 
(1861) later discovered through laboratory experiments that some gases (e.g., H2O and 
CO2) might block infrared radiation and that changes in the atmospheric concentrations 
of these gases could alter the climate. 
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The average global temperature has followed natural events (e.g., volcanic 
eruptions5 and solar flux variations) within a range of natural fluctuations over the past 
ten centuries. This situation was gradually changed with the onset of the Industrial 
Revolution (1800-1870) during which fossil fuels came to be used as the primary energy 
source for production and transportation purposes. Through interrelated processes of 
population growth, rapid industrialization, and urbanization, massive quantities of CO2 
emissions and large-scale deforestation6 that have positive radiative forcings7 have 
produced an accelerated pattern of increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations. 
It was not until the late 19th century that the effects of human influence began to 
draw scientists’ attention. Svante Arrhenius (1896) published the first calculation of 
impacts of human emissions of CO2; his work indicated that a 40% increase or decrease 
of atmospheric CO2 concentrations might trigger glacial advances or retreats. Callendar 
(1938) argued that global warming induced by increasing atmospheric CO2 
concentrations and fossil-fuel combustion was underway and that a doubling of CO2 
concentrations might cause an increase in the mean global temperature of 2ºC. 
Scientific studies designed to enhance understanding of global climate change 
have become more diverse in recent decades. As part of an effort to assess the carbon 
cycle (and specifically the atmosphere-ocean exchange of CO2), Revell and Suess (1957) 
                                                 
5 During volcanic eruptions, ash and sulphur dioxide form sulphate aerosols in the 
stratosphere, which can cool the global climate. 
 
6 Due to rapid population growth and urbanization, massive area of forest have been 
destructed and transformed to agricultural or urban uses, which diminishes the natural 
capacity to absorb CO2 in the atmosphere. 
 
7 Radiative forcing is a measure of the warming or cooling influence a factor has in 
altering the balance of incoming and outgoing energy in the atmosphere system. Positive 
forcing tends to warm the surface while negative forcing tends to cool it (IPCC, 2007a). 
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found that it might take centuries for the oceans to completely absorb CO2 accumulated 
in the atmosphere. In addition to CO2 and H2O, other anthropogenic GHGs (e.g., CH4, 
nitrous oxide (N2O), and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)) were recognized in the 1970s 
(Ramanathan, 1975; Wang et al., 1976). Moreover, scientists identified the cooling effects 
of atmospheric aerosols (suspended small particles) and clouds by reflecting sunlight 
(Twomey, 1977; Charlson et al., 1990). 
Modern data of atmospheric CO2 concentrations began to be documented in the 
late 1950s. By measuring atmospheric CO2 concentrations at the Mauna Loa observatory 
in Hawaii, Charles Keeling (1961) observed their seasonal fluctuation due to exchange of 
CO2 through photosynthesis and respiration between the atmosphere and biosphere.8 In 
addition to the annual cycle, he observed an annual rise of the atmospheric CO2 
concentrations over the course of decades of work (Keeling, 1961). 
Despite modern documentation of atmospheric CO2 concentrations it is necessary 
to have longer term records of GHGs to prove anthropogenic influences on changes in the 
composition of the global atmosphere. Using advanced technology (e.g., the isotopic 
measurement), scientists have been able to reconstruct the Earth’s surface temperatures 
and atmospheric chemical compositions dating back 650,000 years from the bubbles 
sealed in the polar ice cores (Barnola et al., 1987; IPCC, 2007a). These palaeoclimatic 
findings reveal that even though the Earth is currently in an interglacial period, the high 
concentration of atmospheric GHGs and the warmth of the last half century are unusual 
and beyond natural fluctuations in the Earth’s history (IPCC, 2007a) (Figure 1.2). 
                                                 
8 When trees in the Northern Hemisphere lose their leaves in winter, the atmospheric 
CO2 concentrations increase because of the decreasing capacity of absorbing CO2. When 
the trees grow leaves in the following spring and summer, the atmospheric CO2 
concentrations decrease. 
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Figure 1.2 Changes in atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and 
nitrous oxide from glacial and interglacial ice core data (IPCC, 2007a).  
 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
In light of increasing attention regarding climate change in the scientific community, the 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental 
Program (UNEP) sponsored the first World Climate Conference and established the 
World Climate Program in 1979 as an initial effort to synchronize international research. 
This work program led in 1988 to the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) with the goal of resolving scientific uncertainties by providing 
objective, balanced, policy-relevant, and internationally coordinated assessments of 
climate change for policy makers around the world (IPCC, 2004). 
The IPCC established three working groups (WGs) to bring together hundreds of 
scientific experts and government policy makers from around the world and to prepare 
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periodic assessment reports on the physical science basis of climate change (WG I), 
adverse impacts and adaptation options (WG II), and mitigation options (WG III) (IPCC, 
2004). Four formal comprehensive assessment reports have thus far been released in 
1990, 1995, 2001, and 2007 and were produced in a rigorous scientific peer-review 
process (e.g., compiling hundreds of papers to draft reports, reviewing and commenting 
from peer experts, and drafting the summary in a plenary meeting). 
Many criticisms have been raised regarding the role of the IPCC and the content 
and the production process of the assessment reports (e.g., the misquotation of the project 
data on the melting of Himalayan glaciers in the Fourth Assessment Report and the lack 
of transparency of the reviewers and the review process). Schrope (2001) argues that one 
primary point of the critiques over the IPCC assessment reports concerns scientific 
integrity. Because of the intended design (i.e., Summary for Policymakers, SPM) some 
scientists question whether these reports were produced under conditions of actual 
scientific consensus or politically compromised consensus. 
In addition, the charge has been leveled that many climate scientists hold 
environmentalist views so they tend to stress the most worrying picture of climate change 
or to understate scientific uncertainty to spur politicians into action (Schrope, 2001). 
Several innovative ideas were proposed by five climatologists to reform the organization 
that included restructuring the IPCC as an independent agency with full-time scientists 
and producing more frequent assessments (rather than a six-year comprehensive report) 
(Hulme et al., 2010). Despite these critiques, these IPCC reports have been considered 
and accepted as the authoritative scientific guide for policy makers (Bolin, 1998; Schrope, 
2001). 
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Current Observation of Climate Change 
According to the most recent IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, the global atmospheric 
CO2 concentration has increased from a pre-industrial value of about 280 parts per 
million (ppm) to 379 ppm in 2005 and to 385 ppm in 2008 (IPCC, 2007a; Keeling et al., 
2009). Global CO2 emissions, the quantity of primary heat-trapping gas derived from fuel 
combustion, have increased from 14.1 in 1971 to 29.0 gigatons (Gt) in 2007 (IEA, 
2009).9 
Global GHG emissions (both CO2 and non-CO2 emissions) have increased from 
28.7 to 49.0 Gt of CO2 equivalents (GtCO2-eq) with an increase of 70% between 1970 
and 2004 (IPCC, 2007c). In 2004, the major sectors of global GHG emissions included 
energy supply (26%), industry (19%), forestry (17%), agriculture (14%), transport (13%), 
residential/commercial (8%), and waste (3%). With current mitigation policies, global 
GHG emissions are expected to continually increase over the next few decades because 
of further increments of economic growth and associated fossil-fuel utilization. 
In addition to the burning of fossil fuels, another human driver of global climate 
change is deforestation. The global forest area is 3,952 million hectare (ha) which 
comprises 30% of the world’s land area. These forests act as a terrestrial sink for CO2 
(absorbing 3,300 MtCO2/yr for the decade 1993-2003) (IPCC, 2007a). However, forests 
continued to disappear at a rate of 12.9 million ha/yr between 2000 and 2005—the 
deforestation rate has though improved from the pace of the 1990s which was 13.1 
million ha/yr (IPCC, 2007c). 
                                                 
9 The data “global CO2 emissions from fuel combustion” refers to emissions directly 
from fossil fuels, which does not include other sources of CO2 emissions and the effect of 
forestry and land-use change. 
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Accumulating evidence indicates that the increasing level of GHGs in the 
atmosphere has begun to alter the global climate system. The average global temperature 
rose 0.76ºC from 1850-1899 to 2001-2005, and eleven of the last twelve years 
(1995-2006) ranked among the dozen warmest years in the instrumental record of global 
surface temperature since 1850 (IPCC, 2007a). 
In addition to increased average global air and ocean temperatures, widespread 
decreases in the expanse of the Earth’s surface covered by glaciers and sea ice in both 
hemispheres have contributed to sea-level rise (Oerlemans, 2005). Global average sea 
level rose at a rate of 3.1 millimeters (mm) per year between 1993 and 2003, which is 
faster than the rate between 1961 and 2003 when the average was 1.8 mm per year. The 
total sea-level rise in the 20th century was approximately 0.17 meters (IPCC, 2007a). 
Webster et al. (2005) found that due to increasing sea-surface temperatures and 
saturation vapor pressure, over the past 35 years both the number and the duration of 
cyclones have decreased, but the number and proportion of tropical cyclones with 
categories 4 and 5 (wind speed in excess of 56 meter per second or m/s) have increased in 
basins such as the North Pacific, Indian, and Southwest Pacific Oceans. In other words, 
although there were fewer tropical storms and storm days, the ones that formed appear to 
have been stronger and more destructive. 
Based on these observations, the current scientific consensus is that the observed 
increase in average global temperature since the mid-20th century is very likely (above 
90% probability) due to increased atmospheric concentrations of anthropogenic GHG 
stemming from fossil-fuel use, land-use changes, and agriculture (Kerr, 2001; Oreskes, 
2004; IPCC, 2007a). 
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Moreover, numerous observed long-term changes in the regional and local climate 
system—such as increased frequencies and magnitudes of extreme weather events (e.g., 
heat waves, floods, and droughts), widespread changes in precipitation volumes, and 
heightened intensities of tropical cyclones—can be interpreted as signals that global 
climate change is occurring (IPCC, 2007a). These changes have had discernible impacts 
on many physical and biological systems at local levels (IPCC, 2007b). 
 
Future Projection of Climate Change and Potential Impacts 
Scientists use computer models to estimate future changes in climate with a range of 
emission scenarios (e.g., from high emission scenarios predicated on a continued 
fossil-intensive energy path to low emission scenarios based on clean and 
resource-efficient technologies). IPCC (2007a) found that a further warming of about 
0.2ºC per decade is projected under these ranges of emission scenarios. The organization 
also found that even if humans were to keep atmospheric GHG concentrations and 
aerosols at year 2000 levels, a further warming of 0.1ºC per decade could still be 
expected (IPCC, 2007a). 
In addition, projection of global surface warming and sea-level rise at the end of 
the 21st century shows that the Earth would be 0.6ºC warmer (likely range is 0.3-0.9ºC) if 
the atmospheric GHG concentrations and aerosols are constant at year 2000 levels. The 
low emission scenario projects that the Earth is estimated to be 1.8ºC warmer (likely 
range is 1.1-2.9ºC) and sea-level rise is predicted to be 0.18-0.38 meters. However, if 
humans continue the highest emission scenario, the global average surface temperature is 
forecast to be 4.0ºC warmer (likely range is 2.4-6.4ºC) and sea level is predicted to be 
0.26-0.59 meters higher at the end of the 21st century (IPCC, 2007a). 
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The changes in temperature and precipitation patterns are expected to affect each 
geographic region differently in many aspects including water resources, ecosystems, 
agriculture and food products, coasts, and public health. In general, drought areas will 
likely become more extensive and the increasing frequency of heavy precipitation events 
will probably amplify flood risks. Moreover, if the Earth is 1.5-2.5ºC warmer, major 
ecosystemic changes (e.g., natural habitats and ecological interactions among species) 
would likely endanger approximately 20-30% plant and animal species (IPCC, 2007b). 
In addition, food production is projected to expand at mid- to high latitudes for 
local average temperature increases of up to 1-3ºC and decrease at lower latitude regions. 
However, the increasing frequency and intensity of droughts and floods are expected to 
decrease local crop production. Coasts are expected to be at increasing risk of flooding 
because of sea-level rise especially in densely-populated and low-lying areas in Asia, 
Africa, and small islands. Finally, climate change is predicted to trigger some health 
impacts, including increased deaths due to heat waves, floods and storms, and increased 
diarrhoeal diseases and infectious disease vectors (IPCC, 2007b). 
 
Scientific Uncertainty 
Schneider (1989) discussed a number of scientific uncertainties in determining the 
present and future effects of anthropogenic climate change. First, projecting future CO2 
emissions (i.e., use of fossil fuels and deforestation) requires that social scientists assume 
behavioral patterns with indecisive parameters such as the size of human population, the 
per capita consumption of fossil fuels, the development and diffusion of energy efficient 
technologies, and so forth (Schneider, 1989). 
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Second, with different CO2 emission projections in various social and economic 
scenarios, scientists need to predict atmospheric CO2 concentrations by considering the 
interacting biogeochemical process (i.e., carbon cycle and carbon sinks of oceans and 
forests). 
Third, it is very difficult to estimate climate response due to feedback mechanisms 
(e.g., ice surface, clouds, and water vapor). For example, changes in ice surface may 
interactively change the Earth’s ability to absorb and reflect solar radiation (the albedo 
effect)—decreasing ice surface may create a darker planet that would absorb more 
energy—which would in turn amplify the warming (Schneider, 1989). 
Fourth, despite the development of global climate models, considerable 
uncertainty remains over the probability of what and when adverse impacts (e.g., water 
supplies and extreme weather events) would occur at regional and local levels of 
geographic scale. 
Finally, the exact economic, social, and political impacts of climate change and 
the effectiveness of various policy responses remain subject to profound uncertainties. 
For example, it is difficult to determine the total economic impacts of climate change due 
to the uneven distribution of benefits and costs of the impacts among affluent and 
developing countries. In addition, it is challenging to estimate the efficacy of some policy 
options, such as the geoengineering solution to deliberately spread dust in the 
stratosphere to reflect sunlight (Schneider, 1989). 
Budnitz et al. (1997) and Ascher (2004) defined uncertainty using two categories: 
1) epistemic uncertainty: incomplete knowledge about a phenomenon that affects our 
ability to model it (e.g., inability to determine small effects and impossibility to calculate 
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outcomes for the multiplicity of interactions among parameters) and 2) aleatory 
uncertainty: inherent vagueness and infeasible information in a nondeterministic 
phenomenon (e.g., truly unknowable and unpredictable factors and factors excluded from 
the model at micro- or macro-levels). 
While greater confidence levels have decreased uncertainty with respect to the 
anthropocentric causes and the probable consequences of climate change, the precise 
timing and degree of adverse impacts and the potential costs and benefits of policy 
responses remain undetermined. Skolnikoff (1999) argues that uncertainty in forecasting 
the details of potential impacts make it difficult to formulate proper public policy because 
of the inability to identify possible affected interests and measures to reduce emissions. 
Nonetheless, Schneider (1989) argues that using scientific uncertainty to justify 
political inaction is not an objective scientific judgment, but a subjective value judgment. 
By choosing to wait for more scientific certainty before initiating preventive actions, 
society takes a (perhaps sizeable) risk of inducing larger magnitudes of climate change. 
For example, the British economist Sir Nicholas Stern (2007) calculated that delaying 
mitigation action will increase the costs of future action. Therefore, since it is impossible 
to diminish scientific uncertainty of global climate change to zero, the problem turns to 
whether policy makers can make an appropriate judgment to take political action before 
more tragic circumstances become manifest. 
Given that global climate change involves numerous variables, uncertainty seems 
inevitable in terms of completely understanding the scientifically complex issue. Bray 
and Von Storch (1999) argue that climate science research is considered to be a good 
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example of postnormal science for its enormous inherent uncertainties.10 Therefore, Von 
Storch (2009) argues that there is a role for social sciences (e.g., economics and culture) 
to help in constructing some uncertainties that natural sciences cannot address. 
 
1.3.3  International Politics Background—International Climate Treaties 
Hempel (2003) contends that after several decades of accumulated scientific evidence, 
the focus of the global climate change policy debate began to shift to political responses 
(e.g., establishing an international policy framework with national targets and timetables) 
during the late 1980s. The record-breaking summer of 1988 and the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) scientist James Hansen’s publicized testimony 
together triggered media and public attention about the potential of a warming climate 
(Hempel, 2003).11 
These factors—increased media and public awareness, continuing scientific 
warnings, and the establishment of IPCC—successfully placed climate change on the 
international environmental political agenda (Hempel, 2003). To develop a process of 
multilateral political cooperation and negotiation, the United Nations (UN) initiated 
further international efforts in the 1990s—formulating the UNFCCC in 1992 and the 
Kyoto Protocol five years later. 
 
                                                 
10 This postnormal science concept was defined and characterized by Funtowicz and 
Ravetz (1985), which refers to an issue or a situation where natural science cannot make 
concrete statement with high certainty. 
 
11 Dr. James Hansen, director of NASA’s Institute for Space Studies, was invited to 
testify in front of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources in 1988. He 
stated that scientists have detected the signal of climate change and have proved human 
activities as major forces with a high level of confidence (Hempel, 2003). 
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
The UNFCCC, drafted under the auspices of the UN, was signed by 154 countries in 
1992 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro and has been ratified by 189 countries to date. 
The accord requires participating nations to gather and share information, to launch 
national strategies for addressing GHG emissions and adapting to expected impacts, and 
to cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change (UNFCCC, 
2006). The ultimate objective of the Convention is stated in Article 2: 
[T]o achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved 
within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 
(UNFCCC, 1992, Article 2) 
 
While this objective showed that the international political community began to 
acknowledge the threat of climate change, the existence of anthropogenic influences, and 
the necessity of preventive mitigation actions (instead of mandating national targets and 
timetables), the Convention remained a non-binding treaty as several industrialized 
countries had wished. Nonetheless, to reach an international consensus (obtaining support 
from numerous developing countries), the Convention required Annex I Parties to assume 
a greater burden in reducing their GHG emissions on a voluntary basis.12 
The Convention entered into force (subject to subsequent ratification by 
participating countries) in 1994 and its subsidiary body began organizing a series of 
meetings known as Conferences of the Parties (COP) to provide a deliberative process to 
                                                 
12 Annex I Parties include 41 industrialized countries and entities. Fourteen of them, 
called Annex I Parties with economies in transition (EIT), are countries that are 
undergoing the process of transition to a market economy, such as Poland and Ukraine. 
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develop an international consensus on further national targets and timetables among 
participating countries. Table 1.1 highlights the major achievement of each of the COPs 
held over the past 15 years. 
Table 1.1 Major Achievement of Conferences of the Parties (COP) During 1995-2009 
COP Year Place Major Achievement 
- 1992 Rio de Janeiro 
9 Adoption of the UNFCCC in Earth Summit 
9 Establish a global consensus on collective actions on stabilizing 
the global atmospheric GHG concentrations 
1 1995 Berlin 9 Berlin Mandate: strengthen commitments of the Annex I Parties and exempt developing countries 
2 1996 Geneva 9 Initially support the development of a legal instrument 
3 1997 Kyoto 
9 Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol—a legally binding treaty 
9 Establish country-by-country emissions targets using 1990 
emissions levels as baselines 
9 Promote three flexibility mechanisms in national responses 
4 1998 Buenos Aires 9 Buenos Aires Plan of Action: commitments to develop monitoring and enforcement mechanisms within two years 
5 1999 Bonn 9 Formulate various operational details for further negotiation 
2000 Hague 9 Negotiations on the modalities of the Kyoto Protocol 
6 
2001 Bonn 9 The Bonn Agreement: political agreement on the modalities of the Kyoto Protocol 
7 2001 Marrakech 9 Marrakech Accords: finalization of the technical details including penalties relating to the Kyoto Protocol 
8 2002 New Delhi 9 New Delhi Declaration: discussion of the clean development mechanism (CDM) 
9 2003 Milan 9 The use of forest sinks projects in the CDM 
10 2004 Buenos Aires 
9 10th anniversary of the entry into force of the UNFCCC 
9 Discussion of impacts of climate change and adaptation 
measures, mitigation policies, and technology 
11 2005 Montreal 
9 The first Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (MOP1) 
9 Begin the dialogue about the future action beyond Kyoto 
Protocol’s expiration date in 2012 
12 2006 Nairobi 9 The second Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (MOP2) 
13 2007 Bali 9 Adoption of the Bali Road Map: agreement on a negotiation plan for the post Kyoto framework (by 2009) 
14 2008 Poznan 9 Agreement on Adaptation Fund for developing countries 
15 2009 Copenhagen 
9 Copenhagen Accord—stabilizing the global temperature rise to 
2ºC above preindustrial levels by 2050 
9 Establish an international monitoring and reporting system and 
the Green Climate Fund to finance developing countries 
Source: Bodansky (2001); Hempel (2003); UNFCCC (2006); UNFCCC (2007) 
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Kyoto Protocol 
While the international political community acknowledged the ultimate objective of the 
UNFCCC (i.e., to stabilize the Earth’s GHG concentrations), there remains a variety of 
ambiguities regarding the interpretation of this goal (e.g., what is the safe level of 
atmospheric GHG concentrations and what is the appropriate time frame?) Reflecting a 
widespread view, Oppenheimer and Petsonk (2005) assert that a well-recognized safe 
corridor is 2ºC warming and atmospheric GHG concentrations of 550 ppm CO2-eq.13 
It was nonetheless found that the voluntary approach of the Convention was 
inadequate to achieve the treaty’s ultimate objective (Oppenheimer & Petsonk, 2005). 
Therefore, the famous Berlin Mandate was produced at the first COP in 1995 to commit 
the Parties to adopt another legal instrument by 1997 that excluded any commitment on 
the part of the developing nations. The resulting legally binding agreement, the Kyoto 
Protocol, was finalized in 1997 at the third COP and was ratified by a total of 183 
countries as of January 2009. The Protocol was designed to move from the voluntary 
basis of the Convention to an obligatory commitment to reduce GHG emissions with 
national targets and timetables.14 
The agreed target was to reduce GHG emissions in industrialized countries 
(Annex I Parties) by an average 5.2% below their 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. 
Three innovative features based on a premise of multilateral cooperation were included in 
                                                 
13 Oppenheimer and Petsonk (2005) compiled several proposed numerical values of 
“dangerous anthropogenic interference,” including: 2ºC warming and 450 ppm CO2 
(O’Neill & Oppenheimer, 2002), 2-4ºC warming and 550 ppm CO2 (Oppenheimer & 
Alley, 2005), and 1ºC warming and 450 ppm CO2 (Hansen, 2005). 
 
14 Six major greenhouse gases are covered: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), 
nitrous oxide (N2O), perfluorinated hydrocarbons (PFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). 
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the Protocol, namely the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the notion of Joint 
Implementation (JI), and the use of Emissions Trading (ET) (UNFCCC, 2007). These 
designs were meant to encourage Annex I Parties to undertake domestic policies to 
reduce GHG emissions or to enhance removal by sinks. 
These three schemes are called “flexibility mechanisms.” 15  The CDM is a 
mechanism that allows Annex I Parties to receive credits (Certified Emission Reductions, 
or CERs) for reducing emissions or increasing carbon sinks if they invest in 
emission-reduction projects or reforestation projects in developing countries. Similarly, 
the JI is a mechanism that allows Annex I Parties to receive credits (Emission Reduction 
Units, or ERUs) for implementing emission-reduction projects or reforestation projects in 
other Annex I countries. The ET is a mechanism that allows Annex I Parties to acquire 
emissions allowance (Assigned Amount Units, or AAUs) or other credits (e.g., CERs and 
ERUs) from other Annex I Parties in an international carbon market (UNFCCC, 2007). 
One important and controversial principle in both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol is the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.16 This notion 
requires developed countries (listed in the Convention as Annex I Parties) to assume most 
                                                 
15 These three flexibility mechanisms were first discussed in the third COP in Kyoto in 
1997. However, the modalities and technical details (e.g., monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms) reached political consensus in the sixth COP in Bonn in 2000 and were 
finalized in the seventh COP in Marrakech in 2001. 
 
16 The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities designed to gain support 
from developing countries seemed reasonable at the time because the Annex I Parties 
produced two-thirds of global emissions and because historical GHG emissions generated 
by industrialized countries were primarily responsible for the contemporary problem. 
However, the rapid increase of GHG emissions from Non-Annex I Parties brought 
concerns about the effectiveness and fairness of the treaty (Hempel, 2003). For example, 
one of key reasons for the US withdrawal from the Protocol in 2001 was because 
President George Bush claimed that the Protocol was a flawed treaty which did not 
include both developed and developing countries (Bush, 2001). 
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of the burden for climate protection in terms of reducing their GHG emissions to 
mandatory targets. However, large developing countries such as China and India (listed in 
the Convention as Non-Annex I Parties) were only required to maintain non-binding 
commitments in response to climate change. 
In addition to the long drawn-out negotiations concerning detailed mechanisms 
and instruments within the Protocol (e.g., CDM, JI, and ET), an especially difficult task 
in this deliberative process was to seek majority support from individual nations to 
achieve the stipulated criteria for ratification of the agreement before it could go into 
effect—55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Annex I Parties which accounted in 
total for at least 55% of the total CO2 emissions for 1990 of the Annex I Parties.17 
The obstacle created by the withdrawal of the US in 2001 hindered the initial 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. However, the agreement finally entered into force 
in 2005 after it was ratified by Japan, the EU, and Russia.18 The total percentage of CO2 
emissions from ratified Annex I Parties is 63.7% (UNFCCC, 2009b). The timeframe for 
                                                 
17 The Article 25 in the Kyoto Protocol states the stipulated criteria of ratification of this 
agreement. The standard “the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Annex I 
Parties” means the amount communicated on or before the date of adoption of this 
Protocol by the Annex I Parties in their first national communications submitted in 
accordance with Article 12 of the UNFCCC—which lists in detail the required 
information in national submission. 
 
18 The Clinton Administration did sign the Protocol in 1997 despite the passage of the 
Byrd-Hagel resolution, which was passed the Senate by a 95-0 vote in 1997 and which 
sought to discourage the President from signing any prospective climate protocol that did 
not include developing countries in the prescribed actions (Byrd-Hagel Resolution, 1997). 
As a result President Clinton never submitted the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for 
ratification. In 2001, President George W. Bush renounced the Kyoto Protocol and 
withdrew the U.S. from participation. He claimed that the treaty was flawed because of 
concerns over insufficient grounding in science and technology, potential economic 
consequences of meeting the even modest reduction target set forth under the Kyoto 
Protocol, and the fairness of the Protocol which exempted developing countries from 
mandatory emissions reduction (Bush, 2001; Cohen & Egelston, 2003). 
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achieving emission targets of the Protocol was a five-year period (2008-2012). During the 
commitment period, each Annex I Party was required to ensure that its total GHG 
emissions did not exceed its allowable level of emissions (i.e., the Party’s base year GHG 
emissions multiplied by its emission targets and then further multiplied by five years). 
 
Post-Kyoto Framework 
Through the release of the documentary “An Inconvenient Truth” in 2006 and the 
subsequent joint award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the IPCC and former American 
Vice-President Al Gore in 2007, the issue of climate change attracted substantially 
increased public attention and media coverage (Boykoff and Roberts, 2007). The issue 
also assumed a prominent position at the center of international environmental politics. 
Even though it is currently the middle of the commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol (when this dissertation is written) and the results of implementing the Protocol 
cannot be fully evaluated until 2012, further diplomatic deliberation for a longer-term 
climate change regime beyond the 2012 expiration year has been proceeding. The Bali 
Road Map, adopted at the thirteen COP in Bali in 2007, included a negotiating schedule 
for finalizing a new comprehensive, effective, and sustained post-Kyoto treaty for 
presentation at the fifteen COP in Copenhagen in December 2009. 
However, the original goal—a legally binding treaty to succeed the Kyoto 
Protocol—was not achieved at the prominently staged Copenhagen climate summit. 
While the leading advocate, namely the EU, was disappointed about the limited 
achievement on producing a comprehensive and enforceable action plan (Kanter, 2009), 
the meeting managed to take a small step forward—receive a commitment from the US 
and four large developing countries (i.e., China, India, Brazil and South Africa) (Broder, 
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2009). The final product, the Copenhagen Accord, sets a goal of limiting global 
temperature rise to 2ºC by 2050, provides an international monitoring and reporting 
system, and establishes a “green climate fund” to transfer funds to developing countries 
vulnerable to climate change (Revkin & Broder, 2009). 
 
Political Negotiation—from Rio de Janeiro to Copenhagen 
A number of observations can be made with respect to the international politics of climate 
change during this fifteen-year diplomatic negotiation (see Table 1.1). First, GHG 
emission-reduction responsibilities have shifted from a voluntary basis to an obligatory 
basis due to recognition of the insufficiency of the voluntary approach (Oppenheimer & 
Petsonk, 2005). Therefore, alternative treaties with specific emission-reduction targets 
and timeframes (i.e., Kyoto Protocol and a possible post-Kyoto regime) are seeking to 
effectively stabilize global atmospheric GHG concentrations at a safe level. 
In addition, even though the Berlin Mandate exempted developing countries from 
having to pursue mandatory GHG emission reductions (largely as part of a strategy of 
enabling a global consensus), Najam et al. (2003) argue that the ultimate objective of the 
UNFCCC will only be achieved with substantial efforts from developing countries. While 
launching and implementing the Kyoto Protocol was viewed as the first and necessary 
step to resolve global climate change by securing initial commitments from industrialized 
countries, the rapid growth of GHG emissions in developing countries implies that 
expansion of the scope of mitigation responsibility to developing countries in the 
post-Kyoto period is inevitable. 
Furthermore, it seems clear that some measure of global climate change is 
unavoidable despite human efforts to stabilize GHG emissions. In addition to continual 
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efforts to enhance mitigation strategies on the part of countries around the world, the 
international political dialogue began to emphasize adaptation strategies beginning in 
2004. These adaptation measures have included international cooperation in building 
technological and financial capacity in vulnerable communities. 
International political systems are often described as anarchic because there is no 
structured government above nations to manage world affairs and to enforce transnational 
agreements. Hence, solutions to international problems must come through cooperation 
among nations (Thompson, 2006). Thompson (2006) further identifies and analyzes 
possible political obstacles to international climate cooperation that need to be addressed 
in three stages (i.e., bargaining, transition, and implementation) (Table 1.2). Two key 
obstacles are discussed in detail in the negotiation of a cooperative climate regime. 
First, Thompson (2006) argues that the consensus of the UNFCCC was easily 
reached (ratified by 189 countries) because of its basic coordination points, namely 
global warming is a potential threat to humans, a multilateral approach is needed, the UN 
is the proper political forum for negotiation and treaty-building, atmospheric GHG 
concentrations should be reduced, and developed countries should pay a higher 
proportion of the mitigation cost. However, disagreements due to distributive conflicts 
(i.e., distribution of costs and benefits) appeared among countries when deciding the 
baselines and emission-reduction targets of the Kyoto Protocol. 
For example, decisions concerning which criteria to use to assign emission 
allowances (e.g., overall emissions, per capita emissions, emissions compared to gross 
national product (GNP), and historical emissions) involve conflicts of interests. A 
consensus was not reached until the final night of the Kyoto conference. In the end, while 
 34
developing countries realized their demand with the decision to take historical emissions 
into account (by only imposing mandatory reduction targets on industrialized countries in 
the first commitment period), they had to ignore the effect of population (i.e., per capita 
emissions)—a decision that might hurt them in the future (Thompson, 2006). 
Table 1.2 The Stages and Obstacles of Climate Cooperation 
Stage Cooperation Obstacle Content 
Coordination/standards Minimum agreement on basic goals and standards 
Distributive conflict Distribution of costs and benefits across countries for certain designs (e.g., targets) 
Two-level politics International agreements still requires domestic political support 
Bargaining power vs. efficiency Countries with strong political power tend to have great bargaining power 
Stage 1 
Bargaining 
Variable costs of action and inaction Countries in favor of a strong climate action tend to be more vulnerable to inaction 
Domestic opposition Insufficient domestic support 
Strategic ratification politics Delaying ratification may increase bargaining power 
Free riding temptations Some countries may benefit if there are enough other states participating 
Competitiveness concerns Countries fear that their economies will be at a competitive disadvantage if they act alone 
Stage 2 
Transition 
Conflicts with trade rules Potential conflicts between the climate regime and existing trade rules in WTO 
Incentives to cheat Lack of enforceable promises out of concern that other countries might not implement 
Monitoring Sufficient capacity and resources to monitor and verify countries’ implementation 
Collective action of enforcement Little incentive for an individual nation to pay the costs of punishing rule breakers 
Domestic implementation Various interest groups may circumvent the implementation of international obligations. 
Stage 3 
Implementation 
Lack of capacity Lack of institutional capacity and resources to track the behavior of relevant actors 
Source: Thompson (2006) 
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Therefore, a global consensus may be simply a result of a competition for political 
power and political compromise. For example, after the US withdrew from the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2001, the participation of Canada, Japan, and Russia became crucial for the 
treaty to come into effect. Thus, these countries were able to use their increased 
bargaining power to pursue their interests at the 2001 Marrakesh meeting. The EU, more 
enthusiastic participants and leaders throughout the process, had to make a compromise 
to include new rules in the Protocol—counting carbon sinks for forest and 
farmland-management practices as reduction credits. This set of rules gave these three 
countries tens of millions of additional tons of carbon credits (Thompson, 2006). 
Although developing countries outnumber industrialized countries, they have less 
political power. Najam et al. (2003) argue that if developing countries want the 
post-Kyoto climate regime to incorporate their concerns and interests (e.g., the equality 
issue of mitigation responsibility on a per capita basis and investment in meaningful 
capacity development for adaptation in vulnerable developing communities), developing 
countries need to take more proactive roles in the negotiation process. 
The second obstacle affecting international cooperation discussed by Thompson is 
insufficient domestic support. Take the US as an example. Although President Clinton 
committed to reducing American GHG emissions by signing the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, 
he did not submit the Protocol to the Senate for ratification because of the unanimous 
opposition to the agreement in the Senate (Byrd-Hagel Resolution, 1997). In addition, 
although President George W. Bush promised in his presidential campaign to establish 
mandatory reduction targets for industrial emissions, he renounced the Kyoto Protocol 
after assuming office due to great pressure from business interests (Thompson, 2006). 
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Given the fact that the US accounts for nearly a quarter of global GHG emissions, 
Böhringer (2002) argues that the country’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol 
significantly affected the effectiveness of the accord. Therefore, sufficient domestic 
support appears to not only influence a nation’s participation and cooperation in an 
international climate framework, but lackluster commitment indirectly affects the efficacy 
of the treaty. Why does a country with strong political power and technological capacity 
like the US not act proactively to mitigate GHG emissions? 
Bazerman (2006) argues that even though American leaders are aware of all of the 
information necessary to anticipate global climate change and its consequences, both 
individual cognitive barriers and social structural barriers have impeded the country from 
taking action—which makes climate change a predictable surprise. Individual cognitive 
barriers include positive illusions, egocentrism, overly discounting the future, the 
omission bias, the desire to maintain the status quo, and inattention to data that lack 
vividness (see Section 2.3.3 and 2.3.5 for a detailed discussion of psychological barriers). 
In addition, organizational and political barriers include the specialization of 
government agencies (i.e., no single agency is responsible for climate change so 
responsibility is diffused) and corruption of the political system (i.e., the special interest 
groups like the oil industry lobby elected officials or tilt decisions in their favor with 
campaign contribution (Bazerman, 2006). Furthermore, Fisher (2006) contends that one 
reason for American inaction on climate policy is the close relationship between natural 
resources industries (e.g., oil and coal) and domestic policy making. The abundance of 
indigenous oil and coal resources and the pivotal role of labor involved in extraction 
make it difficult for the US to shift its energy structure to cleaner source. 
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In addition to President Bush’s claims of three flaws of the Kyoto Protocol (i.e., 
exclude developing countries’ responsibilities, insufficient science and technology 
innovation, and inadequate protection against domestic economic harm), Cohen and 
Egelston (2003) argue that the most significant impediment to the country’s participation 
is the increasingly oppositional relationship between the United States and China. This 
observation is particularly interesting to follow up in the future because of the tension 
between these two countries at the Copenhagen climate summit in 2009 (Revkin & 
Broder, 2009). 
In contrast to the decision by the United States to abandon the Kyoto Protocol, the 
European Union declared its leadership in international climate politics by moving 
forward with ratification of the accord despite the American withdrawal. On the basis of 
their comparison of the US and the EU, Vogler and Bretherton (2006) contend that 
although both sides share a growing understanding of the need to develop alternative 
energy technologies, the fundamental difference hinges on the divergent ways the two 
polities interpret scientific uncertainty and gauge the urgency of the problem. 
Governments of the major countries in Europe consider global climate change to 
be real and to require immediate remedial action. Although every nation invariably has its 
own political and economic considerations, recognition of the critical qualities of climate 
change appears to be a key factor influencing national engagement (Vogler & Bretherton, 
2006). Societal recognition is particularly important in democratic countries because 
mobilization of public opinion is a key factor driving the direction of government policy 
making. Therefore, obtaining sufficient domestic support is apparently an essential 
challenge for a nation to comply with the international climate regimes. 
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1.3.4  Concluding Remarks 
As introduced in this section, both science and political domains have made substantial 
progress in addressing human-induced climate change over the past several decades. 
Countless scientists have collected scientific evidence to verify anthropogenic forces and 
attempted to predict the potential impacts of climate change. The current scientific 
consensus indicates that the observed increase in average global temperature since the 
mid-20th century is very likely due to increased atmospheric GHG concentrations from 
human activities (e.g., fossil-fuel use and deforestation) (IPCC, 2007a). 
In addition, even if humans were to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations 
and aerosols, the warming trend is unavoidable. In the worse case scenario, the increase 
in global average temperature is estimated to be 2.4-6.4ºC and the sea-level rise is 
predicted to be 0.26-0.59 meters at the end of the 21st century. The changes in 
temperature and precipitation patterns will likely affect human society in water resources, 
ecosystem changes, agricultural productivity, coastal erosion, and public health (IPCC, 
2007b). 
Due to the state of scientific evidence becoming more certain and increased public 
awareness, global climate change has been moving up the international political agenda. 
The UN initiated a series of international efforts such as the establishment of the IPCC 
and the adoption of international climate treaties. Although it is challenging to achieve a 
global consensus, the international political community has progressed gradually from an 
agreement to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations (i.e., the UNFCCC), to an 
agreement requiring the initial implementation of mitigation measures on the part of 
industrialized countries (i.e., the Kyoto Protocol), and then to a possible agreement 
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entailing the comprehensive endorsement of mitigation by all nations (i.e., a post-Kyoto 
regime). 
 
1.4  Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation consists of six chapters in total. The next chapter presents the research 
rationale by examining several theoretical frameworks for the integration of science and 
the public in the environmental policy-making process and by reviewing existing 
sociological findings regarding the public understanding of climate change. The third 
chapter provides a comprehensive introduction of the case study. The content includes a 
discussion of the motivation for selecting Taiwan as the focal point of investigation, an 
analysis of various social values of the Taiwanese people, a review of the development of 
environmentalism in Taiwan, and an account of various domestic climate policies to date. 
The fourth chapter describes the methods used in the empirical portion of this 
study. The content covers an explanation of the research questions and structure, a 
discussion about why youth were targeted as the study population, and a series of detailed 
descriptions of three constituent studies (i.e., an IA focus-group workshop, a comparative 
survey, and a web-based survey). The fifth chapter reports the results of these studies and 
analyzes key findings within the context of relevant literature. The final chapter discusses 
two interesting inquiries in depth and concludes with the policy implications of this study 
with respect to Taiwan and other Asian countries. 
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1.5  Summary 
With decades of efforts in accumulating scientific evidence, the current scientific 
consensus is that contemporary climate changes in both temperature and precipitation are 
very likely induced by human activities (e.g., fossil-fuel use and deforestation) (IPCC, 
2007a) and that these changes, with temporal and spatial variability, are affecting 
ecosystems and society in terms of ecosystem changes, agricultural productivity, coastal 
erosion, and public health (IPCC, 2007b). The international political community has 
begun to take necessary actions to address the problem by initiating processes to 
encourage transnational cooperation and negotiation over broad multiparty climate 
treaties (i.e., UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol). 
While both scientific and political domains have made substantial progress in 
addressing human-induced climate change over the past several decades, few meaningful 
results have been achieved in terms of reducing global GHG emissions. To effectively 
resolve the problem requires interdisciplinary cooperation and collective and sustained 
effort on the part of many nations. Social scientists can play a role in helping to bridge 
the different appraisals of laypeople and the scientific and political communities. 
In addition, the actual compliance of individual nations to an international 
mitigation treaty is reliant on obtaining sufficient domestic support (Thompson, 2006). 
Whether a country—in terms of government and society at large—recognizes climate 
change as a pressing and prioritized problem that requires urgent action is particularly 
important in driving the direction of formal policy making in democratic countries. Thus, 
an interdisciplinary climate-related case study at the domestic level can be useful because 
countries can learn from one other (Thompson, 2006). 
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To aid current understanding of the integration of science and the public in the 
domestic policy-making process, this doctoral research seeks to shed light on whether the 
public’s scientific understanding of climate change is a necessary prerequisite for 
effective policy making. At a micro-individual level, the study examines Taiwanese 
youth’s general concern about climate change and investigates the interrelationships 
among three constituent elements (i.e., attitudes, scientific knowledge and behavioral 
intentions). At a macro-structural level, the study aims to assess the effectiveness of an 
experimental participatory exercise in enhancing scientific understanding and in 
formulating climate policies. 
The field work of this investigation, conducted in the summer and fall of 2008 in 
Taiwan, comprises three constituent studies (i.e., an IA focus-group workshop, a 
comparative survey, and a web-based survey). This case study is expected to contribute in 
a variety of ways—the findings can be compared with other research; valuable insights 
about domestic climate policies produced in the experimental participatory exercise can 
be used by policy makers; and the unique cultural background of this case study can 
inform future exploratory investigations involving social scientific research on China. 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Overview 
Because global climate change is a complex scientific-political challenge, mitigation will 
require scientific research from multiple disciplines and collective efforts from various 
societal actors. In addition to extensive work on the natural science of climate change and 
the international politics of the issue, considerable research has been conducted on the 
problem from various social scientific perspectives. As an empirical study that attempts 
to explore interrelationships among science, the public, and politics (i.e., whether 
scientifically literate citizens can facilitate climate policy making), this dissertation 
focuses on an aspect of critical importance—the public understanding of science. 
Studies of the public understanding of science are pursued in several different 
academic areas including communications (e.g., mass media coverage on science), 
education (e.g., science education and literacy), and the sociology of science (e.g., 
science, technology, and society). This research investigates the issue in particular from 
the perspectives of public policy and the sociology of science. Section 2.2 explains the 
theoretical research rationale about integrating scientists and citizens in the 
environmental policy-making process in general. 19  Section 2.3 reviews existing 
sociological studies regarding public perception and understanding of global climate 
change. Section 2.4 summarizes the findings of the chapter. 
 
                                                 
19 The chapter interchangeably uses the term “scientists” with “experts” and “citizens” 
with “the public.” 
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2.2 Science and Citizens in the Formulation of Environmental Policy 
2.2.1  Introduction 
Political scientist Frank Fischer (2003a) defines public policy as “a political agreement 
on a course of action or inaction designed to resolve or mitigate problems on the political 
agenda and presented in various forms: a law, a rule, a statute, an edict, a regulation, or an 
order.” In comparison to the range of public policy issues, environmental problems are 
usually considered to constitute relatively complicated and difficult political dilemmas 
for policy makers because they involve various disciplines and numerous stakeholders 
with competing interests. The statement is especially accurate with respect to global 
climate change—a challenge that affects humans, nonhumans, and ecosystems across 
space and time. To collectively address the problem, a broad array of societal actors not 
only need to be involved, but also need to develop their scientific capabilities for making 
rational and informed decisions. 
This section introduces a detailed theoretical framework on the integration of 
science and public participation in the environmental policy-making process. Subsection 
2.2.2 introduces the development of policy studies and then describes the policy-making 
process for environmental problems. Subsection 2.2.3 explores the role of science in the 
policy-making process and discusses the central role of “science” in what some authors 
have termed the “risk society.” Subsection 2.2.4 examines the increasing importance of 
public participation in the policy-making process in democratic modes of governance. 
Subsection 2.2.5 explains the rationale and the policy implications of a scientifically 
literate citizenry in modern society. Subsection 2.2.6 concludes with remarks on the 
necessity of public understanding of science in the environmental policy-making process. 
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2.2.2  Policy-making Process for Environmental Problems 
The Development of Public Policy Study 
Public policy is a political action or inaction formulated and enforced by governments to 
resolve social problems. The field of public policy studies developed after World War II 
because of a newly invigorated political interest in confronting issues like poverty, health 
care, and social welfare (Fischer, 2003a). In addition, due to industrialization and 
technology advancement, society was forced to address new threats such as nuclear war, 
novel medical technologies, and environmental degradation (Fischer, 2003b). Historian 
Stephen Toulmin (1990) argues that it was not possible to address these challenges 
without considering some underlying social and cultural factors (e.g., the value of human 
life and humans’ responsibility to protect the world of nature). 
As a result, Harold Lasswell (1951), considered to be the founder of the policy 
science movement, envisioned a multidisciplinary approach in his celebrated book The 
Policy Orientation. Lasswell (1951) wanted to create an applied social science that could 
improve the process and the outcomes of policy decision making and facilitate the 
development of democratic governance. The resultant product, policy science, was 
envisioned as a mediator between academics, government decision-makers, and ordinary 
citizens to provide objective solutions to problems (Fischer, 2003a). 
Prior to the multidisciplinary methodological perspective advanced by Lasswell, 
the field of policy science was dominated by an empiricist methodological framework. 
This perspective, based on epistemology, argued that the reality of a problem exists as an 
objective phenomenon and that its causes and effects can be discovered through empirical 
testing of hypotheses (Fischer, 2003a). Empiricist analysts thus focused (and continue to 
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focus) on the deployment of technocratic policy-analysis tools such as cost-benefit 
analysis, risk-benefit analysis, and quantitative calculation of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of various policies. These empiricist policy analyses, based on assembling 
what was deemed to be objective scientific knowledge, were not used to any great degree 
by administrators because they lacked sophisticated understanding of the relationship of 
knowledge to politics and policy to social scientific expertise (Fischer, 2003a). 
Using the energy crisis in the 1970s as an example, deLeon (1988) argued that the 
empiricist framework could not provide an effective solution for policy makers because 
the objective technical computing models had little predictive power. Fischer (2003a) 
argues that the complex energy problem during the 1970s influenced as it was by 
numerous underlying political and social factors (e.g., foreign policy and the American 
way of life) had to be reframed in its normative social context rather than simply 
calculated to discover the technical relationships between supply and demand. 
Consequently, instead of making decisions from disinterested quantitative facts, 
several so-called postempiricist schools of thought have been developed to provide policy 
makers with alternative methodologies that consider the subjective foundation of social 
reality (i.e., social, cultural, and political factors) (Fischer, 2003a). By involving a wider 
range of interests, explanations, arguments, and discourses in the policy-making process, 
postempiricist analysts seek to provide information of value not only to elite bureaucratic 
decision makers, but to ordinary citizens as well. This more participatory approach 
emphasizes deliberative interactions among citizens, analysts, and decision makers (Hajer 
& Wagenaar, 2003). The ultimate goal is to generate essential information that empowers 
citizens to have serious public discussions and to make informed choices. 
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Constructing Environmental Problems 
Most postempiricist policy analyses draw heavily on the notion of social constructionism. 
As discussed above, the empiricist framework believes that the reality of a problem exists 
as an objective phenomenon. In contrast, social constructionists believe that the reality of 
a problem is a creation of the social interaction of individuals, groups, and society 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966). What people perceive, understand, and interpret as real (and 
as a problem) is likely to vary because of their different worldviews as influenced by 
culture, education, economic status, and so forth. In other words, the reality of a problem 
is not an objective, fixed answer, but is formed by the varying ways in which the social 
realities of the world are shaped and perceived by members of society (Gergen, 1999). 
The identification of a problem is critical because it is through such framing that 
political systems decide whether there is a need to initiate a new policy or to change an 
existing one. It is for this reason that social constructionists are particularly interested in 
discovering how an issue comes to be recognized by the government (and the society at 
large) as sufficiently important to be put on the political agenda for consideration. This 
so-called “agenda-setting” stage is influenced by various scientific, social, and political 
factors: the mobilization of adequate evidence pertaining to the existence of a problem, 
the societal recognition of the situation as a problem, the exercise of organized group 
pressure, the available resources to deal with them, and the political climate or 
willingness to act (Kraft & Vig, 2003; Kingdon, 1995). 
Similarly, sociologist John Hannigan (1995) argues that the successful social 
construction of an environmental problem rests on six essential factors: 1) scientific 
authority for and validation of the claims; 2) existence of “popularizers” who can bridge 
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environmentalism and science; 3) media attention in which the problem is framed as 
novel and important; 4) dramatization of the problem in symbolic and visual terms; 5) 
economic incentives for taking positive action; and 6) emergence of an institutional 
sponsor who can ensure both legitimacy and continuity. 
First, it is a prerequisite to obtain scientific validation of the problem from a 
variety of sources of scientific expertise. Second, Hannigan (1995) contends that it is 
essential to have “scientific popularisers” who can bridge elite scientists and other 
environmental activists (e.g., journalists and political leaders) by transforming and 
reframing esoteric scientific findings into proactive environmental claims. Third, media 
coverage of the environmental problem is a crucial factor because the problem will be 
placed on the public and political agenda only if the public considers the problem to be 
important. Fourth, Hannigan (1995) argues that environmental problems need to be 
dramatized in highly symbolic and visual terms that are easily communicated to the 
public. For example, stratospheric ozone depletion only began to attract the public’s 
attention after the graphic metaphor of “an ozone hole over the Antarctic” was invoked. 
He argues that such images “provide a kind of cognitive short cut compressing a complex 
argument into one which is easily comprehensible and ethically stimulating.” Fifth, to 
prevent or reduce potential opposition, it is necessary to highlight the economic benefits 
of a particular course of policy action or to provide economic incentives for taking 
positive actions to address environmental problems. Finally, obtaining institutional 
support is significant especially once the problem moves up on the political agenda and 
the follow-up policy-making process begins to gather momentum (Hannigan, 1995). 
 
 48
In other words, to be successfully constructed as a valid problem the issue not 
only needs to be verified by scientists, but needs to be regarded as such by a concerned 
public, covered by the media, advocated by interest groups, and recognized and 
supported by politicians. However, Downs (1972) famously argued that public interest 
about a problem will experience a cycle: public interest is negligible in the pre-problem 
stage; is awakened by a dramatic event or discovery; is intensified during the 
problem-solving process; and then gradually declines. While most environmental 
policy-making processes are lengthy and media coverage on dramatic events does not 
persist indefinitely, it is a challenge for policy makers, scientists, and environmental 
activists to retain the public’s interest over the full span of the required stages. 
 
The Process of Policy Formulation 
Although different authors employ various terminologies to describe the policy-making 
process, most policy issues follow a common sequence of five stages: policy formulation, 
policy legitimation, policy implementation, policy evaluation, and policy change (Figure 
2.1) (Kraft & Vig, 2003; Anderson, 2000). After a problem assumes a position on the 
political agenda, various actors (e.g., president, governmental agencies, and legislators) 
can directly design and draft an appropriate policy and program (e.g., goals and 
implementation strategies). The stage of policy formulation usually requires the 
participation of experts who supply scientific evidence and the formulation of 
socioeconomic impact assessments of the environmental problem for policy makers. 
The drafted policy then enters the process of legitimation which means the policy 
needs to be ratified formally by legislators or authorized by governmental agencies 
depending upon the level of the policy (e.g., a statute, a rule, or an order). In addition, this 
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process is a highly politicized stage because it often requires obtaining political and 
public support (i.e., support from different political parties and stakeholders) (Switzer, 
2004). The next stage is to put the legitimized policy and program into effect through 
administrative decisions. Switzer (2004) argues that this stage may involve conflicts 
among bureaucracies because competing agencies (or even different divisions in the same 
agency) may be forced to vie against one another for institutional resources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The stage of policy evaluation refers to a process to measure the effectiveness of 
the policy and to assess whether the policy has achieved its objectives. The appraisal can 
take a variety of forms such as cost-benefit analysis, feedback from interest groups, or 
simply personal judgment by policy makers (Switzer, 2004). The outcome of the 
Figure 2.1 The policy-making process in the policy-cycle model with different 
stages. 
Policy 
Formulation 
Policy 
Legitimation 
Policy 
Implementation
Policy 
Evaluation 
Policy 
Change 
Agenda 
Setting 
- Recognize the problem 
- Obtain the political priority 
- Design and draft policy goals and strategies 
- Use scientific evidence for the env. problem 
- Mobilize political and public support 
- Obtain a legal ratification 
- Implement the policy 
- Compete for government resources 
- Assess the effectiveness of the policy 
- Use various tools (e.g., cost-benefit analysis) 
- Adjust the policy from the result of evaluation 
- Terminate the program 
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evaluation is then used to modify the goals, means, and strategies of the policy or to 
terminate the program in the final stage of policy change. This so-called policy-cycle 
model not only emphasizes all phases of policy making, but also highlights its 
continuousness and changing condition—a policy may be reevaluated and revised 
because of new information or shifting opinions (Kraft & Vig, 2003; Anderson, 2000). 
 
Characteristics of Environmental Problems 
The process of public policy making invariably involves a variety of actors (e.g., 
politicians, scientists, interest groups, and the public) and the success of the process is 
influenced by numerous scientific, social, and political factors. Among diverse problems 
on the political agenda, environmental problems are usually viewed as especially difficult 
for policy makers to manage because of seven core characteristics: their public nature, 
transboundary features, complexity and uncertainty, irreversibility, temporal and spatial 
variability, administrative fragmentation, and regulatory intervention (Carter, 2001). 
These characteristics—involving scientific, social, and political factors—often influence 
different stages of the policy-making process. Global climate change contains all seven 
features and is used as an example in the following discussion. 
First, many environmental resources are public goods which means that their 
benefits are shared without discrimination (Weale, 1992). However, while the benefits 
from using a public good are often limited to a small group of people, the costs are spread 
widely. This feature can be best explained by the renowned idea of the “tragedy of the 
commons” proposed by the late ecologist Garrett Hardin (1968). He argued that the 
pursuit of individual interest in common resources will usually result in harm if in the 
absence of any social or political controls because people tend to maximize their own 
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benefit and overuse or overpollute common resources. While Hardin proposed a mutual 
cooperative approach (e.g., a society-recognized regulation), it is often difficult for policy 
makers to determine who should gain the benefit and to achieve a consensus that is 
acceptable to the community as a whole. 
Second, the tendency of environmental problems to transcend political boundaries 
is an especially salient feature of global common resources. Many such problems are not 
limited to a nation’s borders and jurisdictions (e.g., air pollution and cross-boundary river 
pollution). 
Third, the interconnectedness of the ecosystem increases the complexity and 
uncertainty of environmental problems because it is difficult to completely identify the 
interdependent relationships between natural and human-made phenomena. While 
science and professional expertise can provide objective scientific knowledge of the 
nature of the problem, the unknown facts and contrasting views among scientists 
frequently slow down the pace of the policy-making process and contribute to the 
displacement of the problem (Carter, 2001). 
Fourth, some environmental problems are irreversible because many natural 
resources are finite. If these resources are exhausted or a vulnerable species becomes 
extinct, there is no way, even with the most advanced technology, that humans can 
recreate these resources or bring those species alive. As a result, policy makers bear a 
great responsibility to prevent those destructive environmental problems. 
Fifth, some long-term and wide-spread environmental impacts tend to affect 
particular subpopulations of people in time and space. Uneven temporal and spatial 
distribution of the costs and benefits of environmental problems creates difficult ethical 
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issues for policy makers (i.e., intragenerational justice and intergenerational justice) 
(Carter, 2001). 
Finally, the last two characteristics—administrative fragmentation and regulatory 
intervention—are related to the structure and policy-making capabilities of modern 
governance. Although the government comprises numerous agencies with specific 
responsibilities, it is common to find that a specific agency neglects others due to a lack 
of horizontal coordination. This dilemma is particularly problematic with respect to 
environmental matters because many of them are often the byproducts of other policy 
domains (e.g., soil erosion due to intensive agricultural practices) and many 
environmental policies conflict with other policy areas (Carter, 2001). Therefore, policy 
makers in an environmental agency specifically need to seek out the cooperation and 
coordination across customary institutional boundaries. 
Take global climate change as an example. Since the atmosphere is considered to 
be a common resource, every industry and every nation emits GHGs that collectively 
contribute to the increased GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. It has been 
exceedingly difficult for policy makers to initiate a satisfactory program regarding who 
should be allowed to emit CO2 and how much should be permitted. In addition, the 
potential consequences of global climate change are often long-term, transboundary, and 
irreversible. The benefits and costs of emitting GHG are unevenly distributed in time and 
in space. It is a challenge for policy makers to pinpoint the responsible parties and 
potentially affected groups. 
Moreover, the complexity of the ecosystem increases the difficulty for scientists 
to construct the empirical relationship between anthropogenic forces and the phenomena 
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and to assess and predict the exact potential impacts. This scientific uncertainty 
influences the general public’s perceptions about the existence of the problem, and in turn, 
its support of any resultant policies. Furthermore, since global climate change is a 
by-product of industrial development, climate policies need the involvement of a broad 
array of administrative institutions responsible for transportation, energy, forestry, and 
economic policy. 
 
Summarized Review 
In brief, with the increasing complexity of modern techno-industrial societies, the 
information requirements for policy makers have been intensified. Traditional empiricist 
policy analyses based on objective scientific knowledge are not sufficient for 
administrators to enable policy makers to engage with contemporary environmental 
problems. There is thus a need for a multidisciplinary postempiricist framework that 
emphasizes deliberative interactions involving a wider range of interests in the 
policy-making process. While numerous scientific, social, and political factors may 
influence the policy-making process for environmental problems, two groups of actors 
and their contributions (i.e., scientists and the public) are key to the deliberative process. 
The next two subsections specifically discuss the roles of these two sets of actors. 
 
2.2.3  Science and the Policy-making Process 
Transformation of Scientific Practices 
Subsection 2.2.2 highlights the importance of science in the contemporary environmental 
policy-making process. During the past few decades, some scholars have argued that 
there has been a transformation in scientific practices from disinterested and 
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non-utilitarian “Mode 1 science” to cross-disciplinary “Mode 2 science” (Gibbons et al., 
1994). The concept of Mode 1 science was formalized in a well-known essay written by 
sociologist Robert Merton (1942). To rescue science from powerful political interference 
by autocratic regimes during and after World War II, Merton (1973) argued that it was 
necessary to maintain the autonomy of modern science that renders scientific knowledge 
independent of social influences from other institutional spheres (e.g., religion and 
economics). The transparent process of scientific inquiry—through peer 
criticism—means that it needed no future external supervision. Science should be left 
alone to produce disinterested and universal truths. 
While Merton’s argument was intended to prevent science from being politicized 
and to ensure its integrity, it seems impossible to keep science entirely “independent and 
disinterested” from other institutional interests because it has come to be embedded with 
so many pivotal developments of modern society (e.g., national economies and the 
military advantages of states) (Jasanoff, 2006). In addition, the modernization of science 
and technology has generated pervasive and inescapable risks that threaten the health and 
safety of people and the environment (Beck, 1992). Sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992) 
famously argues “today risk is once again increasing as technology, largely owing to 
reflexive modernity, becomes inherently complex. Accidents and crises largely become 
unpredictable, and governments lose control of the regulatory structures which contain 
such accidents and crises.” 
Due to the increasing complexity and uncertainty of modern techno-industrial 
societies, both decision makers and the public require that science provides not merely 
true and reliable knowledge, but some in-depth insights regarding the implications of the 
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knowledge (e.g., purposes and effectiveness). As a result, scientific practices have 
expanded to Mode-2 science which is mission-oriented on a cross-disciplinary basis and 
embraces growing public demands for accountability (Nowothy et al., 2001). Mode-2 
science has been developing with the emergence of public science to include 
“policy-relevant knowledge in the broadest sense: science that underwrites specific 
regulatory decisions, science offered as legal evidence, science that clarifies the causes 
and impacts of phenomena that are salient to society, and science that self-consciously 
advances broad social goals, such as environmental sustainability” (Jasanoff, 2006). 
 
Roles and Functions of Science in the Policy-making Process 
As a result of the transformation of scientific practices, science now assumes an 
increasingly significant role in the political arena. Susskind (1994) argues that scientific 
advisers can play five primary roles in the environmental policy-making process: trend 
spotters, theory builders, theory testers, science communicators, and applied policy 
analysts. First, trend spotters usually are scientists who first observe changes in the 
patterns in ecosystems or recognize perturbation in longitudinal data and then determine 
the significance of the problem. 
Second, theory builders verify the observations initially reported by trend spotters, 
explore the causes of the problem, and build models to explain past circumstances and to 
predict future effects (Hannigan, 1995). 
Third, theory testers play a significant role in increasing the credibility of the 
scientific claims by testing the hypothesis and the resultant models assembled by the 
theory builders. These three roles are usually more prominent during the fact-finding 
stages (i.e., problem recognition and agenda setting) (Hannigan, 1995). 
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Fourth, scientists can play a role as science communicators that translate the 
technical language into plain language that is easier for the public to understand. This 
task means that the scientific understanding of environmental problems is not only 
limited to a small group of elite scientists, but is relevant to a wider group of lay people 
(Hannigan, 1995; Reddy, 2009). Lasswell (1941) and numerous others have argued that 
one of the professional’s responsibilities is to educate citizens and to build their scientific 
capability to intelligently participate in deliberations on public affairs. 
Finally, scientists also act as policy analysts that provide policy recommendations 
to policy makers. The most common institutional form for delivering this information is 
the scientific advisory committee comprising various experts. Both roles (i.e., science 
communicators and policy analysts) are more dominant during the negotiation/bargaining 
period (i.e., policy legitimation and implementation) (Susskind, 1994). 
Similarly, Ascher (2004) discusses five political functions that scientific expertise 
can serve for decision makers. Scientists can assist policy makers by identifying the 
problem, outlining potential policy options, conveying the scope of scientific uncertainty, 
projecting the likely outcomes of the policy options, and evaluating the effectiveness of 
the resultant policy. Nevertheless, despite these political services, Ascher (2004) contends 
that scientists still need to overcome some inherent conditions for conflict with policy 
makers. Government agencies often suppress, oversimplify, and distort scientific 
information for their own institutional interests (e.g., to enhance their authority and 
budget). For example, scientific uncertainty and disagreement among scientists regarding 
global climate change is often manipulated to justify the delay of action or to perpetuate 
inaction (Brunner, 2001). 
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Approaches of Science in the Policy-making Process 
It is instructive to explore exactly how science fulfills theses various functions during 
actual policy-making processes. Irwin (1995) describes three approaches through which 
science can assist decision makers to respond to environmental threats: the expert 
approach, the democratic approach, and the pragmatic approach. First, the expert 
approach, mostly observed in the form of formal “scientific advisory committees,” has 
long been utilized by policy makers. The committee consisting of numerous scientific 
specialists seeks to provide independent, neutral, and objective scientific expertise. 
However, this approach has been shown to have numerous flaws that arise from its 
inability to achieve policy resolution because an overemphasis on expert assessment may 
differ sharply from the knowledge of other stakeholders, lower possibilities for a wider 
policy debate and appraisal, and generate legitimation problems (i.e., doubt over the 
justification of an action simply by the conclusion of the committee) (Irwin, 1995). 
Second, the democratic approach mostly occurs in the form of public inquiries or 
hearings, and involves a broader representation of expert views (e.g., interested members 
of the public) in the process compared to closed advisory committees. Even though this 
participatory mode provides opportunities for wider cross-examination and exchange of 
technical expertise, it also has attracted criticism. For example, lengthy deliberations tend 
to become inefficient, costly, and even ritualized—citizens are more like passive 
audiences rather than active participants. In addition, while involving more participants 
with various interests, the process sometimes just exacerbates conflict (Irwin, 1995). 
Finally, the pragmatic approach is less formalized and more flexible compared to 
the previous two decision modes. Unlike the other models that are based on claims to 
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“independence and expertise” and “representation and democracy,” the pragmatic 
approach focuses on “practicability and manageability” (Irwin, 1995). One means of 
implementation entails a committee or task force that comprises not only scientific 
experts, but also representatives of stakeholder and other social groups (e.g., labor 
organizations). In spite of the difficulties that lay representatives may encounter in fully 
understanding the finer points of technical discussion, this attribute can be a key strength. 
To ensure that the resultant policy is manageable, workable, and enforceable, such 
committees often stay away from radical and difficult political strategies (Irwin, 1995). 
 
Challenges of Sufficient Scientific Evidence 
Although science plays multiple functions in the policy-making process, there are some 
problems that remain to be addressed. Environmental social scientist Andrew Blowers 
(1993) argues that obtaining sufficient scientific evidence and sound scientific judgment 
of environmental problems is challenging for policy making in five ways. First, it is 
difficult to establish causal relationships especially in cases that require assignment of 
responsibility for externalities produced by certain polluters. Second, it is difficult to 
forecast exact impacts (e.g., incidence, distribution, time, and effect) because the 
estimation of probabilities will vary under different assumptions. Third, uncertainty will 
always exist when evaluating potential risks imposed on future generations. Fourth, the 
absence of environmental data often leads to manipulation by vested interests against 
environmentalists. Finally, complex environmental scientific problems often involve 
broad speculative ideas and fragile interpretations which often have difficulty surviving 
in the political arena of competing interests (Hannigan, 1995). 
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Summarized Review 
In brief, the traditional (and highly untenable) approach calls for the presentation of 
findings by scientific experts who then hand over responsibility to policy makers. 
However, information requirements on the part of policy makers and the general public 
have been intensified because of the proliferation of environmental threats in modern 
techno-industrial society. Therefore, there is an increasingly significant role for science to 
take on more expansive roles in the policy-making process as policy analysts and science 
communicators. For scientists to transform complex environmental problems to the 
non-scientific world, citizens are presumed to need to demonstrate capability to 
participate effectively in deliberations on public affairs. 
 
2.2.4  Citizens and the Policy-making Process 
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, there is an increased need to include a wider range of 
perspectives in the policy-making process involving scientifically complex environmental 
problems. The public is not only a key actor in constructing environmental problems (i.e., 
providing lay perspectives in the deliberative process), but also an important driving 
force in formulating and implementing policies to address controversial environmental 
issues. This situation implies that a policy or problem that lacks public support will 
unavoidably encounter political and societal opposition in systems of democratic 
governance. 
 
Administrative Rationalism vs. Democratic Pragmatism 
Political scientist John Dryzek (1997) discusses three coordination mechanisms through 
which human beings can solve environmental problems: administrative rationalism, 
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democratic pragmatism, and economic rationalism. Economic rationalism seeks to rely 
on market mechanisms to mitigate environmental problems through a variety of strategies 
such as taxes, fees, incentives, and cap-and-trade schemes. Although it has been the most 
prominent approach over the past two decades, Dryzek (1997) argues that the other two 
mechanisms have achieved more substantial success in the real world. Therefore, the 
discussion here will focus on how these two mechanisms—expert-driven administrative 
approaches and citizen-driven democratic approaches have been employed in practice. 
Administrative rationalism is defined as “the problem-solving discourse which 
emphasizes the role of the expert rather than the citizen or producer/consumer in social 
problem solving, and which stresses social relationships of hierarchy rather than equality 
or competition” (Dryzek, 1997). This policy discourse is a traditional problem-solving 
approach with a strong alliance between scientific experts and professional administrators. 
Administrative institutions in recourse management and pollution control have often 
sought to solve problems by employing practices that rely on the contributions of 
privileged scientists at some level (such as providing scientific evidence of the problem 
in the environmental impact assessment process) and policy recommendations with 
rationalistic policy analysis techniques (e.g., cost-and-benefit analysis) (Dryzek, 1997). 
Dryzek (1997) argues that traditional expert-driven administrative rationalism is 
not an effective problem-solving discourse in the context of complex problems because 
of the following reasons. First, hierarchy is based on expertise, but the complexity of the 
problem makes it nearly impossible for an expert to synthesize sufficient knowledge from 
different perspectives. 
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Second, the Weberian compartmentalization of bureaucratic structure tends to 
produce problem displacement rather than problem solution. Since most governments 
have specialized agencies and divisions, it is common to observe the displacement of 
problems—for example, apparent efforts to “solve” air pollution create water pollution 
problems. It is quite difficult to integrate different agencies and to manage solutions that 
transcend the divisions (Dryzek, 1997). 
Finally, implementation deficits are common under administrative rationalism: 
gaps between the expected outcomes of high-level executive decisions and the actual 
achievements at street level (Weale, 1992). The well-known inadequacies associated with 
strict command-and-control regulatory policies demonstrate that effective compliance 
with policy decisions requires simultaneous compliance, negotiation, and coordination of 
agency officials, polluters, developers, and resource users (Dryzek, 1997). 
As a partial resolution to some of these problems, Dryzek (1997) argues that 
democratic pragmatism affords a useful corrective. The democratic concept of this 
mechanism does not mean to hand over the responsibility of problem solving from 
environmental administrations to the public or to the representatives of various interest 
groups, but it seeks to make administrations more responsive by involving a plurality of 
perspectives. The democratization of administrations is essential because of the need to 
secure legitimacy for decisions in interactive policy-deliberation processes. 
The biggest challenge that democratic pragmatism needs to confront is the uneven 
political power distribution and the unequal financial resources of different interest 
groups (Dryzek, 1997). While the pluralist concept of democratic pragmatism views all 
actors and interests as equally legitimate, it is expected that powerful interests with large 
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financial resources (e.g., major corporations and industry groups) will have greater 
political influence on policy debates in capitalist democracies. Not only can business 
allocate more financial resources both in advertising its corporate image and in lobbying 
politicians and legislators, but also the privileged position of business in affecting 
national economic standing (e.g., through gross domestic product and employment) 
means that it will likely be more politically influential than other interest groups. 
Nonetheless, a democratic approach is likely more effective in resolving complex 
environmental issues. Fischer (2003a) argues that broad public participation brings a 
number of benefits to democratic policy development and implementation, namely 
providing unique lay perspectives, decreasing conflict over a dispute, expanding 
acceptance and support of decisions, increasing legitimacy, and improving the public’s 
knowledge about policy problems. 
In addition, the importance of public participation in achieving sustainable 
development has been recognized in several international documents (e.g., Agenda 21, 
Rio Declaration, and Johannesburg Declaration) and treaties (e.g., UNFCCC) (Segger et 
al., 2003). However, the principle of public participation in these diplomatic declarations 
primarily focuses on ensuring basic human rights in three aspects: rights of expression, 
access to information, and access to justice.20 
 
                                                 
20  The principle is based on the Aarhus Convention (Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters), that was drafted in Denmark in 1998. The objective of this 
document is to protect the rights of every person of present and future generations to live 
in an environment adequate to his/her health and well-being in terms of access to 
information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in 
environmental matters. 
 63
Segger et al. (2003) argue that effectively implementing public participation in 
sustainable development policies requires a sustained and concerted effort on the part of 
civil society that includes opportunities for outreach to civil society events (e.g., 
stakeholder dialogues and experts’ roundtable). The growing scope of civil society 
activities that involve the general public in environmental matters implies that the role of 
the public in the policy-making process has shifted from one of passive information 
recipient to one of active opinion contributor. 
 
Public Participation Methods 
Numerous different methods (e.g., public hearings and consensus conferences) have been 
developed to involve the public in decision making regarding complex issues of science, 
technology, and environment over the past few decades (e.g., biotechnology, waste 
repository, radioactive sites, and food risk) (see Rowe & Frewer, 2000). Many researchers 
have defined and distinguished these participatory methods in different categories such as 
the formality of the process, the nature of participants, the extent of involvement, and the 
objectives of participation (e.g., Dryzek, 1997; Rowe & Frewer, 2000; Beierle & Cayford, 
2002). 
Dryzek (1997) defined the public participatory practices in the environmental 
policy-making process with five categories: public consultation, alternative dispute 
resolution, policy dialogue, public inquiries, and right-to-know legislation. Beierle and 
Cayford (2002) examined five mechanisms: public meetings and hearings, advisory 
committees not seeking consensus, advisory committees seeking consensus, and 
negotiations and mediations. Rowe and Frewer (2000) reviewed and evaluated eight 
public participatory methods: referenda, public hearings/inquiries, public opinion surveys, 
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negotiated rule making, consensus conference, citizens’ jury/panel, citizen/public 
advisory committee, and focus groups (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 Public Participation Methods 
Methods Participants Duration Key Mechanism 
Referenda All member Single event All participants directly vote on a decision with equal influence. Final outcome is binding. 
Public 
hearings/inquiries 
Interested 
citizens Weeks to years
Participants may voice opinions in an open 
forum but have no direct impact on 
recommendation. 
Public opinion 
surveys 
Large sample 
(representatives 
of public) 
Single event 
Participants may voice opinions in a 
standardized survey via face-to-face, telephone, 
or internet. 
Negotiated rule 
making 
Small sample 
(stakeholder 
groups) 
Days to 
months 
Participants work as a committee to reach a 
consensus on a specific question or regulation. 
Consensus 
conference 
Small sample 
(representatives 
of public) 
(10-16 people) 
Weeks of 
preparation 
and 3-4 days of 
conference 
Participants discuss key issues with assistance 
of independent facilitators and expert 
presentations. Conclusions on key questions are 
presented via citizen reports or press 
conference. The process is open to the public. 
Citizens’ 
jury/panel 
Small sample 
(representatives 
of public) 
(12-20 people) 
4-10 days 
Participants discuss key issues with assistance 
of independent facilitators and expert 
presentations. Conclusions on key questions are 
presented via citizen reports or press 
conference. The process is not open to the 
public. 
Citizen/public 
advisory 
committee 
Small group of 
stakeholders 
Days to 
months 
Participants discuss key issues with interaction 
with industry representatives. 
Focus groups 
Small group 
(representatives 
of public) (5-12 
people) 
Single event 
Participants discuss general issues. The process 
is video/audio recording to assess 
opinions/attitudes. 
Source: Rowe and Frewer (2000) 
 
The discussion here reviews some common practices based on the extent to which 
decision makers intend the public to be involved. The extent of public involvement can 
be reviewed from the lowest level (e.g., the public receives relevant information), to the 
medium level (e.g., the public casts a vote in a referenda and the public provides their 
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opinions in a survey or a hearing), and to the highest level (e.g., the public participates in 
exercises with some degree of decision-making authority) (Rowe & Frewer, 2000). 
First, the least the public can be involved in decision making is to receive relevant 
information with the purpose of protecting the public’s right. With the passage of a series 
of right-to-know legislation (i.e., the federal Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, the 
Freedom of Information Act in 1974, and the federal Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act in 1986), the US government recognized citizens’ rights 
to participate in agency rulemaking and to have access to relevant scientific and technical 
information (Dryzek, 1997).21 
These laws have aimed at increasing the transparency of governmental decision 
making, including an appropriate breadth of perspectives, legitimizing governmental 
actions, and tailoring specific policy frameworks. However, both the purpose and the 
degree of openness and transparency in science are context-specific and are sometimes 
traded off against other important social values such as the privacy of research subjects 
and the confidentiality of proprietary business information (Jasanoff, 2006). 
Second, the public can be involved in decision making at a medium degree by 
voicing opinions via different mechanisms (e.g., voting in a referenda and participating in 
surveys, focus groups, and public hearings). For example, public hearings are mandatory 
procedures in the United States required by the National Environmental Policy Act and 
this process requires that policy makers document both the public’s comments and the 
                                                 
21 The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act was part of hazardous 
waste regulations in the United States (i.e., Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act). It provides the public access to information about 
hazardous chemicals present in the community by requiring operators of facilities 
reporting information regarding the presence of hazardous chemicals. 
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responses to these comments for large-scale, publicly-funded development proposals as 
part of the process of preparing environmental impact statements (EISs) (Dryzek, 1997). 
These mechanisms, considered to be one-way communication, have little or no 
interaction (e.g., dialogues and debates) among various stakeholders. While the public 
receives information from expert testimony in public hearings, their comments have little 
influence on the decisions presented in the hearings. In contrast, while members of the 
public are allowed to voice their opinions in referenda, surveys, and focus groups, they 
have restricted access to information and resources to enable them to make informed 
decisions (Rowe & Frewer, 2000). 
Finally, in contrast to the basic assurance of the public’s right to have access to 
relevant information or the medium involvement of collecting public opinions, a variety 
of participatory methods are aimed at engaging the public in more meaningful 
discussions involving well-designed deliberation processes. Deliberation is a necessary 
communication process for a democratic approach that involves a variety of actors in 
policy-making processes (Dryzek, 1997). According to Reich (1990), deliberation refers 
to “a process of social learning about public problems and possibilities” and the goal of 
deliberation is “the creation of a setting in which people can learn from one another.” 
As a result, methods such as consensus conferences and citizens’ juries/panels 
provide the participants with resources and information to make informed decisions. A 
small group of participants is selected as representatives of certain populations to 
deliberate key issues. During the process independent facilitators are present to assist the 
discussion and experts are invited to provide relevant information. Conclusions of the 
conference on key questions are presented via citizen reports or press conferences. 
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However, the influence on the final decision is not guaranteed like in a referendum (see a 
detailed discussion of consensus conferences in Subsection 2.2.5). 
Each of these participation methods has its strengths and weaknesses. Rowe and 
Frewer (2000) argue that a variety of contextual and environmental factors (e.g., national 
political styles, the role of government, and sensitivity of the focus issue) may influence 
the effectiveness of the method. As a result, there is no perfect method for a certain 
situation. Nonetheless, while one key benefit of broader public participation is to increase 
the legitimacy of the decision, it is particularly important to gain representative public 
samples in some small sample group-based mechanisms. 
 
Summarized Review 
In short, Dryzek (1997) argues that the citizen-driven democratic approach is a more 
effective mechanism than the expert-driven administrative approach for solving complex 
environmental problems of modern democratic governance. Public participation is not 
only a procedure that legitimates policy decisions, but it is a process that can enhance the 
quality and the effectiveness of policy decisions (e.g., greater public satisfaction with 
adopted policies). Numerous participatory experiments involving deliberative discussions 
with the involvement of a variety of perspectives have been conducted in connection with 
a wide range of environmental issues (e.g., biotechnology, waste repository, radioactive 
sites, and food risk) (see Rowe & Frewer, 2000). 
However, in this deliberative and social learning process, one key information 
source for the participatory public is scientific experts. As noted in Subsection 2.2.3, 
scientists ideally need to act as communicators and educators that attempt to build the 
public’s intellectual capability to meaningfully engage in complex environmental 
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policy-making processes. Interestingly, while the public tries to understand the scientific 
context of complex environmental problems, it is incumbent on scientists and policy 
makers to simultaneously attempt to understand unique lay perspectives. A cooperative 
and mutually beneficial relationship between scientists and the public prompts the 
development of the public understanding of science research—an important subject that 
will be discussed in the following subsection. 
 
2.2.5  Public Understanding of Science 
The Public’s Need to Understand Science 
As discussed in the previous subsection, while public participation is an important 
policy-making process of democratic governance, the outcome of deliberation will be 
most rational and meaningful when the involved citizens are intellectually capable of 
making informed decisions. This need has prompted establishment of a field of scientific 
research organized around the public understanding of science and the key focus of 
scholars and other practitioners working in this domain is to measure and explain the 
content and the degree of the public’s scientific understanding and to find remedies for 
the public’s apparent ignorance or misunderstanding of science (e.g., Wynne, 1995; Irwin 
& Wynne, 1996; Gregory & Miller, 1998). 
Many authors have discussed the public’s need to understand science and its 
benefits. Haldane (1939) argued many years ago that the ordinary person must know 
something about various branches of science because these matters affect his everyday 
life. In the years following World War II, the Association of Scientific Workers (1947) 
advanced three common justifications for an improved public understanding of science: a 
technically literate population is essential for future workforce requirements, science 
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becomes an important part of cultural understanding, and greater public understanding of 
science is deemed to be indispensible for a modern democracy. 
The Royal Society of London (1985) emphasized in a widely circulated report 
entitled The Public Understanding of Science that better technical comprehension would 
enrich society and improve the quality of decision making in terms of national prosperity, 
economic performance, public policy, personal decisions, everyday life, risk and 
uncertainty, and contemporary thought and culture (see Irwin & Wynne, 1996). 
Durant et al. (1989) assert that the public needs to care about science for four 
reasons: 1) cultural literacy: people should know about science—the greatest 
achievement of human culture; 2) practical functionality: people need to know about 
science because science-based technologies affect everyone’s life; 3) democratic 
resilience: only informed public debate can assist the democratization of science-related 
policy decisions; 4) attitudinal familiarity: the public support for science is based on a 
minimal level of public knowledge. 
 
Public Understanding of Science Research 
Public understanding of science research involves several disciplinary and 
interdisciplinary fields. While numerous surveys on public attitudes about science have 
been conducted since the 1950s, it was not until the 1980s that systematic inquiries began 
to develop (Wynne, 1995). Bauer et al. (2007) reviewed the development of “public 
understanding of science” studies and compiled the research agenda into three paradigms 
in three time periods—Science Literacy, Public Understanding of Science, and Science 
and Society (Table 2.2). 
 
 70
Table 2.2 The Development of Public Understanding of Science Research 
Paradigm/Period Attribution Problems Proposal Research 
Science Literacy 
1960s-mid 1980s 
Public deficit 
Knowledge 
Literacy measures 
Education 
Public Understanding of Science 
After 1985 
Public deficit 
Attitudes 
Education 
Knowledge-attitude 
Attitude change 
Image marketing 
Science and Society 
1990s-present 
Trust deficit 
Expert deficit 
Notions of public 
Crisis of confidence 
Participation 
Deliberation 
“Angels” mediators 
Impact evaluation 
Source: Bauer et al. (2007) 
 
Beginning in the 1960s, the scientific literacy paradigm explored questions 
pertaining to whether members of the public were scientifically literate in terms of basic 
understanding (i.e., abilities in reading, writing and numeracy) and political literacy (i.e., 
the knowledge of the political process) (Bauer et al., 2007). John Durant (1993) further 
defined scientific literacy in accordance with three aspects: knowing a lot of science 
(content), knowing how science works (process), and knowing how science really works 
(implication). He argues that knowledge of scientific facts and knowledge of the 
scientific method do not imply an understanding of their significance, so what the public 
needs to know is how scientific knowledge is generated: how scientific investigations are 
conducted and how scientific decisions are made (Gregory & Miller, 1998). 
The National Science Foundation (NSF) in the US carried out a series of surveys 
of public attitudes and knowledge about science and technology during the 1970s as part 
of its “science indicators” program. Jon Miller (1998), the designer of the NSF surveys, 
claimed that a scientifically literate citizen needs to have 1) a basic vocabulary of 
scientific terms and constructs; and 2) a general understanding of the nature of scientific 
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inquiry. Miller (1998) expects a scientifically literate citizen to be able to read and 
comprehend the Tuesday science section of The New York Times. Similarly, Durant et al. 
(1989) designed the Oxford Scientific Knowledge Scale with two dimensions: the content 
(i.e., elementary scientific knowledge) and the process (i.e., scientific research method). 
Durant et al. (1989) also conducted surveys of scientific literacy in 1988 in the US 
and the UK. These surveys contained a series of quiz-type questions that examined the 
public’s overall level of scientific understanding in various fields of science. For example, 
the respondents were asked to identify whether particular statements were correct (e.g., 
the sun goes round the earth and electrons are smaller than atoms). Another element of 
investigation regarded the knowledge of the concept of “theory” (e.g., whether Einstein’s 
theory of relativity is an idea, a well established explanation, or a proven fact). 
Ironically, while various researchers argue that it is important for the public to 
understand science, the surveys by Durant and colleagues (1989) suggested a sign of the 
public ignorance of science. While the majority of the respondents showed a moderate 
level of interest in science, their performance on factual scientific knowledge was 
unsatisfactory (averaging only 11 correct items out of 20 questions). In addition, the 
result revealed that the respondents that identified themselves as very interested and very 
well-informed tended to be better educated and have a higher score on objective scientific 
understanding. 
This situation of a scientifically illiterate citizenry mainly demands increased 
efforts in science education because of the belief that poorly informed people are 
implicitly disqualified from participating in policy decisions with scientific context 
(Bauer et al., 2007). This so-called deficit model adopts a one-way, top-down 
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communication process that relies on scientists to educate scientifically illiterate citizens. 
By conveying scientific information to citizens through school education and the mass 
media, it is expected that the public’s scientific understanding would be enhanced. 
However, based on longitudinal surveys conducted in both the US and the UK, Miller 
(2001) argues that adult scientific literacy has not significantly improved after years of 
education efforts. 
After reviewing a substantial body of the American national survey regarding the 
public understanding of (and attitudes about) science and technology from 1957 to 1999, 
Miller (2004) found that while the proportion of scientifically literate citizens in the US 
has increased over the past two decades, the overall level is still inadequate (only 17% of 
Americans qualified as scientifically literate in 1999). However, most Americans have 
expressed a positive attitude toward science and technology by showing a high degree of 
interest in new scientific and medical discoveries and holding to the belief that science 
and technology are important and beneficial in their daily lives in terms of making life 
healthier, easier, and more comfortable (Miller, 2004). Miller (2004) argues that despite 
the majority of scientifically illiterate citizens, the interest and belief in science and 
technology is embedded in American culture. 
While continually measuring the public’s overall level of scientific knowledge, a 
second paradigm predicted the public understanding of science shifts the research 
emphasis to public attitudes toward science and technology and the relationship between 
attitudes and knowledge. The concern about potential public negative attitudes toward 
science emerged prominently in the US during the mid-1980s—in the wake of a series of 
hazardous events (e.g., the Three Mile Island accident, the Love Canal incident, and the 
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Bhopal explosion). The primary research question during this time centered on 
investigations of the expectation “the more you know it, the more you love it” (Bauer et 
al., 2007). 
Allum et al. (2008) analyzed the presumed linear relationship between public 
attitudes and public knowledge about science and technology across forty countries 
during the period from 1989 to 2004. The result revealed a positive but weak correlation 
between these two variables. Nonetheless, while people that are more scientifically 
literate tend to endorse more positive attitudes toward science in general, they are not 
necessarily more positive about some controversial issues in specific technological 
applications (e.g., agricultural biotechnology, and genetically modified food). 
Both the scientific literacy paradigm and the public understanding of science 
paradigm are based on a deficit of public comprehension and an emphasis on education 
and communication to enhance lay scientific knowledge and attitudes. The final paradigm 
is grounded in the relationship between science and society and shifts the focus from the 
deficit of scientific and technological institutions and expert representatives to an 
approach based on public engagement (Bauer et al., 2007). A number of qualitative 
research studies of deliberative activities (e.g., citizen juries, hearings, and consensus 
conferences) have been conducted not only to discover the relationship between the lay 
public and science (i.e., scientific institutions and scientists), but also to attempt to 
explore the underlying social and cultural factors that influence people’s scientific 
understanding (e.g., Seargent & Steele, 1998; Rowe & Frewer, 2004; Rowe et al., 2005). 
Interestingly, the democratic argument for the public understanding of science is 
that scientifically literate citizens would be more prepared to take part in important 
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personal and societal decisions. However, Turney (1996) argues that it should be the 
other way around: if people see an opportunity to participate, then they would be more 
willing to understand science. He found that while none of the lay participants in the UK 
Consensus Conference on plant biotechnology knew about the subject, they were willing 
to study technical information from the experts during weeks of preparation because they 
knew their opinions would shape the report of the conference. 
 
Critiques of Standardized Instrument of Scientific Literacy 
Bauer et al. (2007) discusses several problems regarding the standardized measurement 
approach to assess public knowledge, interest, and attitudes about science. The first 
problem that this group of authors identifies is the vague definition of essential scientific 
knowledge. What counts as science is variously defined by different people and even by 
the same people under different circumstances (Ziman, 1991). While Miller (2001) 
suggests that citizens need to be able to comprehend science-related news articles, Durant 
and colleagues (1989) assert that citizens need to know only elementary level scientific 
facts. In reality, not everyone has access to The New York Times, and the reason why 
some adults are not smarter than fifth graders may be simply because they forgot 
elementary knowledge which may lack day-to-day relevance (Miller, 2001). As Turney 
(1996) observed, people ignore science because they tend to view the bulk of scientific 
knowledge as simply irrelevant to their needs and interests. Therefore, there is apparently 
a gap between what people think they need to know and what scientists assume people 
need to know. 
Miller (2001) argues that traditional factual communications have little lasting 
effect on knowledge levels—people tend to receive knowledge, use knowledge they need, 
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and then forget it. As discussed earlier, the practical reason for the public to understand 
science is predicated on the claim that science-based technologies affect everyone’s lives. 
Miller (2001) contends that the social application aspect of scientific knowledge (e.g., 
boiling water will kill viruses, but antibiotics will not) may be more needed and relevant 
to real life for citizens than knowing an electron is smaller than an atom. 
This point directly leads to the second problem of the measurement of scientific 
knowledge. To measure the level of scientific literacy in general, these surveys usually 
use a composite scale that may be constructed using items derived from various scientific 
disciplines. For example, Miller (1998) constructs the understanding of science and 
technology with four aspects (i.e., molecule, DNA, radiation, and the nature of the 
universe). Miller (2004) found great variations in Americans’ understanding across these 
different scientific domains. Nearly 50% of American adults correctly understand that the 
earth rotates around the sun while only approximately 10% correctly understand the 
concept of radiation (Miller, 2004). 
It seems inevitable that some people will be more familiar about certain fields, 
and others will be more knowledgeable about other scientific issues. This situation means 
that it is unlikely that people can know it all. As a result, the specific scientific knowledge 
presumed as essential and chosen by scientists to measure may directly influence the 
outcomes of these surveys on scientific literacy. In addition, while the measurement is 
supposed to be interpreted in combination, it is common for public speakers and the mass 
media to manipulate the implications by citing single items (Bauer et al., 2007). 
Moreover, although the Oxford scale showed reasonably strong reliability in 
Durant et al.’s (1989) study in the US and UK, Pardo and Calvo (2004) argue that the 
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scale is deficient in terms of its reliability in cross-cultural equivalence. Because every 
country has different scientific priorities and science-education systems, it is problematic 
(and nearly infeasible) to have a fair and universal indicator of scientific literacy for 
cross-cultural measurement and comparison (Bauer et al., 2007). 
Finally, the original concept of scientific literacy is a threshold measure. Miller 
(2004) argues that an individual needs to have “some” minimal level of literacy and be 
interested in and have positive attitudes toward science and technology to be qualified as 
a scientifically literate citizen ready to participate in political decisions. However, the 
threshold and the standard are difficult to determine—how high does one need to score to 
be considered as literate? Is correctly answering half of the items on a test of scientific 
facts sufficient? In addition, as Miller (2004) points out, 17% of adults in the United 
States qualified as scientifically literate in 1999—a level that is approximately equal to 
citizens in the UK, France, Denmark, and the Netherlands. If this level is still considered 
to be insufficient, what proportion of scientifically literate citizens should a society aim to 
achieve? 
 
Critiques of the Deficit Model 
Because the surveys conducted by Durant and colleagues (1989) revealed the finding of a 
scientific illiterate citizenry, proponents of the various deficit models demanded more 
education to improve the public’s scientific knowledge. The civil education approach has 
attracted a great deal of attention and discussion over the past decade among scholars and 
policy makers concerned about science education policy (Miller, 2004; Bauer et al., 
2007). However, Miller (2001) found that despite enhanced education and 
communication, adult scientific literacy has not been significantly improved. Apparently, 
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the educational focus on factual scientific knowledge has failed to effectively diminish 
the gap of insufficient scientific understanding. The following discussion illustrates a 
number of critiques of the deficit model. 
First, Irwin et al. (1996) contend that the traditional narrow framework based on 
scientists’ assumptions of essential scientific knowledge neglects preexisting lay 
knowledge. As discussed in Subsection 2.2.3, scientific knowledge has expanded from 
objective, homogeneous, and value-free facts to a broader sense that is diverse, 
heterogeneous, and policy-relevant. The high level of complexity, uncertainty, and 
controversy of a variety of risk-related problems in the modern society (e.g., genetically 
modified crops and environmental pollutants) requires various branches of science to 
work together with non-scientific organizations. As a result, lay knowledge can in some 
instances be as significant as expert-presumed scientific knowledge. 
In addition, this top-down, one-way education model often limits the sources of 
information available to the public and selects certain forms of knowledge that are seen 
as privileged and legitimate (Irwin et al., 1996). Based on studies of local pollution and 
hazard issues, Irwin and his colleagues (1996) argue that there is a need for more than 
one source of technical information and a requirement for interactive communication 
processes rather than a singular didactic process. It is important to know where and from 
whom citizens receive their information about technical matters because different sources 
or interest groups give rise to different public understandings. 
Finally, Turney (1996) found that public ignorance does not necessarily mean that 
the public is lacking knowledge. In a famous case involving radiation workers in a 
nuclear reprocessing plant, Wynne et al. (1990) found that even though these individuals 
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seemed to need to understand the science of radiation risks for their own health benefit, 
they resisted receiving such information. These workers justified their ignorance on their 
interpretation that they did not need to confront endemic uncertainties and they trusted 
that there were specialized experts in the company to protect them. Wynne (1995) argued 
that people do not necessarily see the need or express the interest to know more when 
they think the potential problems are under the control of trusted scientific expertise. 
Failure to improve adult scientific literacy has demonstrated that the deficit model 
(i.e., addressing the problem of scientific insufficiency with civil education) 
oversimplified the problem. It appears that public ignorance of science involves more 
underlying social-institutional considerations (e.g., trust in institutions and scientists) than 
simply the issue of inadequate scientific knowledge. Therefore, more in-depth studies are 
required to investigate the relationship between science and the lay public and to explore 
how the engagement of scientists and citizens would help policy makers to address 
controversial environmental problems in a variety of participatory practices. 
 
Integration of Science and Citizens 
The dynamic relationship between science and citizens has been a key focus of inquiry 
not only for scholars working on the public understanding of science, but it has also 
animated the efforts of policy makers interested in public participation practices. While 
Beck’s (1992) notion of the risk society captured the public’s concern about increasing 
risks in techno-industrial modern society, the privileged status of science and the benefit 
of science and technology were also challenged during this same general time period. For 
example, environmental groups began to employ counter-expertise to combat the 
“official” science deployed by industry and regulatory agencies (Yearley, 2000). 
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In addition, the emergence of an increasing number of highly complex and 
uncertain problems related to health and the environment attracted the public’s attention 
(e.g., bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), hazardous industrial wastes, and 
agricultural biotechnology). To address these controversial issues has required the 
public’s involvement in formulating public policies. For example, the Science and Society 
report published in the UK by the House of Lords (2000) not only proposed broader 
public participation in science policy, but also suggested that the process of engaging the 
public should become a normal and integral part of the policy-making process. 
However, the scientific literacy studies discussed earlier showed the existence of a 
perceptual gap with respect to scientific knowledge between privileged scientific experts 
and the general public. Durant (1995) referred to the relationship between scientists and 
citizens using the doctor-patient metaphor—“cautious skepticism is simply what any 
sensible person is inclined to exercise when dealing with professionals who have the kind 
of power that doctors have over their patients’ lives.” The point he raised was that trust 
and public discontent with expertise had become key issues in the public understanding 
of science. Therefore, he argues for a shift in the public understanding of science research 
to explore more fully how the public engages with science (Durant, 2008) 
Science shops and consensus conferences have been developed in an attempt to 
bridge the gap between scientific expertise and lay perspectives (Gregory & Miller, 1998). 
First, the concept of science shops was pioneered in the Netherlands during the 1960s and 
later spread to other European countries over the following decade. It was found at the 
time that a variety of social groups (e.g., students and non-governmental organizations) 
had limited (or even no) access to scientific knowledge. Therefore, universities 
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established science shops or specialized research centers to provide opportunities for the 
public (scientifically disadvantaged social actors) to gain access to scientific insights and 
expertise (Irwin, 1995). 
While the science shops served various client groups (e.g., environmental groups, 
trade unions, and welfare workers), they tended to get involved only in projects that met 
at least one of the following criteria: 1) the client group had no money to pay for research; 
2) the project had no commercial motives; 3) the project was in a position to implement 
the results for some practical purpose (Irwin, 1995). However, some of the non-profit and 
service-oriented Dutch science shops were closed down in the late 1990s for various 
reasons including changes in the political climate, financial cutbacks, reorganizations in 
Dutch higher education, and the professionalization of action groups (Wachelder, 2003). 
To withstand these financial constraints and the problems of marginalization in 
the university system, Fischer et al. (2004) argue that science shops need to adapt their 
strategies to the changing environment in several ways, namely by establishing political 
coalitions (from grassroots movements to policy making), building up an international 
knowledge network, engaging in commercially profitable projects, and obtaining public 
support in new social movements.22 
Second, consensus conferences, pioneered by the Danish Board of Technology in 
the 1980s, constitute a tool of deliberative democracy—engaging the public in political 
decision making with reasoned discussions (Blok, 2007). Since this time, approximately 
50 consensus conferences have been organized throughout the world (e.g., Australia, 
                                                 
22 For instance, the science shop in Bonn has engaged in commercial activities by selling 
career counseling and job-seeking help in the social and ecological field. However, 
science shops need to be aware of the potential conflicts of interests between social goals 
and commercial goals (Fischer et al., 2004). 
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Japan, the US, the UK) for a variety of controversial issues (e.g., biotechnology, medicine, 
or the environment) (e.g., Guston, 1999; Purdue, 1999; Einsiedel et al., 2001; Brown et 
al., 2004). Two primary goals of these events have been 1) to provide decision makers 
with the information resulting from the conference and 2) to stimulate public discussion 
through media coverage of both the conference and follow-up debates (Fischer, 2003a). 
This participatory process for an effective consensus conference takes months of 
preparation and involves numerous political actors (e.g., politicians, scientific experts, 
and citizens). Approximately 20 interested citizens with mixed socio-demographic 
characteristics are recruited and required to attend several weeks of preparatory meetings 
during which they need to study information from expert presentations and technical 
reports. At the official conference, usually lasting three to four days, the participants are 
intellectually capable of interacting with panels of experts and of engaging in substantive 
discussions with fellow participants. The conferees then prepare a consensus report and 
that is presented publicly to various stakeholders and decision makers (Fischer, 2003a). 
The conclusion of the conference clearly reflects the concerns of the population 
more than the traditional expert assessments. Moreover, the recommendations made by 
the participating citizens have successfully influenced the Danish Parliament on a number 
of environmental policies, namely opposing funding on animal gene technology research 
and accepting a tax on private vehicles (Fischer, 2003a). In addition, the conferees 
demonstrated increased knowledge of the subject and felt more confident in their ability 
to address technical issues generally (Joss, 1995). However, the cost of organizing 
consensus conferences is high in terms of time, money, and effort and these factors may 
be sources of concern if a pending decision is urgent (Fischer, 2003a). 
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Although these two mechanisms engage scientists and the public in different 
ways—science shops for grassroots movements and consensus conferences for policy 
making—it is interesting to find that the role of scientific experts in both practices are 
somewhat similar. Scientific experts act as assistants and service-providers who supply 
scientific information to the general public—who may have difficulty accessing science 
on their own. In addition, the relationship between the scientific experts and citizens in 
both settings shifts from the traditional top-down model of educators and receivers to 
working as side-by-side partners. Most important of all, the scientific information 
delivered in both models is the knowledge the public needs for their everyday dealings 
with science and technology and for making informed decisions (Irwin, 1995) 
However, the participatory approach is a challenge for policy makers because of 
the high cost (i.e., time, money, and effort) and the difficulty assessing the effectiveness 
of such deliberative activities. In addition, while policy makers often expect that the 
participatory activities will serve as a means of public persuasion, the outcome does not 
always turn out as expected. For example, the British public was still not convinced of 
the benefits of genetically modified crops and food products after the national GM Nation 
debate in the UK in 2003 (Bauer et al., 2007). One possible response was to conclude that 
further dialogue was needed until the public had inculcated the “right” attitude. 
Nevertheless, the key question is whether political and scientific institutions are prepared 
to accept the public’s informed decision even if it runs counter to their prefigured 
expectations. Otherwise, a situation is created whereby the dialogue and deliberation will 
not stop until the public renders the decision that the policy makers expect. 
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Summarized Review 
In brief, it is generally agreed that it is essential for the public to have a better scientific 
understanding in modern techno-industrial democratic society than is currently the case. 
The traditional deficit model assumes a public state of deficiency: citizens lack either 
enough or the right kind of knowledge, and thus fail to display sufficiently positive 
attitudes and do not make informed decisions. The limited improvement in scientific 
literacy among citizens after decades of civil education has become manifest that the 
public’s level of scientific knowledge is not solely influenced by the extent of 
information exposure—the receipt of more information does not mean we know more. 
Moreover, while the public may have inadequate scientific knowledge, scientists 
display incapacity to appreciate lay and experiential knowledge. These ordinary 
perspectives are crucial in policy making because the realm of working scientific 
knowledge has expanded from one of homogeneous and objective facts (provided by 
scientist) to an assembling of multidisciplinary viewpoints (constructed by a variety of 
societal actors). As a result, a diverse number of public engagement practices have been 
developed to bridge the relationship between scientists and citizens. These mechanisms 
are designed to create opportunities for mutual learning experiences for both scientists 
and citizens so that not only the public understands science, but also scientists understand 
the public. 
 
2.2.6  Concluding Remarks 
Given the diverse issues on the contemporary political agenda, environmental problems 
tend to be viewed as especially difficult for policy makers to manage (Carter, 2001). 
Because of increasing environmental threats in modern techno-industrial society, the 
 84
information requirements for policy makers and the general public have expanded from 
an exclusive focus on objective scientific knowledge (realists) to multidisciplinary 
scientific perceptions (constructivists). Thus, Dryzek (1997) argues that the citizen-driven 
democratic approach is a more effective mechanism than the expert-driven administrative 
approach for solving complex environmental problems in democratic governance. 
This participatory framework emphasizes deliberative interactions by involving a 
wider range of interests in the policy-making process. However, to ensure the quality of 
the deliberations and the effectiveness of resulting policy decisions, it is essential to build 
the intellectual capacity of citizens—enhancing the public understanding of science. 
Acting as communicators, scientific experts may be a significant information source for 
the public. However, the traditional deficit model that relies exclusively on an education 
approach to improve scientific literacy has been judged to be a problematic 
oversimplification. 
In addition to the extent of scientific knowledge, there are underlying social and 
cultural factors that influence the public’s scientific understanding. In an effort to bridge 
the relationship between scientists and citizens and to involve multiple perspectives in the 
policy-making process, a number of participatory practices have been developed to 
encourage the public to acquire necessary scientific information and to let scientists and 
policy makers understand the perspectives of lay citizens. 
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2.3  Sociological Studies of Climate Change 
2.3.1  Introduction 
Global climate change’s anthropogenic causes, adverse impacts on human society, and 
potential solutions are connected to each individual on the planet at various degrees. It is 
a profound challenge for environmental sociologists to understand how human beings 
perceive, respond, and expect to resolve this complex global environmental problem. In 
addition, as discussed in Section 2.2, to integrate scientific and lay perspectives into the 
environmental policy-making process in modern techno-industrial societies, it is essential 
to enhance societal understanding of science. Social scientific research has in recent years 
been playing a role to integrate these domains (i.e., science, citizens, and politics) and to 
bridge the different appraisals of laypeople and scientific experts. It is accordingly also a 
critical challenge for environmental sociologists to explore how these three domains 
influence and interact with each other. 
This section examines recent findings from sociological studies of the public 
understanding of climate change. Subsection 2.3.2 highlights the rationale of the 
relationships among attitudes, knowledge, and behavioral intentions from a social 
psychological perspective. Subsection 2.3.3 reviews the evolution and the context of 
public perception of climate change since the 1980s. Subsection 2.3.4 discusses the 
public’s scientific knowledge and misconceptions regarding climate change.23 Subsection 
2.3.5 examines several participatory practices that have engaged citizens in the 
development of climate policies. Subsection 2.3.6 concludes this section. 
                                                 
23 This paper defines “perception” as general concern and awareness—people’s initial 
impression about climate change. In contrast, “understanding” is defined as in-depth 
scientific knowledge that includes comprehension of causes, consequences, and 
responding strategies. Therefore, the review is separated into two subsections. 
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2.3.2  Theoretical Relationships of Attitudes, Knowledge, and Behaviors 
Dietz and Rosa (2002) argue that environmental sociologists need to “work at both the 
local and global, or micro and macro levels, and especially at the meso level that seeks to 
link phenomena at these two levels to understand the human dimensions of global 
change.” Such an observation suggests that it is of particular interest to explore how 
people at the local level view and interpret this global problem and how they conceive of 
the responses being mobilized by various institutions (e.g., governments, corporate, and 
civil society organizations). 
Rosa (2001) further asserts that “sociology has approached the global climate 
change problem from opposite ends of the epistemological spectrum: an interpretive, 
social constructivist perspective (von Storch & Stehr, 1997) and an ecological, scientific 
perspective (Dietz & Rosa, 1997).” The first perspective has centered on exploring key 
factors that shape public understanding of climate change through the assimilation of 
scientific claims-making. The second perspective has focused on scientific and policy 
issues such as the modeling of human sources of CO2 buildup (Dietz & Rosa, 1997) and 
the societal impact assessment of carbon policies (Krebill-Prather & Rosa, 1994). 
In accordance with the social constructivist perspective, Dietz and Rosa (2002) 
contend that two major issues emerged in environmental sociological research on climate 
change: 1) understanding public perceptions and concerns and 2) examining human 
responses to those perceptions (e.g., individual decision making at a micro level, and 
organizational and state responses at a macro level). Moreover, a particular emphasis 
worthy of study has been the relationship between public comprehension and its 
responses—how people’s concern stimulates their actions to combat climate change. 
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While scientific research on global climate change originated during the 1950s, 
the issue did not begin to attract popular attention until the 1980s. Since then social 
scientists have applied considerable effort to measuring people’s concerns about various 
climate-related issues. Dunlap and Jones (2002) argue that public concern is often 
conceptualized and investigated through two approaches: a theoretical approach and a 
policy-relevant approach (see Section 4.5). Based on attitude theory (Maloney & Ward, 
1973), the theoretical approach investigates the knowledge of respondents in terms of the 
nature of beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors and the theoretical and empirical 
relationships at a micro or individual level from a social psychological perspective. 
The aim of this work is that by collecting data on public concerns and attitudes 
about climate change it might become possible to predict how the public will act. Figure 
2.2 shows the basic structure of attitude-behavior theory (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). A 
person’s beliefs and societal performance expectations determine how s/he will act and, 
in turn, perform certain behaviors. Dunlap and Jones (2002) argue that these attitudes are 
generally presented in four ways: affective (i.e., emotion or feelings), cognitive (i.e., 
relevant knowledge), conative (i.e., intention or commitment to act), and behavioral (i.e., 
actual or reported actions) expressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2.2 The attitude-behavior theory and the expressions of attitudes. 
Source: Ajzen and Fishbein (1980); Dunlap and Jones (2002) 
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Various inquiries have used different models to examine which factors determine 
a person’s environmentally relevant behaviors and to investigate how these factors 
associate with each other. For example, Krosnick et al. (2006) use the so-called ACE 
model to determine the seriousness of a respondent’s judgments about global warming 
with variables such as Attitudes toward consequences, Certainty, and Existence beliefs. In 
addition, Leiserowitz (2006) argues that the general public’s risk perceptions and policy 
support are determined by a variety of psychological and socio-cultural factors (i.e., 
affect, imagery, and values).24 
Patchen (2006) integrated several theoretical models and created a comprehensive 
model to determine behaviors relevant to climate change.25 He argues that individuals are 
influenced by various social forces and personal characteristics and accordingly evaluates 
his/her situation by making a preferred choice based on four motives: emotional concern, 
benefit-cost analysis, personal capability, and personal habit (Figure 2.3). 
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24 Affective images refer to people’s positive or negative feelings for specific visual or 
symbolic impressions of climate change. Values include worldviews of social relations 
such as hierarchical, fatalistic, individualistic, and egalitarian (Leiserowitz, 2006). 
 
25 Figure 2.3 does not indicate detailed associations among factors in Pachen’s study. 
Figure 2.3 Patchen’s model of the determinants of behavior relevant to climate change. 
Personal Characteristics 
 
Knowledge 
Value-ideology 
Demographic 
Appraisals of Situation 
 
Seriousness of Problem 
Possible Solutions 
Who is Responsible— 
Who should Act? 
Personal Role 
Emotions 
Benefit-Costs 
of Actions 
Ability to Take 
Specific Actions 
Behavior
Habit 
 89
On the basis of a comprehensive review of relevant studies, Patchen (2006) 
identifies two reasons that drive people to take actions to preserve the environment and to 
combat climate change. The first reason, originated from the utilitarian concept, is the 
rational judgment of “net benefit”—the merits outweigh the costs of actions. The other 
reason, based on emotional concern, is the fear of being threatened by climate-change 
impacts. In addition to the introduction of messages that focus on these two reasons, he 
argues that it is essential to inform people about their shared responsibility for the 
problem and about specific actions that they can take to tackle climate change. 
A key concern discussed by Patchen (2006) was the judgment of seriousness of 
climate change. Krosnick et al. (2006) conducted a nation-wide telephone interview study 
in the US during 1997-1998 to investigate the factors that may influence people’s 
perception of the seriousness of global warming. The result revealed that individual 
seriousness about the problem is an interactive function of existence beliefs, attitudes, 
certainty, and beliefs about human responsibility and policy effectiveness. In other words, 
people who believe that human-induced global warming exists and causes adverse 
consequences with a high certainty will likely regard climate change as a serious problem 
and support robust climate policies. 
These beliefs are influenced by a variety of factors. Existence beliefs depend on 
whether people have relevant personal experiences with relevant real-world conditions, 
whether they have trust in scientists and have cognitive skills to judge, and their exposure 
to relevant news media messages. Attitudes toward climate change depend on how people 
perceive and evaluate particular consequences. Finally, certainty is influenced by people’s 
knowledge and perceptions (Krosnick et al., 2006). 
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A variety of external factors appears to influence an individual’s attitudes toward 
climate change when appraising his or her situation (Patchen, 2006). According to many 
national surveys and opinion polls conducted over the course of the past two decades, 
general public awareness toward global climate change has increased considerably since 
1988 (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006). At the same time, some researchers have described 
fluctuations in public concern and interest in the issue. Ungar (1992) argues that the 
public’s attention has tended to be attracted and catalyzed by real-world events. An 
example of this phenomenon is that while scientific evidence of global warming had 
existed for some time before 1988, it was the unusually hot and dry summer that year in 
the US that first mobilized vigorous social attention around the issue and first ignited 
public anxiety in the country. 
In contrast, Krosnick et al. (2000) discovered in the surveys conducted before and 
after the 1997 Kyoto Conference that although the international debate about the resultant 
Protocol attracted popular attention and strengthened existing beliefs and attitudes, no 
significant changes could be discerned in public opinion about climate change. Ungar 
(2000) argues that global climate change lacks the currency and day-to-day relevance 
necessary to motivate individuals to obtain information. This observation is relevant in 
helping to understand why public interest in climate change has fluctuated over time. 
In addition to the occurrence of real-world events, another factor influencing the 
public’s variable attention span and perception is media coverage—how the issue is 
reported by journalists and interpreted by readers (e.g., Harrison, 1982; McComas & 
Shanahan, 1999; Corbett & Durfee, 2004). For example, balance, a cherished journalistic 
norm, can contribute to informational bias in the case of climate change (Boykoff & 
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Boykoff, 2004; 2007). An analysis of so-called prestige-press coverage of global 
warming in the US from 1988 to 2002 revealed that although the international scientific 
community had by that point reached a consensus on the anthropogenic contributions to 
global warming, the majority (52.7%) of coverage in the US gave roughly equal attention 
to two views: anthropogenic causes and natural fluctuations (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004). 
Boykoff and Roberts (2007) analyzed forty English-language newspapers during 
1988-2006 in seventeen countries including the US, the UK, Japan, and Australia. The 
result revealed that coverage of climate change/global warming and adaptation has been 
lower outside of Europe and North America. Moreover, this reporting was often 
comprised of “second-hand” news stories reproduced from Europe and North American 
sources. A separate quantitative analysis of newspaper coverage of climate change in the 
US and UK by Boykoff and Rajan (2007) found that the number of news articles in both 
countries has increased significantly since 2006, and they attribute this effect to the 
publicity that former Vice-President Al Gore generated with his film An Inconvenient 
Truth. 
In brief, one research emphasis for environmental sociologists has been to 
investigate people’s beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behavioral intentions from a social 
psychological perspective. In addition to external social influences, one key personal 
characteristic that appears to shape an individual’s attitudes and influences is his or her 
knowledge-appraisal process. This factor is closely related to the key inquiry of this 
doctoral research—how scientific understanding may help the public take actions to 
combat climate change. The next two subsections review the general public’s perceptions 
and scientific understanding of climate change. 
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2.3.3  Public Perception of Climate Change 
Enhancing public awareness of climate change is considered to be a prerequisite for 
galvanizing successful grassroots movements committed to changing individual 
behaviors and putting pressure on governments to formulate effective policies. This 
discussion primarily highlights the findings from a study by Nisbet and Myers (2007) that 
compiled the results of over 70 polls and surveys over the past two decades.26 Findings 
from numerous survey and focus-group studies are also included in the analysis. The 
content of the public’s perception was analyzed in several aspects (e.g., initial awareness, 
beliefs in the reality of climate change, and risk perception). 
 
Public Awareness of Climate Change 
Before exploring the context of what the public thinks of the issue of climate change, it is 
reasonable to understand their basic impression—do they even know about the issue? 
This is why the most simple and commonly-used indicator in early public opinion polls 
and surveys of a person’s level of awareness of climate change was to ask respondents 
“Have you heard or read anything about the greenhouse effect, global warming, or 
climate change?” Nisbet and Myers (2007) found that most of the American public was 
not aware of the issue until the record-breaking hot summer of 1988. Only 39% of the 
respondents in 1986 had heard about the greenhouse effect. The percentage increased to 
58% in 1988 and grew to over 80% in the 1990s, and 91% in 2006. 
                                                 
26 The public polls and surveys compiled by Nisbet and Myers (2007) have respondents 
of nationally representative adult samples with sample size of approximately 1,000 or 
more. The data sources include a variety of survey agency, news organizations (e.g., 
Gallup Organization, Cambridge Reports, ABC News, the Pew Research Center). While 
citing data from Nisbet and Myers (2007), this chapter does not specifically reference the 
original survey sources in the references. 
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Belief in the Reality of Climate Change 
One of the most important concerns is whether or not the public believes that climate 
change/global warming caused by the enhanced greenhouse effect is a “real” issue with 
the level of severity that necessitates concern and response. According to Nisbet and 
Myers (2007), 68% of the American public in 1992 believed in the reality of the issue. 
Since then an increased percentage of Americans has been convinced that the world’s 
temperatures have risen, ranging from 72% in 2000 to 84% in 2007. 
However, with the increased scientific confidence that accompanied publication 
of the IPCC’s fourth assessment report in 2007, why would some people still have doubts 
on the reality of global climate change? Leiserowitz (2006) discusses five reasons why 
people may deny the reality of global climate change: 1) the belief that global warming is 
a natural course of events; 2) the belief that the problem is exaggerated by the media; 3) 
the belief that the scientific evidence is insufficient; 4) the belief that global warming is a 
false theory; 5) the belief that the problem is made up by some conspiracy theories. 
Nisbet and Myers (2007) also discover that while most Americans are affirmative 
that the phenomenon is happening, they are less certain about scientists’ position on the 
issue. Despite slightly different questions and phrases from various surveys, not many 
respondents believe that there is a consensus among scientists on the issue, ranging from 
28% in 1994 to 40% in 2007. In addition, only 32% of the respondents in a 2007 poll 
answered that they trust scientists on the issue of environment “completely” or “a lot” 
while 43% trust them moderately and 24% trust them “little” or “not at all.” Thus, Nisbet 
and Myers (2007) argue “trust in scientists likely remains a factor in perceptions of the 
scientific evidence relative to global warming.” 
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The Pew Research Center (2008a) conducted a poll (n=1,502) in April 2008 and 
found that while most Americans (73%) believed that global warming is a serious 
problem, only 47% thought it was caused by human activities. Similar to the 
contradictory result in the US, a poll (n=1,039) conducted by Ipsos MORI in the UK in 
May 2008 revealed that while a majority of British respondents (77%) were concerned 
about climate change, 60% still doubted that climate change is induced by humans (Ipsos 
MORI, 2008). 
 
Public Risk Perception of Climate Change Impacts 
Although the majority of the public in the US believes that climate change is real and 
occurring, people are less certain about the role of anthropogenic forces. This conception 
is likely influenced by a perception that deep disagreements continue to exist among 
scientists (Nisbet & Myers, 2007) and by informational bias from ostensibly balanced 
media coverage (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004). Moreover, the public’s expression of worry 
about climate change is affected by how people perceive the immediacy of impacts 
related to climate change. This is an important point because lay risk perceptions may 
influence the resultant sense of urgency to take mitigation actions. If people do not feel 
climate change is dangerous and do not feel threatened, why would they feel compelled 
to take any actions? 
Peters and Slovic (2000) argue that this negative affect would drive people to 
make a change in order to remove themselves from the dangerous situation and lessen 
their feeling of being at risk. Weber (2006) argues that two approaches that can establish 
a person’s risk perception and trigger his/her reactions include 1) experiencing adverse 
consequences personally and 2) receiving statistical information of adverse consequences 
 95
from experts. On one hand, even though some extreme weather events occasionally 
happen these days, one challenge to experience-based reactions is the relatively small 
likelihood of seriously adverse impacts for most people in the current generation. 
On the other hand, the challenge for the second approach is the potential conflict 
between subjective risk perceptions and objective risk assessments provided by scientists. 
Without one of these two interventions (i.e., personal experiences and statistical 
description), people will fail to pay attention and to allocate resources to moderate 
climate-change risks. However, decision makers need to be cautious when employing 
these interventions to enhance the public’s risk perception of climate change because it 
may compromise their concern about other important risks (e.g., hazardous waste 
exposure) (Weber, 2006). 
Although there is a growing consensus among climate scientists about the 
anthropogenic influences and the potential adverse impacts of climate change, the exact 
effects (i.e., when, where, and at what degrees will these impacts happen) remain 
uncertain. Oppenheimer (2005) argues that even though natural scientists have done their 
best to quantify their assessments and to estimate future scenarios, there are apparently 
limits on the extent to which science can define climate “danger.” 
Take the disintegration of the major ice sheets as an example. There are still 
uncertainties about how much warming will occur, how much ice will melt, how much 
sea-level will rise, and when these changes will happen. Even if there is a perfect 
computer model that can project the scenario with countless variables, the model cannot 
assess how dangerous the collapsed ice sheets are for different people (Oppenheimer, 
2005). Thus, Oppenheimer (2005) argues “social science may also make important 
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contributions by helping policy makers understand the way in which values arising from 
cultural and ethical considerations ought to contribute to determining the final outcome.” 
A Gallup poll (n=1,012) conducted in March 2008 revealed that while 61% of 
Americans recognized that global warming has already begun, only 37% worried about 
the problem (in comparison to 35% in 1990) and only 34% thought additional, immediate, 
and drastic actions were necessary (Gallup, 2008). This perception may be caused by the 
fact that only less than half of Americans believed that global warming would pose a 
threat to them in their lifetime, ranging from 25% in 1997 to 33% in 2002 to 40% in 2008 
(Nisbet & Myers, 2007; Gallup, 2008). 
Nisbet and Myers (2007) found that the percentage of Americans who worried a 
“great deal” about global warming fluctuated during the course of the past two decades, 
ranging from 35% in 1989 to 24% in 1997 to 41% in 2007 (in the aftermath of the release 
of The Inconvenient Truth). The level of concern about global warming was significantly 
lower compared to other environmental issues, especially water-related pollution issues. 
For example, a total of 58% of Americans worried a “great deal” about drinking polluted 
water. 
Based on a nation-wide survey conducted during 2002-2003, Leiserowitz (2006) 
found that Americans perceived global climate change as an issue that carried moderate 
risk. Interestingly, a total of 68% of the respondents were most concerned about the 
impacts on people around the world and non-human biological community, compared to 
13% who were concerned about the impacts on themselves, family, and the local 
community, 9% were concerned about the impact on the US, and 10% were not 
concerned at all. Due to the perception of lower personal and local relevancy, Leiserowitz 
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(2006) argues that the moderate level of concern may explain why global warming has 
been placed in a lower political priority. 
Based on two national surveys conducted during 2002-2003, Lorenzoni et al. 
(2006) compared the affective images of climate change among the British and American 
publics. The respondents were requested to identify three images coming up in their 
minds regarding climate change and to rate the affect toward the images (positive or 
negative). The study reported that while the British and American publics shared several 
impressions (e.g., flood, sea level, and changing climate), they had some different 
perceptions. 
For example, the British respondents were more sensitive to the images: “ozone,” 
“pollution,” “weather,” “greenhouse,” and “rain.” In contrast, significantly more 
American respondents mentioned “ice melting,” “heat,” “nature,” “disaster,” and 
“skepticism.” In addition, the respondents in both countries felt a negative attitude toward 
climate change, which means they felt the problem was a bad thing. Moreover, citizens in 
both countries considered climate change (i.e., its impacts, causes, and solution) to be less 
personally relevant and psychologically distant (Lorenzoni et al., 2006). 
Lazo et al. (2000) employed a quantitative survey to investigate whether experts 
and laypeople had different perceptions of ecosystem risks caused by global climate 
change in terms of various risk characteristics (e.g., understandability and controllability). 
While laypeople tend to presume catastrophic ecosystem impacts from climate change, 
they believe that scientists have sufficient understanding about the risks and that these 
impacts are manageable. In contrast, although experts do not perceive climate-change 
impacts to be significant as laypeople, they think that these risks are less understandable 
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and less controllable. The result suggests a need for better risk communication between 
climate scientists and laypeople because these two groups appear to hold significantly 
different risk perceptions. 
 
Public Support for Policy Action and the Kyoto Protocol 
As discussed above, the general public tends to view global climate change as less 
personally relevant and more psychologically distant. That is why global warming was 
ranked by Americans as a relatively low priority compared with other public issues (Pew 
Research Center, 2008a). Similarly, although there was a high level of concern about 
climate change, Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003) found in a 2002 British survey that people 
tended to place their main priorities on other personal issues such as health, family, and 
safety. 
This conclusion corresponds quite closely with two other surveys carried out in 
the UK in 2004. By this point in the political evolution of the issue, most people had 
heard about global warming and viewed it as the most important environmental issue of 
the day, but they considered terrorism and domestic issues as higher priorities (Norton & 
Leaman, 2004; Kirby, 2004). A total of 68% of the British people in 2008 wanted the 
government to do more on the issue of climate change, but 59% questioned the 
government’s underlying motivation—to raise taxes (Ipsos MORI, 2008). 
Leiserowitz (2006) found in the 2002-2003 survey that Americans demonstrated a 
contradictory mentality toward climate change risk perception and policy preferences. 
Even though the American public expressed moderate levels of concern about the issue 
(largely because they did not think climate change would impact them), 90% of the 
respondents thought that the US should reduce its GHG emissions. 
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In addition, the majority of Americans supported the Kyoto Protocol (88%) and 
expected the US to reduce its GHG emissions regardless of what other countries did 
(76%) in the 2002-2003 survey (Leiserowitz, 2006). Nisbet and Myers (2007) found a 
similar result—64% in 2002 and 73% of Americans in 2005 thought the US should 
participate in the Kyoto Protocol to reduce global warming. Interestingly, when the 
survey provided President Bush’s argument for withdrawing from the treaty—the treaty 
places too much of an economic burden on the US while demanding little of developing 
countries, the public had a slightly different response. The 2001 Gallup poll revealed that 
while the majority of Americans disapproved of President Bush’s decision (ranging from 
48% to 51%), there were a significant number of people accepted his argument (ranging 
from 32% to 41 %) (Nisbet & Myers, 2007). 
Furthermore, while most Americans supported a variety of GHG 
emission-reduction policies at the national level, they opposed tax polices that would 
directly affect them (Leiserowitz, 2006; Nisbet & Myers, 2007). Leiserowitz (2006) 
found that over 70% of the American public supported policy actions on increasing 
vehicle-emission standards, regulating CO2 as an air pollutant, and shifting subsidies 
from the fossil-fuel industries to the renewable energy industries. Support for a 
market-based emission trading system was divided evenly (40% in favor; 40% opposed; 
18% unsure). 
Nisbet and Myers (2007) concluded with similar findings from a 2007 Gallup poll. 
A total of 79% and 84% of Americans favored the initiatives that set higher emission 
standards for automobile and for industries. In addition, 81% of Americans supported 
proposals to develop solar and wind power and to impose mandatory controls on GHG 
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emissions. Nonetheless, although the public was strongly in favor of increased 
investment in solar and wind energy, the support on expanding nuclear energy was split 
(50% in favor and 46% opposed). Moreover, compared to the same poll in 2001, these 
opinions did not change significantly. 
Interestingly, while Americans have a tendency to support policies targeting 
industry, they are not so enthusiastic about policies targeting households and consumers. 
Although a total of 54% of the respondents favored a gas-guzzler tax (Leiserowitz, 2006), 
approximately 80% of Americans resisted increasing taxes on electricity and 70% 
opposed increasing taxes on gasoline (Nisbet & Myers, 2007). This result may suggest 
that Americans expect the problem can be solved by someone else (e.g., government and 
industry), without changes in their personal behavior (Leiserowitz, 2006). 
In addition, based on an ABC poll in 2007, Nisbet and Myers (2007) found that 
the majority of Americans prefers a voluntary approach with financial incentives rather 
than a mandatory approach for a variety of policy actions: reducing automobile gasoline 
consumption, reducing appliance electricity consumption, and reducing household and 
office energy consumption. The only exception is a strategy to reduce the GHG emissions 
that power plants are allowed to release: 62% of Americans think the government should 
require these facilities to reduce their releases by law. 
In recent years, carbon capture and storage (CCS) has emerged as an important 
policy response for limiting GHG emissions. Shackley et al. (2005) investigated the 
public perception of CCS in the UK and his survey results revealed that a majority of the 
British public was not at the time familiar with this technology. The respondents viewed 
CCS as one part of a decarbonization strategy, along with renewable energy technology, 
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energy efficiency, and lifestyle change. Public support for CCS depended on three 
commitments: acknowledgment of human-induced climate change, recognition of the 
seriousness of climate-change impacts, and acceptance of the need to reduce carbon 
emissions. Interestingly, the level of public support for CCS slightly increased after some 
information was provided to the respondents. 
 
Public Perception of Taking Personal Actions 
The discussion above implies that most people do not support the policy options that may 
directly jeopardize their benefits or lifestyles (e.g., gasoline tax policy). While mitigating 
climate change will likely require behavioral adjustments at some level, it is particularly 
interesting to examine how the public perceives its roles and responsibilities in combating 
climate change. Table 2.3 shows a comprehensive analysis of what the British public 
identified as barriers to engage with climate change at individual and social levels 
(Lorenzoni et al., 2007). 
At social levels, the public thought that the government and industry did not make 
sufficient efforts toward tackling climate change and that social norms are difficult to 
resist (e.g., owning a vehicle is considered part of a good lifestyle). In contrast, the public 
identified a variety of constraints that inhibit mitigation actions. For instance, people are 
not knowledgeable about causes, consequences, and potential solutions to the problem. 
The dominant belief system in contemporary society (e.g., technocentrism and fatalism) 
may also restrain their actions. Lorenzoni et al. (2007) argue that there is a need for 
policy makers to address these concerns and to overcome people’s barriers to effectively 
achieve reduction targets and to enable the public to shift to more sustainable lifestyles. 
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Table 2.3 Public Perception of Barriers to Engaging with Climate Change 
Individual Barriers Social Barriers 
y Lack of knowledge about the causes, consequences, and potential 
solutions 
y Uncertainty and skepticism about the causes, seriousness, 
necessity and effectiveness of actions 
y Distrust in information sources (e.g., media) 
y Externalizing responsibility and blame (i.e., causes and solution) 
to governments and industries 
y Reliance on technology (e.g., technology will solve the problem) 
y Climate change perceived as a distant threat in space and in time 
y Importance of other priorities (e.g., family, local environmental 
issues) 
y Reluctance to change lifestyles because of concerns about 
degrading living standard, inconvenience and cost 
y Fatalism (e.g., It is too late to do anything) 
y Helplessness feeling due to the global scale of the problem 
y Lack of political action by 
local, national and 
international governments 
and distrust in governments 
y Lack of actions by business 
and industry 
y Worry about “free-rider 
effect” (e.g., why would I 
take actions if no one else 
does?) 
y Pressure of social norms and 
expectations (e.g., social 
status of car ownership) 
y Lack of enabling initiatives 
(e.g., availability of 
alternative choices) 
Source: Lorenzoni et al. (2007) 
 
Cross National Comparisons of Public Perception 
As the prior discussion demonstrates, there have been numerous studies targeting the 
social dimensions of global climate change in the US and Europe. In contrast, researchers 
have carried out fewer inquiries on other regions of the world or investigations predicated 
on broad cross-cultural analyses. A poll conducted in 2008 across 12 countries by the 
UNEP (n=12,000) suggested that the environment remained a concern despite the 
financial crises and that 43% of respondents thought global climate change was a bigger 
problem than the economy. A total of 75% of respondents wanted their countries to 
reduce GHG emissions at least as much as other nations and 55% of them wanted their 
government to invest in renewable energy (UNEP, 2008b). 
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Deriving data from a 2007 ACNielsen global online survey, Sandvik (2008) 
investigated the relationship between public concern about global warming, national 
economic wealth level (i.e., per capita GDP), and CO2 emissions. The result of the 
cross-national analysis (46 countries) ironically revealed that the willingness of a nation 
to commit to reduce its GHG emissions is negatively correlated to its GDP level and its 
share of CO2 emissions. In other words, citizens of affluent nations were less concerned 
about climate change than citizen of less wealthy nations. 
 
Youth Perception of Climate Change 
Based on a 1999 Eurobarometer survey that recruited over 14,000 respondents from 15 
countries, Hersch and Viscusi (2006) argue that there are significant intergenerational 
differences in willingness to pay higher gasoline prices to protect the environment. The 
younger age groups were “more willing” to pay and were willing to “pay more” for 
gasoline than older age groups. This age-related difference is likely influenced by 
exposure to environmental risk information—younger age groups are better informed 
because they are more exposed to various available information sources. The result 
suggests that policy makers should consider the perspectives of different age 
subpopulations while pursuing certain initiatives especially in countries with distinct 
demographic trends (e.g., an aging society). 
Because this doctoral research targets the subpopulation of youth as the study 
population (also see Section 4.3), a UNEP survey conducted in 2008—when this doctoral 
research was carried out—is reviewed. According to this online survey (n=1999), a total 
of 88% of young people, ranging in age from 12 to 18 years old, across five countries 
(Brazil, India, Russia, South Africa, and the US) thought world leaders should do 
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“whatever it takes” to tackle climate change (UNEP, 2008a). The study also found that an 
average of 85% of the respondents across all five sample countries was concerned about 
climate change. A majority (89%) believed that young people like them could make a 
difference on the issue. The youth from Brazil, India, South Africa, and the US (the 
averages were above 90%) were more enthusiastic about their personal contribution than 
those from Russia (77%). 
 
Summarized Review 
In brief, the public’s awareness toward global climate change has increased in the past 
two decades. While most people believe in the authenticity of the issue, they have doubt 
about the scientific consensus and anthropogenic influences. In addition, even though the 
public has a negative impression about climate-change impacts, most people do not seem 
to overly worry about the problem because they do not perceive climate change as an 
immediate threat to them. That most people consider climate change to be less personally 
relevant and psychologically distant may influence their sense of urgency to take action 
and their choice of prioritized public policies. 
Moreover, while most Americans think that their government should support the 
Kyoto Protocol and implement a variety of national policies to reduce its GHG emissions, 
they place the responsibility of reduction on the government and industries. The public in 
the US tends to oppose tax policies that target households and consumers. These results 
suggest that the general public not only has different risk perceptions from scientific 
experts, but they also have different expectations about responsibility to combat climate 
change. This body of research suggests that scientists and policy makers have an 
obligation to improve communication with the general public regarding climate change. 
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2.3.4  Public Scientific Understanding of Climate Change 
The discussion in Section 2.2 points out that a scientifically literate citizenry is an 
essential component in a democratic society for addressing environmental problems with 
high scientific and technological complexity. In addition, social psychologists consider 
knowledge/cognitive expression as one important indicator of a person’s behavior (Ajzen 
& Fishbein, 1980). Hence, it is an important task for environmental sociologists to 
investigate the general public’s level of scientific understanding of global climate change. 
However, compared to the great body of survey studies that have been carried out 
on public perception, a far smaller number have sought to measure the public’s 
comprehensive understanding of climate change. Unlike opinion polls on which 
respondents can directly express their views, investigating factual knowledge requires 
more intensive cooperation because it is time consuming and it may not be popular 
(people may resist taking a quiz). This factor helps to explain why the most commonly 
used indicator of scientific knowledge in existing surveys is a simpler indicator—the 
knowledge of causes of climate change. 
Nisbet and Myers (2007) analyzed Gallup’s polls over the past two decades and 
found that only a small fraction of the American public has confidently self-evaluated 
their knowledge level of global warming as “very well,” ranging from 11% in 1992 to 
22% in 2007. The majority of the respondents felt that they understood the issue “fairly 
well,” ranging from 42% in 1992 to 54% in 2007. Due to the lack of studies focusing on a 
comprehensive investigation of scientific knowledge, this subsection reviews findings in 
the following aspects (i.e., limited understanding and misunderstanding of climate 
change). 
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A Limited Scientific Understanding 
Early studies showed that although people are increasingly aware of global climate 
change, they have a limited understanding of its particular causes, consequences, and 
solutions (e.g., Bostrom et al., 1994; Read et al., 1994; Stamm et al., 2000). For instance, 
Read et al. (1994) found that Americans had a limited conception of climate change. 
Although most respondents knew the basic scientific concept of the greenhouse 
effect—the atmosphere traps heat from the sun—many of them did not view the 
phenomenon as a normal process vital to humans’ survival. Furthermore, the respondents 
showed a moderate understanding of the mechanism of albedo—increasing albedo would 
reduce temperature because of the effects of increasing cloud cover and atmospheric 
aerosols (e.g., suspended dust and volcanic eruption particles) (Read et al., 1994). 
Brechin (2003) analyzed two surveys conducted in 1999 and 2001 by Environics 
International and found that misunderstanding of the cause of climate change was 
observed on a worldwide basis. While many respondents correctly indicated deforestation 
and air pollution as causes, few respondents identified correctly that fossil fuels were the 
primary anthropogenic contributor to global warming in the 1999 survey. Of 27 countries, 
Finland was the country with the highest percentage of correct responses: 17%. 
However, other studies revealed different results. The General Social Survey in 
1994 and 2000 showed that the majority of Americans (61% and 62%) could correctly 
identify the use of fossil fuels (i.e., coal, oil, and gas) as a contributor to the greenhouse 
effect (Nisbet & Myers, 2007). A survey conducted by Spellman et al. (2003) in 2000 
aimed to assess the level of scientific knowledge of British higher education students on 
the issue of global warming. The result revealed that a significant percentage of the 
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respondents (78% on average) had a fairly good understanding of ten scientific 
statements related to global warming and the greenhouse effect. Over 90% of the 
respondents correctly identified key causes of global warming (i.e., CO2, fossil fuels, and 
deforestation) and the largest GHG emitter in the world at the time (i.e., the US). 
Based on multinational surveys in 2003-2004, Reiner et al. (2006) compared 
public opinions of climate change and energy-policy preferences in the US, the UK, 
Sweden, and Japan. Over 70% of the respondents in all four countries correctly 
understood that cars and coal plants increase the level of CO2 in the atmosphere and that 
wind turbines either have no impact or reduce CO2 levels and planting trees can decrease 
CO2 levels. 
Reiner et al. (2006) also observed one inconsistency—the knowledge about 
nuclear plants. Approximately 30% of the respondents in Sweden and over 60% of the 
respondents in other three countries either had an incorrect understanding of nuclear 
plants (i.e. nuclear power increases CO2 atmospheric concentrations) or did not know the 
answer. Another inconsistency was the knowledge about CCS. The majority of the 
respondents in Sweden (60%) and Japan (75%) correctly identified that CCS could 
moderate global warming, while a lower percentage of the respondents in the US (20%) 
and the UK (40%) had correct answers. 
In contrast to the reasonably good level of knowledge about the causes, the public 
appears to have a relatively poorer understanding of the adverse impacts and solutions to 
climate change. Nisbet and Myers (2007) found in the surveys taken in 2002, 2004, and 
2005 that less than half of Americans (42%, 48%, and 43%) answered correctly to 
questions pertaining to their government’s political responses to the Kyoto Protocol (that 
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the Bush administration had withdrawn support for the accord). In addition, Spellman et 
al. (2003) found that the British higher education students performed with a lower 
correctness rate in two scientific statements: the effect of volcanic eruptions on the global 
climate (52%) and global warming impacts on crop and timber production in Europe 
(52%). 
 
Scientific Misunderstanding 
In addition to its limited scientific knowledge of global climate change, the public has for 
a long time confused the issue with stratospheric ozone depletion. Early studies by 
Bostrom et al. (1994) and Read et al. (1994) found that respondents tended (at least at the 
time) to confound the ozone problem with the greenhouse effect and weather with climate. 
Moreover, the respondents tended to problematically propose general pollution control as 
the most effective form of mitigation for climate change. Nisbet and Myers (2007) also 
found that a majority of Americans (57% in 1994 and 54% in 2000) were confused about 
global warming and stratospheric ozone depletion—they thought the greenhouse effect is 
caused by a hole in the earth’s atmosphere. 
Similarly, Gowda et al. (1997) reported a number of misconceptions on the part of 
American high school students. In addition to the common confusions (i.e., ozone 
depletion and weather), the students not only confused climate change with multiple 
unrelated environmental disruptions, but also mistakenly overestimated the temperature 
change—higher than adults and IPCC scientists. These scholars analyzed several factors 
that may cause students’ misunderstanding: 1) inadequate information exposure on 
climate change (especially through academic channels); 2) skewed media coverage 
(especially through television); 3) erroneous judgements about complex phenomena 
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because of heuristic education; 4) generalization of environmentalism. Nonetheless, 
because the students expressed a high level of trust in scientists and teachers, Gowda et al. 
(1997) suggest that it is both the opportunity and responsibility of these two actors to 
educate and communicate this complex problem and to enhance the public’s scientific 
understanding. 
Furthermore, Sterman and Sweeney (2007) conducted an experimental study 
targeting highly educated adults in the United States (i.e., graduate students at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT) to investigate their scientific knowledge of 
the mass balance principle and the basic process of GHG stabilization—atmospheric 
GHG concentrations will stabilize only when emissions equal removal. These researchers 
found a widespread misconception insomuch as respondents believed that if GHG 
emissions decreased, the atmospheric GHG concentrations and the mean global 
temperature would soon also decline. 
Another prior work by Sterman and Sweeney (2002) showed that even highly 
educated adults had a poor understanding of the basic stock-flow structure concept (e.g., 
water will overtop from a bathtub when inflow exceeds outflow). The authors argue that 
the respondents tend to intuitively think that there is a direct correlation between the 
system inputs (e.g., emissions) and the system outputs (e.g., global mean temperature). 
This mistaken knowledge leads to the wait-and-see mentality and delayed policy 
responses because people think that climate change can be reversed quickly (Sterman & 
Sweeney, 2002; 2007). 
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Knowledge vs. Behavioral Intentions 
The last finding comes from a study that aimed to test the attitude theory—whether a 
knowledgeable person would be more likely to endorse climate-protection actions. Bord 
et al. (2000) conducted a survey of Americans in 1997 to assess public behavioral 
intentions to address global warming with three factors: knowledge about global warming, 
risk perceptions, and general environmental beliefs. The respondents (n=1,218) were 
asked to identify the primary cause of global warming among five actual (e.g., use of coal 
and oil) and four bogus causes (e.g., insecticides). The investigators also had respondents 
rate the likelihood of experiencing different risk-relevant events on an individual and 
societal basis and to answer a series of questions related to human-nature relationships in 
accordance with Dunlap’s New Environmental Paradigm Scale. 
The key dependent variable was respondents’ behavioral intentions which were 
measured with two scales: the voluntary action scale and the policy referenda scale. The 
voluntary action scale consisted of five items of lifestyle choice (e.g., using more energy 
efficient household appliances and driving fewer automobile miles). The respondents 
were asked to rate their willingness to take such actions using a five-point Likert scale. 
The policy referenda scale was constructed from several hypothetical referenda questions 
(e.g., a $1.00-per-gallon tax on gasoline and an energy-use tax on businesses). The 
respondents were requested to vote (support or oppose) on each policy. 
The results of this study indicated that Americans were willing to support some, 
but not all, behavior changes and policies to address the global warming issue. While the 
majority of the respondents was willing to purchase an energy-efficient car (63%) and 
install more insulation in their homes (74%), few Americans would volunteer to drive 
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less (31%) or use less air conditioning and heat (42%). Additionally, a total of 69% of the 
respondents were willing to support a government program to preserve rain forests 
throughout the world, while 82% opposed a $1.00-per-gallon tax on gasoline. 
Although all three variables (i.e., knowledge about global warming, risk 
perceptions, and general environmental beliefs) were significantly correlated with 
behavioral intentions, the multivariate analysis showed that correct understanding of the 
causes of climate change was the strongest determinant of both stated intentions to take 
voluntary actions and to vote on hypothetical referenda to enact new government policies 
to reduce GHG emissions. The authors concluded that “a general pro-environmental 
stance is insufficient to ensure responsible decision making. Responsible decision making 
requires at least some minimal knowledge of cause and effect.” 
Nevertheless, based on the ACE model discussed in Subsection 2.3.2, Krosnick et 
al. (2006) argue that enhancing knowledge would likely increase a person’s certainty, 
which would then increase his/her assessment of the seriousness of the issue, which in 
turn would increase policy support. In other words, knowledge itself may not necessarily 
increase people’s support for a relevant policy. To activate this cognitive pathway with 
these reasoning steps, knowledge has to be in place along with the beliefs about the 
existence of climate change and the attitudes about human responsibility. This 
mechanism is more complicated than what the deficit model posits—namely that greater 
knowledge about the issue leads directly to more positive attitudes toward it. 
 
Summarized Review 
In summary, while numerous polls and surveys have investigated the public’s general 
concerns about climate change, far fewer studies have been specifically focused on 
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assessing the public’s level of scientific knowledge of the problem. In addition, because 
most research has used “the knowledge of the causes of climate change” as an important 
indicator of overall knowledge, it has thus far not been possible to provide a complete 
analysis of the public understanding of climate change in terms of causes, consequences, 
and potential solutions. 
Accordingly, it appears that although people have an increasing understanding of 
the anthropogenic causes of climate change (i.e., the role of fossil fuels in contributing to 
the problem), they show limited knowledge of the impacts of and possible interventions 
to address climate warming. Moreover, the confusion between climate change and ozone 
depletion has been observed now for two decades. Furthermore, Bord et al. (2000) argue 
that a correct understanding (especially the causes) of climate change is a significant 
variable for enhancing behavioral intentions to take climate-change protection. 
Scholarship advises both education and communication to enhance the public’s basic 
scientific knowledge. 
 
2.3.5  Public Participation in the Development of Climate Policy 
As discussed in Section 2.2, there has been an increasing need over more than a half 
century to engage the public in various public affairs under systems of democratic 
governance to effectively manage the challenges of scientific expertise. A controversial 
issue with a high level of scientific complexity like global climate change especially 
requires the participation of numerous societal actors. Kempton (1991) argued that it is 
necessary to involve citizens’ perspectives in the formulation of climate policies because 
the effectiveness of GHG emission mitigation measures requires cooperation from 
consumers and workers. Moreover, adaptation strategies to limit adverse climate impacts 
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require compliance from a wide range of potential victims (e.g., farmers, residents in 
vulnerable areas to natural hazards). Thus, this subsection aims to discuss how the 
involvement of the public can assist the development of climate change policies by 
reviewing relevant empirical studies. 
 
The Development of Integrated Assessment (IA) 
The increased need for including stakeholder knowledge and enhancing stakeholder 
interactions in the policy-making process has given rise to an emergent 
method—Integrated Assessment (IA)—that has been extensively employed in social 
scientific research in recent years (see, e.g., Kasemir et al., 2003). Since the 1990s, IA has 
attracted attention due to the perceived need to offer a synthesizing assessment across 
diverse fields of expertise to policy makers regarding complex issues with high scientific 
uncertainty (e.g., global climate change) (Weyant et al, 1996). Kloprogge and Van der 
Sluijs (2006) define the IA method as “an interdisciplinary process of combining, 
interpreting and communicating knowledge from diverse scientific disciplines.” More 
specifically, this collective learning process links models of different scientific 
communities into a more comprehensive model (Norgaard & Baer, 2005) and seeks to 
produce more rational strategies to respond to problems like climate change (Eder, 1999). 
One instructive example is the assessment reports published by the IPCC that 
incorporate research findings from various disciplines (e.g., climate science, marine 
science, and economics). The process of writing an IPCC assessment report is elaborate 
and time-consuming because hundreds of scientists are involved in drafting and 
reviewing articles, exchanging feedback, and negotiating and building a consensus 
(Norgaard & Baer, 2005). To effectively provide integrated expertise to policy makers, 
 114
these reports are even drafted with a summary specifically for communicating with this 
audience (i.e., Summary for Policymakers). 
In contrast to the traditional IA that primarily approaches issues from the 
privileged expert-framed perspective, Darier et al. (1999b) emphasize lay knowledge and 
reframe IA toward a more public-centered perspective. Kloprogge and Van der Sluijs 
(2006) argue that it is necessary to include stakeholder perspectives to enhance the 
quality of the assessment, to obtain public support and legitimacy, and to attain 
democracy. Van de Kerkhof (2006) furthermore asserts that the involvement of societal 
actors can enhance policy making in many aspects: mobilizing the specific expertise of 
these actors, improving awareness and support for specific policy measures, enhancing 
the legitimacy of the decision taken, and building new networks and coalitions. 
 
The Development of Participatory Integrated Assessment (PIA) 
To bridge the gap between the science of global climate change and relevant lay 
perspectives, researchers have developed a method that relies on the participation of 
ordinary citizens in IA. The resulting method, Participatory Integrated Assessment (PIA), 
seeks to break down the boundary between “the science domain” and “the policy 
domain” by engaging non-scientist stakeholders (non-scientific knowledge) with experts 
(natural science knowledge) to increase social acceptability of the proposed policy 
options (Kloprogge & Van der Sluijs, 2006). 
A variety of techniques have been developed and are currently in use in the field 
of PIA such as consensus conferences, citizens’ juries, focus groups, stakeholder dialogue 
sessions, and so forth (see Subsection 2.2.5 and Subsection 4.4.2). Each of these 
techniques entails a unique set of objectives and methods. For example, a consensus 
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conference anticipates building an agreement that meets the needs of all participating 
stakeholders for a specific policy. Even though the consensus-building approach has 
numerous advantages (e.g., reduce conflict, increase compliance, improve policy, prevent 
litigation, and establish relationships), it has many disadvantages (Van de Kerkhof, 2006). 
Because every stakeholder has different interests and priorities, the discussion has 
a tendency to conclude with an agreement over general principles rather than concrete 
results. Hence, the resultant consensus tends to be an agreeable/compromised decision 
rather than a quality decision. In addition, the consensus is likely to be biased because of 
the selection of participants—notably the prevailing mainstream perspective may directly 
influence the outcome of the discussion (Van de Kerkhof, 2006). 
As a result, Van de Kerkhof (2006) provides an alternative approach: deliberation 
orientation. While a consensus-building orientation is a process of negotiation, 
deliberation is characterized as a process of argumentation and communication in which 
participants exchange opinions and viewpoints, weigh and assess different arguments, 
and offer reflections. In other words, the deliberation approach aims to let participants 
understand others’ different position and does not require a consensus. 
 
The Development of Integrated Assessment Focus Groups 
In addition to different objectives (i.e., to obtain a consensus or to obtain a meaningful 
communication process), these participatory techniques may use different mechanisms 
(e.g., conferences and workshops). The most common technique used for the issue of 
climate change over the past two decades has been the focus group (e.g., Darier & Schüle, 
1999; Darier et al., 1999a; Darier et al., 1999b; Kasemir et al., 2000a; Stoll-Kleemann et 
al., 2001; Puy et al., 2008). The feature of the small group in the focus-group method 
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makes it easier for participants to interact with each other and more efficient to achieve a 
group conclusion than a large group setting like a conference. 
Most of these early undertakings were based on several major climate-related 
European projects during the late 1990s (e.g., ULYSSES, CLEAR).27 These projects 
across Europe were considered as pioneering not only in engaging the general public in 
the assessment, but also in developing the IA focus-group method (Kasemir et al., 2000a). 
The ULYSSES project involving approximately 600 citizens in seven European 
metropolitan areas (i.e., Athens, Barcelona, Frankfurt, Manchester, Stockholm, Venice, 
and Zurich) aimed to collect lay perspectives about climate change and to provide 
policy-relevant information for decision makers (Kasemir et al., 2003). 
In addition, the procedure of the IA focus-group method was refined in the 
ULYSSES project. Kasemir et al. (2003) designed the process with five 2.5-hour sessions 
in three phases: participants’ initial expressions, in-depth discussion motivated by expert 
input, and synthesis assessment (Figure 2.4). Some of the techniques used in this exercise 
included “image collages” (i.e., participants picture the future of different reduction 
targets with images provided), computer models (i.e., participants receive expert 
information of global change with a computer tool, such as TARGETS28), and citizens’ 
reports (i.e., participants produce a written document outlining the group’s conclusions). 
 
 
                                                 
27 ULYSSES stands for “Urban Lifestyles, Sustainability, and Integrated Environmental 
Assessment.” CLEAR stands for “Climate and Environment in Alpine Regions.” 
 
28 TARGETS (Tool for Analysing Regional and Global Environmental and Health 
Targets for Sustainability) is a computer model that provides graphs of global climate 
trends. 
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Participants’ spontaneous 
feelings about climate change
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By incorporating experts into the process of interaction, the purpose of IA focus 
groups is not only to listen and to gather information, but also to enable participants to 
make informed decisions and to have a more effective discussion. Due to its various 
advantages, the IA focus-group method was employed in this doctoral research (see 
Section 4.4 for the detailed methods). 
While the focal issue discussed in these early European studies (e.g., Darier & 
Schüle, 1999; Darier et al., 1999a) was quite general (i.e., general discussion on the 
problem of global climate change and responding actions), the dialogues in some of the 
later investigations were more narrowly targeted. For example, Puy et al. (2008) 
conducted several IA focus groups that provided valuable insights and recommendations 
for the forest bioenergy system in Spain. Cohen et al. (2006) used stakeholder-dialogue 
sessions to discuss adaptation options of water management in Canada. 
Figure 2.4 The three phases of IA focus-group processes (Kasimir et al., 2003). 
IA Focus Group 
Phase 1 
IA Focus Group 
Phase 2 
IA Focus Group 
Phase 3 
Expert Input 
Session 1:  
Opinion sharing / General discussion / 
Participants’ collages 
Session 2, 3, 4: 
In-depth discussion of policy options / 
Computer models (e.g., TARGETS) / 
Expert presentation 
Session 5Synthesis of informed 
participants’ conclusions 
: 
Concluding assessment / Citizens’ 
reports 
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Example Studies of Integrated Assessment Focus Groups 
Since global climate change involves a variety of issues and policies (e.g., energy and 
water management), this discussion emphasizes how these participatory exercises 
facilitate the development of climate policies rather than the context of policies. The 
following review selects a number of studies that are more relevant to this doctoral 
research to explain the workings of this process in detail using the classification system 
developed by Darier et al. (1999a). 
Darier et al. (1999a) categorize the objectives of participatory focus-group studies 
into two clusters: research orientated and policy making. The research-orientated studies 
(e.g., Kasemir et al., 2000a; Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001) collect participants’ general 
perceptions regarding climate change during focus-group discussions. The qualitative 
results derived from these discussions can serve as tools to understand citizens’ level of 
climate-change knowledge. For example, decision makers can take useful policy-relevant 
information and recommendations provided by citizens when considering a 
high-compliance policy. The PIA studies in this cluster indirectly contribute to the climate 
policy-making process. 
On the contrary, rather than simply gathering the participants’ opinions, the 
policy-making studies (e.g., Shackley & Deanwood, 2003; Cohen et al., 2006) include 
pragmatic exercises that engage stakeholders in constructing and contributing to the 
formulation of climate assessments, scenarios, and decisions. In other words, these two 
approaches differ in the extent to which public participation contributes to policy 
frameworks: the policy-making studies focus on “actual participation and direct 
contribution to the process and the context of policies” (Darier et al., 1999a) 
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Take the research-orientated objective. Kasemir et al. (2000b) involved the public 
in climate and energy-decision processes and observed how ordinary people developed 
their preferences about public choice. The result of the focus-group studies in the 
ULYSSES and CLEAR projects showed that participants tended to adopt an ethical 
approach to framing their discussions of climate impacts. Their perspectives on political 
responses were based on an intuitive appreciation of deep-ecology and the precautionary 
principle—the climate impacts are so catastrophic that there is a need to act on climate 
change despite the inherent costs and scientific uncertainties (Kasemir et al., 2000a). 
However, while many participants expressed a desire to reduce energy 
consumption, they rejected high energy prices as a strategy for achieving this objective. 
Their views on mitigation measures were closer to an economic-management perspective 
that sought to implement a cost-minimizing climate policy after weighing the costs of 
mitigation and adaptation options (Kasemir et al., 2000a). Because of the inconsistent 
viewpoints of these European participants, Kasemir et al. (2000a) suggest that it is 
necessary to frame both perspectives in advocating climate policies—an ethical 
discussion of climate impacts with a discussion of cost-effectiveness mitigation options. 
Another useful example is provided by a psychological study conducted by 
Stoll-Kleemann et al. (2001) that was based on 14 Swiss IA focus groups carried out as 
part of the CLEAR projects. These researchers investigated the underlying social and 
psychological factors that drive people to take (or not take) personal climate-mitigation 
actions. They found that although the participants recognized the potential impacts of 
climate change and the need for low-carbon futures, they tended to justify their inactions. 
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There was apparently a gap between attitudes and behaviors because of 
external-internal contradictions from a psychological perspective (e.g., societal norm vs. 
individual responsibility). What a society expects from an individual may not match with 
his/her belief system. This internal inconsistency, or dissonance, triggers a number of 
socio-psychological denial mechanisms (Table 2.4). For instance, even though 
respondents were aware of the problem and knew how they “should” react, they still 
denied their responsibility (e.g., I am not the main cause of this problem) or expressed 
their feelings of powerlessness (e.g., I am only an infinitesimal being in the order of 
things) (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). 
Stoll-Kleemann et al. (2001) analyzed the dialogues of the focus groups and 
discovered four common interpretations of participants’ justifications for their barriers to 
action (i.e., unwillingness to give up customary lifestyles, belief that the costs are greater 
than the benefits, doubts of technological and regulatory solutions, and distrust with the 
government’s capacity) (Table 2.4). It is instructive to take the comfort interpretation as 
an example; a participant expressed his/her opinion on public transportation as “You have 
to rely on public means of transport and depend on their schedule. I think that’s the main 
problem: you have to give up quite a bit of your comfort.” As a result, these authors 
suggest that more attention needs to be given to activate people’s social and 
psychological motivations to commit to adopting personal mitigation measures (e.g., 
providing an incentive) in the process of implementing climate policies. 
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Table 2.4 Socio-psychological Denial and Displacement Mechanisms 
Nine Ways of Denial Four Interpretations of Denial 
y Metaphor of displaced commitment: 
“I protection the environment in other ways” 
y To condemn the accuser: 
“You have no right to challenge me” 
y Denial of responsibility: 
“I am not the main cause of this problem” 
y Rejection of blame: 
“I have done nothing so wrong as to be destructive” 
y Ignorance: 
“I simply don’t know the consequences of my actions” 
y Powerlessness: 
“I am only an infinitesimal being in the order of 
things” 
y Fabricated constraints: 
“There are too many impediments” 
y After the flood: 
“What is the future doing for me?” 
y Comfort: 
“It is too difficult for me to change my behaviors” 
y The comfort interpretation: 
An unwillingness to give up 
customary habits and favored 
lifestyles. 
y The tragedy-of-the-commons 
interpretation: 
The construction of attitude and 
behavior connections that regard any 
costs to the self as greater than the 
benefits to others 
y The managerial-fix interpretation: 
A lack of acceptance that climate 
problem can be resolved by recourse 
to technological and regulatory 
innovation 
y The governance-distrust interpretation:
An underlying lack of faith in the 
capacity of government to deliver 
climate change mitigation 
Source: Stoll-Kleemann et al. (2001) 
 
These two research-orientated studies demonstrate how the administration of IA 
focus groups not only can provide researchers with qualitative insights regarding citizens’ 
perceptions, but they can also assist policy makers in considering climate options that are 
more acceptable to the general public. 
In contrast, most of the PIA studies with the “policy-making” objective have to 
date been linked to the development of scenarios with lay knowledge in the 
assessment-making process. For example, Shackley and Deanwood (2003) engaged 
stakeholders in the construction of socio-economic scenarios for regional climate-change 
impacts (e.g., vulnerability of the coastal zone, agriculture, and biodiversity) in two 
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English regions. To construct a comprehensive IA of climate change impacts in 2050, in 
addition to climate change scenarios (a natural science perspective), four socio-economic 
scenarios (a social science perspective) were considered in the assessment. 
First, approximately 100 stakeholders from various sectors were involved in three 
regional stakeholder workshops in 1999. After an introduction by expert presenters (e.g., 
regional planning teams), the group produced a qualitative description of several 
socio-economic scenarios with different levels of economic, societal, and environmental 
activities in the future (e.g., global sustainability and regional enterprise). These scenarios 
were then presented to a national stakeholder workshop to discuss potential impacts. For 
instance, the stakeholders came up with the storyline of potential spatial change of 
biodiversity under the global sustainability scenario: extensive farmland areas would be 
re-created as habitats due to concerns of sustainability (Shackley & Deanwood, 2003). 
Shackley and Deanwood (2003) argue that stakeholder participation can serve as a 
mediating device between intellectual debate and policy deliberation because multiple 
stakeholders with different perspectives and interests can be involved in the 
scenario-building process. In the case of this particular exercise, diverse policy actors 
were willing to compromise their preferred future options to some extent because they 
wanted to contribute to the project and to have influence on policy development. 
Similarly, to build a comprehensive regional assessment of the climate-change 
impacts on water resources in the Okanagan Basin in Canada, Cohen et al. (2006) used 
stakeholder-dialogue sessions to complement traditional quantitative climate-change 
models (e.g., the basin hydrological scenario, agricultural water supply and demand 
scenarios). A variety of stakeholders (e.g., regional water managers and irrigators) 
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participated in a full-day workshop that provided valuable insights. For instance, 
although groundwater may represent a viable alternative water source, the participants 
expressed concerns about the lack of groundwater-extraction regulations. They also 
recognized the importance of a governance structure and support for a basin-wide 
coordinated water-management program such as irrigation scheduling. 
 
Summarized Review 
Based on the studies reviewed above, it is possible to make several general summarizing 
comments with regard to public participation in climate policy making. First, compared 
to numerous participatory projects conducted in Europe, fewer PIA studies have been 
carried out in other geographic regions. Moreover, with respect to doctoral research 
reported in this dissertation it will be interesting to observe how the public-driven PIA 
approach might be implemented in an Asian context where it is common for privileged 
experts to play dominate roles in the policy-making process. 
Second, most PIA exercises have been research-orientated studies—they have 
indirectly enhanced the development of climate policies by providing general 
policy-relevant perceptions of participants with respected to global climate change. Even 
though participants may discuss some policy options in these studies, it is difficult to 
evaluate exactly how their views influence climate policies. Moreover, although the 
introduction of expertise is expected to assist the participants, the effect of the expert 
treatment on the participants requires a special design to assess (i.e., pre- and post- tests). 
Finally, although some cases have engaged stakeholders in the construction of the 
scenarios that have come out of the assessment process, few PIA studies directly involve 
stakeholders in contributing to “real climate policies.” Kloprogge and Van der Sluijs 
 124
(2006) attribute the problem to the relative novelty of the PIA method and its indefinite 
role in local, regional, and global policy processes. 
 
2.3.6  Concluding Remarks 
To understand the human dimensions of global climate change, social psychologists have 
investigated people’s attitudes, knowledge, behavioral intentions, and their relationships. 
It is anticipated that these findings can help to predict and interpret actual choices of 
actions or inactions. Based on the foregoing review of numerous studies, it can be 
concluded that public awareness toward global climate change has increased in the past 
two decades. While most people (at least in the advanced industrial countries that have 
been the focal point of this review) recognize the authenticity of the issue, they evince 
only a moderate level of concern because they have doubt about the human influences of 
climate change and the immediate personal impacts of increasing atmospheric GHG 
concentrations. In addition, most people support government implementation of various 
policies to reduce CO2 emissions, but they tend to allocate the responsibility to the 
government and industries and ignore their own responsibility. 
Although the public demonstrates an increasing level of concern about climate 
change and an improving level of understanding of its anthropogenic causes (i.e., use of 
fossil fuels), the general public still demonstrates limited knowledge of the impacts and 
potential solutions. Bord et al. (2000) argue that a correct understanding of the causes of 
climate change can be used to determine people’s behavioral intentions to combat climate 
change. However, the common misconception between climate change and ozone 
depletion is still observed among the general public. 
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Numerous researchers have argued that it is essential to involve the public in 
ongoing policy-making processes. The common practice, PIA, suggests that informed 
participants can help to develop climate policies that people will be more willing to 
endorse. While most studies to date have focused on collecting participants’ perspectives 
on specific climate-related issues, very few PIA studies have sought to directly involve 
stakeholders in contributing to “real climate policies” because of the novelty of the 
method and its indefinite role in local, regional, and global policy processes. 
 
2.4  Summary 
Global climate change is a profound challenge for policy makers to manage because it 
contains all seven characteristics of environmental problems (i.e., the public nature, 
transboundary features, complexity and uncertainty, irreversibility, temporal and spatial 
variability, administrative fragmentation, and regulatory intervention) (Carter, 2001) (see 
Subsection 2.2.2). Successful placement of the issue on the political agenda and effective 
formulation and implementation of climate policies require recognition of the problem 
and collective efforts from numerous societal actors (e.g., scientists, mass media, and the 
public). 
A democratic approach that involves a variety of perspectives in a deliberative 
policy process is likely to prove favorable in solving complex environmental problems. 
While both scientists and the public play important roles in the policy-making process, 
there is also a cooperative relationship between them—how scientists facilitate citizens’ 
understanding of science for these complex problems and how citizens contribute their 
lay knowledge to aid scientists. The key objective in enhancing the public’s scientific 
 126
literacy is to ensure the quality of the deliberations and the effectiveness of the resulting 
policy decisions. 
Public understanding of science is not only politically essential for policy makers, 
but it is also a significant area of social scientific inquiry. The level of an individual’s 
scientific knowledge is important because environmental attitude researchers anticipate 
that it, along with beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intentions, can help to predict 
personal choices of action or inaction. Bord et al. (2000) argue that people with a factual 
understanding of the causes of climate change would likely be more willing to take 
individual initiative to address climate change and to support climate policies that can 
mitigate GHG emissions. 
The review of numerous studies on the public understanding of global climate 
change found that the general public still evinces limited knowledge about the impacts 
and potential solutions to the problem despite improved understanding of its 
anthropogenic causes (i.e., use of fossil fuels). Nonetheless, while most people believe in 
the authenticity of the issue, they do not demonstrate a high level of concern because they 
have doubt about the human influences and the immediate personal impact of increasing 
atmospheric GHG concentrations. In addition, while most people support government 
implementation of various policies to reduce GHG emissions, they resist policies that 
may be individually harmful (e.g., gas tax). 
An increasing number of participatory practices have involved scientific experts 
and the public in the climate policy-making process. A controversial issue like global 
climate change that involves a variety of interest groups especially requires sound 
deliberative processes through which different actors can communicate and exchange 
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perspectives. However, most existing studies have focused on collecting citizens’ 
perspectives on specific climate-related issues rather than anticipating their contributions 
to “real climate policies.” 
In summary, global climate change is an environmental problem with high 
complexity and uncertainty so it is particularly important for social scientists to regularly 
conduct studies on the public understanding of climate change and on the relationship 
between scientific experts and the public. Additionally, given the fact that most studies on 
public understanding of and public participation in science and climate change are carried 
out in Europe and North America, social scientists have a responsibility to explore cases 
in other geographic regions. Therefore, this doctoral research attempts to bridge the gap 
by presenting a case study of the public understanding of climate change in Taiwan. 
 CHAPTER 3 
CASE STUDY CONTEXT 
 
3.1  Overview 
While social scientists attempt to study human perception of and responses to climate 
change, the factors that influence the public understanding of climate-change science may 
originate from proximate societal factors. In addition, regardless of the level of 
international political cooperation to address the issue, most meaningful climate policies 
can only be formulated and implemented by domestic systems of governance.29 Thus, it 
is significant for an interdisciplinary climate-related case study to situate its analysis in a 
comprehensive understanding of the subject country that is the target of inquiry. 
To enhance appreciation of the chosen study area and to facilitate interpretation of 
the research results, this chapter provides a detailed introduction of the political context 
under investigation. Section 3.2 discusses why Taiwan was chosen as the study location. 
Section 3.3 examines key social values of the Taiwanese people through two perspectives: 
political-cultural and socio-psychological. Section 3.4 reviews the emergence of 
environmentalism in Taiwan with respect to the evolution of its environmental movement 
and the public’s environmental concern. Section 3.5 describes the current status of 
climate-change policies in Taiwan and introduces two mitigation policies under active 
consideration. The last section summarizes this chapter. 
                                                 
29 Despite the lack of federal actions in the US, several states have actively taken actions 
to reduce their GHG emissions. For example, ten northeastern states (e.g., New Jersey 
and New York) developed the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative—a regional 
market-based cap-and-trade scheme. California further launched an initiative to regulate 
automobile CO2 emissions (Selin & VanDeveer, 2007). 
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3.2  Study Area—Why Taiwan? 
3.2.1  Introduction 
Given the fact that several developing Asian countries—most notably China and 
India—are responsible for growing volumes of GHG emissions, securing commitments 
from these nations to mitigate releases will be important in managing global climate 
change over the long term. However, compared with numerous social scientific studies of 
global climate change in North America and Europe, substantially fewer investigations 
have focused on Asian countries. As attention for mitigation responsibility begins to shift 
to developing countries in the post-Kyoto period, it has become increasingly important to 
expand the scope of work to include geographic areas that have thus far been relatively 
neglected. For example, Yue and Sun (2003) argue that newly industrialized countries 
should be urged to bear partial obligations for mitigating emissions. Consistent with this 
challenge, the current research project seeks to increase contemporary understanding of 
the public-science nexus around the issue of climate change in Taiwan. 
This section highlights a number of characteristics that make Taiwan a useful case 
study. Subsection 3.2.2 begins with a brief introduction of Taiwan in terms of its 
geography, sociopolitical system, and so forth. Subsection 3.2.3 analyzes Taiwan’s 
responsibility for global climate change given its large per capita GHG emissions. 
Subsection 3.2.4 explains why this island is highly susceptible to a variety of adverse 
impacts of climate change. Subsection 3.2.5 describes how Taiwan’s newly democratic 
system of governance can contribute to this doctoral research in terms of engaging the lay 
public in the policy-making process. Subsection 3.2.6 concludes with some summarizing 
remarks. 
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3.2.2  A Glance of Taiwan 
Taiwan is an island located in Southeast Asia (southwest Pacific Ocean) comprising a 
land mass of approximately 36,000 square kilometers (13,900 square miles), an area 
roughly equal in size to the Netherlands or the combined area of the states of New Jersey 
and Connecticut (Figure 3.1) (GIO, 2009).30 The island lies in a complex tectonic area 
with frequent seismic activity that gives rise to its mountainous topography. The highest 
point, the main peak of Jade Mountain, is 3,952 meters (12,966 feet) above sea level. 
Taiwan has a current population of 23 million people and ranks as the 14th most densely 
populated country in the world. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 The geographic location of Taiwan. 
                                                 
30 The official name of Taiwan is The Republic of China (ROC) and comprises the main 
island of Taiwan, the Pescadores, Kinmen, Matsu, and a number of other islets. This 
dissertation uses Taiwan to refer to the assemblage of territory as a whole because this is 
the more familiar nomenclature used throughout the world. 
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Taiwan has an oceanic and subtropical monsoon climate owing to its geographic 
location relative to the Tropic of Cancer and warm ocean currents arrive from the south. 
Summers are long and humid with an average temperature of approximately 28ºC. By 
contrast, winters are short and mild with the average temperature ranging from 15 to 20ºC. 
In addition, the average annual rainfall is nearly 2,500 mm. Three primary precipitation 
sources include monsoons in winter and summer, and thunderstorms and typhoons in 
summer. While these tropical cyclones cause severe damage due to strong winds and 
heavy rainfall, they also provide an important source of water (GIO, 2009). 
Taiwan maintains a market-driven, capitalist economy with a strong orientation 
toward export production that made it the 24th largest economy in the world in 2007. It 
has a nominal gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of nearly US$16,800, the 38th 
highest in the world. Its actual purchasing power parity (PPP) was equivalent to more 
than US$30,000. In 2007, three major sectors contributed to Taiwan’s GDP in various 
proportions: services (71.1%), industry (27.5%), and agriculture (1.5%). These fractions 
have changed significantly over the past two decades—the proportions in 1987 were 
services (50.3%), industry (44.4%), and agriculture (5.2%) (GIO, 2009). 
Moreover, as a relatively young democratic system, Taiwan has experienced not 
only a dramatic political transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime over the 
past two decades, but also a shift toward a more liberal and diverse civil society. The 
Taiwanese government has conducted four presidential elections since 1996 and 
experienced two successful political power transfers between parties (in the presidential 
elections in 2000 and 2008). The Taiwanese people now have more opportunities to 
participate in the political process and in social movements. 
 132
3.2.3  High Responsibility 
Taiwan is an important contributor to global climate change because both its total CO2 
emissions and its releases per capita are ranked among the world’s 30 largest emitting 
nations (IEA, 2009). Taiwan’s total GHG production, excluding the impact of land-use 
change and forestry, has doubled from 1990 to 2007 (TEPA, 2009). According to the 
Taiwan Environmental Protection Administration (TEPA) (2009), Taiwan generated 316 
million tons of CO2-equivalent emissions in 2007, an amount that was equal to 
approximately 1% of global total emissions (its population is equal to roughly 0.35% of 
the global total). Among six major heat-trapping gasses, CO2 comprises the largest 
quantity gas emitted (92.4%) in Taiwan (Figure 3.2). Therefore, the following analysis 
primarily uses CO2 emissions to discuss why Taiwan is responsible for contributing to 
global climate change from the perspectives of energy use and economic development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CO2, 92.44%
N2O, 3.49%
CH4, 1.40%
HFCs, 0.69%
PFCs, 1.26%
SF6, 0.72%
Figure 3.2 The percentage of six major greenhouse gasses in the total GHG 
emissions of Taiwan in 2007 (316 Mt CO2-eq.) (TEPA, 2009). 
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Figure 3.3 illustrates that the CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in Taiwan have 
increased by nine-fold since 1971 (IEA, 2009). Several studies have been conducted to 
investigate the reasons for Taiwan’s rapid increase of CO2 emissions (Chang & Lin, 1999; 
Lin et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2007; Chang et al., 2008). According to the Taiwan Bureau of 
Energy (2008), the total energy supply in Taiwan in 2008 was 142.5 million kiloliters of 
oil equivalent, 99.3% of which came from imported sources. In addition, fossil fuels (i.e., 
coal, petroleum, natural gas, and liquid natural gas) comprised 91.3 % of Taiwanese 
energy inputs. Nuclear power contributed an additional 8.3%, while renewable energy 
(e.g., hydroelectric, solar, and wind power) added less than 1% to the total energy supply 
(TBOEMEA, 2008). Moreover, approximately half of Taiwan’s energy was consumed in 
the form of electricity (51.0%), followed by petroleum products (38.7%) and coal 
products (7.7%) (TBOEMEA, 2008). 
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Figure 3.3 Carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion in Taiwan during the 
period 1971-2007 (IEA, 2009). 
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In 2006, 95.5% of Taiwan’s total GHG emissions were the result of energy-related 
consumption and the remaining 4.5% was generated from industrial processes (TEPA, 
2009). Because 77.0% of Taiwan’s electricity is generated from fossil fuel-based thermal 
power plants, it is necessary to take electricity consumption into consideration when 
reviewing CO2 emissions. After redistributing the amount of electricity consumed by 
each sector, the industrial sector accounted for 53.6%, the transport sector comprised 
13.6%, and the residential sector consisted of 12.2% of Taiwan’s total CO2 emissions in 
2007 (Figure 3.4) (TBOEMEA, 2009). In contrast, the CO2 emissions in the US in 2007 
were distributed by end-use sectors: the transport sector (33.8%); the industrial sector 
(27.6%); the residential sector (20.6%); and the commercial sector (17.9%) (USEIA, 
2008). These data demonstrate two different carbon societies: production-orientated 
(Taiwan) and consumption-orientated (the US). 
 Figure 3.4 Carbon dioxide emission distribution (including electricity consumption) 
by main sectors in Taiwan in 2007 (TBOEMEA, 2009). 
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The 2002 National Communication of Taiwan stated that the activities that 
released the most CO2 emissions include the iron and steel industry (30%), the chemical 
industry (28%), the textile industry (9%), and the electrical machinery industry (7%) 
(TEPA, 2002).31 Various studies have demonstrated that expanding industrial production 
and electricity consumption are largely responsible for Taiwan’s growing CO2 emissions 
over the past two decades (Chang & Lin, 1999; Lin et al., 2007). For example, Lin et al. 
(2006) discovered that economic growth and high energy intensity were the key factors 
driving Taiwan’s rising industrial CO2 emissions between 1981 and 2001. 
While the industrial sector generated more than half of Taiwan’s CO2 emissions, it 
contributed less than 30% of Taiwan’s GDP in 2007 (TMEA, 2009). Lin et al. (2006) 
found that Taiwan’s CO2 intensity (unit GDP emissions) and CO2 emission coefficient 
(unit energy emissions) were relatively high and grew rapidly during the period 
1990-2000 compared to other countries (e.g., US, Japan). These data imply that Taiwan 
depends on relatively high energy intensive industries that are subsequently responsible 
for producing high CO2 emissions (Lin et al., 2006; Chang et al., 2008). 
Table 3.1 presents several indicators on energy, the economy, and the environment 
for Taiwan, the world, and the member countries of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). While Taiwan (as noted above) accounted for 
0.35% of the global population, its total CO2 emissions, economic contribution, and 
energy consumption consisted of approximately 1% of global totals. 
                                                 
31 Signatory Parties of the UNFCCC were required to submit official national reports, 
known as national communications, by certain timeframes (i.e., 1995, 1998, 2003, and 
2006). These documents highlight information including the GHG emissions inventory, 
climate-change policies and measures, vulnerability assessment, and so forth. Taiwan also 
follows the guideline to prepare its national communication. 
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In addition, both its CO2 intensity and CO2 emission coefficients were higher than 
average for the OECD countries. This situation suggests that Taiwan emitted more CO2 
than the OECD countries for the same unit of energy consumed and the same unit of 
economic value created. Figure 3.5 further presents the comparison of these two 
indicators among selected countries. In brief, this situation arguably imposes a 
disproportionate obligation on Taiwan to take proactive measures to mitigate its GHG 
emissions.32 
Table 3.1 Taiwan’s Energy/Economy/Environmental Indicators in 2007 
Taiwan in the World
 Taiwan World OECD 
Rank % 
Total emissions (million tons CO2) 276 28962 13001 22 0.95
Per capita emission (tons CO2/capita) 12.08 4.38 10.97 18 -
Population (million) 22.9 6609 1185 47 0.35
GDP PPP (billion USD) 636 61428 32361 18 1.04
Per capita GDP (thousand USD) 27.77 9.29 27.31 22 -
Energy supply (MTOE) 109.9 12030 5497 21 0.91
Per capita consumption (TOE) 4.80 1.82 4.64 22 -
CO2 intensity: Unit GDP emission (kg 
CO2/USD) 
0.43 0.47 0.40 53 -
CO2 emission coefficient: Unit energy 
emission (tons CO2/TOE) 
2.51 2.41 2.37 33 -
Source: International Energy Agency (2009). 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Given Taiwan’s poor diplomatic status (i.e., it is not a member of the UN), the country 
is not a signatory party to either the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. Its participation in 
the diplomatic negotiation in the international treaties has been restricted. As one of the 
newly industrialized countries (e.g., South Korea), Taiwan may not be as responsible as 
industrialized countries (Annex I Parties), but it is expected to make more efforts than 
developing countries. However, its responsibility to reduce GHG emissions is not derived 
from diplomatic political obligations, but from an ethical perspective. 
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Figure 3.5 Carbon dioxide emission coefficient and intensity among selected major 
countries in 2007 (IEA, 2009). 
 
3.2.4  High Vulnerability33 
Increasing evidence indicates that global climate change is affecting many areas of the 
Asian region. According to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, the area-averaged 
annual mean warming in East Asia (where Taiwan is located) is projected to be about 
1.5ºC in the decade of the 2020s, 3.6ºC in the decade of the 2050s, and about 6.1ºC in the 
decade of the 2080s under the scenario of high fossil-fuel consumption (IPCC, 2007b). In 
addition, the IPCC forecasts that the mean annual increase in precipitation is forecasted to 
be approximately 2.5% in the 2020s, 8.5% in the 2050s, and 15.3% in the 2080s. With 
                                                 
33 Vulnerability is defined as “the degree to which a system is susceptible to and unable 
to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and 
extremes” (IPCC, 2007b). 
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enhanced variability in both temperature and precipitation, the Asian region is likely to be 
adversely affected in terms of agriculture and food security, hydrology and water 
resources, coastal and low-lying areas, natural ecosystems and biodiversity, and human 
health (IPCC, 2007b). 
In addition to numerous research reports about harmful impacts of climate change 
on a global scale, an increasing number of climate studies has been conducted on a local 
scale over the past two decades. Because of its unique physical environment, a 
mountainous subtropical island in Southeast Asia, Taiwan is highly vulnerable to the 
potential impacts of global climate change (TEPA, 2002). For example, Hsu and Chen 
(2002) examined characteristics of climate-change patterns in Taiwan and the relationship 
with global climate change over the past 100 years. Their results indicated that Taiwan 
has experienced an island-wide warming trend of 1.0-1.4ºC over this time span. Of 
concern is the apparent fact that the warming effect was even more significant than the 
rise in average global temperature during the same period. 
Analysis also suggests that precipitation in Taiwan has increased in the northern 
region, but has decreased in the southern region over the past 100 years (Hsu & Chen, 
2002; Yu et al., 2006). Although the higher rate of precipitation was not observed 
island-wide, most regions in Taiwan have exhibited a significant decrease in the annual 
number of rainy days. Moreover, the number of heavy precipitation days (daily 
precipitation exceeds 50 mm per day) has increased at remote stations in the areas of 
northern and eastern Taiwan. The observed trend in temperature and precipitation is 
consistent with changes in the global climate system (Hsu & Chen, 2002). 
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As highlighted in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007b), the 
frequency and intensity of extreme climate events (i.e., heat waves, intense rains and 
floods, droughts, and cyclones/typhoons) have been increasing in Asia. It is instructive to 
take a recent natural disaster as an example. A strong typhoon, named Morakot, brought a 
tremendous amount of rainfall in August 2009. The Alishan weather station in the 
southern part of Taiwan estimated that accumulated precipitation was 2,965 mm in just 
four days (Taiwan Central Weather Bureau, 2009). This event caused severe floods, 
landslides, and mud flows, killing 634 people and causing approximately US$500 million 
in damage. 
Data from fourteen tidal stations during the past 90 years indicates that the 
sea-level has increased in parts of the north (0.035 cm per year) and south (0.061 cm per 
year) in Taiwan (TEPA, 2002). Furthermore, the excessive extraction of groundwater in 
southern coastal areas enhances the increased rate of land subsidence. Accordingly, the 
combined effect of sea-level rise and land subsidence is occurring at a rate of over 1.5 cm 
per year. While the coastline in the north has thus far remained stable, the coastline in the 
southeast has retreated by 20-50 meters over the past twenty years (TEPA, 2002). 
Additionally, it is estimated that if the sea level rises one meter in Taiwan, an area of 
about 272 km2 (comprising 0.76% of the total national landmass) would be inundated 
(TEPA, 2002). 
Chang (2002) used multiple regression models to investigate the impact of 
climate change on sixty different crops. The result showed that warmer temperatures and 
increased precipitation would decrease production of rice (Taiwan’s most important 
staple crop) and several other agricultural products such as soybeans and sugarcane; the 
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novel conditions would positively affect certain vegetables and fruits. To sum up, two 
climate variables (temperature and precipitation) have a significant and non-monotonic 
impact on crop yields. Moreover, a temperature rise may not necessarily be singularly 
negative for farmers, but increasing rainfall intensity could be devastating to the welfare 
of rural communities in Taiwan (Chang, 2002). 
In addition to the impact on agricultural productivity, climate variability is likely 
to directly and indirectly affect Taiwan’s environment and society in a wide range of 
ways. For instance, dengue fever which usually occurs during summer and autumn in 
central and southern Taiwan is now spreading to the northern areas (TEPA, 2002). 
Moreover, most of the Taiwanese people live in the western flood plain due to the 
mountainous topography in the eastern part of the island. The dense pattern of settlement 
increases susceptibility to extreme weather events. However, it is necessary to embark 
upon more extensive investigations to establish the relationship between these local 
effects and global climate change with greater confidence. 
In brief, given the fact that Taiwan is an island with relatively limited natural 
resources, high population density, and pronounced hazard vulnerability, the case of 
Taiwan (and in particular how the government develops domestic responses to the 
anticipated consequences of climate change) holds potentially instructive lessons for the 
rest of the Asian region. In addition, Taiwan’s level of economic advancement and 
technology development should assist the government in formulating climate change 
adaptation policies (in contrast to most developing countries that lack the necessary 
capacity to cope with the adverse impacts of climate change). Such circumstances give 
Taiwan particular value as a case study with which to observe public responses to 
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climate-related risk and how these concerns may (or may not) influence people’s 
intentions to endorse climate-management policies. 
 
3.2.5  Sociopolitical Condition 
In addition to its economic organization and physical conditions, it is also instructive to 
consider Taiwan’s sociopolitical conditions to appreciate the way that societal influences 
are shaping the formulation of domestic climate-change policies. Taiwan has a relatively 
young system of democratic governance that not only has experienced a dramatic 
two-decades long political transition after fifty years of authoritarian rule, but also has 
shifted in the direction of a more liberal and diverse civil society. After the abolition of 
martial law in 1987 and a series of open elections during the 1990s, the Taiwanese people 
now have more opportunities to participate in the political decision-making process and 
in social movement organizations. 
According to the Taiwan Ministry of the Interior (2008), the average turnout rate 
in four presidential elections since 1996 was comparatively high (78.8%) and the average 
turnout rate in six national legislative elections since 1992 was 65.3%. In addition, civil 
society groups are able to participate proactively in the formulation of public policy. The 
number of national social associations, excluding political and industrial organizations, 
has increased from 486 in 1977 (the pre democratic era) to 8,542 in 2008 (TMOI, 2008). 
These data indicate that citizens in Taiwanese society are willing to become engaged with 
political and societal activities. 
The process of democratization has stimulated the development of environmental 
politics in Taiwan (see the detailed discussion in Section 3.4). According to TEPA 
(2009b), the number of volunteers involved in environmental protection activities 
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increased from 101,606 people in 2003 to 150,914 people in 2008 (a growth rate of 
48.5% over just five years). In addition, local environmental groups have actively 
launched climate-protection campaigns. For instance, a climate-awareness parade was 
organized in December 2007 and 2008 (Lin, 2008). 
Moreover, since the political reforms in 2000, numerous citizen participatory 
practices have been conducted to promote deliberative democracy in Taiwan (Taiwan 
Thinktank, 2007). These practices not only provide opportunities for the general public to 
discuss a variety of national and local issues, but also assist academic expertise and 
governmental officials in improving the range of public participatory mechanisms and 
processes. For example; several citizen consensus conferences were organized to help 
identify public perspectives about the universal health care system and the adoption of 
surrogate motherhood legislation (Taiwan Thinktank, 2007). Additionally, the National 
Youth Commission, a secondary governmental agency, has organized a series of regional 
forums and national conferences to involve youth in deliberating various public issues. 
In summary, Taiwan, as a newly democratic society, is currently experiencing the 
process of prosperous development of civil society and its involvement in the political 
system. Therefore, the sociopolitical condition in Taiwan provides a notable opportunity 
to conduct an empirical case study of participatory democracy around a highly complex 
environmental problem. 
 
3.2.6  Concluding Remarks 
Taiwan was specifically selected as the study area for this doctoral research because it has 
several unique characteristics. First, Taiwan arguably bears a disproportionate 
responsibility for contributing to climate change because both its total CO2 emissions and 
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its CO2 emissions per capita are ranked among the world’s top 30th largest emitting 
nations. The primary reason for this situation is that the Taiwanese economy depends 
heavily on industries with high energy intensities and high CO2 intensities. Second, the 
island is highly susceptible to a variety of adverse impacts of climate change because of 
its physical environment, relatively limited natural resources, and high population density. 
Hsu and Chen (2002) found that observed trends in temperature and precipitation were 
consistent with changes in the global climate system and the local warming effect was 
even more significant than the increased average global temperature in the last century. 
Finally, given its newly democratic system of governance, the Taiwanese people 
have opportunities to participate in political decision-making processes and in social 
movement organizations in ways not previously possible. Furthermore, a number of 
citizen participatory practices have been conducted to advocate deliberative democracy in 
Taiwan. Thus, the sociopolitical condition of Taiwan provides a notable opportunity to 
consider the development of participatory democracy around a highly complex 
environmental problem. In summary, this case study of Taiwan is advantageous because it 
demonstrates how a newly industrialized society is beginning to implement domestic 
climate policies via a participatory approach. In addition, the results of this research are 
potentially comparable with studies conducted in other countries that may share similar 
characteristics (e.g., high responsibility and high vulnerability). 
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3.3  The Changing Social Values in Taiwan 
3.3.1  Introduction 
In addition to the detailed introduction of the study area in terms of its physiogeographic 
and economic characteristics, it is beneficial to develop familiarity with the people 
there—who these people are and what they think at a societal level of aggregation. Two 
key perspectives are employed: Alex Inkeles’ (1997) national character theory34 and 
Ronald Inglehart’s (1997) intergenerational value change theory. This study deploys both 
theories to investigate four social values that are relevant to the current inquiry (i.e., 
public scientific understanding and public political participation): predisposition toward 
(anti)authoritarianism, sensibilities toward democracy/autocracy, sense of citizenship, and 
faith in scientists and experts (see Subsection 3.3.2). 
This section highlights these distinguishing social values of the Taiwanese people 
through two standpoints: a political-cultural perspective and a socio-psychological 
perspective. Subsection 3.3.2 reviews the concepts of national character theory and 
intergenerational value change theory. Subsection 3.3.3 examines how the collective 
Taiwanese personality has been influenced by both traditional oriental culture and 
modern western culture throughout the country’s dynamic history. Subsection 3.3.4 
describes some key social values (e.g., viewpoints on citizenship and democracy) that are 
predominantly endorsed by Taiwanese people based on the result of a longitudinal survey: 
the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS). Subsection 3.3.5 summarizes this section. 
                                                 
34 This national character concept does not mean that all members of the society have the 
same personality. Instead, it simply suggests that a majority of the given population will 
share some similarity of their values because they are enriched from the same social, 
cultural, political, and economic backgrounds. The study of national character can refer to 
a great range of meanings including emotions (e.g., reactions to shames), cultural 
traditions (e.g., values to family), and ways of acting (e.g., enterprising). 
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3.3.2  Enduring Characters or Shifting Values 
While Alex Inkeles’ (1997) national character theory and Ronald Inglehart’s (1997) 
intergenerational value change theory both address a key social scientific question—what 
do people think of—they represent two oppositional perspectives on the notion of 
whether their values change over time. First, national character (also called modal 
personality) refers to enduring personality characteristics and patterns that are common or 
standardized among the adult members in a given society (Inkeles, 1997). For example, 
Putnam (1993) found that while Italy established new regional governments during the 
1970s, these newly created democratic institutions led to dramatically different outcomes 
in the various regions. Despite massive historical economic, social, political, and 
demographic change, residents of southern Italy displayed the same low levels of civic 
involvement (e.g., electoral participation) that they had nearly a century earlier—and 
these tendencies had sharp influences on the effectiveness of institutional performance. 
The contemporary study of national character can be traced back to attempts to 
develop psychological profiles to understand the behaviors of various combatants during 
World War II (e.g., Japanese tidiness, Russian tempestuousness) (Neiburg & Goldman, 
1998; Cohen, 2000). The field was further developed by political scientists to study traits 
and attitudes toward democracy in different cultures (Almond & Verba, 1962; Putnam, 
1993). Although Inkeles (1997) advanced the theory by implementing more rigorous 
statistical analysis rather than relying on subjective interpretations, the concept was 
overlooked and controversial because it required longitudinal empirical investigations. 
The formation or the transformation of national character is deeply influenced by 
the dynamic socio-cultural system of a society, which means that while national 
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characters are durable, they are still changeable. It is thus significant for social scientists 
to understand the culturally patterned behaviors of the majority of citizens and the factors 
that shape these dispositions. For example, Inkeles (1997) found that while Americans 
had long had a tendency to be proud of their governmental institutions (e.g., Constitution, 
freedom, and democracy), this disposition of political confidence has been shaken since 
1955. 
In contrast, Inglehart’s (1997) intergenerational (or postmaterialist) theory 
emphasizes a shift of values (i.e., values oriented around materialism in particular) in a 
society across generations. This concept, based on the notion of a need hierarchy 
(Maslow, 1954), states that once people have attained material security, they tend to 
prioritize their focus on more postmaterial values (e.g., self-expression and freedom).35 
This theory is, by extension, a core element of the postmodernization process—a 
transformation process from an economically driven traditional industrial society to an 
advanced industrial society that evaluates costs and benefits of economic achievement 
(e.g., environmental protection). 
In particular, Inglehart contends that during the post-World War II era relatively 
younger generations (in comparison to their pre-war grandparents) who grew up in a 
context characterized by rapid industrial growth and economic development have 
switched their predominant concerns from economic and physical security (material 
values) toward self-expression and freedom (postmaterial values). He led a cross-cultural 
study of 43 societies that was carried out during the early 1990s under the auspices of the 
                                                 
35 Maslow’s need hierarchy concept proposes that when people’s physical needs (e.g., 
food, shelter) are attained, they tend to pursue physiological needs (e.g., esteem, 
self-expression, and aesthetic satisfaction). 
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World Values Survey to examine potential value shifts in a time span between 1970 and 
1994. The results showed that almost all of the societies included in this research have 
experienced a statistically significant shift toward postmaterial values (Inglehart, 1997). 
 
3.3.3  Political-cultural Perspective 
While both theories (i.e., national character and intergenerational value change) require 
longitudinal studies to observe whether people’s values endure or shift over time, it is 
beneficial to examine historical economic, social, political, and demographic changes in a 
given society. Although there is no systematic psychological research specifically 
centered on Taiwanese characteristics, this discussion provides some observational 
insights from Taiwan’s political and culture history. As shown in Table 3.2, Taiwan is a 
society that has experienced numerous changes in ruling regimes throughout its history. 
Each political transition not only brought changes in the socio-cultural system of the 
island, but also influenced its national character. 
Reviewing Taiwan’s political history, Tsai (2009) argues that both the eastern and 
the western cultures have influenced the development of some distinguishing 
characteristics of the Taiwanese people. On one hand, because most early inhabitants 
migrated from mainland China, the island has been deeply influenced by traditional 
Chinese culture (e.g., Confucianism).36 Some of the traditional Chinese characteristics 
described by Hsu (1961) include lacking individualism, conservative (strongly favoring 
the status quo), highly competitive (restricted to family rather than individual goals), and 
submissive to authority (Inkeles, 1997). 
                                                 
36 Confucianism is an ancient Chinese system of moral, social, political, philosophical, 
and quasi-religious thought that has significantly shaped the culture and history of many 
East Asian countries for 2,500 years. 
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Table 3.2 The Political Transformation History of Taiwan 
Stage Timeline Key Development 
Prehistory and 
early settlement 
50000 BCE–  
1624 CE 
y Malay and Polynesian settlement. 
y Han Chinese began settling since 1200s. 
European rule 1624-1662 
y In 1544, a Portuguese ship named Taiwan “Ilha Formosa,” 
but it did not settle the island. 
y In 1624, the Dutch established a commercial base on 
Taiwan and made Taiwan a colony. 
Koxinga/ Imperial 
Chinese rule 1662-1895 
y Koxinga defeated the Dutch in 1662. 
y Qing Dynasty ruled Taiwan. 
Japanese rule 1895-1945 
y Taiwan was ceded to Japan by Qing China which was 
defeated in the war. 
y Japanese began the modernization and industrialization of 
the island by constructing railroads and developing 
commerce. 
Post-War Taiwan 1945-present 
y Kuomintang (KMT) martial law period: after being 
defeated by the Communists in the Chinese Civil War, 
Republic of China (ROC) retreated from mainland China 
to Taiwan. 
y White Terror period (1945-1987). 
y Modern democratic period: direct presidential election in 
1990s began Taiwan’s democratization reform. 
Source: The Republic of China Yearbook 2008 (GIO, 2009) 
 
These characteristics seem to be influenced by the predominant Confucian school 
of thought. Confucianism believes in humanity and is organized around two key tenets: 1) 
developing an internal benevolence and 2) maintaining harmony through external human 
relationships in a society (Yao, 2000). The first tenet suggests that people can be induced 
to behave properly through the operationalization of internalized rituals and the 
development of patterns of behavior based on ceremonial routines. The second tenet 
asserts that a harmonious society can be achieved if people subscribe to five relationships: 
father to son, elder brother to younger brother, husband to wife, elder to junior, and ruler 
to subject. These tenets shape people with qualities of citizenship and social 
responsibility. 
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In addition to these beliefs, Confucius and his edited book, Analects of Confucius, 
has influenced numerous students. Due to his significant role, teachers, scientists, and 
other purveyors of expert knowledge have enjoyed high respect in Taiwan. As a result, 
people who live in a Confucianism-influenced society tend to defer to the opinions of 
experts and respect elitism. 
On the other hand, Taiwan has been extensively influenced by western culture. 
Due to its unique geographical location and rich agricultural resources, Taiwan has been 
regarded as an important commercial center in the Asian maritime trading network since 
the 17th century. Because of long contact with seafaring Europeans and Americans, 
Taiwan was one of the earliest Asian countries to experience the modern world of 
banking, business management, and international trade, as well as some western values 
that came with these institutions like the principles of law (e.g., procedural justice and the 
concept of impartiality), competition, individual interest, and democracy (Tsai, 2009). 
These western dispositions stood in stark contrast to more authoritarian values 
associated with traditional Chinese society (Tsai, 2009). For instance, Chang et al. (2005) 
found that Confucian values have a negative correlation with democratic values, which 
means Confucian values and democratic values move in oppositional directions. 
Nonetheless, Tsai (2009) argues that Taiwan was able to integrate the traditional Chinese 
culture and the modern western culture and to develop its own characteristics. 
As illustrated in Table 3.2, Taiwan has been invaded, colonized, and ruled by 
various external political regimes (e.g., The Netherlands, Japan, and ROC). To secure 
their authority, each of the newly arrived political regimes usually repressed Taiwanese 
people who vocalized antagonistic opinions. For example, thousands of Taiwanese elites 
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were killed or subjected to disappearance during the period of White Terror during the 
period from 1945 to 1987. Due to single party authoritarian rule, the populace did not 
have opportunities to participate in public affairs and tended to be fearful of expressing 
personal opinions in public.  
Lin (2004) analyzed the Taiwanese society through a psychiatric perspective and 
discovered that people, due to Taiwan’s long colonial history, have tended to display 
symptoms of the extensively documented Stockholm syndrome. 37  The relationship 
between island residents and the various ruling regimes evinces a contradictory 
psychology: fear but dependence. As a result, the long history of colonization of Taiwan 
drives the submissive personalities toward authoritarianism while at the same time being 
hesitate to outwardly express opinions. 
After being ruled by several authoritarian political regimes over the last several 
centuries, Taiwan began to move in a more liberal direction after the elimination of 
martial law during the 1980s. This process gradually led to the implementation of more 
expansive democratic reforms and the first direct presidential election in 1996. The 
groundwork for this process of democratization was established to a large degree by the 
US during the decades after World War II.38 During the process, the Taiwanese people 
began to understand their civil rights and to express their opinions in public.  
                                                 
37 The Stockholm syndrome is a psychological response sometimes seen in abducted 
hostages in which victims show signs of loyalty to their abductors, regardless of the 
danger (or at least risk) in which they have been placed. 
 
38 Taiwan was a close ally of the US in the fight against communism after World War II. 
The US helped to reconstruct Taiwan by providing nearly $1.5 billion in financial aid 
during the 1950s and 1960s. The Congress further passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 
1979 that reiterated American commitments to the security of the Taiwanese people. The 
United States urged the KMT government to undertake democratic reform after the 
emergence of increasing public pressure during the 1980s. 
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It can be concluded that the national characteristics of the Taiwanese people are 
influenced by two contrasting cultures: Confucianism and the ideals of western 
democracy. Chang et al. (2005) compared Confucian and democratic values in three 
Chinese societies: Hong Kong, mainland China, and Taiwan. Taiwan was the second in 
the level of modernization, the first in the level of democratization, and the last in 
Confucianism. They also argue that modernization is not only a strong contributor to 
democratic consciousness, but a factor causing shifts in Confucian values. 
 
3.3.4  Socio-psychological Perspective 
As discussed in Subsection 3.3.2, it requires longitudinal statistical studies to determine 
whether people’s values endure or shift over time. In addition, to assess Inglehart’s (1997) 
intergenerational value change theory, one needs to measure if a majority of the 
population in a society shifts values over time and assess the extent of any purported 
value changes across different generations (i.e., whether the grandparents’ generation had 
different values from the current generation). 
Marsh (1999) suggests that there are significant differences in various social 
values across three generations of Taiwanese. The first generation comprises people born 
between 1894 and 1917 who lived their lives during the Japanese colonial period. The 
second generation encompasses people born between 1918 and 1941 that experienced 
World War II.39 The third generation consists of those people who were born between 
1942 and 1967 and benefitted greatly from the rapid economic growth and social 
modernization after World War II. 
                                                 
39 Because Taiwan was ruled by Japan during World War II, it was part of the war zone. 
Many Taiwanese men were enlisted in the Japanese army. In addition, the American air 
force attacked Taiwan and these bombing raids caused thousands of casualties. 
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Marsh’s study included two questions to assess viewpoints about political 
participation among these three generations (Table 3.3). Although the level of support for 
democracy over elitism (i.e., disagreement with the statement) increased over the course 
of the generations, the trend was not overwhelming because 42% of the most recent 
generation of respondents still expressed elitist responses. Moreover, the most prominent 
viewpoint shifted from a commitment to authoritarianism to a regard for democracy. 
While 78% of the first generation respondents trusted political leaders, 90% of the third 
generation respondents showed support for mass citizen participation (Marsh, 1999). 
Table 3.3 Questions and Responses of Viewpoints about Political Participation 
Elitism vs.  
democracy of opinion 
Some people think one has to have at least a high school education to have his 
opinions respected by others in society. 
Authoritarianism vs. 
Democracy 
If you want to make Taiwan a better place, there are two opinions. 
a. All citizens should take an interest in politics and speak their opinions freely.
Agreement: Generation 1 (13%); Generation 2 (36%); Generation 3 (90%) 
 
b. Entrust everything to political leaders. 
Agreement: Generation 1 (78%); Generation 2 (53%); Generation 3 (6%) 
Source: Marsh (1999) 
 
The Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) is a longitudinal nation-wide study 
launched in 1984 to track social values on a variety of topics through annual face-to-face 
interviews. Table 3.4 highlights a number of questions related to the perception of the 
role of citizens and the government and the resultant data provide some insight into the 
evolution of public attitudes on political participation over the course of the past two 
decades. The Taiwanese people seem to evince somewhat contradictory dispositions 
toward democracy and these inclinations fluctuate over time. 
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The 2005 data serve as an example (Table 3.4). While a majority of respondents 
display pro-democracy attitudes for questions B (“I better not get involved in public 
affairs because they are difficult to deal with”) and C (“As long as we often provide 
opinions, people like us can still influence societal development”), similar percentages of 
respondents are negatively inclined toward democracy for question A (“A general citizen 
can still influence the government’s decision”) and D (“If everybody has 
different/inconsistent viewpoints, the society will be chaotic”) (IOSSinica, 2006). 
Table 3.4 The Frequency Distribution of Attitudes toward Political Participation 
(1984-2005) (n range from 1895 to 4199) 
 1984 1990 1995 2000 2005 
A. A general citizen can still influence the 
government’s decision. (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Agree (pro-democracy) 57.6 51.4 49.7 52.9 35.7
Disagree 25.1 29.7 39.9 38.2 57.8
B. I better not get involved in public affairs 
because they are difficult to deal with. 
     
Agree 27.7 39.5 43.3 44.4 44.5
Disagree (pro-democracy) 60.4 46.4 48.0 49.3 50.6
C. As long as we often provide opinions, people 
like us can still influence societal development. 
     
Agree (pro-democracy) 59.3 55.3 62.2 62.8 53.7
Disagree 23.0 25.3 26.6 27.9 39.7
D. If everybody has different/inconsistent 
viewpoints, the society will be chaotic. 
     
Agree 70.5 62.7 61.5 58.0 61.9
Disagree (pro-democracy) 15.9 26.0 30.6 32.7 32.6
Source: IOSSinica (2006) 
 
The 2005 survey shows that while 53.7% of the respondents assert that they can 
influence societal development, only 35.7% of them believe that a general citizen can 
influence governmental decisions. In addition, 61.9% of the respondents feel that society 
will be chaotic if everyone’s opinion is inconsistent (Table 3.4). These seemingly 
conflicting attitudes can be further explained from the 2008 TSCS data (Table 3.5). A 
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majority of respondents do not believe that their opinions would be taken into 
consideration by governmental officials in the process of decision making. Nonetheless, 
two-thirds of the respondents (66.6%) think that casting votes is an effective way to 
influence politics. 
In summary, since the democratic transition in the 1990s, the Taiwanese people 
have shown an inconsistent attitude toward political participation and have kept a 
traditional value: pursuing a harmonious society. Although most people have a positive 
attitude toward democracy at some level, they do not believe their opinions would be 
valued by government officials. This attitude may be driven by the fact that Taiwan is still 
in the process of democratization and that citizens are exploring their roles. 
Table 3.5 The Frequency Distribution of Attitudes toward Political Participation in 
2008 (n=1980) 
 
Agree Neither Agree Nor Disagree Disagree 
a. A lay person like me, only casting one vote, can 
make an influence on politics. 66.6% 11.2% 20.7%
b. The governmental officials will be concerned 
about the viewpoint of a lay person like me. 17.2 18.4 62.8
c. When the governmental officials want to do 
something, they will take into consideration the 
opinions of a lay person. 
26.7 17.8 53.5
Source: IOSSinica (2009) 
 
3.3.5  Concluding Remarks 
This section seeks, on the basis of prior research, to sketch out a profile of the Taiwanese 
people that will be helpful in facilitating interpretation of the research results in 
subsequent chapters of this dissertation. The examination is conducted through two 
aspects: a political cultural perspective and a social psychological perspective. Because of 
its dynamic political transitions, the national character of Taiwan has been shaped by two 
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contradictory value systems: the traditional oriental culture (Confucianism) and the 
modern western culture (Democratization). First, Confucianism has had an impact on 
Taiwanese value dispositions through respect for teachers, scientists, and other experts. 
Second, as a result of colonial and authoritarian regimes over centuries, the Taiwanese 
people tend to be submissive to authoritarianism and hesitate to express opinions. 
Moreover, Marsh (1999) argues that three generations of Taiwanese have 
significantly different attitudes toward political participation. Members of relatively 
younger generations have a positive disposition toward democracy and mass citizen 
participation and this temperament stands in contrast to their grandparent’s generation 
that continues to maintain resolve for authoritarianism. However, according to the results 
of the TSCS, despite the democratic transition that has taken place since the 1990s, the 
Taiwanese people display contradictory attitudes on political participation. Although most 
people believe in democracy at some level, they doubt the efficacy of the general citizen. 
In other words, despite its high level of industrialization and modernization, Taiwanese 
society can still be regarded as having transitioned only partway from authoritarianism to 
democratic ideals. The predominant values of the polity give credence to democracy as a 
relatively abstract concept, but there is a lack of faith in the efficacy of citizenship. 
 
3.4  Environmental Politics in Taiwan 
3.4.1  Introduction 
Environmental reform in most Asian countries has followed a path that resembles the 
experience of most Western countries, namely rapid industrialization and urbanization, 
followed by massive environmental deterioration, followed by the ongoing diffusion of 
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societal awareness of the costs of such activities. However, the uptake of a modern sense 
of environmental consciousness in Taiwan has taken a somewhat more complicated road 
because the country’s authoritarian political system was dominant for more than fifty 
years. As such, the development of environmentalism has been closely tied with the 
political transition in Taiwan. 
During the authoritarian period, administrative agencies played leading roles in 
drafting and enforcing environmental regulations. In addition, it was often difficult to 
regulate polluters because numerous heavy industries were owned and operated by either 
the government or the ruling party—the KMT. This system of top-down governance 
changed gradually with the establishment of governmental environmental protection 
agencies at national and local levels and with the rise of an environmental movement in 
the late 1980s. 
This section provides a discussion of the historical development and the current 
state of environmental politics in Taiwan. Subsection 3.4.2 first describes the evolution of 
the environmental movement in Taiwan from a political perspective. Subsection 3.4.3 
reviews the emergence of environmental awareness among the Taiwanese people. 
Subsection 3.4.4 specifically examines how the public has perceived the issue of global 
climate change. Subsection 3.4.5 concludes with some summary remarks. 
 
3.4.2  Evolution of the Environmental Movement 
While Taiwanese citizens enjoyed benefits from their rapid industrialization and 
economic growth after World War II, the island began to suffer from various forms of 
environmental deterioration (Chan, 1993). However, it was not until the early 1980s that 
an increasing number of local residents, concerned with the potential health impacts of 
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polluting sources such as petrochemical factories and landfills, started to express their 
dissatisfaction by organizing sporadic protests (Tang & Tang, 1997). These 
environmental protest movements were mostly local, politically moderate, and small in 
scale because martial law was still in effect during this period. 
Tang and Tang (1997) argue that these demonstrations contributed more to the 
creation of opportunities for residents to express their frustration and to seek monetary 
compensation from industrial owners than they did to improvements of environmental 
conditions in particular communities. In addition, many of these campaigns failed 
because of various structural factors (e.g., the lack of nationwide environmental 
organizations due to martial law, dispersed interest motivation on the part of local 
factions, and manipulation of major mass media by the KMT regime) (Tang & Tang, 
1997). This mode of nascent activism tended to be reported as being motivated by the 
irrational behaviors of a group of unreasonable, anti-development, and 
compensation-oriented residents. 
A turning point, the cancellation of a proposed DuPont petrochemical plant due to 
strong local opposition in 1986, demonstrated to the general public that determination 
and better organization were the key success factors for collective action in grassroots 
environmental movements (Reardon-Anderson, 1992).40 The number of environmental 
conflicts increased after the abolition of martial law in 1987 because the new political 
situation reduced the marginal costs (i.e., the risk of being arrested) among participants of 
                                                 
40 Regardless of potential penal consequences under the martial law, local residents in 
Lukang organized and demonstrated both in their community and in the capital city, 
Taipei, to oppose DuPont’s plan of building a petrochemical plant. The protests directly 
challenged the KMT government’s authority because this project was supported by major 
ministries in the central government. In the end, DuPont voluntarily withdrew its 
construction project, which represented a victory to many environmentalists. 
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protests (Hsiao et al., 1995). At a national scale, membership-based environmental 
organizations emerged after 1987 and these groups have not only supported and 
facilitated local environmental protests, but they have attracted the public’s attention to 
broader environmental issues, such as wildlife protection, forest conservation, and 
water-resource preservation. 
Furthermore, the TEPA was upgraded to a ministerial-level organization under the 
Executive Yuan (the executive branch) in 1987. During the 1990s, a number of 
environmental statutes were drafted, one of which was the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Act. It not only requires an independent review committee to assess the 
environmental impacts of major development projects, but also involves the public in the 
process (i.e., mandatory public hearings). This review process created a platform for 
comprehensive debates among different stakeholders and interest groups. As a result of 
this legislation, environmentalism in Taiwan experienced a transition from local protest 
movements toward more deliberative policy-making processes through the growth of 
civil society and the reform of environmental institutions. 
After a series of open elections in the 1990s, the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP), the long-time opposition party, came to power in some municipalities and had 
their voice represented in the Parliament. In 2000, the DPP won the presidential election 
and this landmark event ended fifty years of KMT administration. Environmentalists 
were optimistic because the DPP was regarded not only as a stalwart companion, but also 
as a relatively environmentally supportive political party. 
This close relationship between the DPP and environmental groups changed after 
the DPP administration cancelled the ongoing construction of Taiwan’s fourth nuclear 
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power plant in 2000 (Hsu, 2005). 41  Without a parliamentary majority and skillful 
statesmanship, the administration was forced to continue the construction in the end (Ho, 
2005).42 In addition, under the pressure of an unprecedented economic recession in 2001 
and a lack of remarkable achievements, the DPP administration was forced to sacrifice 
many its promised environmental reforms (Ho, 2005). As a result, Taiwanese 
environmentalists were disappointed with the DPP administration (i.e., their old ally in 
democratic movement over the past two decades) and outraged by what they perceived to 
be a foregone outcome engineered by business interests. 
During the past two decades, strong environmental positions have become a 
crucial element of a solid pro-democracy coalition involving environmental movement 
elites, the opposition political party, and other social movement leaders against the 
authoritarian government in Taiwan (Kim, 2000). The emergence of an environmental 
movement in Taiwan is closely bound up with the process of democratic consolidation. 
However, because environmental groups were not organized as an autonomous political 
force during the democratization process, environmental issues tended to be marginalized 
in the political process when competing with other political interests. 
                                                 
41 With technological assistance from the US, Taiwan had constructed three nuclear 
power plants with six reactors by the mid-1980s. The construction budget of the fourth 
nuclear power plant (FNPP) was approved by the KMT-dominant legislature in 1994 
(Hsu, 2005). However, the antinuclear movement, one of the key issues advocated by 
environmental groups, has never stopped. Because opposition to the construction of the 
FNPP has always been a core value of the DPP, President Shui-bian Chen abruptly 
announced the cancellation of the FNPP after he resumed office in 2000. 
 
42 When DPP won the presidential election in 2000, the party did not have a majority of 
seats in the Legislative Yuan. The KMT-dominant Legislative Yuan was in favor of the 
construction of the FNPP so they filed an appeal that stated the termination decision 
violated the constitution. The Council of Grand Justices later declared that the 
termination decision of the FNPP was procedurally flawed which demanded that the 
Executive Yuan immediately resume the constructions (Ho, 2005). 
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While the environmental movement in Taiwan has primarily focused on local 
issues to date, there are signs that individual groups have begun to advocate on some 
global environmental issues such as global climate change. For instance, dozens of civil 
society groups collectively initiated the “Anti-warming parade” in 2007 and several 
climate change-related campaigns (e.g., turn off the lights campaigns) (Lin, 2008). Mol 
(2001) argues that the main factors driving the globalization of environmental reform 
throughout much of East and Southeast Asian are either global or national because the 
region lacks supranational organizations like the EU. 
These factors include global environmental regimes (e.g., international treaties), 
strong national environmental NGOs that link to global activist networks, support given 
by international development assistance programs, and global green markets that push 
regional or national producers toward environmentally sound production (Mol, 2001). 
However, because Taiwan is excluded from international diplomatic negotiations, it is of 
particular interest to observe the factors that are responsible for mobilizing the 
globalization of environmentalism in Taiwan. 
 
3.4.3  The Emergence of Environmental Concern 
While the Taiwanese public became increasingly aware of the level of environmental 
deterioration in large parts of the island during the period after the 1980s, a number of 
surveys have been conducted to understand the public’s environmental concerns (e.g., 
Hsiao et al., 1995; 2002; IOSSinica, 2002). For instance, three national surveys in 1983, 
1986, and 1999 (n=1,146, 518, and 1,495) asked about the public’s perception of 
environmental problems in terms of seriousness and urgency (Hsiao et al., 1995, 2002). 
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This work reported that on a list of 18 social problems, environmental pollution 
was regarded as the sixth most serious in 1983, ranked in second place in 1986, and 
ranked in fifth place in 1999 (Hsiao et al., 1995, 2002). The top four most serious social 
problems in 1999 included juvenile delinquency, bribery in elections, public safety, and 
unemployment. In addition, nine of eleven environmental problems (e.g., air and water 
pollution, solid waste, resource depletion, and energy shortage) were perceived to be 
more serious in 1986 than they were three years earlier (Hsiao et al., 1995). 
The 2001 TSCS focused on investigating public priorities on various social 
problems (one of which was environmental issues). The respondents (n=2,052) were 
asked how they felt about environmental quality at present compared to the situation five 
years earlier and how they expected conditions to change five years into the future (i.e., 
worse, no change, better, do not know) (Table 3.6) (IOSSinica, 2002). The results 
suggested that a majority of the Taiwanese public thought that overall environmental 
quality had worsened over the preceding five years except for the longstanding issue of 
solid waste treatment.43 
Meanwhile, they were pessimistic about the future. One third of the respondents 
thought that overall environmental quality would deteriorate, except solid waste 
treatment and wildlife habitats. In addition, the 2001 TSCS found that 37.1% of the 
respondents thought ozone depletion was the most serious global environmental problem, 
followed by climate change with 21.7% (IOSSinica, 2002). 
                                                 
43 According to the 2008 Yearbook of Environmental Protection Statistics (TEPA, 2009b), 
the total solid waste in Taiwan in 1996 (five years prior to the 2001 TSCS) was 8.7 
million tons (Mt), which significantly decreased to 7.3 Mt in 2001 and to 4.4 Mt in 2008. 
In addition, the recycling rate has been improved from 1.2% in 1998, to 7.5% in 2001, 
and to 32.8% in 2008. These data imply that Taiwan has made a substantial effort in 
improving solid waste problems over the past two decades. 
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Table 3.6 Public Concern about Environmental Quality in the Past and Future 
 Past (5 yrs) Future Expectation (5 yrs) 
Air quality (including acid rain) Worse (80.4%) Worse (52.7%) DK (24.7%) 
Water quality (river, lake, reservoir) Worse (68.8%) Worse (43.4%) DK (26.9%) 
Solid waste treatment Better (52.6%) Better (41.3%) DK (25.1%) 
Soil/water conservation in slope land Worse (65.7%) Worse (33.9%) DK (31.6%) 
Wildlife, forest, and wetland Worse (40.0%) Better (26.9%) DK (36.2%) 
Land and groundwater Worse (59.6%) Worse (37.7%) DK (35.3%) 
Coastal area  Worse (57.8%) Worse (36.3%) DK (35.7%) 
Industrial pollution Worse (63.9%) Worse (37.9%) DK (28.7%) 
Source: (IOSSinica, 2002) 
 
Tu (2004) analyzed the attitudes of the Taiwanese public about the relationship 
between environmental protection and economic growth using TSCS data from 1991, 
1994, and 2001.44 When asked to prioritize between economic growth and environmental 
protection in a 2001 survey, 46% of the respondents (n=2,052) selected economic growth 
and 40.8% selected environmental protection. The percentage of respondents prioritizing 
environmental protection over economic growth shifted from 53.2% in 1991 to 67.2% in 
1994, to 40.8% in 2001, which may suggest that the economic recession in 2001 affected 
public attitudes. He further found that education and increased awareness of pollution 
were two important factors for prioritizing environmental protection—people who are 
more educated and more concerned about pollution tend to support the importance of the 
environment. 
 
                                                 
44 The question regarding the trade-off between economic growth and environmental 
protection is commonly used in environmental surveys in Taiwan as an indicator of 
pro-environment or pro-development attitudes. This implies that the general framing of 
these two issues are oppositional. It may be interesting to discover if there is a potential 
for attitudes that simultaneously embrace these two goals. 
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Hsiao et al. (2002) further investigated if there was a possible paradigm shift in 
terms of the relationship between the environment and development between 1983 and 
1999 (Table 3.7). The results showed the apparent inconsistencies inherent in the 
Taiwanese value system. Although a high percentage of respondents tended to accept a 
new environmental value set (e.g., limit to growth), they still wanted the benefits of 
technology and continued growth. Nonetheless, the proportion of the public that endorsed 
a pro-development attitude (items 5, 8, and 9) decreased from 1983 to 1999. 
Table 3.7 Environmental Consciousness—the Relationship between Environment and 
Development Index (1983-1999) 
1983 (n=1,146) 1986 (n=518) 1999 (n=1,495)
Questions 
Agree (%) Agree (%) Agree (%) 
1. Human must live in harmony with nature in 
order to survive. 95.6 99.2 98.4 
2. We are approaching the limit of the number of 
people the earth can support. 88.6 85.5 91.3 
3. Serious and disruptive shortages of essential 
new materials are likely if things continue. 83.7 87.5 89.0 
4. A polluted environment can’t be restored to its 
original state. 78.7 89.1 86.7 
5. Industrial societies provide a high level of 
well-being for most people who live in them.* 91.6 89.7 85.4 
6. The more industrial development, the more 
destruction of the natural environment will take 
place. 
81.5 79.4 81.7 
7. A nuclear accident resulting in the 
contamination of the environment is increasingly 
likely. 
70.3 85.4 80.9 
8. Science and technology are our best hope for 
the future.* 93.6 89.9 80.6 
9. The good effects of technology outweigh its 
bad effects.* 91.3 88.9 76.1 
10. The storage of nuclear wastes is too 
dangerous. 48.5 76.6 73.0 
Source: Hsiao et al. (2002) 
* Pro-development items 
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In addition to the perceived tradeoff between environmental protection and 
economic growth, Wei (2001) investigated the disposition of the Taiwanese public with 
respect to environmental justice using the 1999 Environmental Consciousness in Taiwan 
Survey. The result showed that although nearly 96.9% of the respondents recognized that 
it was a basic right to have clean air and water, 44.9% of the respondents agreed that the 
living environment of a minority of the population can be sacrificed for the benefit of 
Taiwan as a whole. 
The 2001 TSCS also investigated the Taiwanese public’s attitudes toward 
environmental action. First, the respondents (n=2,052) were asked about their preferred 
protest actions against a polluting factory in the neighborhood. The majority of the 
respondents would take moderate actions, such as reporting an incident to environmental 
and safety agencies (75.0%) or signing a petition (72.8%). Relatively fewer people would 
take aggressive actions, such as protesting in front of the factory (29.4%) or blocking the 
factory (16.6%). On a somewhat different matter, 77.6% of the respondents were willing 
to pay a higher price for a green product (IOSSinica, 2002). 
The last question on the 2001 TSCS survey focused on the frequency of certain 
personal behaviors. A total of 54% of the respondents recycled often and 79.1% never 
littered. While 42.5% of the respondents never carried their own shopping bags, 54.5% 
often reused plastic bags. While 78.9% of the respondents never carried their personal 
tableware when dining out, 59.1% never used disposal tableware at home and 52.7% 
never drank bottled water at home. These results imply that the majority of the Taiwanese 
public tends to exhibit basic and moderate environmentally friendly behaviors in their 
daily consumer and household practices (IOSSinica, 2002). 
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A more recent 2006 Environmental Protection Knowledge Survey also provided 
some interesting observations with respect to environmental concern in Taiwan (Table 3.8) 
(TEPA, 2006). A majority of the respondents (i.e., two sample groups—the public and 
college students) recognized the environmental impacts of overly pursuing economic 
growth and the urgent need to protect the environment. Interestingly, most of these 
respondents were willing to lower their living standards for the goal of environmental 
protection—a sign of willingness to take individual environmental responsibility. 
Table 3.8 The Frequency Distribution of Agreements with Pro-environmental 
Attitudes 
Statements 
General 
Public 
(n=1,628) 
College 
Students 
(n=1,270) 
Overly pursuing economic growth would cause environmental problems 83.1% 94.5% 
Protecting our environment is of urgent need 98.6 96.5 
I would rather lower my living standards for environmental protection 82.2 78.5 
Source: 2006 Environmental Protection Knowledge Survey (TEPA, 2006) 
 
3.4.4  Public Perception of Climate Change in Taiwan 
There has not been significant research specifically focused on the public understanding 
of global climate change in Taiwan, but reviewing a number of surveys on general 
environmental issues can provide some valuable insights. These surveys have been 
motivated by a desire to understand the public’s general environmental concern since the 
1990s. In these investigations, one key aspect of environmental awareness was 
knowledge of international environmental issues, and a commonly-used indicator was the 
correct recognition of the focus issue of the Kyoto Conference in 1997. 
First, a national survey Environmental Consciousness in Taiwan was carried out 
by the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica in 1999 and involved interviews with 
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1,495 randomly-selected households. This instrument revealed that 81.4% of the 
respondents did not know the major issue of the Kyoto Conference and 13.8% correctly 
identified the focus issue. Moreover, a majority of the respondents (42%) selected ozone 
depletion as the most pressing global environmental issue and 16% selected climate 
change/global warming (Hsiao et al., 2002). 
In addition, according to a 2005 Environmental Protection Knowledge Survey 
(n=1,208), 33.7% of college students correctly identified global warming as the focus 
issue of the Kyoto Protocol, 33.0% did not know the answer, and 27.1% misperceived 
that ozone depletion was the focus issue. Nevertheless, 77.7% of college students 
correctly recognized CO2 and methane as the primary GHG (TEPA, 2005). The same 
survey (n=1,270) was carried out in 2006, and the result showed an increasing percentage 
of college students (55.9%) with the correct understanding of the issue of the Kyoto 
Protocol. In addition, the percentage of respondents who did not know the answer 
decreased to 17.1% (from 33.0% in 2005) (TEPA, 2006). 
The 2006 survey (n=1,628) also extended the question to the general public. In 
this instance, 36.5% of Taiwanese people had heard about the Kyoto Protocol while a 
majority (63.5%) had not heard about this treaty. Among those who had heard about the 
Protocol, 41.6% correctly perceived the focus issue, while 36.9% of respondents thought 
(incorrectly) that ozone depletion was the key issue. Compared with Hsiao et al.’s (2002) 
study, the percentage of the general public’s correct identification of the focus issue of the 
Kyoto Protocol had improved from 13.8% to 41.6% (TEPA, 2006). 
The 2006 Environmental Protection Knowledge Survey posed two additional 
multiple-choice questions regarding knowledge of the consequences of increasing CO2 
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emissions and of ozone depletion (see the questions in Table 3.9). In this case, 78.2% of 
college students and 35.9% of the general public correctly identified that global warming 
(greenhouse effect) is attributable to increasing CO2 emissions associated with industrial 
activities. A total of 54.5% of the public and 18.3% of college students misperceived that 
ozone depletion was the consequence of increasing CO2 emissions (TEPA, 2006). 
Furthermore, when asked about the consequences of ozone depletion, 69.5% of 
college students and 45.3% of the general public correctly selected the option of exposure 
to excess ultraviolet light. A sizeable percentage of the general public (40.1%) and 
college students (24.6%) incorrectly selected the option of increasing temperature/sea 
level rise as a consequence of ozone depletion (Table 3.9). 
Table 3.9 The Frequency Distribution of Two Climate-Related Knowledge Questions 
Question 1) 
What is the environmental consequence of increasing carbon 
dioxide emissions due to industrialization? 
College Students 
(n=1,270) 
General Public 
(n=1,628) 
Ozone Depletion 18.3% 54.5% 
Dust Storm 2.5 3.3 
Global Warming (Greenhouse Effect) 78.2 35.9 
Forest Wildfire 0.5 1.6 
Do not Know 0.6 4.7 
Total (%) 100.1 100 
Question 2) 
What is the consequence of ozone depletion? 
College Students 
(n=1,270) 
General Public 
(n=1,628) 
Exposure of excess ultraviolet light 69.5% 45.3% 
Increasing Temperature/Sea Level Rise 24.6 40.1 
Increasing Typhoon 1.7 1.2 
Atmosphere Depletion 2.7 8.1 
Do not Know 1.6 5.3 
Total (%) 100.1 100 
Source: 2006 Environmental Protection Knowledge Survey (TEPA, 2006) 
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These results suggest that college students have a better understanding than the 
general public in Taiwan regarding the topic of global climate change. It can also be 
found that ozone depletion was commonly confused with global climate change/global 
warming by both college students and the general public. Interestingly, the percentage of 
the Taiwanese public (54.5%) that misunderstood these two issues in 2006 was similar to 
the percentage of Americans (54%) who were confused about them in 2000 (Nisbet & 
Myers, 2007). Even though the timeframe may not be directly comparable (i.e., American 
data were from 2000 and Taiwan data were from 2006), it can be inferred that the 
confusion between global climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion is quite 
universal. 
In addition to data on general perceptions about global climate change collected 
from common environmental surveys, Hsu (2006) conducted a national survey study that 
interviewed Taiwanese as part of a randomly gathered sample of college students and 
investigated the interrelationships between their knowledge, attitudes, and behavioral 
intentions toward climate change. The result first revealed that 100% of the respondents 
(n=773) had heard about the greenhouse effect, 98.1% had heard about climate change, 
and 76.0% had heard about the Kyoto Protocol. This level of familiarity with these 
climate-related terms implies that Taiwanese college students have been exposed to 
preliminary climate-change information during the mid-2000s. 
Hsu (2006) then used twenty yes-or-no items to assess college students’ level of 
knowledge on the issue of climate change in three dimensions (i.e., causes, impacts, and 
solutions). The investigation revealed that respondents had a satisfactory level of overall 
climate-change knowledge with an average score of 70 out of 100 (14 out of 20 questions 
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answered correctly). Moreover, the respondents performed better on the dimension of 
climate-change impacts (scored on average 80% of questions correct) than in the 
dimension of causes (70%). By contrast, they had a relatively limited knowledge (50%) 
of potential mitigation solutions and the international treaty (i.e., Kyoto Protocol).45 
In addition, respondents expressed pro-climate protection attitudes with an 
average score of 3.9 on a 5-point Likert scale (a higher score indicates a pro-climate 
attitude). However, they displayed lower behavioral intentions with an average score of 
2.9 on a 5-point Likert scale (a higher score indicates a higher willingness to take 
pro-climate actions). We can interpret this result to mean that despite Taiwanese college 
students’ pro-climate protection attitudes, they were not so active themselves in taking 
mitigative climate-change actions (Hsu, 2006). 
Finally, Hsu (2006) analyzed the relationships among three variables—knowledge, 
attitudes, and behavioral intentions—with respect to global climate change. First, the 
variable of climate knowledge was positively correlated with a pro-climate attitude 
(r=0.30, p<0.001). Second, the variable of a pro-climate attitude was positively correlated 
with the variable of behavioral intention toward protecting the climate (r=0.26, p<0.001). 
Finally, climate-change knowledge was positively correlated with behavioral intentions 
toward protecting the climate (r=0.22, p<0.05) (Hsu, 2006). It can be concluded that each 
of these three variables is positively related to the other two variables, but the small 
correlation coefficients suggest that the relationships are marginal. 
                                                 
45 The cause dimension consists of seven items (e.g., the use of fossil fuels enhances the 
greenhouse effect). The impacts dimension includes five items (e.g., the enhanced 
greenhouse effect will cause sea-level rise). The solution dimension includes eight items 
(e.g., energy conservation can moderate the greenhouse effect). Assuming it is a test, a 
average score of 70% is considered to be satisfactory. 
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3.4.5  Concluding Remarks 
The development of environmental politics in Taiwan has proceeded down a path that is 
roughly similar to the process that has transpired in most Western countries—a largely 
grassroots movement emerged in response to rapid industrialization and urbanization and 
the resultant environmental deterioration that took place as a result of these activities. The 
difference is that the development of environmentalism in Taiwan has been closely tired 
with the country’s political transition due to its long-time authoritarian political system. 
This circumstance contributes to an interesting political dynamic—Taiwanese 
environmental groups tend to work in an alliance involving a variety of social activists. 
Numerous studies suggest that the Taiwanese public maintains that overall 
environmental quality has been degraded and is unlikely to improve within five years. 
Additionally, although a majority of people endorse a pro-environmental value, they still 
endorse the government’s emphasis on economic growth. Despite the fact that general 
awareness about global climate change has increased, there still exists in the public mind 
considerable confusion between global climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion. 
Moreover, Taiwanese college students have a better understanding than the 
general public on the topic of climate change and display what can be constructed as a 
satisfactory level of familiarity on the topic. However, compared to their understanding of 
impacts and causes, comprehension of mitigation interventions is poor. In addition, even 
though Taiwanese college students seem to hold pro-climate protection attitudes, they 
have not been to date particularly active in their uptake of pro-climate mitigation 
behaviors. Finally, Hsu (2006) found that each of these variables (i.e., knowledge, 
attitude, and behavioral intentions) was weekly positively related to one another. 
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3.5  Domestic Climate Policies in Taiwan 
3.5.1  Introduction 
While the international political community has been negotiating comprehensive climate 
regimes to combat global climate change since 1990, it is essential to formulate and 
implement domestic climate policies (i.e., mitigation or adaptation strategies) for 
achieving meaningful results.46 This doctoral research primarily focuses on the mitigation 
policy option—how to reduce human-induced GHG emissions. As introduced in Section 
3.2.3, Taiwan is highly responsible for contributing to this global problem because of its 
disproportional responsibility (i.e., 0.35% of the global population produced 1% of global 
GHG emissions in 2007). Although Taiwan is not a signatory to the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol (hence no obligation), the government first began the process of 
formulating domestic climate policies in the 1990s. It is particularly interesting to explore 
some factors that prompted Taiwan’s political actions and the current status of these 
domestic political efforts. 
This section describes the current status of climate-change policies in Taiwan. 
Subsection 3.5.2 highlights the overall landscape of the politics of global climate change 
in Taiwan. Subsection 3.5.3 reviews the development of climate-change policy in Taiwan. 
Subsection 3.5.4 introduces two domestic mitigation policies that are specifically in the 
jurisdiction of the TEPA—a mandatory regulation (i.e., Greenhouse Gas Reduction Bill) 
and a voluntary program (i.e., Energy Conservation and Carbon Reduction Program). 
Subsection 3.5.5 concludes with some summary remarks. 
                                                 
46 Mitigation refers to an anthropogenic intervention to reduce the sources or introduce 
any mechanism that removes greenhouse gases. Adaptation refers to adjustment in natural 
or human systems in response to actual or expected climate stimuli or their effects, which 
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities. 
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3.5.2  The Politics of Global Climate Change in Taiwan 
After the 1992 Rio Summit, the Taiwanese government initiated a ministerial-level 
working group to organize a variety of political responses to climate change including 
diplomatic negotiation, scientific research, awareness education, and formulation of 
policy responses. In addition, during the 1990s the National Science Council of Taiwan 
began to promote localized global change research projects and launched several 
international research networks (e.g., World Climate Research Programme) (TEPA, 2002). 
Moreover, in an attempt to deliberate energy supply-security strategies and to shift 
toward a low-carbon society over the long term, the Taiwanese government organized the 
National Energy Conference in 1998 and 2005. 
Given Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation in the international community (i.e., it is not 
a member of UN, so it is excluded from most official international negotiations), it is 
surprising to find that the government has actively responded to the problem. Being 
isolated may seem favorable because it prevents Taiwan from being regulated in the 
international agreements. However, the real situation is not that simple. Therefore, it is 
interesting to explore what factors drove the government to proactively take political 
responses since 1992 and what barriers impede the effectiveness of Taiwan’s mitigation 
initiatives. 
 
Driving Forces of Political Action in the 1990s 
Due to the rise of globalization, Taiwan began to become aware of the significance of 
participating in international political affairs in the 1990s. Even though Taiwan is 
excluded from most diplomatic negotiations, the government managed to attend a variety 
of international conferences (e.g., COPs of the UNFCCC) using the status of NGO 
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delegations. In this compromised approach, government officials were able to observe the 
meetings, obtain updated information, and even arrange bilateral meetings. However, 
several trade sanctions were imposed on Taiwan by the US and many European countries 
in 1994 because it violated the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) for smuggling rhino-horn products (Yue & Sun, 2003). 
This experience made the government realize that Taiwan would have to comply 
with the obligations of international agreements (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol) even without 
signing them or without participating in the negotiation process (Yue & Sun, 2003). This 
pragmatic concern about potential economic impacts due to trade sanctions was the 
primary reason driving the government to actively develop a political response to 
mitigate its GHG emissions during the 1990s (e.g., initiating a ministerial-level working 
group and consensus-building energy conferences). 
In addition to concern about the possibility of having trade sanctions imposed on 
it, Taiwan considers itself an active member of the global community with responsibility 
to protect the environment (TEPA, 2002). This moral-obligation rationale anticipates the 
acquisition of political leverage in the international political community. By showing 
Taiwan’s commitment, and by actively fulfilling its obligations, the government hopes to 
be included in the diplomatic negotiations. Yue and Sun (2003) argue that Taiwan’s 
mitigation practices can demonstrate a “showcase effect” for other newly-industrialized 
and developing countries. As a newly-industrialized society with relatively high 
technological and financial capability, Taiwan’s compliance with the Kyoto Protocol 
(even it is not obligated) can show a positive example to other newly-industrialized 
countries that are likely to become regulated during the post-Kyoto period. 
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Potential Barriers to Effective Political Action 
If the Taiwanese government has attempted to reduce its GHG emissions during the 
1990s, why are there no meaningful results regarding GHG emission reduction after 
nearly two decades? The following discussion argues that two potential barriers have 
impeded effective political actions in Taiwan—the scientific knowledge gap and the 
political challenge. 
The first factor that has contributed to a delay of political actions in Taiwan is the 
scientific barrier. Subsection 2.2.3 highlights the functions and the roles that science and 
scientists can play in the policy-making process (e.g., theory builders and applied policy 
analysts). Even though the National Science Council of Taiwan has encouraged localized 
climate-change research projects since the 1990s, sound scientific evidence does not 
come quickly and easily, especially for an issue like global climate change which refers to 
variability of global climate patterns over time. Longitudinal studies are required to 
observe whether there is a change in the climate system, to confirm that the observed 
changes are results of global climate change, and to construct prediction scenarios. 
For example, typhoons strike Taiwan every summer; it would take years to prove 
that the increased frequency and intensity of typhoons are adverse impacts of climate 
change. In addition, to provide advice, such as insights regarding GHG emission trends, 
to policy makers, scientists and experts need time to construct emission scenarios, to 
build GHG inventories, to assess socio-economic scenarios, and so forth. Therefore, 
bridging the scientific knowledge gap may be the foremost step to overcome in taking 
actual political actions. 
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The other potential factor impeding effective political actions is the political 
barrier. First, since climate-mitigation strategies involve collective efforts from multiple 
disciplines and government ministries in the national government (e.g., environmental 
protection, energy, and economics), a key challenge requires addressing the integration of 
various GHG-related government agencies due to the fragmentation of domestic politics 
(Huang & Lee, 2009). For instance, an energy-tax policy in Taiwan may involve the 
Environmental Protection Administration (TEPA), the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(MEA), and the Ministry of Finance. However, the different and sometimes conflicting 
interests among these government agencies make it difficult to collaborate. 
Furthermore, given the fact that Taiwan is responsible for producing high CO2 
emissions because of its dependency on relatively high energy-intensive industries, 
adjustment of the industrial structure in Taiwan (energy intensive industries vs. energy 
efficient industries) seems an effective approach for lowering GHG emissions. However, 
the weak status of the TEPA in the Executive Yuan (a secondary cabinet) causes difficulty 
in fighting against a prioritized agency such as MEA. 
Second, even though the DPP took over the presidential office from the KMT 
after the political transition in 2000, the DPP administration struggled in implementing 
some policies and formulating new policies because of a lack of a parliamentary majority. 
To fight against the DPP administration, the KMT-dominant Legislative Yuan has 
boycotted many bills (including the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Bill) during the 
eight-year ruling period of the DPP (see Section 3.4 and Subsection 3.5.4). 
Finally, similar to the process of forming an international agreement, a major 
controversy persisted on whether Taiwan should establish a specific GHG reduction 
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target and timetable and whether such targets should be put in the context of the GHG 
Reduction Bill. If such fixed measures are established, what target and timetable should 
be set? This dilemma has been debated in many national meetings not only by various 
stakeholders (e.g., industries and NGOs), but by different governmental agencies (e.g., 
TEPA and MEA) (Lin, 2008). 
Environmental groups rigorously advocated the standard of Annex I Parties in the 
Kyoto Protocol (i.e., lower Taiwan’s CO2 emissions to the 1990 level by 2012). The MEA 
proposed that each sector and agency voluntarily reduce its GHG emissions based on its 
own goal. The target proposed by the TEPA was a resolution of the 1998 National Energy 
Conference: lower Taiwan’s CO2 emissions to the 2000 level by 2020—which was 
approximately 10 tons of CO2 emissions per capita (Lin, 2008). 
Some opponents of setting specific targets and establishing a timetable of GHG 
emission reduction argue that there is no need for Taiwan to act that proactively. They 
position Taiwan like other developing countries—that it just needs to comply with the 
post-Kyoto regime instead of the standard for industrialized countries in the Kyoto 
Protocol. In the end, although the draft GHG Reduction Bill does not include a specific 
reduction target and timetable, as a compromise, it authorizes the TEPA to establish a 
reduction goal for the future cap-and-trade scheme (Huang & Lee, 2009). 
In brief, due to the scientific complexity and political sensitivity of global climate 
change, the discussion above can provide some insights about the compelling challenge 
of formulating and implementing domestic climate policies. It takes time to gather 
sufficient scientific evidence (to confirm scientific validation, to develop a potential 
solution, and to advise policy makers). It also takes time to achieve a societal consensus 
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for acceptable political actions. The next section discusses the evolution of climate policy 
making in Taiwan by examining two primary policy discourses in detail. 
 
3.5.3  The Evolution of Climate Policy Making 
Lin (2008) uses John Dryzek’s (2005) discourse analysis approach to review the 
development of climate-change policies in Taiwan from 1992 to 2008 in terms of 
rationality, core values, discourse content, and strategy (Table 3.10).47 In addition, based 
on Maarten Hajer’s (1995) discourse-coalition theory, Lin (2008) identifies two major 
discourse coalitions in the climate-policy process in Taiwan: the environmental 
pragmatist discourse coalition and the climate action discourse coalition.48 
Four primary discourse periods are identified during a 17-year time span: 
scientific knowledge discourse period (1992-1997); energy safety discourse period 
(1998-2000); nuclear-free homeland discourse period (2000-2005); energy conservation 
and carbon reduction discourse period (2005-2008). In this sense, the development of 
climate policies in Taiwan has been similar to the process that has taken place at the level 
of international society in terms of constructing scientific knowledge to advocating the 
reduction of GHG emission. In addition, the transition of each discourse coalition through 
time was influenced by several national events (i.e., in 1998 and 2005 the National 
Energy Conference and in 2000 the fourth nuclear power plant controversy) and by some 
                                                 
47 Discourse analysis is a tool for postempiricist policy analysts to examine the way we 
define, interpret, and address environmental affairs. Each policy discourse can be 
analyzed from the following elements: basic entities constructed; assumptions about 
natural relationships; agents and motives; and key metaphors (Dryzek, 2005). 
 
48 Discourse coalitions refer to a coalition of actors sharing the same policy discourse 
that focuses on narrative storylines rather than empirical evidence. Different discourse 
coalitions may compete for a position that can drive institutional practices and advocacy 
argumentation process (Hajer, 1995). 
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international events (i.e., the release of “An Inconvenient Truth” and Nobel Prize in 2007) 
(Lin, 2008). 
Table 3.10 Policy Discourse Analysis in Different Periods from 1992 to 2008 
Period Key Facet Environmental Pragmatist Discourse Coalition 
Climate Action Discourse 
Coalition 
Motive & 
Rationality 
Scientific Rationality & 
Economic Rationality Ecological Rationality 
Core value Pragmatism Sustainable Development 
Discourse 
Content 
y Avoid economic impact 
and trading sanctions 
y Follow the world trend 
of environmental 
protection 
y Lessen GHG emissions 
y Increase energy use 
efficiency 
y Construct climate 
change study at local 
perspectives 
y Oppose nuclear power 
and energy intense 
industry 
y Criticize development 
y Set up GHG reduction 
target and timetable 
y Promote renewable 
energy and energy 
saving 
y Carbon tax 
I. Scientific 
Knowledge 
Discourse Period 
(1992-1997) 
Strategy 
y Use control and 
economic incentives 
y Promote renewable 
energy 
y Consider nuclear power 
y GHG emissions control
y Carbon tax and 
economic incentives 
Motive & 
Rationality 
Economic Rationality & 
Technological Rationality Ecological Rationality 
Core value No regret Strategy Sustainable Development 
Discourse 
Content 
y Promote energy 
diversity 
y Set up GHG reduction 
target and timetable 
y Increase energy use 
efficiency 
y Ensure the role of 
nuclear power 
y Oppose nuclear power 
and energy intense 
industry 
y Set up GHG reduction 
target and timetable 
y Promote renewable 
energy  
y Adjust the industry 
structure 
II. Energy Security 
Discourse Period 
(1998-2000) 
Strategy 
y Use control and 
economic incentives 
y Promote renewable 
energy 
y Reduce the ratio of 
manufacture industry 
y GHG emissions control
y Carbon tax and 
economic incentives 
y Consider GHG 
emissions in the 
environmental impact 
assessment 
Source: Lin (2008) 
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Table 3.11 Policy Discourse Analysis in Different Periods from 1992 to 2008 (Conti.) 
Period Discourse Environmental Pragmatist Discourse Coalition 
Climate Action Discourse 
Coalition 
Motive & 
Rationality Economic Rationality Ecological Rationality 
Core value Nuclear-free Homeland Sustainable Development / Environmental Justice 
Discourse 
Content 
y Stop constructing the 
fourth nuclear power 
plant 
y Promote energy 
diversity 
y Increase energy use 
efficiency 
y Stop constructing the 
fourth nuclear power 
plant 
y Cancel inappropriate 
energy subsidy 
III. Nuclear-free 
Homeland Discourse 
Period (2000-2005) 
Strategy 
y Stop constructing the 
fourth nuclear power 
plant 
y Adjust the industry 
structure 
y Voluntary GHG 
reduction 
y Promote renewable 
energy and small-scale 
power plant 
y Electricity market 
liberalization 
Motive & 
Rationality 
Economic Rationality & 
Technological Rationality Ecological Rationality 
Core value Pragmatism Sustainable Development / Environmental Justice 
Discourse 
Content 
y Save energy and reduce 
carbon 
y Clean development 
mechanism 
y Adaptation strategy 
y Low carbon society 
y Oppose to use nuclear 
power as an option to 
reduce GHG emissions
y Low carbon society 
y Adaptation strategy 
y The role of cities 
y National security 
IV. Energy 
Conservation and 
Carbon Reduction 
Discourse Period 
(2005-2008) 
Strategy 
y GHG inventory 
y Citizen campaign to 
reduce carbon 
y GHG emission trading 
y Capacity building of 
reduction 
y Set up GHG reduction 
target and timetable 
y Carbon tax 
y Develop renewable 
energy 
Source: Lin (2008) 
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These two coalitions (i.e., the environmental pragmatist discourse coalition and 
the climate action discourse coalition) share some similarities with respect to objectives, 
but they have employed different rationalities and strategies. On one hand, the 
environmental pragmatist discourse coalition, mainly advocated by government agencies 
and industrial groups, emphasizes technical and economic rationalities. It tends to favor 
conservative policies that are technologically and economically feasible and politically 
implementable (e.g., renewable energy and energy-efficiency technologies with minimum 
economic impacts to industries; pragmatic policies such as GHG inventories) (Lin, 2008). 
One the other hand, the climate action discourse coalition, mostly advocated by 
environmental groups, emphasizes ecological rationality. It tends to advocate more 
aggressive policies that are rooted in an environmental protection ideology (e.g., the 
industrial structure adjustment; mandatory GHG regulations). Because the key actors in 
this discourse coalition are environmental groups, the climate action discourse coalition 
has also taken the route of the emergence of environmental movements in Taiwan: 
criticizing development and supporting an ideal form of ecological rationality (Lin, 
2008). 
These two coalitions have employed different approaches. For example, the 
climate action discourse coalition has supported a specific GHG reduction target and 
timetable while the environmental pragmatist discourse coalition does not think that 
setting a specific target and timetable is necessary. However, it is interesting to find that 
even though the environmental pragmatist discourse coalition has gradually constructed 
the current system of climate change policies in Taiwan, the climate action discourse 
coalition has successfully influenced some policies over the past two decades. For 
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instance, the climate action discourse coalition proposed to adjust the industrial structure 
in Taiwan in the late 1990s and the concept was accepted and supported by the 
environmental pragmatist discourse coalition in the 2000s (Lin, 2008). 
According to the 2002 National Communication of Taiwan (TEPA, 2002), the 
government planned five major policy initiatives to stem the growth of GHG emissions: 
energy policy and energy structure adjustment; industrial policy and industry structure 
adjustment; agricultural developmental policy; forestry administration policy; and waste 
(wastewater) prevention policy. However, discursive constructions of climate change 
policies in Taiwan have centered largely on energy issues. Among numerous 
climate-related policies, this study specifically chooses two better-developed and ongoing 
mitigation strategies that are within the domain of the TEPA: the Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Bill and the Energy Conservation and Carbon Reduction Program. 
 
3.5.4  Two Domestic Mitigation Policies 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Bill 
As one of the GHG-related governmental agencies, the TEPA is directly responsible for 
formulating and implementing regulations for GHG emissions. To ensure a legal basis for 
controlling releases after the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005, the agency began 
to prepare a cap-and-trade policy. The resulting mandatory statute, the Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Bill, was drafted and submitted to the Legislative Yuan in 2006. At the time of 
this writing, the draft Bill was still under review. This draft bill contains 28 articles with 
four primary objectives: 1) mitigate global climate change; 2) reduce GHG emissions; 3) 
ensure national sustainable development; 4) fulfill responsibility to protect the global 
environment (Figure 3.6) (Huang & Lee, 2009). 
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As shown in Figure 3.6, the draft Bill first clarifies responsibilities among various 
government agencies (i.e., the central and local authorities). It then describes a 
three-stage progressive reduction process: 1) create an inventory system that regulated 
emitters can report and that the TEPA can monitor; 2) establish a GHG emission 
performance standard; 3) formulate an emission-trading scheme with reduction goals and 
emission allowances. Finally, the draft Bill clearly outlines the compliance regime and 
imposes penalties on fraudulent declaration, non-compliance with emission performance 
standards, and the cap-and-trade allowance (Huang & Lee, 2009). 
 
Structure of GHG Reduction Bill 
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Figure 3.6 Structure of the draft GHG Reduction Bill (Huang & Lee, 2009). 
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In short, to build capacity to implement the bill after promulgation, the TEPA 
officially established a GHG Reduction Management Office in 2008 comprising three 
working groups: reduction planning, inventory and trading, promotion, education and 
adaptation strategies. The reduction planning working group is responsible for the 
legislation of the bill and potential international cooperation. The inventory and trading 
working group seeks to enable industries to build the GHG inventory and to comply with 
the cap-and-trade scheme. The education and adaptation working group aims to enhance 
public awareness of climate change by implementing CO2 reduction campaigns (i.e., the 
energy conservation and carbon reduction program) and to draft related domestic 
adaptation strategies. Although the bill primarily involves industries—the major sector of 
CO2 emissions—it is valuable to understand the views of the general public with respect 
to the apportionment of responsibility to various industries. 
 
Energy Conservation and Carbon Reduction Program49 
In addition to the mandatory GHG Reduction Bill that targets large GHG emitters, the 
TEPA launched a separate initiative called the Energy Conservation and Carbon 
Reduction Program (ECCRP) in 2008 that encourages people to voluntarily reduce their 
carbon footprints. First, the ECCRP Declaration consists of ten major actions and 
numerous daily life changing behaviors centered on transportation choices and 
consumption patterns involving energy, food and green products (Table 3.12). These 
recommendations aim to enable the general public to more easily understand what 
personal changes they can make to mitigate their personal CO2 emissions. 
                                                 
49  The phrase Energy Conservation and Carbon Reduction (pronounced as 
“Jie-Neng-Jian-Tan”) has commonly been used in many climate-protection campaigns 
and media coverage. Carbon represents an abbreviation of carbon dioxide. 
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Table 3.12 Energy Conservation and Carbon Reduction Declaration 
Key Action Daily Life Behavior 
1. Use air conditioning more 
efficiently 
y Use air conditioning less and open windows more 
y Reduce wearing formal dress (i.e., suits and ties) unless 
necessary 
y Maintain air conditioning at 26-28 degrees Celsius 
2. Turn off appliances when 
not using 
y Turn off lights and unplug appliances 
y Review lighting needs and reduce unnecessary light bulbs 
3. Use energy saving lamps 
and save money 
y Change regular incandescent light bulbs to compact fluorescent 
light bulbs 
4. Consume green products 
y Purchase products with green labels, energy-saving labels, 
water-saving labels, and high energy efficiency ratio (EER) 
value. 
5. Ride a bicycle and walk 
more 
y Use stairs more; elevator less 
y Ride a bicycle to commute 
y Walk more to enhance health 
6. Reduce using private 
transportation tools 
y Use public transportation more 
y Reduce the frequency of driving (e.g., cars or motorcycles) along
y Do not drive one day a week 
7. Select and use vehicles 
Properly 
y Purchase a hybrid or an electronic car 
y Turn off the engine when idling 
8. Consume food products 
with low carbon footprint 
y Choose local food products 
y Eat vegetables one day a week or one meal a day 
9. Reduce wasting resources 
y Carry personal tableware (e.g., chopsticks, cups) and shopping 
bags 
y Drink bottled water less 
y Reduce using disposal products 
10. Cherish resources 
y Use papers double sides 
y Use recycled papers 
y Reduce buying and using over-package products 
y Recycle materials 
Source: TEPA (2008) 
 
Additionally, the ECCRP initiated a national campaign during the summer of 
2008 that invited political leaders, government agencies, and public organizations to 
make a voluntary commitment to the declaration. This promotional effort included the 
establishment of an official website, the promotion of tours on campuses, and so forth. 
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Through a series of well-publicized activities, the TEPA expected to increase public 
awareness of climate change and to achieve some level of reduction from the public. 
One key problem with this voluntary project stems from the obvious difficulty of 
identifying conscientious participants and assessing programmatic effectiveness. It is of 
particular interest to observe whether these commitment-signing campaigns are effective 
or just symbolic. In addition, the initiative places the emphasis and the responsibility of 
GHG reduction squarely on the public and consumers. It is thus worthy to understand 
how the general public—who are not the major CO2 emission contributors in 
Taiwan—regard such a program. 
 
3.5.5  Concluding Remarks 
Among numerous climate-change policies, this doctoral research focuses on the aspect of 
GHG emission mitigation. This section first describes the overall landscape of the politics 
of global climate change in Taiwan including the factors that drove the government to 
take actions in the 1990s and the factors that are potentially impeding the policy making 
in the 2000s. In addition, the development of climate policies in Taiwan is discussed. Lin 
(2008) identifies two major discourse coalitions in the climate-policy process: the 
environmental pragmatist discourse coalition and the climate action discourse coalition. 
The first coalition, emphasizing technical and economic rationalities, has thus far been 
responsible for constructing the system of climate-change policies in Taiwan. The later 
one, based on ecological rationalities, has been advocated by Taiwanese environmental 
groups. 
Two different mitigation policies under the jurisdiction of the TEPA are described. 
The first one, a cap-and-trade statute (i.e., Greenhouse Gas Reduction Bill), has been 
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written and is at the time of this writing in the midst of moving through the legislative 
process. The draft Bill covers government responsibilities, reduction measures (i.e., 
emission-performance standards and the emission-trading scheme), and creation of a 
compliance regime. In contrast, a voluntary initiative—the Energy Conservation and 
Carbon Reduction Program—was launched to increase public awareness about reducing 
individual carbon footprints. 
In addition to the different approaches being considered (one is potentially 
mandatory and another one is voluntary), these two policies target different groups to 
reduce their carbon footprints. The Greenhouse Gas Reduction Bill focuses on regulating 
industries and the Energy Conservation and Carbon Reduction Program emphasizes the 
role of the public, in particular the role of people acting in their capacity as consumers. 
Therefore, it is of particular interest to understand how the general public understands 
these two programs. This is why these initiatives were selected for special consideration 
in the empirical analysis discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
3.6  Summary 
The influences that shape the public understanding of climate-change science may 
originate from locally orientated societal factors. At the same time, meaningful GHG 
mitigation policies can require endorsement by national governments. Under such 
circumstances, there is value in considering an interdisciplinary case study of how local 
views relate to policy activities. To enhance appreciation of the empirical analysis and to 
facilitate interpretation of the research results, this chapter provides a contextual 
introduction of the study area. 
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Taiwan is the target for this investigation because it is a relatively large 
contributor of international GHG emissions (ranked among the world’s top 30 largest 
emitting nations). In addition, the island displays various vulnerabilities to the adverse 
impacts of global climate change. Taiwan’s recent transition to democratic governance 
and its status as a newly industrialized society that is beginning to implement domestic 
climate policies via a participatory approach are other features that add to the potential 
value of this case study. 
Moreover, the process of democratic reform that Taiwan has undergone is closely 
bound up with the emergence of environmentalism during the period since the early 
1980s. The public became aware of the importance of environmental protection and lay 
understanding of global climate change has also increased. Although Taiwan is not 
obligated to ratify the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, the government started to 
address the issue to fulfill its nominal responsibilities. Two of the mitigation 
policies—the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Bill and the Energy Conservation and Carbon 
Reduction Program—will be subjected to more careful consideration in subsequent 
chapters of this dissertation. 
 
CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
4.1  Overview 
Due to the complexity of global climate change, it is unlikely that human society will be 
able to resolve the problem from the perspective of a single intellectual or disciplinary 
domain. Interdisciplinary coordination and collective sustainable actions from all levels 
of society will be key to eventual success. Kasemir et al. (2003), for instance, argue that 
an integration of the social sciences with the natural sciences on climate change is 
necessary to support climate policy making in the future. Therefore, this research focuses 
on identifying the societal dimensions surrounding the effective construction of climate 
policies at the national level. To evaluate the integration of science and the public in the 
policy-making process, this dissertation comprises three interrelated constituent studies 
and adopts a mixed-methods approach with both quantitative and qualitative components. 
This chapter comprehensively describes the research background and the various 
techniques that were used in this inquiry. Section 4.2 describes the research questions, 
objectives, and the structure of the three constituent studies. Section 4.3 provides several 
reasons for the decision to select youth, particularly university students, as the study 
population. Section 4.4 illustrates the method in Study 1 involving an exploratory IA 
focus-group workshop. Section 4.5 explains the method in Study 2 consisting of a 
comparative-survey study conducted in the IA focus-group workshop. Section 4.6 
describes the technique in Study 3 centered on a quantitative web-based survey. The last 
section summarizes the research methodology. 
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4.2  Research Questions, Objectives, and Constituent Studies 
Although researchers have conducted a number of studies to assess public understanding 
of climate change, few of these investigations have considered how humans respond to 
the dilemma (e.g., individual decision making, social movements, and organizational and 
state responses) and on the relationship between people’s comprehension and their 
behavioral responses. To narrow this gap, this research seeks to evaluate the relationship 
between the public understanding of climate change and people’s behavioral intentions 
and policy preferences with respect to mitigation of the underlying problem. Taiwan was 
selected as the study area because of several distinctive characteristics (see Section 3.2). 
The key research question in this inquiry, therefore, is whether public scientific 
understanding of climate change is a necessary prerequisite for effective policy making. 
To address this primary research question most effectively, it is deconstructed into a 
number of instructive secondary questions and three primary objectives (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 Secondary Research Questions and Objectives 
Research Question Research Objective 
4.2.1 How do people perceive climate change and 
what is the level of public scientific knowledge of 
climate change in Taiwan? 
Objective 1: To examine the concerns of 
Taiwanese youth about global climate change in 
terms of their attitudes, scientific knowledge, and 
behavioral intentions. 
4.2.2 Will a better understanding of climate 
science enhance people’s willingness to change 
their behaviors and to endorse more stringent 
climate policies? 
Objective 2: To investigate the interrelationships 
among these three elements (i.e., attitudes, 
scientific knowledge, and behavioral intentions). 
4.2.3 Will an integration of scientific expertise 
increase the lay person’s understanding of climate 
change effectively? 
4.2.4 Will an integration of lay knowledge and 
scientific expertise effectively influence the 
formulation of climate policies? 
Objective 3: To assess the effectiveness of an 
experimental participatory exercise (i.e., the IA 
focus groups) in enhancing individual scientific 
understanding and engagement in policy making. 
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These research questions and objectives are further investigated in three 
constituent studies. Figure 4.1 illustrates the structure of this doctoral research containing 
the research questions and objectives. Study 1 was an IA focus-group workshop that 
anticipated addressing questions 4.2.1, 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 by interpreting the qualitative 
dialogue during the discussion sessions. Study 2, a quantitative survey conducted before 
and after the workshop, sought to investigate questions 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 by comparing the 
survey responses of the workshop participants. Finally, Study 3 was a quantitative 
web-based survey intended to address questions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. 
These three studies were not only designed to jointly address a central research 
inquiry, but they also mutually benefited each other. Study 2, which was executed in the 
same manner as Study 1, served as a pretest procedure for the larger-scale web-based 
survey in Study 3. The IA focus-group workshop was carried out to help interpret the 
quantitative data in the survey studies and also to understand how a public participation 
event could be designed on the basis of this experimental workshop. 
 
 
 
Research 
Objective 
1 & 3 
Research 
Objective 
2 & 3 
Research 
Objective 
1 & 2 
 
 
 
 
Research 
Question 
4.2.1 
4.2.3 
4.2.4 
Research 
Question 
4.2.2 
4.2.3 
Research 
Question 
4.2.1 
4.2.2 
Study 1 
IA focus-group Workshop 
Study 2 Study 3 
Web-based Survey Pre- and Post-Survey 
 
Figure 4.1 The research structure with the research questions and objectives. 
 
 191
4.3  Study Population 
4.3.1  Introduction 
The UNEP identifies nine major groups as their partners in civil society. 50  The 
organization anticipates that these groups can bring broader perspectives to 
environmental policy making, to help implement the organization’s work program, to 
liaise between the UNEP and local communities, and to raise public awareness through 
education and grassroots campaigns (UNEP, 2009). Moreover, Agenda 21 (the action plan 
formulated at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit) encourages these entities to become familiar 
with and to actively participate in decision making for the pursuit of sustainable 
development (UNCED, 1992). 
[O]ne of the fundamental prerequisites for the achievement of sustainable 
development is broad public participation in decision-making. 
Furthermore, in the more specific context of environment and 
development, the need for new forms of participation has emerged. This 
includes the need of individuals, groups, and organizations to 
participate in environmental impact assessment procedures and to 
know about and participate in decisions, particularly those which 
potentially affect the communities in which they live and work. 
Individuals, groups and organizations should have access to information 
relevant to environment and development held by national authorities, 
including information on products and activities that have or are likely to 
have a significant impact on the environment, and information on 
environmental protection measures.       (UNCED, 1992, Article 23.2) 
 
According to Agenda 21, the public’s information and their involvement in 
environmental issues are critical to realizing sustainable development (UNCED, 1992). 
To learn about people’s viewpoints more thoroughly, this study specifically targets one 
                                                 
50 The nine major civil society groups comprise women, children and youth, indigenous 
peoples and their communities, NGOs, local authorities, workers and trade unions, 
business and industry, the scientific and technological community, and farmers (UNEP, 
2009). 
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major stakeholder—youth. Subsection 4.3.2 discusses several reasons for selecting this 
group as the study population. Subsection 4.3.3 further introduces some demographic 
information of youth in Taiwan. Subsection 4.3.4 provides a few concluding remarks. 
 
4.3.2  Why Focus on Youth? 
Youth was selected as the study population for this study because of two unique 
characteristics: 1) its significant representation in contemporary society and 2) its 
intergenerational role in implementing sustainable development. First, given that youth is 
a subordinate group covering a large demographic range, the UNEP has identified 
children and youth as one of the nine major groups in civil society. At the end of 2008, 
the population of children and youth accounted for 44.9% of the world’s population, and 
the youth group (age between 15 and 24 years) constituted 17.6% of the world population 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2008).51 Moreover, unlike children, youth above the age of 18 
years can meaningfully participate in politics and express their voices by executing 
citizen rights, such as casting votes. 
A recent example of this political efficacy can be found in the 2008 presidential 
election in the US. Some political commentators have argued that young voters (between 
18 and 29 years of age) were the decisive factor to President Barack Obama’s electoral 
victory (American University, 2008; CIRCLE, 2008; CNN, 2008). While other age 
groups approximately split their votes between both candidates in the popular vote, more 
than two-thirds of young voters supported Barack Obama, which may have been a 
significant factor in the difference in the popular vote (Obama: 52.9% and McCain: 
                                                 
51 Even though each country may have different definitions, according to the United 
Nation’s definition, children are those persons under the age of 14 and youth are those 
persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years (UN, 2009). 
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45.7%). In addition to contributing votes for Barack Obama, the candidate’s campaign 
successfully contacted and mobilized more young people to attend public events than the 
McCain campaign, especially in some key battleground states (Pennsylvania: 24%; 
Indiana: 30%; and Nevada 35%) (PEW, 2008b). 
This example suggests that by means of actively participating in politics and 
public affairs, the youth demographic can effectively make a difference in some political 
decisions. It is for this reason that this research targeted youth to investigate the group’s 
perspective on the issue of global climate change. In addition to representing a large array 
of societal perspectives in the present generation, a second reason was that the youth 
perspective has unique implications in implementing sustainable development. 
Agenda 21 points out that “[T]he involvement of today’s youth in environment 
and development decision-making and in the implementation of programmes is critical to 
the long-term success of Agenda 21” (UNCED, 1992). The document further explains 
that the reason why the participation of youth is essential is that their unique perspectives 
and involvement may impact their present and future lives. 
[I]t is imperative that youth from all parts of the world participate actively 
in all relevant levels of decision-making processes because it affects their 
lives today and has implications for their futures. In addition to their 
intellectual contribution and their ability to mobilize support, they bring 
unique perspectives that need to be taken into account. 
(UNCED, 1992, Article 25.2) 
 
Some may wonder how the youth group can meaningfully influence processes 
relevant for sustainable development. Sustainable development was famously defined as 
“development that meets the need of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987). This commonly-quoted 
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definition has been criticized because of its vagueness and its difficulty to implement in 
terms of 1) contradictory notions and competing interpretations of “sustainable” and 
“development” (Dresner, 2002; Jacobs, 1991; O’Riordan, 1988); 2) the vague concept of 
“needs” (Pearce et al., 1989); 3) unpredictable technological limitation and capability in 
the future; 4) imprecise time span of the so-called “future generation.” 
  Regardless of these critiques on linguistic definition, the concept of sustainable 
development primarily involves the issue of intergenerational justice—are environmental 
goods and bads distributed fairly between generations? The key question then shifts to 
whether the objectives of protecting benefits of future generations could justify 
restrictions on people’s non-sustainable lifestyles.52  Beekman (2004) addresses this 
question by interpreting sustainable development as a principle of intergenerational 
justice and a future-oriented green ideal on the basis of various theories, such as the 
savings principle (Rawls, 1993), the restraint principle (Wissenburg, 1998), the notion of 
chains of love (Passmore, 1980), and the idea of a transgenerational community 
(de-Shalit, 1995). 
Although future preferences are unknowable, Rawls (1993) argues that the 
amount of resources that the current generation wishes to save for future people should be 
equal to what they wish previous generations had saved for them. Wissenburg’s (1998) 
restraint principle further suggests that current generations should use the environment to 
meet basic human needs in a way that does not reduce the opportunities of future 
                                                 
52 The political philosopher Avner de-Shalit (1995) specifically defines the concepts of 
generation and future generation. “[A] generation is a set of people who are of more or 
less the same age and who live at the same period in history, usually regarded as having a 
span of thirty years. Future generations are people who by definition will live after 
contemporary people are dead.” 
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generations. To supplement these two principles of intergenerational justice, Beekman 
(2004) argues for a future-oriented narrative interpretation of sustainable development. In 
this sense, one key motivation of people’s concern about future generations comes from 
love for their immediate descendants (Passmore, 1980). However, de-Shalit’s (1995) 
transgenerational community concept—in contrast to Passmore’s chain of love 
principle—suggests that the present generation is obliged to ensure good environmental 
quality for posterity since they are future members of the community. 
Due to the lack of interaction among generations, can the present generation 
understand the needs of future generations and truly take responsibility for protecting 
their benefits? In addition, the obligations of the present generation to the future 
generation fade away over time in de-Shalit’s (1995) theory. Our obligations to those who 
exist now will be greater than our obligations to those who exist in the near future. 
Moreover, how should we handle obligations to people who live in the remote future? As 
a result, it seems inevitable that when contemporary decision makers encounter conflicts 
of interest among generations, the benefit of future generations would be sacrificed. 
While future generations will inherit existing natural and cultural resources, they 
will also acquire environmental problems that are caused in the present. Since we cannot 
directly hear voices of future generations, their needs are likely to be compromised by 
present-oriented decisions. As future decision makers, children and youths seem to be the 
only group that exists both in the present and in the near future. Therefore, this paper 
argues that the role youth should play is representative of future generations. 
Instead of arguing why the present generation needs to protect the future 
generation, it may be helpful to argue from another perspective: how future generations 
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can protect their own benefits. The active participation of youth indicates that it is 
possible to enlist the intergenerational viewpoints by future people. With the involvement 
of youth in the policy-making process, more sustainable outcomes can be more 
reasonably achieved. 
Take global climate change as an example. Its anthropogenic causes and potential 
consequences will affect future generations. Similar to Rawls’ (1993) savings principle, 
the resourcist view of intergenerational justice asserts the appropriate consumption and 
distribution of non-renewable natural resources across time (Barry, 1989). Without 
limiting use of non-renewable energy or compensating depleted natural resources, future 
generations may suffer from increasing costs of extracting remaining resources or 
decreasing quality of life because of exhausted natural resources. The economist Nicholas 
Stern (2007), author of an influential report for the UK government on the risks of 
deferring efforts to meaningfully reduce GHG emissions, also argues that delaying 
mitigation action will increase the costs of future action. 
At the same time, the adverse impacts of climate change are likely to be chronic 
and long-term. Even if we are ultimately able to control the concentrations of all GHGs 
and aerosols at year 2000 levels, the IPCC (2007a) projects that the global average 
temperature would still increase about 0.1ºC per decade. Many consequences induced by 
climate change are also expected to worsen by the end of the current century. Given that 
the current world average life expectancy at birth is 66.6 years (CIA, 2009), youth in the 
current generation will be most adversely affected and will face the challenges wrought 
by climate change far into the future. Because of this intergenerational role, it is essential 
to encourage youth to actively participate in formulating contemporary climate policies. 
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On the basis of this rationale, this study specifically focuses on this major group as the 
target of its investigation. 
 
4.3.3  Youth in Taiwan 
The total population of Taiwan was 23,037,031 persons at the end of 2008. The 
population of youth (aged between 15 and 24 years) accounted for 14.1% of the national 
population. Among this age group, 51.8% were men and 48.2% were women (TMOI, 
2008). This study particularly targeted university students to represent youth because of 
the high education level in Taiwan. The present education system in Taiwan supports 22 
years of formal study, including preschool (2 years), primary school (6 years), junior high 
school (3 years), senior high school (3 years), college or university (4 years), and 
graduate school (4 years). After having nine years of compulsory education in primary 
and junior high schools, Taiwanese youth can continue their education in senior high 
school (aged between 15 to 17 years) and higher education at university (aged above 18 
years) (TMOE, 2008). 
According to the Taiwan Ministry of Education, the gross enrollment rate of 
higher education in 2007 was 85.3%, an amount that is higher than that recorded for other 
countries (e.g., United States: 82%, United Kingdom: 59%, and Japan: 58%) (TMOE, 
2009a). These data suggest that having higher education is very common for Taiwanese 
youth. In the 2008-2009 academic year, there were a total of 1,006,102 enrolled 
undergraduate students in Taiwanese universities (TMOE, 2009b). Since most Taiwanese 
youth go to college or university, this study focuses specifically on students currently 
engaged in higher education—university students. 
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4.3.4  Concluding Remarks 
Implementing sustainable development requires the active participation of various civil 
society groups and one of these important stakeholder constituencies is youth. The 
involvement of youth is especially significant because this demographic cohort represents 
a wide range of societal perspectives and brings unique and intergenerational viewpoints 
to implementing sustainable development. Global climate change is likely to have 
long-term adverse impacts, and such circumstances ideally demand the active 
participation of youth in formulating appropriate policies. In addition, because higher 
education is very common in Taiwan, this case study specifically focuses on Taiwanese 
university students as the study population. 
 
4.4  Study 1: IA Focus Group Workshop 
4.4.1  Introduction 
As discussed in Section 4.2, this doctoral research seeks not only to evaluate the 
relationship between the public understanding of global climate change and people’s 
behavioral intentions and policy preferences in taking actions to mitigate the problem, but 
also to explore what role scientific expertise can play in bridging civic understanding and 
developing mitigation responses. Study 1, one of the three constituent studies, aims to 
create an opportunity for integrating perspectives from experts and youth. 
This chapter provides a comprehensive explanation for Study 1 involving the 
facilitation of an IA focus-group workshop. This experimental participatory exercise was 
crucial to the success of this doctoral research because it also involved Study 2 and three 
secondary research questions. By interpreting the qualitative dialogue during the sessions, 
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Study 1 foreshadowed efforts to address the following research questions (also see Table 
4.1). 
4.2.1 How do people perceive climate change and what is the level of public 
scientific knowledge of climate change in Taiwan? 
4.2.3 Will an integration of scientific expertise increase lay people’s 
understanding of climate change effectively? 
4.2.4 Will an integration of lay knowledge and scientific expertise effectively 
influence the formulation of climate policies? 
 
Subsection 4.4.2 discusses the methodology underlying the IA focus groups. 
Subsection 4.4.3 highlights the procedures for recruiting respondents and conducting the 
workshop. Subsection 4.4.4 describes the roles of the moderators and experts who were 
involved in this study. Subsection 4.4.5 explains the design of the discussion sessions. 
Subsection 4.4.6 explains the method of data analysis and interpretation. Subsection 4.4.7 
concludes with a few remarks. 
 
4.4.2  IA Focus Groups 
To effectively evaluate the integration of science and the public in the policy-making 
process, this study employed an interdisciplinary research method involving the use of IA 
focus groups. This technique has been adopted in many social scientific studies of global 
climate change over the past decades (e.g., Darier & Schüle, 1999; Darier et al., 1999a, 
1999b; Kasemir et al., 2000a; Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Puy et al., 2008). The concept 
of IA focus groups combines two research techniques: integrated assessment and focus 
groups. Both of these approaches are described below. 
First, the idea of IA was developed in the 1990s because of the need to provide 
synthesized information from various disciplines to policy makers for large-scale 
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environmental issues such as global climate change (Weyant et al., 1996). In addition, to 
integrate a variety of different areas of scientific expertise, it has proven necessary to 
incorporate the lay public in the policy-making process in democratic societies. To bridge 
the gap between the science of global climate change and relevant lay perspectives, 
researchers developed a method that relies on the participation of ordinary citizens in IA. 
The participatory dimension of IA, also called PIA, is designed to enhance interactions 
between experts (scientists and policy actors) and the lay public. One of the most 
common participatory procedures in IA is the focus-groups method (Kasemir, et al., 1999; 
Dürrenberger, et al., 1999). 
Focus groups are a research technique that has been commonly used since World 
War II (Merton & Kendall, 1946; Merton, 1987). The method was first widely accepted 
in the pragmatic market-research community as a way to understand consumers’ concerns 
toward commercial products and services (Krueger & Casey, 2009). It was not until the 
1980s that the academic and nonprofit communities began to adopt this research method. 
Unlike individual interviews that use a predetermined questionnaire with closed-ended 
response choices, focus groups derive from two social scientific research methods: 
interviews and group discussions. 
These two methods in combination contribute to a significant advantage for focus 
groups, namely that they encourage intragroup interactions. Kasemir et al. (2003) pointed 
out that “the advantage of focus groups compared to individual interviews is that focus 
groups intrinsically exhibit social dynamics that allow for interactions between multiple 
perspectives, instead of just compiling different perspectives by individual questionnaires 
or interviews.” This means that new ideas are possibly generated by group interaction. 
 201
Focus groups typically include five features: (1) a small group of people with (2) 
similar characteristics (3) who provide qualitative data in (4) a focused discussion to (5) 
help understand the topic of interest (Krueger & Casey, 2009). The primary purpose of 
the methodology is for the investigator to listen and to gather information from this small 
group of perspectives. It is recommended that focus groups should not be used when 
organizers or researchers intend to educate participants or need a conclusion or a 
consensus (Krueger & Casey, 2009). 
In addition, information derived from conventional focus groups is not sufficient 
to provide input on complex societal or political issues. Therefore, IA focus groups adjust 
the general method to a longer and more structured discussion process that serves as an 
intermediary forum between public debates and private decision making (Kasemir et al., 
2003). By incorporating experts into the process of interaction, the purpose of IA focus 
groups is not only to listen and to gather information, but to enable participants to make 
informed decisions and have a more effective discussion. 
 
4.4.3  Procedure and Recruitment 
With some modifications of the IA focus-group method described by Kasemir et al. 
(2003), a one-day workshop was organized in the summer of 2008. University students 
were assembled to discuss the issue of global climate change and the responses that have 
thus far been undertaken by the Taiwanese government. To offer a comfortable setting for 
participants, the workshop was co-organized with the Association of Taiwanese Public 
Policy Development and sponsored by the National Youth Commission. To clearly 
promote the purpose of the event, the activity was named “The Youth Participatory 
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Workshop for Anti-warming53 Policies.” The study aimed to recruit approximately twenty 
participants so a small-scale approach was developed to advertise the workshop. 
Messages regarding the focus-group workshop were sent via electronic mail to 
several key Taiwanese youth organizations (e.g., student clubs and non-profit 
organizations) with specific instructions for them to forward this information to their 
members. Details regarding the workshop were also posted on several appropriate web 
sites such as Civil News Platform and Bulletin Broad System (BBS), a system commonly 
used by Taiwanese university students. Prospective respondents—primarily university 
students—interested in this issue applied to participate in advance. No specific screening 
criteria were used to select respondents for the workshop. Because these young adults 
voluntarily registered for the workshop with no monetary compensation, it is assumed 
that they had a relatively high level of personal concern about global climate change and 
thus demonstrated a comparatively high willingness to participate in public policies. 
A quantitative survey was administered at both the start and conclusion of the 
workshop to assess the differences in the participants’ levels of scientific understanding 
and personal responses (i.e., personal behaviors and policy preferences) (for the complete 
methodology of the pre- and post-survey, see Section 4.5). In addition to the survey, a 
supplementary qualitative investigation was carried out to analyze the content and the 
interactive process of the focus-group discussion with the consent of the participants. The 
ensuing discussion was video recorded and transcribed to written documents. The 
transcript was analyzed qualitatively in the data-analysis process. This qualitative 
                                                 
53 The term “Anti-warming” (pronounced as “Kang-Nuan-Hua”) was chosen because in 
Taiwan “global warming” is a more commonly used term than “climate change.” Many 
climate-protection campaigns have used the term “anti-warming” to convey their 
concerns to the public. 
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information provided a complementary tool to interpret the quantitative data collected 
from the surveys. These two techniques were used to assess the effectiveness of 
stakeholder participation in formulating domestic climate policies. 
 
4.4.4  Moderator and Expert 
To conduct a more efficient discussion, participants were divided into two small groups 
(Group A and Group B). Four experienced facilitators were hired to serve as skilled 
discussion leaders. Although these moderators did not have any specific environmental 
background, they were trained by going through a guidebook covering discussion 
principles and model questions and answers prior to the workshop.54 One moderator and 
one assistant moderator were assigned to each focus group. The moderator was 
responsible for leading the discussion (e.g., encourage speaking and stimulate interaction) 
and to keep the proceedings on track. While the whole process was video recorded, the 
assistant moderator operated the video camera, tracked discussion times, and wrote down 
key points raised by each group member to simplify the transcription process. 
Two experts were invited to provide scientific information about climate change 
to both focus groups. Dr. Huang-Hsiung Hsu, an atmospheric scientist from the 
Department of Atmospheric Science at National Taiwan University (NTU), explained the 
science of the greenhouse effect and the adverse impacts of climate change. Dr. Tze-Luen 
Lin from the Department of Political Science at NTU discussed international politics and 
policy making (e.g., Kyoto Protocol), as well as Taiwan’s energy use, CO2 emissions, and 
climate policies. 
 
                                                 
54 The training and the guidebook was conducted and prepared by the author. 
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4.4.5  Session Design 
The technique of IA focus groups structures the process into three phases: participants’ 
spontaneous expressions, their assessment of current research findings as motivated by 
expert input, and synthesis of informed participants’ conclusions (Kasemir et al., 2003). 
The whole process is optimally designed for five sessions lasting approximately 2.5 hours 
per session. Considering the feasibility of execution (e.g., difficulty to gather participants 
many times under financial constraint), this study condensed and shortened the original 
design. Based on the same tripartite phase structure, three primary sessions were 
conducted as part of a one-day, seven-hour workshop (Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 Agenda and Session Description of the IA Focus-Group Workshop 
Session Time (min) Session Description 
Opening 30 Introduction and pre-test survey administration 
Session 1 60 
y Self-introduction 
y Sharing of personal understanding of climate change in causes and 
consequences and anthropogenic contribution 
45 Expert Presentation 1 (Dr. Huang-Hsiung Hsu): Scientific phenomenon, cause, and impacts of global climate change 
Session 2 
45 Expert Presentation 2 (Dr. Tze-Luen Lin): Global climate change and Taiwan’s responses to global climate change 
90 
In-depth discussion: 
y Humans’ responsibility to resolve global climate change 
y The responsibility of industrialized and developing countries 
y Should Taiwan ratify the Kyoto Protocol? Session 3 
90 
Group consensus building: Would you support this policy? 
y Group A: Energy Conservation and Carbon Reduction Program 
y Group B: Greenhouse Gas Reduction Bill (draft) 
Closing 30 y Group A and Group B Presentation y Post-test survey administration 
 
Table 4.2 summarizes the agenda and each session of the IA focus-group 
workshop. The event began with a 30-minute opening during which the schedule of the 
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day was introduced and the participants completed the pre-test survey on their attitudes 
about global climate change prior to being exposed to the expert input. The first session 
(1 hour) consisted of self-introductions of group members and the sharing of personal 
understandings about climate change. The self-introductions aimed to help group 
members relax and to build a friendly atmosphere. The participants were then asked to 
describe their personal impressions of climate change, to discuss the extent to which they 
recognized it as a problem, and to identify its causes and consequences. 
The second session of the workshop (1.5 hours) consisted of two expert 
presentations. The first expert treatment was designed to cover fundamental information 
about climate change from a physical science perspective. The presenter, Dr. 
Huang-Hsiung Hsu, described the science of the greenhouse effect, the natural and 
anthropogenic causes of planetary warming, the adverse impacts and the scientific 
evidence of ongoing processes, and the future projections of global temperature and 
sea-level increases. 
The second expert delivered information about climate change from a policy 
science perspective. The presenter, Dr. Tze-Luen Lin, explained the significance of a 
series of international meetings (e.g., COPs) and treaties (e.g., UNFCCC, Kyoto 
Protocol), and CO2 emissions, energy use, and mitigation strategies in Taiwan. Followed 
by each lecture-type presentation was a 15-minute question-and-answer period during 
which the participants were able to interact with the invited experts. 
After the participants received the scientific and policy-relevant expertise in the 
second session, the last session (3 hours) anticipated the participants making an informed 
assessment by having in-depth discussions and building a group consensus. The 
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discussion proceeded in two stages: general climate issues (1.5 hours) and domestic 
climate policy (1.5 hours). In the first stage, they were asked to discuss some issues: 
y Are humans responsible for inducing climate change? Should humans take 
responsibility to resolve the problem? 
y Who should take responsibility? Industrialized or developing countries? 
y Who should take responsibility in Taiwan? Industries or the general public? 
y Should Taiwan ratify the Kyoto Protocol?55 
 
In the second stage, each group discussed one domestic climate policy (mitigation 
strategy) and tried to reach a group consensus—whether to support the policy or not. The 
strategy discussed by Group A was a voluntary-based governmental initiative called 
“Energy Conservation and Carbon Reduction Program.” Group B discussed a mandatory 
policy being debated at the time in Taiwan—the “Greenhouse Gas Reduction Bill 
(Draft)” (see Section 3.5 for a detailed introduction). 
IA focus-groups members are generally requested to make their concluding 
assessment via the production of a written citizens’ report in the last phase (Kasemir et al., 
2003). Due to the constraints on scheduling, the participants in this study were not able to 
complete a written group report. Nevertheless, each group was required to make an oral 
presentation of their consensual position during the closing. The end of the workshop was 
marked by the distribution of a post-test survey that inquired about their attitudes about 
climate change after receiving expert input and interacting with their fellow participants. 
 
                                                 
55 Since Taiwan is not a UN member, it has been excluded from most formal processes of 
international negotiation, including the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, some political 
commentators have argued that Taiwan should begin to reduce its GHG emissions 
because it might become subject to mandated reduction targets along with other 
newly-industrialized nations (e.g. South Korea) during the post-Kyoto period. 
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4.4.6  Data Analysis 
The discussion session of each group was video recorded and transcribed to written 
documents. It is difficult to quantify the participants’ responses in a group discussion 
because once a point is mentioned by a group member; it is unlikely another member 
would repeat the same point. In addition, regardless of the moderators’ efforts to 
encourage every group member to share his/her opinion, it is inevitable that some 
participants were more vocal and some were more silent. As a result, the transcript was 
primarily analyzed qualitatively. Subsection 5.2.2 presents a number of interesting group 
dialogues which were key discussion topics in session 1 and session 3 (see Subsection 
4.4.5). These dialogues are highlighted either because the focus-group participants raised 
unique viewpoints (e.g., different and new ideas reviewed from preceding literature) or 
because some patterns were observed (e.g., agreement or disagreement with fellow group 
members which led to further in-depth interactions). 
 
4.4.7  Concluding Remarks 
This study employed the technique of IA focus groups that has been commonly used in 
many interdisciplinary studies involving complex issues at the interface of science and 
public policy. To understand Taiwanese university students’ perspectives about the issue 
of global climate change and to assess the effectiveness of a participatory exercise in 
enhancing scientific understanding and in formulating climate policies, a modified 
one-day IA focus-group workshop was organized in 2008. The workshop consisted of 
three sessions: participants’ spontaneous expressions, expert presentations of current 
research findings, and synthesis of informed participants’ conclusions. 
 
 208
4.5  Study 2: Pre- and Post-Survey 
4.5.1  Introduction 
Study 2, the second of the three constituent studies in this doctoral research, consisted of 
a comparison survey study carried out in the IA focus-group workshop in Study 1. The 
purpose of this study was to learn how the expert-integrated focus-group workshop 
influenced the participants’ understanding of the issue of global climate change. To 
accomplish this aim, a standardized multiple-item survey was designed and administered 
at the beginning and end of the workshop to collect quantitative data that could be used to 
assess potential changes in participants’ attitudes, scientific knowledge, behavioral 
intentions, and policy preferences. This chapter explains the methodology of the pre- and 
post-survey in detail including the design of the instrument and its administration. By 
comparing the survey responses of the workshop participants, the study anticipated 
addressing the following research questions (also see Table 4.1). 
4.2.2 Will a better understanding of climate science enhance people’s willingness 
to change their behaviors and to endorse more stringent climate policies? 
4.2.3 Will an integration of scientific expertise increase lay people’s understanding 
of climate change effectively? 
 
Subsection 4.5.2 summarizes the historical development of survey research 
methods in the social sciences. Subsection 4.5.3 discusses two different approaches that 
have been commonly used to investigate people’s environmental concern and introduces 
the combined approach that was applied in this study. Subsection 4.5.4 highlights the 
procedure used to administer this survey. Subsection 4.5.5 describes the questionnaire 
construction including the structure, dimension, variables, and questions. Subsection 
4.5.6 explains how data was analyzed. Subsection 4.5.7 concludes this section. 
 209
4.5.2  Survey Research Method 
Babbie (1990) points out that contemporary survey research is a product of American 
researchers in this century and it grew out of significant developmental efforts by three 
sectors of American society: the Bureau of the Census, the commercial polling firms (e.g., 
Gallup Poll), and the activities of some universities (e.g., Bureau for Applied Social 
Research at Columbia University). Countless survey experiences in decennial censuses, 
product marketing, and political polling have refined the technique with respect to 
sampling, question wording, and data collecting. Differing from a census that generates 
basic characteristic data of the entire population, a survey is designed to examine a 
fraction of a population by sampling. Even though a census covers extensive perspectives 
of the population, the information it provides is not sufficiently specific enough for 
researchers in many disciplines. To fill the information gaps, special-purpose surveys 
have been commonly developed in the United States since the 1930s (Fowler, 2009). 
Survey research is a method that uses a standardized questionnaire to collect 
quantitative information of subjective perceptions of the study population from a sample. 
The technique was first used to measure public opinions for news articles (media), to 
evaluate political perceptions (politics), and to assess consumptive preferences (business). 
However, the method has now been applied in numerous areas of public policy and the 
study of social problems (Fowler, 2009). It is suggested that a survey can be an effective 
research tool when combined with other methods (Babbie, 1990). This is why this 
doctoral research employed a qualitative IA focus-group method and a quantitative 
survey method to comprehensively appraise the concern among Taiwanese youth 
regarding the issue of global climate change. 
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4.5.3  Survey Approach 
Survey research, an early example of empirical social science research, has been 
commonly used to measure people’s overall level of environmental concern, a term also 
synonymous with environmental attitudes (Ester, 1981). Dunlap and Jones (2002) define 
environmental concern as “the degree to which people are aware of problems regarding 
the environment and support efforts to solve them and/or indicate a willingness to 
contribute personally to their solution.” To measure a person’s environmental concern a 
clear conception is necessary. Thus, Dunlap and Jones (2002) further clarify the concept 
of environmental concern with two components: “environmental” and “concern” parts. 
The “environmental” part of environmental concern refers to a particular 
environmental issue about which the investigator would like to understand how the study 
subject thinks. The term “environment” has multiple meanings. It can simply mean 
biophysical phenomena or it can indicate the interactive relationship between the 
biophysical environment and human activities. A clearly defined environmental issue is 
essential to measure people’s concern effectively. The chosen issue can be studied at 
various levels of generality (a specific or a general issue), at differing geographical scales 
(at the local or global level), and in differing time frames (past, present, or future) 
(Dunlap & Jones, 2002). For example, global climate change is considered a specific 
environmental issue that may cause long-term impacts at the planetary level.56 
                                                 
56 The level of generality is a relative concept. For example, a study that focuses on 
environmental problems is more general than a study of pollution; a study of pollution is 
more general than a study of air pollution. Even though global climate change is an 
inherently complex problem that involves various underlying environmental issues, such 
as air pollution, energy use, water resources, and so forth, it has been recognized as a 
significant environmental issue in and of itself. Thus, this study considers it as a specific 
environmental issue. 
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In addition to the environmental part, the “concern” component of environmental 
concern suggests an expression of unease about the chosen environmental issue. It is 
often conceptualized and investigated through two approaches: a social-psychological 
theoretical approach and a practical policy-relevant approach (Van Liere & Dunlap, 1981). 
The theoretical approach, based on attitude theory, usually investigates the study subjects’ 
knowledge of the nature of beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors and their 
theoretical and empirical relationships at a micro or individual level. The theoretical 
study generally consists of four dimensions: cognitive, affective, conative, and behavioral 
expression indicators (Dunlap & Jones, 2002). 
In contrast, the policy approach typically investigates the study subjects’ 
understanding of environmental problems and their policy implications at a macro level 
or in terms of their structural scope. The central question centers on how the study 
subjects’ think about the environmental problem in terms of perceived seriousness and 
causes of such problems, preferred responsible sectors, and individual support for various 
solutions (Dunlap & Jones, 2002). Table 4.3 illustrates a detailed comparison of these two 
approaches in terms of scope, emphasis, and investigation indicators.  
A large number of studies have employed the survey research method to measure 
people’s concern about various climate-related issues (e.g., Read et al., 1994; Bord et al., 
2000; Lazo et al., 2000; Seacrest et al., 2000; Sterman & Sweeney, 2002; Shackley et al., 
2005). For instance, Shackley et al. (2005) used the policy approach to measure British 
citizens’ perception of an off-shore CO2 capture and storage strategy. Bord et al. (2000) 
deployed the theoretical approach to measure Americans’ attitudes, knowledge and 
behavioral intentions of global warming and the interrelationships between each facet. 
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Table 4.3 Comparison of the Two Approaches of Environmental Concern 
 Theoretical Approach Policy-Relevant Approach 
Scope Micro/individual-level Macro/structure-level 
Emphasis 
The role of individuals’ behaviors in 
creating and solving environmental 
problems (Attitude Theory) 
The role of social institutions, 
environmental policies, and collective 
action in creating and solving 
environmental problems 
Investigation 
Indicators 
y Cognitive expression: accurate 
environmental knowledge, personal 
environmental belief  
y Affective expression: personal 
feelings and emotions 
y Conative expression: personal 
intentions, commitments, and 
willingness to perform individual 
actions or to support public policy 
proposals 
y Behavioral expression: actual or 
reported personal environmental 
behaviors, public environmental 
behaviors 
y Individuals’ perception of the 
seriousness of the problem  
y Individuals’ perceived causes of the 
problem and blame among various 
stakeholders 
y Individuals’ anticipated sectors to 
have responsibility for solving the 
problem 
y Individual’s preferred solutions 
y Individuals’ support for governmental 
regulations 
y Individuals’ expressed willingness to 
engage in collective actions 
Source: Dunlap and Jones (2002) 
 
It has become increasingly common for researchers to conduct policy-relevant 
studies that use indicators of the theoretical approach or social-psychological theoretical 
studies that include policy-relevant variables. Thus, this study was designed to employ 
both approaches in combination to investigate individuals’ understanding of global 
climate change, their responses to this issue, and to explore their interrelationships. 
 
4.5.4  Administration 
One critical process of conducting social scientific studies that involve human subjects is 
obtaining a research approval from the relevant Institutional Review Board (IRB). This 
ethical procedure is designed to protect subjects from risks to which they may be exposed 
during their participation as a respondent. This doctoral research also completed this 
process by submitting the research protocol to the IRB at New Jersey Institute of 
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Technology (NJIT). The protocol was first approved in June 2007 and then renewed in 
July 2008. All participants in this study received a consent form that explained their 
rights as a research subject. By signing the form, the subject agreed to be involved in the 
study. Additionally, to obtain a better response rate and to avoid misunderstandings of the 
questions, the survey instrument was further translated into Chinese, the native language 
of the respondents in Taiwan.57 
The sample targets of the pre- and post-survey study were the young adults who 
participated in the IA focus-group workshop in the summer of 2008 so the sampling 
process was carried out at the same event. As highlighted in Subsection 4.5.1, the same 
instrument was administrated at the beginning and end of the workshop. Participation in 
the survey was completely voluntary and included a separate consent form. The 
participants needed to sign two consent forms to indicate that they agreed to participate in 
both IA focus-group workshop and pre- and post-survey. In addition, the survey was not 
anonymous, so the pre- and post-responses could be matched and compared. 
 
4.5.5  Questionnaire Design 
Structure of the Instrument 
As discussed in Section 4.5.3, this study adopted a combined approach to investigate 
Taiwanese university students’ concern about climate change such as their general 
attitudes, scientific knowledge, and behavioral intentions. The standardized survey 
instrument with multiple-items in eight pages had four sections and numerous dimensions 
(Figure 4.2). 
                                                 
57 The translation in the survey instrument and the following data analysis was done by 
the author. Nevertheless, the consent form that was submitted to the IRB was bilingual. 
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Construction of Variables and Questions58 
The first section “General Concern” comprised four dimensions with a total of fourteen 
questions designed to assess the respondents’ general attitudes about global climate 
change and their understanding of various policy implications (Table 4.4). In the first 
dimension (Q1.1) each respondent was asked to self-evaluate his/her level of familiarity 
with three different terms (e.g., global climate change) and two climate policies (e.g., 
                                                 
58 A variable is a logical grouping of attributes. For example, the variable “gender” is 
made up of the attributes “male” and “female.” A dimension is an aspect of a variable. 
For example, the variable of “religiosity” may belong to the “belief dimension” (Babbie, 
1990). 
Figure 4.2 The structure of the pre-and post-survey instrument in sections and 
dimensions. 
Environmental 
Concern about 
Climate Change 
General 
Concern 
Scientific 
Knowledge 
Individual 
Responses 
Demographic 
Information 
Section Dimension 
Physical Science 
Policy Science 
Societal Concern 
Economic Concern 
Familiarity with term/policy 
Political Concern 
Demographic information 
Government Commitment 
Individual Experiences 
Policy Preferences
Willingness to Change Behaviors 
Willingness to Take Political Actions 
Mass Media 
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Kyoto Protocol) along a continuum scale (from very familiar to not familiar at all) (see 
the complete survey instrument in Appendix A). 
Table 4.4 Dimension, Variable, and Question Number of Section I (General Concern) 
Dimension Variable Question No. 
Familiarity Familiarity with terms and policies Q1.1 
Problem recognition Q1.2; Q1.3; Q1.4; Q1.5 
Political concern 
Political priority Q1.7; Q1.8 
Blame for the problem Q1.6 
Responsibility for solving the problem Q1.9; Q1.10 Societal concern 
Personal relevancy index Q1.11; Q1.12; Q1.13 
Economic concern Economic tradeoff Q1.14 
 
The second dimension that examined the respondents’ political concern comprised 
two variables: problem recognition and political priority. The variable of problem 
recognition was measured by four questions that asked how the respondents perceived 
global climate change (Q1.2, Q1.3), whether they recognized it as real (Q1.4), and how 
much they were concerned about the adverse effects (Q1.5). In addition, the respondents 
were asked to select three prioritized public policies (Q1.7) and three prioritized 
environmental issues (Q1.8) for the Taiwanese Government’s actions to indicate their 
perceived political priority of climate change. 
The third dimension, “societal concern,” aimed to investigate how the respondents 
thought about the relative responsibility of various societal groups in accordance with 
three variables: blame for the problem, responsibility for solving the problem, and 
personal relevancy. The respondents were asked to self-evaluate their levels of agreement 
with whether human activities were the key driving force to global climate change on a 
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five-point scale (strongly agree: 5; strongly disagree: 1) (Q1.6).59 They also identified 
major economic/industrial sectors that should bear responsibility for solving the problem 
(Q1.9, Q1.10). 
The last variable was a composite measure “Personal Relevancy Index,” with 
which the respondents assessed their relationship to global climate change in terms of 
personal contributions, impacts, and actions (Q1.11, Q1.12, Q1.13). These three questions 
were designed in an “agree-disagree” format with a five-point scale (Box 1). The higher 
the index score, the more the respondents regarded global climate change as a relevant 
issue in their lives. It was noteworthy that Q1.13 was reversely worded which means a 
strong disagreement with the statement would be recorded as 5 points. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1) Question Example – Q1.11, Q1.12, Q1.13 
 
Provide your assessment of the following statement: 
 
Q1.11 My daily activities contribute to global climate change. 
Q1.12 Global climate change may impact me personally in my lifetime. 
Q1.13 The problem of global climate change is so overwhelming that it is really beyond the 
control of a young person such as me. (Reversed worded) 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
Do Not 
Know 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
Finally, the dimension of economic concern was constructed so as to be able to 
understand the respondents’ opinions about difficult trade-offs between environmental 
                                                 
59 A number of items in this instrument were formatted as Likert-scale type questions, 
mostly with a scale of five points. These items were phrased as a statement for the 
respondents to rate and to assess their level of personal agreement, willingness, and 
support. Higher scores corresponded to higher levels of agreement, willingness, and 
support. Take the agree-disagree type of question as an example. A strong disagreement 
was scored as 1 point, a neutral position (neither agree nor disagree) was scared as 3 
points, and a strong agreement was scored as 5 points. In other words, a score of 5 means 
the respondent agreed with the item very much. 
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protection and economic objectives (Q1.14). One key point that needed to be emphasized 
was that several questions in this section had an additional option “Do not know.” It 
allowed those who were unwilling to answer the question to select an opinion-free option 
instead of forcing an invalid answer that would have likely adversely affected the dataset. 
The goal of the second section was to investigate respondents’ scientific 
knowledge of climate change using two dimensions: physical science and policy science. 
Table 4.5 highlights the dimension of physical science including a number of variables 
pertaining to—whether the respondents could identify causes, consequences, and 
mitigation strategies of climate change correctly (Q2.1, Q2.2, Q2.3); whether they had 
correct knowledge of greenhouse-effect phenomena (Q2.4.1, Q2.4.2); whether they were 
familiar with current scientific observations (Q2.4.3, Q2.4.4, Q2.4.5, Q2.4.6); and their 
future projections of global climate change (Q2.4.7, Q2.4.8, Q2.4.9). Additionally, the 
policy science dimension employed three variables to examine respondents’ 
understanding about the current reality of some policy-relevant issues: international 
treaties (Q2.4.10, Q2.4.11), Taiwan’s energy use (Q2.4.12), and Taiwan’s GHG emissions 
(Q2.4.13, Q2.4.14, Q2.4.15). 
Table 4.5 Dimension, Variable, and Question Number of Section II (Scientific 
Knowledge) 
Dimension Variable Question No. 
Identification of causes, impacts, mitigations Q2.1; Q2.2; Q2.3 
Greenhouse effect phenomena Q2.4.1; Q2.4.2 
Scientific observation Q2.4.3; Q2.4.4; Q2.4.5; Q2.4.6 
Physical Science 
Future projection Q2.4.7; Q2.4.8; Q2.4.9 
International treaty Q2.4.10; Q2.4.11 
Taiwan energy use Q2.4.12 Policy Science 
Taiwan GHG emissions Q2.4.13; Q2.4.14; Q2.4.15 
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In the first three questions of this section, the respondents were asked to identify 
correct causes, impacts, and mitigation strategies from a list of ten choices comprising 
both actual and bogus queries—a modified version from a survey by Bord et al. (2000).60 
If a respondent successfully identified the correct answer (or did not select a bogus 
option), the item was recorded as a correct answer. The overall score on a particular item 
depended on the number of correct answers the respondent identified (see Box 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 2) Question Example – Q2.2 and Q2.4 
 
Q2.2 Select from the following list the potential consequences that are contributing directly by 
global climate change. <You may select more than one option> 
□Increasing average global air and ocean temperatures 
□Increasing chances of skin cancer due to exposure to excessive ultraviolet light (bogus) 
□Increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather 
□Increasing pesticide residues in food products (bogus) 
□Increasing radioactive waste (bogus) 
□Change in precipitation volume (i.e., increasing flood and drought, water resource 
shortage) 
□Decreasing agricultural productivity 
□Decreasing biodiversity 
□Decreasing vector-borne diseases (bogus) 
□Global average sea level rise 
□Melting glaciers and ice cap in mountain and polar region 
 
Q2.4 Yes or No question. Please indicate whether each of the following statements is correct. 
Do not worry if you do not know the answer as this is not a test. If you do not understand 
the item, you may leave it blank. 
 Yes No Do Not Know 
Q2.4.1 The greenhouse effect is a natural phenomenon 
that moderates the earth’s average surface temperature 
within a relatively comfortable range. 
□ □ □ 
Q2.4.7 If the global concentrations of all greenhouse 
gases and aerosols had been kept constant at year 2000 
levels, further warming could be stopped. (bogus) 
□ □ □ 
Q2.4.13The major contributor of carbon dioxide 
emissions (including direct emission and indirect 
electricity consumption) in Taiwan is the industrial sector.
□ □ □ 
 
                                                 
60 Bord et al. (2000) asked respondents to indicate whether they thought each item was a 
major cause or a minor cause of global warming or not a cause at all. These items were 
either actual causes (e.g., use of coal and oil by electric companies) or bogus causes (e.g., 
use of chemicals to destroy insect pests). 
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The respondents were then asked to assess the correctness of a set of fifteen 
factual scientific statements that also included six false queries. In addition to true or 
false options, an extra option “Do not know” response was inserted to discourage 
guessing. However, selection of this option was recorded as an incorrect answer during 
the scoring phase. Despite the different formats used in Q2.1-Q2.3 and Q2.4, these 
scientific questions have the same dichotomous concept—the respondents perceived 
either correct or incorrect responses to each scientific statement. Box 2 illustrated 
question examples for Q2.2 and Q2.4. 
The third section sought to understand respondents’ individual responses to 
climate change in five dimensions. The first dimension investigated respondents’ 
subjective viewpoints about whether Taiwan should commit to reduce its GHG emissions 
in a “Yes or No” format (Q3.1). They were further asked about their reasoning of such 
commitments in a contingent design. Respondents that selected “Yes” in Q3.1 would 
proceed to Q3.2 and respondents that selected “No” in Q3.2 would proceed to Q3.3. 
The second aspect requested respondents to self-rate their level of willingness to 
change personal behaviors to favor climate-protection actions with respect to energy use, 
transportation practices, and general consumption patterns (Table 4.6). This set of 
questions (Q3.4) was also modified from Bord et al.’s (2000) study.61 A rating-scale table 
was designed to enable the respondents to rate the potential changes of each action in 
accordance with a five-point scale (willing: 5; unwilling: 1). The respondents then 
indicated their own experiences of having taken certain actions (e.g., use of public 
                                                 
61 Bord et al. (2000) asked respondents to express how likely they would be to take 
certain voluntary actions (e.g., carpool and drive less; replace older appliances) along a 
five-point Likert scale. 
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transportation) in Q3.5 with five options (frequently, sometimes, rarely, never, and do not 
know). 
Table 4.6 Dimension, Variable, and Question Number of Section III (Individual 
Responses) 
Dimension Variable Question No. 
Government commitment Q3.1; Q3.2; Q3.3 
Energy use Q3.4.1; Q3.4.2 
Transportation Q3.4.3 Willingness to change behaviors 
Green consumption Q3.4.4; Q3.4.5; Q3.4.6 
Individual experiences Experience Q3.5 
Political actions Q3.6.1; Q3.6.2; Q3.6.3 Willingness to take political 
actions Environmental movement Q3.6.4; Q3.6.5 
Policy preferences Mitigation Policy Preferences Index Q3.7 
 
The fourth dimension also used a five-point Likert scale (Q3.6) to assess 
respondents’ willingness to participate in certain political and social actions that could 
motivate the Taiwanese government to reduce the island’s GHG emissions (e.g., attend a 
public hearing, join an environmental group). The last dimension, revised from Bord et 
al.’s (2000) study,62 examined the respondents’ personal support for climate policies of 
various intensities (Q3.7). These possible initiatives represented a wide range of 
mitigation strategies, including a green industrial development plan, a cap-and-trade law, 
taxes and other economic incentives, a reforestation program, and a nuclear energy 
development plan. Box 3 illustrates question examples for Q3.2 and Q3.7. 
The survey concluded with a set of questions designed to collect demographic 
information (i.e., age, gender, academic major, and educational status). Two 
                                                 
62 Bord et al. (2000) asked respondents to indicate how they would vote regarding 
several hypothetical governmental initiatives in a national referendum (e.g., an 
energy-use tax on businesses, a rainforests-preservation program) in a continuum of 
definitely yes, probably yes, probably no, and definitely no. 
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supplementary questions about information sources and film-viewing experiences were 
asked at the end. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3) Question Example – Q3.2 and Q3.7 
 
Q3.2 Taiwan should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions because the country _______________ 
<You may select more than one option> 
□May face trade sanctions from the rest of the world. 
□Has relatively high greenhouse gas emissions per capita (per person). 
□Will be affected by the adverse impacts resulting from global climate change. 
□Will benefit economically from action to reduce its emissions in the long term. 
□Is a member of the global community and does not have a moral right to destroy the 
environment. 
□Others: _______________________ 
 
Q3.7 Below is a list of several possible initiatives that could help to reduce emissions of carbon 
dioxide into the atmosphere. Please fill in the response that most closely reflects your 
views in terms of your support for each activity. 
 Strongly Support Support Neutral Oppose 
Strongly 
Oppose DK
Q3.7.1 Encourage the 
development of less pollution 
and energy intensive industries 
by shifting government subsidy 
programs 
□ □ □ □ □ □
Q3.7.6 Encourage the planting 
of trees □ □ □ □ □ □
Q3.7.7 Support the use of 
nuclear power as an alternative 
source of energy 
□ □ □ □ □ □
 
4.5.6  Data Analysis 
The responses collected in the pre- and post-surveys were recorded in Excel spreadsheets. 
The quantitative data were presented in two ways: a direct value or score of the item and 
a frequency (i.e., the percentage of responses in certain options). The potential changes of 
the pre- and post-responses were determined by the direct comparison of the value of a 
variable or the average score of a scale. Due to the small sample size (less than 30), this 
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study did not administer statistical analyses to verify the statistical significance of the 
changes of the pre- and post-responses (e.g., the paired T test). 
 
4.5.7  Concluding Remarks 
This study used a standardized survey, the most common social science research method, 
to collect quantitative information of subjective perceptions from the young adults who 
participated in the IA focus-group workshop. The purpose of this study was to learn how 
the expert-integrated focus-group workshop influenced the participants’ understanding of 
climate change. Therefore, by administrating the same survey instrument at the beginning 
and end of the workshop, not only could the study collect data on participants’ concern 
about climate change, the comparison of the pre- and post-survey responses could also 
assess potential changes of the participants’ overall level of understanding. 
In addition, this study employed both theoretical and policy approaches to 
investigate Taiwanese university students’ overall concern (general attitudes, scientific 
understanding), individual responses (behavioral intention and policy preferences) toward 
the issue of global climate change, and to explore the interrelationships. The 
multiple-item survey instrument was constructed with a structure consisting of four 
sections—General Concern, Scientific Knowledge, Individual Responses, and 
Demographic Information. Several types of questions were used in the survey. For 
example, a dichotomous (true or false) format was chosen to quantify the respondents’ 
scientific knowledge. The second series of questions comprised multiple-choice questions 
that allowed respondents to select either single or multiple answers. The third category of 
questions used a Likert-scale format with which the respondents could rate their level of 
personal agreement, willingness, and support. 
 223
4.6  Study 3: Web-based Survey 
4.6.1  Introduction 
Study 3 was a standardized survey study conducted in November 2008. This survey 
sought to investigate Taiwanese university students’ overall level of concern about 
climate change and to explore the hypothetical relationship between scientific knowledge 
and individual responses (i.e., willingness to endorse different climate protection actions 
and policies). To collect data from a larger-scale sample population, the study relied on a 
medium that is extensively used by young people in Taiwan: the Internet. 
This chapter explains the methodology of this web-based survey, including a 
description of the features of the Internet-assisted survey method, the design of the 
questionnaire, and the administration of the survey. By collecting information from a 
larger-scale sample population, the third constituent study sought to address the following 
research questions (also see Table 4.1). 
4.2.1 How do people perceive climate change and what is the level of public 
scientific knowledge of climate change in Taiwan? 
4.2.2 Will a better understanding of climate science enhance people’s willingness 
to change their behaviors and to endorse more stringent climate policies? 
 
Subsection 4.6.2 discusses advantages and disadvantages of an Internet-assisted 
survey method and compares this approach to other survey methods. Subsection 4.6.3 
describes the administration processes of this survey study. Subsection 4.6.4 explains the 
sampling issues that arise in the use of online surveys and introduces the sampling 
technique. Subsection 4.6.5 describes the various components of the questionnaire 
including question and format construction. Subsection 4.6.6 explains the method of data 
analysis. Subsection 4.6.7 concludes this section. 
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4.6.2  Internet-assisted Survey 
Comparison of Survey Method 
There are four primary survey methods that differ in accordance with their modes of data 
collection: face-to-face, telephone, mail, and online. 63  Face-to-face and telephone 
interviews are administrated by interviewers—trained interviewers ask respondents 
survey questions personally or via telephone and enter their responses into a database. In 
contrast, mail and online surveys are self-administrated by interviewees. Survey 
questions are displayed in a paper format sent via mail or in an electronic format 
distributed via electronic mail (e-mail) or over the Internet, and respondents then submit 
their responses through the designed modes. 
Table 4.7 compares the advantages and disadvantages of these four survey 
methods (Sue & Ritter, 2007; Fowler, 2009). Some of the key considerations include 
research feasibility (e.g., cost, required staff, access to samples, required time to prepare), 
research reliability (e.g., response rate, interviewer bias), and research design (e.g., 
geographic reach, sensitive topic, complex and contingent question). Each method has 
strengths and weaknesses and selection of a particular method depends on the 
requirements and restrictions of the particular project. An online survey may encounter 
problems of coverage bias, sample representativeness, and unidentified respondents, but 
                                                 
63 Online surveys include two common ways of data collection: e-mail surveys and 
web-based surveys. With e-mail practices, the prospective respondent receives an e-mail 
with a survey attached to it and sends a return e-mail back with the completed survey 
attached to or included with it. The researchers distribute and collect data fully through 
e-mail, but they need to manually transfer the raw data into a database. In contrast, with 
web-based surveys, the potential participant can receive an invitation e-mail or a pop-up 
message from other web sites containing a link to the survey website where he/she will 
find the survey instrument. The participant then completes and submits the survey online. 
The researchers collect data online with no need for manual data entry. 
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it has benefits of reduced time, lower cost, direct data entry, flexibility in format and wide 
geographic reach (Sue & Ritter, 2007; Fowler, 2009). 
A number of studies have discussed the pros and cons of online data collection 
(Sax, et al., 2003; Granello & Wheaton, 2004; Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006; Lefever et 
al., 2007). Granello and Wheaton (2004) suggest that the benefits of online surveys are 
not fully apparent unless the limitations are addressed first. Weighing the benefits of this 
technique against the limitations imposed by this doctoral research (limited budget and 
staff), the decision was made to employ the web-based method. 
Table 4.7 Comparison of Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Survey Methods 
Survey Type Advantages Disadvantages 
Face-to-face 
interview 
y Good response rates 
y Can ask complex questions 
y Long interviews tolerated 
y Enlisting better cooperation 
y Can observe respondents 
y Limited geographic reach 
y Time-consuming 
y Expensive 
y Interviewer bias 
y Sensitive topics difficult to explore 
y Requiring trained interviewer 
Telephone 
y Limited coverage bias 
y Speedy responses 
y Can ask complex questions 
y Wide geographic reach 
y Requiring fewer staff than 
face-to-face interview 
y Confusion with sales calls 
y Intrusive 
y Call screening 
y No visual support 
y Sensitive topics difficult to explore 
y Requiring correct phone numbers 
Mail 
y Low cost 
y Wide geographic reach 
y No interviewer bias 
y Anonymity allows sensitive 
questions 
y Sufficient time for thoughtful 
answers 
y Requiring minimal staff 
y Low response rate 
y Lengthy response period 
y Contingency questions not effective 
y Do not know who is responding to the 
survey 
y Difficult to enlisting cooperation 
y Requiring correct mailing addresses 
Online 
y Low cost 
y Fast 
y Efficient 
y Contingency questions effective 
y Direct data entry 
y Wide geographic reach 
y Sufficient time for thoughtful 
answers 
y Coverage bias: limited to internet 
users 
y Problem of sample representativeness 
y Reliance on software 
y Do not know who is responding to the 
survey 
y Difficult to enlisting cooperation 
y Low response rate 
y Requiring correct email addresses 
Source: Sue & Ritter (2007); Fowler (2009) 
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Overcoming Coverage Bias – Widespread Internet Usage 
Computer technology has improved and currently available systems facilitate survey 
research in a variety of ways, such as using statistical software for data analysis and 
assisting telephone interviews with data collection (Babbie, 1990; Fowler, 2009). The 
proliferation and rapid growth of the World Wide Web has taken the computer-assisted 
survey method to the next level—an “all-in-one” survey technique with multiple 
functions: data collection, data entry, and analysis. The technology makes the online 
survey an appealing research method. 
Internet users in each geographical region have increased since 2000 with an 
average growth rate of 362.3% (Table 4.8). These Internet users comprised 24.7% of the 
world’s population in 2009 (Internet World Stats, 2009a). The Internet tends to be more 
commonly used in North American. Although Latin America and Asia have very high 
Internet user populations (52.7% of global Internet users), an overwhelming majority of 
the population does not use the Internet (penetration rates are less than 20%). 
Table 4.8 Internet Usage in Users and Penetration in Regions in 2009 
Region/Country Internet Users Penetration Rate (% population) 
Growth Rate
(Users 2000-2009)
World Total 1,668,870,408 24.7% 362.3%
North America 251,735,500 73.9% 132.9%
Europe 402,380,474 50.1% 282.9%
Oceania/Australia 20,838,019 60.1% 173.4%
Latin American 175,834,439 30.0% 873.1%
Middle East 47,964,146 23.7% 1360.2%
Asia 704,213,930 18.5% 516.1%
Africa 65,903,900 6.7% 1359.9%
Source: Internet World Stats (2009a) 
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Taiwan, the study area in this doctoral research, was one of the countries with a 
widespread Internet environment (Table 4.9) and its penetration rate (67.2%) ranks 23rd 
in the world (Internet World Stats, 2009b). Compared to countries that have populations 
above 15 million and penetration rates above 50%, Taiwan was in eighth place (Figure 
4.3). According to the Taiwan Network Information Center (TWNIC), the Internet 
penetration rate reached 71.0% of the population in the age category above 12 years of 
age in 2009 (TWNIC, 2009). Among various age groups, the group of youth (ages 
between 15 and 24 years old), the sample population, comprises a group of relatively 
high Internet users (Figure 4.4). 
Table 4.9 World Ranking of Internet Penetration in Selected Countries* 
Rank Country Penetration Rate(% population) Internet Users Population
2 Netherlands 90.1%         15,000,000         16,645,313
6 Canada 84.3%         28,000,000         33,212,696
8 Australia 79.4%         16,355,388         20,600,856
11 Japan 73.8%         94,000,000       127,288,419
13 United States 72.3%       220,141,969       303,824,646
16 South Korea 70.7%         34,820,000         49,232,844
22 United Kingdom 68.6%         41,817,847         60,943,916
23 Taiwan 67.2%         15,400,000         22,920,946
26 Germany 63.8%         52,533,914         82,369,548
29 Spain 63.3%         25,623,329         40,491,051
32 Italy 59.7%         34,708,144         58,145,321
34 Malaysia 59.0%         14,904,000         25,274,133
36 France 58.1%         36,153,327         62,177,676
41 Romania 53.9%         12,000,000         22,246,862
World Total 24.70% 1,668,870,408 6,767,805,208 
Source: Source: Internet World Stats (2009b) 
* These countries were selected because their population exceeded 15 million people, which was 
comparable to the case of Taiwan. 
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Figure 4.4 Internet penetrations of different age groups in Taiwan (TWNIC, 2009). 
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4.6.3  Administration 
Figure 4.5 highlights the complete execution process of this web-based survey. The 
survey in Study 2 was constituted in part as a pilot test procedure for the online survey 
used in Study 3. Experience with this survey helped to improve the length and the quality 
of the online survey questionnaire. The revised instrument was constructed on a 
web-survey host called SurveyMonkey64 (see the completed instrument in Appendix B). 
The flow and format of the survey was pretested for one week. The finalized survey was 
then released for a period of three weeks in November 2008 (see the sampling technique 
and process in Section 4.6.4). 
 September 2008 
 Data analysis of pre-and post-survey 
 Survey revision for web-based survey 
 October 2008 
 Online survey construction 
 Pre-test of the format and flow 
 November 2008 
 Promotion and distribution 
 Three weeks of administration 
Figure 4.5 The execution process and the schedule for the web-based survey study
from preparation, pre-test, revision, administration, and analysis. 
Survey Draft 
IRB Approval 
 IA focus-group workshop in 
August 2008 
Pre Test (Study 2)
Administration 
Pre Test (Online) 
Survey Revision 
Data Analysis 
 Original approval in June 2007 
 Renewed approval in July 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 SurveyMonkey is a commercial web-based survey host that offers a wide range of 
services, such as providing survey templates and various question types, supporting 
survey distribution and data collection, computing basic statistics, and exporting data to 
Excel files. 
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4.6.4  Sampling 
Most of the limitations of online-data collection (e.g., unidentified samples, low response 
rate, randomness and representativeness of samples) are associated with the sampling 
process. The first concern about conducting online surveys is dishonest respondents who 
do not enter honest answers. However, this weakness is a feature of paper-and-pencil 
surveys as well (Lefever et al., 2007). Thus, in an effort to avoid intentionally deceitful 
responses, this study designed an extra barrier that required potential participants to enter 
an access code that could only be acquired in the e-mail invitation. 
A second concern is the potential for lower response rates from online surveys 
(Granello & Wheaton, 2004). However, unless researchers have access to information on 
the total number of prospective respondents within a specific sample population (e.g., 
e-mail lists, newsgroups), it is difficult to calculate response rates. Sax et al. (2003) found 
from a national survey of college students that web surveys have lower response rates 
than paper surveys. The result also indicated that a few factors that contributed to the low 
response rates included survey length, infrequent use of campus e-mail addresses, 
concern about privacy, and gender (i.e., women responded at a higher rate than did men). 
Finally, Van Selm & Jankowski (2006) argue that it is problematic to achieve a 
random sample of Internet users because of the difficulty of obtaining e-mail lists of 
potential respondents and the variation in e-mail address construction. Even if a sample 
list is acquired from a newsgroup, these people are likely to be interested in specific 
topics. They thus suggested that online surveys work better for studies using 
non-probability samples, but they also advise that researchers need to strive for an 
acceptable level of randomness and representativeness to develop meaningful samples. 
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Conventional probability sampling methods have dominated survey research.  
This sampling method involves the random selection concept which means the selected 
sample group can represent the population. Non-probability sampling methods, on the 
other hand, have been used alternatively in limited budget circumstances and when a 
precise representativeness of the population is not necessary (Babbie, 1990). While 
government agencies and academic organizations heavily emphasize the use of 
probability sampling techniques, private political polling groups and market-research 
organizations rely on non-probability sampling methods (Fowler, 2009). Since the focus 
of this doctoral research was not a large-scale quantitative study for a general population, 
it was considered that a precise random sample would not be necessary. 
This study employed two common techniques for non-probability sampling in 
online surveys: snowball sampling and convenience sampling. The snowball-sampling 
method first identifies one potential participant who meets the sample criteria (i.e., an 
enrolled university student) and asks the participant to refer someone else for the survey 
by forwarding around the e-mail invitation which included a link that directed 
prospective respondents to the survey. Similar to the approach used to recruit participants 
for the IA focus-group workshop, information about the study was released to several key 
Taiwanese youth organizations and spread among their member networks. To increase the 
number of respondents, the supplementary convenience sampling method was also used.  
In this case, the survey-invitation message containing the link to the survey was posted to 
several popular online community bulletin boards and discussion forums. The invitation 
briefly introduced this academic study and led the interested university students to the 
survey site. 
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Two disadvantages of these two sampling techniques can be identified. Since no 
direct incentive was provided, participation was completely voluntary. Potential 
participants self-selected into the study and may not be representative of the general 
population. In addition, because of the nature of the investigation, the respondents likely 
tended to comprise a group of individuals interested in the survey topic (Sue & Ritter, 
2007). It merits observing, however, that the study may have benefitted by recruiting 
respondents with a higher willingness to participate in the survey. It is therefore necessary 
to apply special care when interpreting the results from the inference analysis. 
Furthermore, the current procedure for estimating the required number of respondents is 
based on the particular probability sampling method. There are no formulas for statistical 
inference when using a non-probability sampling method (Sue & Ritter, 2007). This study 
therefore sought to recruit as many respondents as feasible in a three-week period. 
 
4.6.5  Questionnaire Design 
Revision of the Instrument 
The online survey instrument was modified and refined based on the results of the pre- 
and post-survey that had been carried out in summer of 2008 (see the completed 
instrument design in Section 4.5.5). The structures of these two surveys were the same 
with four sections, but the online version was shortened to a total of 40 items (see the 
completed instrument in Appendix B). To keep the completion time to approximately 10 
minutes (so that the respondents did not lose patience), several questions deemed to be of 
secondary importance were eliminated. 
First, Section I General Concern was shortened to twelve items. Questions 
regarding problem recognition, blame, and responsibility for climate change, economic 
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tradeoffs, and political priority were retained in the instrument. One dimension with two 
items was included to explore the respondents’ trust in scientists. The Personal Relevancy 
Index, a composite Likert-scale of three items, was used to measure how the respondents 
evaluate the relationship between themselves and the issue of climate change in terms of 
causes, impacts, and actions. The phrasing of the third item (personal actions) was 
revised because the original wording had double-barreled concepts that were inconsistent 
with the Index on the basis of results from the pre-test survey.65 
y The original wording: The problem of global climate change is so 
overwhelming that it is really beyond the control of a young person such as 
me. 
y The revised wording: There is still something a young person such as me can 
do to contribute to resolve the problem of global climate change. 
 
Second, to shorten the length of the survey instrument and to reduce the 
complexity of the original design in the second section, the online version selected twelve 
dichotomous questions to assess respondents’ scientific understanding of climate change. 
The respondents were asked to answer whether these scientific statements were correct. 
Three items were designed for each variable: causes, adverse impacts, and mitigation 
policies. One item was intended to test knowledge pertaining to the scientific basis of the 
greenhouse effect. The remaining two items tested the knowledge of respondents in the 
policy-science dimension (Table 4.10). 
This online survey eliminated two original variables (i.e., scientific observation 
and future protection) because the pre-test result found a low level of knowledge on those 
                                                 
65 Double-barreled concepts refer to inconsistent ideas in the same statement, which may 
cause respondents to become confused and misguided. For example, the respondents may 
disagree with the idea that global climate change is an overwhelming problem, but they 
may agree with the idea that the ability of a young person to effect change is limited. 
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items. To prevent respondents from dropping out due to frustration with difficult 
questions, twelve of the questions were purposely designed to be relatively easy. Of these 
items, six were quite straightforward and six were more modest questions based on the 
outcome of the pre- and post-survey. In addition, three statements are reverse-worded 
(Items 3, 6, and 10). The ozone layer-depletion item (Item 3) was intentionally designed 
to assess the common tendency to confound the separable problem of ozone depletion 
with global climate change. The remaining two questions were reverse-worded to prevent 
response sets (i.e., some respondents may tend to answer questions in a certain direction). 
In the third section, the dimension of government commitment remained 
unchanged. The number of items in the two sets of questions (i.e., personal behaviors and 
the policy-preferences dimension) was reduced to three and five items respectively. In 
addition, the question regarding responsibility among various societal sectors was revised 
and moved from the first section to the third section. This revision tried to make the 
question focus more on the distribution of responsibility between specific producers and 
consumers. 
y The original wording: Select from the following list the three entities that you 
think have primary responsibility for resolving global climate change? 
Choices: Environmental groups; Every citizen; Industries; Media; National 
government; Scientists; No specific entity; Others. 
y The revised wording: Which of the following groups in Taiwan bear primary 
responsibility for reducing their greenhouse gas emissions? 
Choices: Industrial sector; Household/consumer sector; Both are equally 
responsible; Do not know. 
 
Finally, the supplementary dimension of media experience was eliminated in the 
fourth section. A question regarding the location of each respondent’s hometown was 
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added to understand the distribution of their respective backgrounds. The other four items 
soliciting demographic information (i.e., age, gender, academic majors, and educational 
status) remained in the revised survey. 
Table 4.10 Items of Scientific Knowledge and Variable in the Online Survey 
Scientific Statement*** Variable E/M**
1. The greenhouse effect is due to the reabsorption of outgoing infrared 
radiation by atmospheric greenhouse gasses, such as carbon dioxide. G.E. M 
2. Industrial manufacturers emitting greenhouse gases during the 
production process contributes to global climate change. Cause E 
3. Ozone layer depletion contributes to global climate change.* Cause M 
4. Deforestation contributes to global climate change. Cause E 
5. Increasing average global air and ocean temperatures are a potential 
consequence of global climate change. Impact E 
6. Global climate change has no effect on the change in precipitation 
volume (i.e., increasing flood and drought, water resource shortage).* Impact M 
7. Global average sea-level rise due to the melting glaciers and ice cap in 
mountain and polar region is a potential consequence of global climate 
change. 
Impact E 
8. People using public transportation could likely moderate the effects of 
global climate change. Mitigation E 
9. Industries implementing carbon capture and storage technology (i.e., 
storing carbon dioxide underground or in the oceans) could likely 
moderate the effects of global climate change. 
Mitigation M 
10. Power plants using sources of renewable energy instead of fossil fuels 
like oil and coal to generate electricity could likely intensify the effects 
of global climate change.* 
Mitigation E 
11. The main purpose of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions in the industrialized countries. Policy M 
12. Taiwan’s carbon dioxide emission per capita (per person) is above the 
world’s average. Policy M 
* indicates reversed-worded statement (Item 3, 6, 10). 
** E refers to easy items and M refers to modest items 
*** The question was phrased as “Please indicate whether each of the following statements is 
correct. Do not worry if you do not know the answer as this is not a test.” 
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Survey Format 
Because SurveyMonkey supports any language, the survey was written in Chinese, the 
respondents’ native language. The link in the invitation directed potential participants to 
the welcome page of the survey which briefly described the objectives of the survey and 
its criteria with respect to eligibility to participate: an enrolled university student above 
18 years old. The presentation of this information was then followed by a consent page 
with detailed instructions of the rights of research subjects and the contact information of 
the project investigator. By selecting the “I consent” option, the respondents officially 
started the survey. This process intended to ensure respondents’ agreement to participate. 
To provide a respondent-friendly online survey, the questionnaire used a 
multipage format that placed each question on its own page with navigation signs 
(previous and next buttons). The respondents could go back to previous questions to 
review or change their responses. In addition, a progress bar assisted respondents in 
completing the survey by indicating the percentage of the overall survey that remained to 
be completed. Moreover, various types of question formats were used, including 
multiple-choice/single-answer questions, multiple-choice/multiple-answers questions, 
Likert-type rating scales, and drop-down menu questions.  
One contingent question was designed. On the one hand, a respondent who 
selected “Yes” in Q.16 would continue filling in his/her survey on Q.17 and then skip to 
Q.19. On the other hand, a respondent who selected “No” in Q.16 would jump to Q.18 
directly and then continue to Q.19. Most importantly, to avoid non-response items and to 
ensure the quality of the data, all questions were designed to require answers—a 
respondent was not allowed to proceed to the next question without entering an answer. 
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4.6.6  Data Analysis 
Similar to Study 2, the quantitative data in this web-based survey was mainly presented in 
two ways: a direct value or score of the item and a frequency (i.e., the percentage of 
responses in certain options). Because of a larger sample size, several statistical analyses 
could be administered. First, item analysis was carried out to ensure the internal 
validation of the three composite Likert scales in this survey (i.e., personal relevancy, 
behavioral intentions, and policy preferences). 
Second, one-way univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted to 
investigate the effect of two demographic variables (i.e., gender and academic majors) on 
dependent variables (i.e., general concern, trust in scientists, belief in human force, 
personal relevancy, scientific knowledge, personal behaviors, and policy preferences). 
Finally, Pearson correlation analysis was conducted to determine the degree of the linear 
relationships between two variables. 
 
4.6.7  Concluding Remarks 
The increased use of the Internet makes online data collection an appealing method with 
several advantages—low cost, ease of data entry, efficient, flexible format, and so forth. 
Considering benefits and limitations, this constituent study therefore used a web-based 
method. This study employed two techniques for non-probability sampling in online 
surveys: snowball sampling and convenience sampling. An invitation message that was 
released via e-mail or via the Internet directed potential participants to the survey site. 
The instrument was modified and shortened to 40 questions from the lengthy one used in 
the pre- and post-study. Nonetheless, the structure and variables remained the same. 
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4.7  Summary 
Interdisciplinary coordination and collective sustainable actions from all facets of society 
will be important to addressing the problem of global climate change. The key research 
question in this inquiry is whether public understanding of climate science is a necessary 
prerequisite for effective policy making. Thus, this doctoral research focuses on 
identifying the integration of the science and the public in the policy-making process. The 
investigation comprises three interrelated constituent studies and adopts a mixed-methods 
methodology with both quantitative and qualitative elements. This chapter describes the 
reasons for selecting university students as the study population and then introduces the 
research method used in each study in detail. 
This research selected the subpopulation of youth as the study population because 
the involvement of youth in sustainable issues is significant in terms of representing a 
wide range of societal perspectives and bringing unique and intergenerational viewpoints 
to the implementation of sustainable development. A complex issue like global climate 
change especially requires the active participation of youth in formulating climate 
policies. In addition, this case study specifically focuses on Taiwanese university students 
because participation in higher education is widespread in Taiwan. 
Study 1 employed IA focus groups to qualitatively measure Taiwanese university 
students’ perspectives about climate change and to assess the effectiveness of a 
participatory exercise in enhancing scientific understanding and in formulating climate 
policies. The modified IA focus-group workshop consisted of three sessions: participants’ 
spontaneous expressions, expert presentations, and synthesis of informed participants’ 
conclusions about Taiwanese climate policies. 
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Study 2 was a pre- and post-comparative survey conducted in the IA focus-groups 
to learn how the expert-integrated focus-group workshop influenced the participants’ 
understanding of the issue of global climate change. This study used a standardized 
survey to quantitatively measure Taiwanese university students’ overall concern (general 
attitudes, scientific understanding) and individual responses (behavioral intention and 
policy preferences) toward the issue of global climate change. The multiple-item survey 
instrument was constructed with a structure consisting of several sections. As discussed 
in the chapter, several types of questions were designed. 
Study 3 employed a web-based survey because of the various advantages of the 
online-survey method. Modified from the survey instrument used in Study 2, the 
instrument of this web-based study was more concise. This study used two techniques for 
non-probability sampling in online surveys: snowball sampling and convenience 
sampling. An invitation message that was released via e-mail or via the web directed 
potential participants to the survey site. This study sought to recruit as many respondents 
as feasible in a three-week period in November 2008. 
In conclusion, this research anticipates that these three constituent studies in 
combination is a satisfactory approach to effectively address the primary research 
question (i.e., identifying the relationship between scientific understanding and 
policymaking), but also can explore the interactive relationship between experts and lay 
people through an experimental participatory exercise. By incorporating various social 
science research methods, both quantitative and qualitative information was acquired, 
that can facilitate data interpretation in the following chapter which discusses the results 
and analysis generated by this methodology. 
CHAPTER 5 
RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
 
5.1  Overview 
Under the purview of modern democratic governance, it is essential to incorporate 
science and the public in the policy-making process for complex environmental problems. 
It is of particular interest to explore how a person develops his or her attitudes, scientific 
understanding, and behavioral intentions from a socio-psychological perspective and to 
investigate how a scientifically literate citizen influences his or her personal behaviors 
and policy support. As described in Chapter 4, this interdisciplinary doctoral research 
comprises three interrelated constituent studies to jointly address some related inquiries 
regarding the public understanding of climate science (see Section 4.2). 
Targeting an important subpopulation (i.e., youth), the entire investigation was 
conducted in Taiwan in the summer and fall of 2008 with 303 young adults involved. Due 
to the design of three interrelated studies and research questions, this chapter aims to 
present the results of this work separately and then to quantitatively and qualitatively 
analyze the corroborated findings in depth. Section 5.2 describes the research results of 
each study (i.e., an IA focus-group workshop, a pre- and post-survey, and a web-based 
survey). Section 5.3 combines the results of the three studies and provides an integrated 
analysis of the different factors underlying the public understanding of climate science 
(i.e., attitudes, knowledge, and behavioral intentions) and of the relationships among 
these elements. It also compares the findings with preceding sociological studies. The last 
section summarizes key findings of this research. 
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5.2  Research Results 
5.2.1  Introduction 
As introduced in Chapter 4, this doctoral research aims to explore whether public 
understanding of climate science is a necessary prerequisite for effective policy making 
with three constituent studies (i.e., an IA focus-group workshop, a pre- and post-survey, 
and a web-based survey). Adopting a mixed methodology, the research is able to examine 
the various constituent elements of the public understanding of climate science and also 
to observe the dynamic relationship between scientific experts and citizens from the 
standpoint of experimental participatory practice. These three studies collectively expect 
to achieve the following research objectives: 
y To examine the concerns of Taiwanese youth about global climate change in 
terms of their attitudes, scientific knowledge, and behavioral intentions. 
y To investigate the interrelationships among these three elements (i.e., attitudes, 
scientific knowledge, and behavioral intentions). 
y To assess the effectiveness of an experimental participatory exercise (i.e., the 
IA focus groups) in enhancing individual scientific understanding and 
engagement in policy making. 
 
This section primarily summarizes the key research findings of each of the 
constituent studies in three subsections. In-depth comparison and cross-examination will 
be analyzed in Section 5.3. Subsection 5.2.2 describes the result observed in the IA 
focus-group discussions with highlights of some in-depth dialogues among the 
participants. Subsection 5.2.3 presents the quantitative results of the comparative surveys 
collected in the IA focus-group workshop. Subsection 5.2.4 illustrates the results of the 
web-based survey to measure Taiwanese young adults’ attitudes about and understanding 
of climate change. Subsection 5.2.5 concludes with a few remarks. 
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5.2.2  Study 1: IA Focus-Group Workshop 
Summary of the Approach 
To understand Taiwanese university students’ perspectives about the issue of global 
climate change and to assess the effectiveness of a participatory exercise in enhancing 
scientific understanding and in formulating climate policies, a modified one-day IA 
focus-group workshop was organized in Taipei in the summer of 2008. The young adults 
who voluntarily registered for the workshop were expected to have a relatively high level 
of personal concern about global climate change. The participants were divided into two 
groups for more efficient discussions (Group A and Group B). One moderator and one 
assistant moderator were assigned to each group to facilitate the discussion. 
The workshop consisted of three sessions: 1) the participants shared their initial 
impressions, 2) the experts presented current research findings (physical science and 
policy science of climate change), and 3) the participants engaged in discussion with the 
aim of reaching a consensus view. Several general issues were discussed in both groups 
(i.e., anthropogenic causes, the responsibility of industrialized and developing countries, 
the responsibility of industries and the public in Taiwan, the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol in Taiwan). 
Each focus group then discussed one domestic climate policy (mitigation strategy) 
and tried to reach a group consensus—whether to support the policy or not. Group A 
discussed a voluntary-based governmental initiative “Energy Conservation and Carbon 
Reduction Program.” Group B discussed a mandatory policy “Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Bill (Draft).” Since the entire process was video-recorded and transcribed to written 
documents, some interesting observations in the discussion were able to be extracted and 
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the selected dialogues are presented in the following (also see Section 4.4 for the detailed 
method). 
 
Characteristics of Participants 
A total of 25 Taiwanese young adults registered to participate in the designed IA 
focus-group workshop before the application deadline, but only 18 of them ultimately 
came on the designated day (n=18). Thirteen of these participants (aged between 19 and 
32 years) were currently enrolled university students (eight undergraduates and five 
graduates), and five were young professionals. In addition, the focus groups included 11 
male and 7 female participants. The respondents were mixed equally and divided into two 
smaller groups according to gender and academic background. 
 
Motivations of Participation 
The participants were required to describe the motivation behind their participation in an 
open-ended question when they registered for the event, and they were also instructed to 
share their motivations with group members when they introduced themselves in the first 
session. Even though all of the respondents were interested in climate change to some 
degree, their personal motivations for participating in a day-long workshop varied.66 
The results show that most of the participants admitted that they did not 
understand the issue and saw the workshop as an opportunity to acquire knowledge. Only 
a handful of the participants did so because they wanted to actively contribute their own 
personal viewpoints. Hence, a search for external information was deemed to be the 
                                                 
66 This subsection primarily presents qualitative dialogues. It is difficult to quantify the 
participants’ responses in a group discussion because once a point is mentioned by a 
group member; it is unlikely another member would repeat the same point. For the 
precise quantitative measurement in IA focus groups, see Subsection 5.2.3. 
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primary motivation, which is different from Darier et al.’s (1999a) findings—European 
citizens participate in citizen panels for two reasons according to these authors (i.e., it 
leads to better policy decisions and implementation; it is good to exchange diverse 
perspectives). 
 
General Perceptions of Global Climate Change 
The participants were asked in the first session to describe their personal impressions of 
global climate change, to discuss the extent to which they recognized it as a problem, and 
to identify its causes and consequences. From the participants’ spontaneous expressions 
about global climate change prior to the expert treatment, it is clear that they had prior 
knowledge of the issue despite variations in their respective levels of scientific 
understanding of climate change. For example, a couple of the participants were even 
able to explain the science of the greenhouse effect and the El Niño phenomenon. 
Several of the participants correctly described global climate change as changes 
or anomalies in meteorological patterns over a long period of time, such as precipitation 
and temperature variability. A number of the respondents in Group B had an interesting 
discussion about a controversial issue—whether global climate change is a result of 
natural fluctuations. The dialogue was as follows: 
 
Global climate change breaks the original natural climate cycle. For 
example, ice melts because the temperature is above, rather below, 0ºC in 
winter. It also includes the ozone hole, the El Niño phenomenon, and the 
ultraviolet exposure index in the weather forecast. The greenhouse effect 
is a normal natural phenomenon. The earth would freeze without it. Global 
warming is abnormal because industries emit greenhouse gasses which 
accelerate the greenhouse effect.      (Youth no. 2, Group B, Session 1) 
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Weather is short term, but the climate is long term. There is supposedly a 
climate cycle—it is hot when it should be; it is cold when it should be; it 
rains when it should. Yes, the average temperature in this century is slowly 
increasing, but if we examine it from a long-term perspective, it may be 
just a natural fluctuation phenomenon like the stock index. 
(Youth no. 6, Group B, Session 1) 
 
Most scholars think that global warming is induced by human activities 
most likely with greenhouse gas emissions like methane, carbon monoxide, 
and carbon dioxide.                 (Youth no. 9, Group B, Session 1) 
 
Some scholars think that the global warming phenomenon is normal and 
periodic, but it is still a hypothesis. It is not very certain. 
(Youth no. 25, Group B, Session 1) 
 
Based on the above dialogue, it can be inferred that while some participants had 
an accurate understanding of climate change, some participants displayed a tendency to 
confuse ozone depletion with climate change and others mistakenly identified carbon 
monoxide as a greenhouse gas. A similar misunderstanding was also found in Group A. 
 
Problem Recognition 
The participants were then asked to share whether they thought there was a climate 
change problem globally and in Taiwan. They were able to shed light on their 
understanding of the climate-related impacts at both a global and local level. In addition, 
it is interesting to find that the participants tended to cite their personal experiences or the 
information derived from the mass media as the reference when illustrating their opinions 
about the reality of global climate change. 
y Global Level 
 
The problem happens at a global scale, such as sea-level rise. An island 
country in the Pacific Ocean, Tuvalu, is almost flooded. It will also 
decrease the land area in Taiwan.     (Youth no. 22, Group A, Session 1) 
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y Global Level 
 
I believe that some animals will become extinct, such as king penguins 
and polar bears.                    (Youth no. 4, Group A, Session 1) 
 
Many Europeans were killed in heat waves. 
(Youth no. 25, Group B, Session 1) 
 
y Local Level 
 
There will be some water shortage problems. Taiwan is small, and it is 
already difficult to reserve water. If climate change causes a lower amount 
of precipitation or intensive rainfalls, it is impossible for watershed to 
retain water resources.              (Youth no. 4, Group A, Session 1) 
 
Typhoons may bring heavy rainfalls.  (Youth no. 13, Group B, Session 1) 
 
It seems that there are more typhoons in fall now (i.e., October and 
November).                      (Youth no. 25, Group B, Session 1) 
 
y Personal Experiences 
 
My hometown is Penghu (an islet in southwest Taiwan). I have seen the 
coast since I was a kid. I have discovered that the coastline is retreating in 
recent years.                     (Youth no. 14, Group A, Session 1) 
 
The ice cap in the Arctic area is melting. I once went to New Zealand 
during the 2001 summer break (winter there). One glacier was retreating 
dramatically compared with a picture taken a year before. I was so 
surprised when I saw the pictures.    (Youth no. 23, Group B, Session 1) 
 
Summer is getting longer and getting hotter. 
(Youth no. 6, Group B, Session 1) 
 
y Mass Media Influence 
 
I once saw a Discovery show reporting that the way of life has changed in 
the Netherlands because of the climate. 
(Youth no. 10, Group A, Session 1) 
 
The girl in the Simpsons has an ice cream which melts fast because of the 
high temperature (an iconic plot in the documentary “An Inconvenient 
Truth”).                         (Youth no. 20, Group B, Session 1) 
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y Mass Media Influence 
 
The escalator taken by Mr. Al Gore in “An Inconvenient Truth” was very 
impressive. It seems that the current temperature has way surpassed the 
earth’s historical records of temperature. So in addition to natural factors, 
there are definitely some anthropogenic forces existing. 
(Youth no. 7, Group B, Session 1) 
 
Identification of Causes and Consequences 
When asked to identify causes and consequences of global climate change, both groups 
were able to produce a comprehensive picture during the group discussion. This 
experience suggests that it is beneficial for scientific information to be exchanged 
through interactions among group members, but there is also a chance that incorrect 
information is transmitted. In addition to anthropogenic causes of climate change, a 
couple of the more knowledgeable participants mentioned natural factors, such as solar 
radiation and the El Niño phenomenon. Moreover, some underlying political and 
economic factors were mentioned: 
 
One cause is lifestyle. When humans’ way of life was changed by the 
industrial revolution and capitalism, corporations and industries got 
stronger and more carbon dioxide was emitted. The traditional and simple 
lifestyle has been changed.          (Youth no. 10, Group A, Session 1) 
 
Politically speaking, one cause is that industrialized countries give the 
economy priority to the environment. These countries throw the 
responsibility of pollution problems to developing countries for their own 
benefit.                          (Youth no. 6, Group B, Session 1) 
 
Anthropogenic Contribution and Responsibility 
After two briefings on the aspects of science and the politics of global climate change, the 
participants were guided to discuss several issues in detail, namely the anthropogenic 
forces and responsibility, the differentiated responsibility of GHG emission reduction, 
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and Taiwan’s compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. Most of the participants recognized 
the dominant influences of human activities on the climate system and the high scientific 
confidence in the 2007 IPCC report presented by the experts. However, a few of them 
were hesitant because of concern about some possible unknown factors (i.e., there might 
be something humans do not know yet) and the limited information on hand (i.e., the 
expert presentation may have only provided a part of the scientific information). 
In addition, an interesting perspective was revealed during the discussion—the 
participants tended to conceptually delink the corresponding relationship between 
anthropogenic contribution and responsibility. In other words, some participants argued 
that humans need to take actions and the responsibility to resolve the problem regardless 
of the debate over whether climate change is driven by human actions. This perception is 
different from the opinion in Western societies where sufficient scientific evidence of 
anthropogenic forces seems to be a key factor liming action. The dialogue was as follows: 
 
Based on the slides of the two experts, the atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide and methane have increased dramatically in 250 years. If 
this hypothesis is correct, it seems that global climate change is induced 
by humans. No matter what, humans need to do something. We need to be 
responsible for the environment we live in. If humans do not take 
responsibility, all of mankind will be affected. 
(Youth no. 6, Group B, Session 3) 
 
I think it [global climate change] is induced by human activities. However, 
even if it is not, there is no reason we can continue the current way of life. 
It is probably not a bad idea to address the problem from a precautionary 
aspect just like the expert mentioned.  (Youth no. 23, Group B, Session 3) 
 
I would not say it [global climate change] is directly caused by humans. 
Based on the current known reality and environmental advocacy it seems 
that humans primarily cause the problem, but there are certainly some 
unknown factors. I’m just wondering why we are discussing this issue. 
Even if it is not caused by humans, don’t we need to have some responses? 
(Youth no. 20, Group B, Session 3) 
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Humans surely need to take responsibility. It [global climate change] 
could be caused by humans or even by earthworms. Who causes the 
problem is not the point. The key point is that only humans can make 
efforts. Only humans can save the earth. We can not do nothing and leave 
it to nature. It is irresponsible. We still need to try our best. 
(Youth no. 24, Group B, Session 3) 
 
Human beings consider themselves as the most superior animal on the 
earth. We have ability to change. In addition, humans are likely impacted 
most among all species. Thus, we have the inevitable responsibility. 
(Youth no. 20, Group B, Session 3) 
 
The above discussion also shows that there is potential for the participants to 
accept the precautionary concept—to take mitigative actions despite scientific uncertainty. 
In addition, the participants tended to endorse an ethical environmental attitude—a moral 
feeling that humans should resolve the problem. Moreover, it is interesting to observe that 
one key justification behind this moral attitude is humans’ sense of superiority. The 
participants displayed a strong belief that humans’ exceptional intelligence and capability 
can resolve the problem. 
 
Common but Differentiated Responsibility 
Considering historical GHG emissions in the aggregate and in terms of per capita shares, 
the participants were instructed to discuss who (i.e., industrialized and developing 
countries) should bear primary responsibility for reducing GHG emissions. The results 
indicate that most of the participants supported the idea that all countries (both 
developing and industrialized countries) should take common responsibility to reduce 
GHG emissions and that the industrialized countries with high GHG emissions and better 
technological and financial capacity should take additional responsibility. 
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However, the respondents raised a number of questions about how to allocate 
each nation’s responsibility and how to calculate each nation’s emission allowance. The 
participants in Group B discussed two primary principles: polluter pays and retroactive 
liability. The first concept means that whoever pollutes should be held liable based on 
proportions—the more you pollute, the more you pay. Supplementing the first principle, 
the latter concept suggests that the historical GHG emissions of each country need to be 
taken into consideration—polluters should still be liable for past emissions. The 
following discussion highlights their argument. 
Those who gain the most profit from industrial development should be 
responsible. Polluters should pay. Those with capacity and experience 
should also take responsibility.       (Youth no. 24, Group B, Session 3) 
 
However, the ones with the most profit are not necessarily the most 
polluting. Responsibility should be based on the quantity of emissions, not 
on the time span of emissions [who emits longer]. If we compare the 
emissions of the United States and China, we will find that even though 
the US is a developed country, its emissions are still a lot. China is a 
developing country, but its current emission is also a lot. It is impossible to 
permit China to pollute for 100 years given the fact that the US has 
polluted 100 years.                (Youth no. 23, Group B, Session 3) 
 
The experts said that carbon emissions from OECD countries comprise 80 
percent of global emissions. So we can focus on these countries to do the 
reduction. Besides, even though China is willing to comply in the 
post-Kyoto period, they want to use a standard based on emissions per 
capita. Maybe we can measure the emission responsibility based on 
industries, not on nations.            (Youth no. 7, Group B, Session 3) 
 
Basically, the serious problem of climate change was caused by developed 
countries in the past. It is not fair to ask developing countries to bear the 
responsibility. It will kill their economic growth. If the responsibility 
standard is based on current emissions, it is not fair for developing 
countries. Developing countries need to develop industries to grow the 
economy. I think developing countries should have higher emission 
allowances, but not too high.         (Youth no. 2, Group B, Session 3) 
 
But if we are going to retrace historical emissions, when should we start? 
(Youth no. 6, Group B, Session 3) 
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In addition, interestingly, both groups discussed the problem of calculating the 
emissions of multinational corporations and their responsibility. Group A argued that 
determining GHG emissions should be based on the country in which a multinational 
company has its headquarters registered rather than where it carries out its manufacturing 
activities. 
 
I think both developed and developing countries should take responsibility. 
Developed countries have benefited from past pollution. We need to 
consider the historical emissions of developed countries. I have a question. 
Should the emissions of multinational corporations be counted in 
developing countries (where the factory is) or in developed countries 
(where the business has its headquarters)? 
(Youth no. 10, Group A, Session 3) 
 
All countries are responsible. Developed countries should take more 
responsibility, but we also need to pay attention as some developing 
countries have emitted more than developed countries. Developed 
countries should provide technology support. As to multinational 
corporations, I think we should consider the location of the mother 
company—where the multinational company registers its headquarters. 
There was a Taiwanese company once thinking of replanting forests in 
China in exchange for carbon emission credits in Taiwan—pollution in 
Taiwan and reforestation in China. This fulfills the idea of carbon trading. 
(Youth no. 21, Group A, Session 3) 
 
Responsibility of Industries and the General Public in Taiwan 
It is notable that one of the experts highlighted the structure of CO2 emissions by sectors 
in Taiwan during the second session. One key message was that Taiwanese industry 
contributes the majority of the country’s CO2 emissions (53.6%), which suggested that 
industries should be the primary target of blame. Interestingly, although the participants 
received this information, they did not directly point fingers at industry when asked to 
assess whether manufacturing companies or the general public should be held responsible 
for reducing CO2 emissions. In contrast, they recognized the public’s responsibility. 
 252
Group B concluded that both industries and the public should bear common responsibility. 
While actions should be taken on the part of each individual, large corporations that profit 
from industrial processes should take more responsibility. An interesting dialogue in 
Group B: 
 
Ethically speaking, everyone should take responsibility, but the 
implementation would be probably more thorough if we regulate 
industries in policy.                 (Youth no. 6, Group B, Session 3) 
 
We need to begin with some large corporations because of their enormous 
emissions. However, the relationship between politics and business is 
complicated.                     (Youth no. 23, Group B, Session 3) 
 
Which sector (industry or the general public) in Taiwan should bear 
primary responsibility is related to the industrial structure. Dr. Lin 
presented that energy-intensive industries in Taiwan contribute to a low 
percentage of GDP. It is not impossible to adjust the industrial structure. 
The problem is not if we can’t but if we do not want to. The government 
continues to provide subsidies (to industries) because they are politically 
influential to help the Government’s rule. I think that both industries and 
the public should take responsibility, but maybe industry should bear more 
responsibility.                     (Youth no. 7, Group B, Session 3) 
 
Everyone is responsible. If I need to choose one between industries and 
the general public to bear primary responsibility, I will choose industries. 
The emission reduced by us through energy savings for 10 years may be as 
well as equal to the emissions of a new factory. 
(Youth no. 2, Group B, Session 3) 
 
In addition, while both groups emphasized the role of government in reducing 
Taiwan’s CO2 emissions, some interesting political issues were discussed specifically in 
Group A. The participants concluded that the government and industries are both 
responsible for high CO2 emissions because the government has highly depended on 
energy-intensive industries to develop its economy. Moreover, some participants thought 
that public opinions are neglected because of the tight alliance between the government 
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and business. Furthermore, one participant recognized the lack of political power of the 
TEPA among government agencies. 
 
The government is also responsible because it formulates and implements 
policies. The government should assist business to transform from high 
energy intensive industries.          (Youth no. 4, Group A, Session 3) 
 
The government should share a large portion of responsibility because the 
policy allows the construction of high polluting industries, such as steel 
plants. We have too many tax exemption strategies for high energy 
intensive industries. The government and industries are accomplices. 
Corporations can lobby in the policymaking process. We are liable 
because we elected such legislators and government officials. 
(Youth no. 21, Group A, Session 3) 
 
I think everybody is responsible, but if I need to pick the priority, I will 
select industries and the government. The government is in charge with 
the direction of policies and information. It is difficult to distinguish the 
government and industries because they both have more political power 
and resources.                    (Youth no. 10, Group A, Session 3) 
 
Policies are always controlled by a small group of people (i.e., the 
government and few corporations). I agree that both the government and 
industries are responsible. We don’t even know how these policies are 
formulated. The opinions of the general public are often neglected. People 
should have their voice heard.        (Youth no. 1, Group A, Session 3) 
 
I think that the commissioner of the Environmental Protection 
Administration needs to be very powerful and famous. If so, he or she can 
confront large corporations with public support. 
(Youth no. 22, Group A, Session 3) 
 
Taiwan vs. the Kyoto Protocol 
The participants had different opinions on whether Taiwan should ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol. One key concern was Taiwan’s difficult diplomatic situation. One participant 
expressed that “the international society does not recognize us as a country and nobody 
invites us to sign the Kyoto Protocol.” On the contrary, another participant argued that “if 
we ratify the Protocol, it will be beneficial to our national image and international status.” 
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Nevertheless, 17 out of 18 participants tended to support the idea that Taiwan should 
reduce its GHG emissions. In addition, several of them were in favor of implementing 
mandatory policies on industries that could reduce GHG emissions more effectively, but 
they thought that there should be supplementary strategies (e.g., incentives). 
 
Taiwan should implement mandatory policies to reduce GHG emissions. If 
we adopt voluntary strategies, it is difficult to regulate because every civil 
group has different opinions. It would be easier to implement a law. 
(Youth no. 8, Group A, Session 3) 
 
I think we should use mandatory methods on industry, but we also need to 
have good supplementary strategies to persuade industries—let them 
believe that they will not be harmed. For example, we could subsidize 
industries to develop green products.  (Youth no. 14, Group A, Session 3) 
 
Domestic Mitigation Policies in Taiwan 
In the final part of Session 3, two groups were instructed to discuss whether they 
supported the two ongoing domestic mitigation policies (see Session 3.5 for the detailed 
content). Group A was assigned to discuss a voluntary-based governmental initiative 
“Energy Conservation and Carbon Reduction Program.” The participants basically 
supported this program, but questioned the effectiveness and implementation difficulties 
of some strategies. Some points are extracted below: 
 
There is no incentive provided when promoting this initiative. The 
program should indicate how these actions can benefit Taiwan and each 
individual.                       (Youth no. 22, Group A, Session 3) 
 
I think some actions are controversial. For example, the energy consumed 
to produce recycled papers may be more than the energy consumed to 
produce new papers.               (Youth no. 21, Group A, Session 3) 
 
When encouraging people to ride a bicycle to commute, Taiwanese 
weather factors are not considered. There is no shower room to change 
cloths in companies for commuters.    (Youth no. 8, Group A, Session 3) 
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It will require some supplementary strategies to promote these ten actions 
(e.g., incentives). For example, if we increase electricity fees, people have 
incentives to save energy. People will recycle resources if they can get 
some money compensation. If we want to encourage people to take public 
transportation systems more, we should have more metro lines or increase 
the frequency of busses.             (Youth no. 4, Group A, Session 3) 
 
It encourages people to carry personal cups and chopsticks, but some 
restaurants or some conferences still provide disposable products, which 
may diminish people’s willingness to comply. 
(Youth no 14, Group A, Session 3) 
 
In addition, while discussing this program to target the general public in particular, 
the participants questioned the efficacy for reducing Taiwan’s GHG emissions. An 
interesting discussion took place in Group A. 
 
I am more worried that such policies may cover other more important and 
more worthy discussion parts because this part of CO2 emissions only 
consists of 11.9% of the total CO2 emissions in Taiwan. 
(Youth no. 10, Group A, Session 3) 
 
Implementing this initiative is to misplace the resources. What the 
government should promote is the adjustment of the industrial structure. I 
support the content of this program, but I don’t think this is a job for the 
government. It is more likely what school teachers should do. 
(Youth no. 21, Group A, Session 3) 
 
This program should be done, but if considering priority, it is not the most 
important thing. In addition, it may mislead the general public that the 
problem would be solved as long as they take these actions. 
(Youth, 14, Group A, Session 3) 
 
Group B discussed a mandatory cap-and-trade policy “Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Bill (Draft).” Although the group reached a consensus to support this policy, they raised a 
number of issues worthy to discuss. First, one participant thought that it would be a little 
bit unfair if the cap did not consider historical emissions. A second participant suggested 
that the implementation should take a progressive path. A third participant was concerned 
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about whether this strategy would reduce GHG emissions effectively or just displace the 
problem. He argued that there should be a plan to reduce the cap (i.e., emission 
allowance). 
 
There can be a strategy between a mother company and a branch company. 
One of them emits, and the other one reduces. They comply with the 
regulation superficially, but then these two companies do not lose anything. 
It is not fair and not beneficial for the reduction of total emissions. 
(Youth no. 7, Group B, Session 3) 
 
Perception about the Mass Media 
Interestingly, during the discussion some participants began to question the information 
delivered by the mass media. A discussion about the mass media took place in Group A. 
 
The media keeps asking us to turn off the lights and plant trees. But the 
key problem is in industries. The media focuses on the effort of reducing 
carbon from the general public. The general public has barriers to get to 
know the issue, and that is why everybody tends to extract information 
from the media.                   (Youth no. 10, Group A, Session 3) 
 
The strange thing is the media asks us to eat vegetable. But how exactly 
can being a vegetarian help carbon reduction? 
(Youth no. 14, Group A, Session 3) 
 
The key point is food mileage. Take beef as an example. It consumes a lot 
of energy and carbon to import beef from New Zealand or Australia. That 
is why we are encouraged to eat local food products. But the media 
simplifies the problem to eating organic foods. 
(Youth no. 21, Group A, Session 3) 
 
Other Observations 
It was found that scientific experts indeed assist the participants. Even though some 
participants were fairly knowledgeable, they often cited information from the two invited 
experts to help themselves make an informed decision during their group discussion. 
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Furthermore, not only did the experts assist the participants by providing scientific 
information, some knowledgeable participants also helped to answer their fellow 
respondents’ questions. Finally, comments from the participants also contributed to the 
quality of domestic climate policies. The participants raised a couple of new ideas such as 
retroactive liability and carbon labeling on products. They also provided some insightful 
perspectives on concerns and difficulties about compliance with the voluntary program 
on conserving energy and reducing carbon emissions. 
 
Summary of Findings 
Most of the participants expected to acquire information from the IA focus group. While 
the participants’ level of scientific understanding of climate change varied, they managed 
to collectively identify causes and consequences during the group discussion. In addition, 
although most of the participants recognized human influences on the climate system, 
they also thought that humans needed to resolve the problem regardless of whether 
climate change is driven by human activities. Moreover, the participants supported the 
concept of the common but differentiated responsibilities. Furthermore, most of the 
respondents thought that Taiwan should reduce its GHG emissions and that industries, the 
government, and the public should bear the responsibility. Finally, both groups reached a 
consensus to support the two domestic climate policies. 
 
5.2.3  Study 2: Pre- and Post-Survey 
Summary of Approach 
To understand how the expert-integrated focus groups influenced the participants’ 
comprehension of global climate change, a standardized quantitative multiple-item 
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survey was administered at the beginning and end of the IA focus-group workshop. The 
study collected data on participants’ concern about climate change (i.e., attitudes, 
scientific knowledge, behavioral intentions, and policy preferences). In addition, 
comparison of the pre- and post-survey responses could be used to assess potential 
changes of the participants’ overall level of understanding (also see Section 4.5 for the 
detailed method). 
The survey was constructed with four sections and numerous dimensions (see 
Appendix A for the complete instrument). The first section “General Concern” comprises 
a number of variables (e.g., problem recognition, personal relevancy index). The second 
section “Scientific Knowledge” includes several questions to measure respondents’ 
correct scientific understanding of the science, causes, consequences, and mitigation 
strategies associated with climate change. The third section “Individual Responses” aims 
to investigate respondents’ views about a variety of mitigation strategies (e.g., willingness 
to change personal behaviors, mitigation policy preferences). The final section consists of 
questions regarding respondents’ demographic information (e.g., age and gender). 
Several formats were used in the survey (e.g., dichotomous, multiple choice, and 
Likert scale). This subsection highlights some key results of this survey. It is notable that 
the sample characteristics are the same with that of the IA focus group—a total of 18 
respondents (with ages between 19 and 32 years), 11 male and 7 female respondents, and 
13 university students and 5 young professionals. 
 
Familiarity with Terms and Policies 
The respondents (n=18) were asked to self-evaluate their level of familiarity with a 
variety of terms and policies on a 5-point Likert scale (a higher score indicates a higher 
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level of familiarity). The pretest survey found that the respondents were more familiar 
with the term “global warming” (rating average: 3.2 out of 5 points) than with 
“greenhouse effect” (3.1 points) and “global climate change” (2.9 points). They were less 
familiar with the Kyoto Protocol (2.3 points) and the Taiwanese Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Bill (Draft) (1.4 points). The post-test survey demonstrated that the 
respondents expressed a higher level of familiarity with all five items after the IA focus 
groups. 
 
Attitudes—Problem Recognition 
When asked about their first impression of global climate change, the majority of the 
respondents referred to changes in seasonal variability (94%), sea level (78%), local 
temperatures (72%), and precipitation (67%). However, approximately half of them 
referred to “global climate change” as “stratospheric ozone depletion” and “ultraviolet 
light intensity.” In addition, a majority of the respondents thought that Taiwan had 
experienced a number of adverse conditions over the course of the past decade: hotter 
summers (94%), warmer winters (83%), longer droughts (61%), and stronger 
precipitation intensity (61%). 
Moreover, the pre-test survey found that all of the respondents (n=18) believed 
that global climate change was real and had already started to happen. They expressed a 
moderate level of concern about potential climate-change impacts with an average score 
of 4.4 points on a 6-point Likert scale (a higher score indicates a higher level of concern). 
The respondents then scored 4.7 points in the post-test survey (slightly higher than the 
pretest survey). 
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Finally, the pre-test survey highlighted that the respondents believed in 
anthropogenic factors in inducing global climate change. They assessed their level of 
agreement that human activities are the main driving force behind global climate change 
with an average score of 4.1 points on a 5-point Likert scale (a higher score indicates a 
higher level of agreement). The average score in the post-response increased to 4.5 
points. 
 
Attitudes—Political Priority 
From a list of ten public issues, the respondents were requested to select three top 
prioritized issues for the government to take immediate action, namely environmental 
protection (61%), the gap between the rich and the poor (56%), and economic growth 
(39%). They were further asked to select three top prioritized environmental issues. All of 
the four most frequently selected issues were locally orientated: water pollution (61%), 
air pollution (44%), natural ecosystem destruction (44%), and solid waste and recycling 
(44%). Only 33% of them considered global climate change to be a prioritized issue. 
This result implies that even if the respondents recognized environmental 
protection as a prioritized public issue, they did not necessarily relate their awareness to 
global climate change. In addition, comparison of the pre- and post-test responses found 
that the percentage that selected environmental protection and global climate change 
increased, respectively, from 61% to 89% and from 33% to 44% (Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 Difference of the percentage of the respondents support for the 
prioritized issues in the pre- and post-surveys in Taiwan (n=18). 
 
 
Attitudes—Blame and Responsibility 
The respondents agreed that industrialized countries are responsible for global climate 
change and these nations should take more responsibility to resolve the problem. The 
average score with respect to the level of agreement was 4.1 points on a 5-point Likert 
scale (a higher score indicates a higher level of agreement). In addition, the respondents 
thought that three entities with primary responsibility to resolve global climate change are 
industries, the government, and every citizen. These perceptions did not change 
significantly after the IA focus groups. 
 
Attitudes—Personal Relevancy Index (PRI) 
The Personal Relevancy Index (PRI) consists of three items that indicate how the 
respondents assessed their relationship to global climate change in terms of personal 
contributions, impacts, and actions with a 5-point Likert scale (a higher score indicates 
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that they feel more relevant to the problem). While they agreed that global climate change 
may affect them personally during their lifetime (4.3 points), they displayed a lower level 
of agreement with the notion that their daily activities contribute to climate change (3.7 
points). 
While the respondents agreed that they may be relevant to the causes and 
consequences of climate change, they thought that the problem is so overwhelming that it 
is beyond the control of young people such as themselves (2.5 points).67 In other words, 
they felt there was little efficacy in the potential actions that a person could contribute. 
This helplessness and powerlessness can be explained by the strength of psychological 
barriers and the invocation of a denial mechanism (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; 
Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). While the respondents felt they had more personal 
relevancy regarding climate change in terms of contributions and actions (both scores 
slightly increased), a comparison of pre- and post-test results found no significant 
difference on all three items. 
 
Attitudes—Economic Tradeoff 
The last question in the general concern section asked respondents to take a position on 
the presumed trade-offs between economic growth and the environment. A total of 78% 
of them thought that both economic and environmental goals are important, but the 
environment should come first and 11% thought the environment should get the highest 
priority. A further 11% placed the economy ahead of the environment though they 
recognized both goals to be important. None of the respondents gave the highest priority 
                                                 
67 This item is negatively worded which means that the disagreement with the statement 
would be recorded as 5 points. The item was then reworded in the online survey. 
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to promoting economic growth. This result shows that most respondents endorsed a 
pro-environmental attitude. This attitude did not change significantly on the post-test 
survey. 
 
Scientific Knowledge—Causes, Impacts, and Mitigation Strategies 
The respondents were asked to identify correct causes, impacts, and mitigation strategies 
for global climate change from a list of actual and bogus queries. If an individual 
successfully identified the correct answer (or did not select a bogus option), the response 
was recorded as a correct answer and scored as one point. The overall score on a 
particular question depended on the number of correct answers the respondent was able 
to provide. The maximum score for the question on causes and mitigation strategies was 
10 points and the maximum score for the question on impacts was 11 points. 
The pre-test survey found that the respondents displayed relatively limited 
knowledge about the causes and mitigation strategies associated with climate change, in 
comparison to the impacts. First, they scored on average 68.3% on the causes. This result 
indicates that out of 10 options, they answered an average of 6.8 items correctly, with a 
range of 4 and 10 points. Among 10 choices, most respondents successfully identified a 
number of straightforward causes of climate change, namely deforestation (100%), 
industrial GHG emissions (94%), the use of fossil fuels in thermal power plants (89%), 
and the individual use of automobiles (78%). 
Interestingly, while they recognized the impacts of thermal power plants, some 
respondents did not relate electricity consumption to the direct causes. A total of 67% 
correctly identified household-electricity consumption and 50% correctly identified 
industrial electricity consumption as a contributor to climate change. In addition, as to 
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four bogus options, more than half of the respondents were able to eliminate nuclear 
plants (72%) and pesticides (67%). However, smaller percentages correctly ruled out the 
use of aerosol spray cans (50%) and ozone depletion (17%). 
Second, the respondents on average scored 83.3% on the questions about 
climate-change impacts which means that out of 11 options they answered an average of 
9.2 items correctly, with a range of 7 and 11 points. Most respondents could correctly 
identify most of the listed impacts, namely sea-level rise (100%), melting glaciers (100%), 
increasing global temperatures (94%), changes in precipitation volume (94%), increasing 
extreme weather (83%), and decreasing biodiversity (83%). 
Large percentages were also able to exclude bogus options, such as decreasing 
vector-borne diseases (94%), increasing pesticide residues in foods (89%), and increasing 
radioactive waste (89%). While a total of 50% of the respondents correctly identified 
decreasing agricultural productivity as an impact, only 39% ruled out the bogus item on 
the question pertaining to increasing chances of skin cancer due to exposure to excessive 
ultraviolet light (39%). 
Finally, the respondents on average scored 72.2% on the mitigation strategies, 
which means that out of 10 options they answered an average of 7.2 items correctly, with 
a range of 5 and 9 points. Most of the respondents successfully identified a number of 
actions that could likely moderate the effects of climate change, namely reforestation 
(94%), conserving energy and electricity (94%), developing energy-efficient products 
(89%), using public transportation (89%), and constructing renewable energy power 
plants (89%). 
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More than half of the respondents correctly excluded three bogus options: 
reducing nuclear power generation (78%), decreasing pesticides use (72%), and limiting 
use of aerosol spray cans (50%). While a total of 61% of the respondents correctly 
selected carbon capture and storage technology (i.e., storing CO2 underground), only 6% 
(one respondent) was able to identify another geo-engineering option: deploying large 
mirrors to reflect some solar energy into space. 
Therefore, the respondents seem to have had better ability identifying 
climate-related impacts than causes and mitigation actions. Interestingly, comparison of 
the pre- and post-survey data shows that there was no significant improvement in correct 
identification of these three aspects. In fact, while scores on the impacts slightly 
increased from 83.3% to 86.9%, both the causes and mitigation strategies received 
slightly decreased scores after the IA focus groups (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 Pre- and Post-Scores of on the Scientific Knowledge Section (n=18) 
Question Q 2.1 Q 2.2 Q 2.3 Q 2.4 
Content Causes Impacts Mitigation Science 
No. of Items 10 11 10 15 
Pre and Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Ave Score 68.3% 66.7% 83.3% 86.9% 72.2% 70.6% 53.7% 78.1%
Max Score 10 10 11 11 9 9 14 15 
Min Score 4 4 7 6 5 4 3 7 
 
Scientific Knowledge—Advanced Scientific Understanding 
The second part of the scientific knowledge section was a 15-item test comprising a 
series of advanced factual scientific statements on climate science and policy science (i.e., 
the greenhouse effect phenomenon, global CO2 emission trends and scientific observation, 
future projections, international agreements, Taiwan’s energy use and CO2 emissions) 
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(see Table 5.2). Six bogus queries were inserted into these 15 items (item no. 2, 4, 7, 11, 
12, and 14). The respondents were asked to appraise whether each statement was true or 
false. Successfully selecting the correct query with “true” and the bogus query with 
“false” is recorded as a correct answer and scored with one point. Choosing the “do not 
know” option is considered as an incorrect answer. The maximum score for this part was 
15 points. 
The pre-test survey found that the respondents on average scored 53.7% on 
advanced scientific knowledge, which means that out of 15 items they answered an 
average of 8.1 items correctly, with a range of scores between 3 and 14 points. The 
percentage of the respondents that correctly answered each item varied from 94% (item 
no. 14) to 17% (item no. 6) (Table 5.2). The results also show inconsistency and variation 
of scientific understanding on each variable. 
First, while 72% of the respondents recognized that the greenhouse effect is a 
natural phenomenon (item no. 1), only 33% knew the effect is not due to the reabsorption 
of outgoing ultraviolet rays by GHG (item no. 2). 
Second, 61% understood correctly the effect of CO2 emissions since the start of 
the Industrial Revolution (item no. 3) and 83% knew that CO is not a greenhouse gas. 
However, only a few respondents knew the exact extent of projected temperature increase 
(28%) (item no. 5) and the exact degree of anticipated sea-level rise (17%) (item no. 6). 
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Table 5.2 Percentage of the Respondents Answer Correctly in Each Item in the Pre- 
and Post-Surveys (n=18) 
Item Pre Post Diff. 
1. The greenhouse effect is a natural phenomenon that moderates the 
earth’s average surface temperature within a relatively comfortable 
range. 
72% 94% +22% 
2. The greenhouse effect is due to the reabsorption of outgoing 
ultraviolet rays by atmospheric greenhouse gasses. 33 56 +22 
3. The global atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has 
increased 35% since the Industrial Revolution during the middle of 
the nineteenth century. The increase exceeded the range of natural 
variability in the earth history. 
61 83 +22 
4. The most important and abundant anthropogenic greenhouse gas is 
carbon monoxide. 83 100 +17 
5. The average global temperature has risen 0.76 degrees Celsius over 
the past 150 years. 28 50 +22 
6. The global average sea level rise during the twentieth century is 
estimated to have been 0.17 meters. 17 56 +39 
7. If the global concentrations of all greenhouse gases and aerosols had 
been kept constant at year 2000 levels, further warming could be 
stopped. 
44 56 +11 
8. If humans continue to use fossil fuels and to emit greenhouse gasses 
at or above current rates, the global average temperature is projected 
to rise approximately 4 degrees Celsius by the end of the current 
century. 
50 78 +28 
9. If humans continue to use fossil fuels and to emit greenhouse gasses 
at or above current rates, the global average sea level is projected to 
rise 0.26-0.59 meters by the end of the current century. 
28 61 +33 
10. The main purpose of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions in the industrialized countries by an average 5.2% below 
their levels in 1990.  
33 89 +56 
11. Taiwan has ratified the Kyoto Protocol. 72 100 +28 
12. The majority of Taiwan’s energy supply is derived from nuclear 
energy. 50 56 +6 
13. The major contributor of carbon dioxide emissions (including direct 
emission and indirect electricity consumption) in Taiwan is the 
industrial sector. 
61 100 +39 
14. Since 1990 the total carbon dioxide emissions of Taiwan has 
stopped increasing. 94 100 +6 
15. Taiwan’s carbon dioxide emission per capita (per person) is above 
the world’s average. 78 94 +17 
Grand Mean 53.7% 78.1% +24.4%
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Third, the respondents did not perform very well on questions about future 
projection of climate change. Less than half (44%) of the respondents recognized that 
even if the global GHG concentration had been kept constant at year 2000 levels, there 
would still be future warming (item no. 7). While half of the respondents knew the 
projected temperature increase in the 21st century (item no. 8), only 28% recognized the 
estimated extent of sea-level rise during the same time period (item no. 9). 
Fourth, 33% of the respondents knew the target and the timetable of the Kyoto 
Protocol (item no. 10) and 72% knew that Taiwan has not ratified the treaty (item no. 11). 
Finally, the respondents displayed better understanding of the queries regarding Taiwan’s 
energy use and CO2 emissions. Half of them correctly knew that nuclear power is not 
Taiwan’s primary energy source (item no. 12) and 61% correctly recognized the industrial 
sector as the primary contributor of the country’s GHG emissions (item no. 13). A total of 
94% of them knew Taiwan’s releases have continually increased since 1990 (item no. 14) 
and 78% knew that the country’s CO2 emissions per capita are above the world’s average 
(item no. 15). 
Furthermore, comparison of the pre- and post-responses found that the 
respondents’ level of scientific understanding improved significantly and uncertainty 
decreased dramatically after the workshop (Figure 5.2). Even though their understandings 
of the causes, consequences, and mitigation actions associated with climate change were 
not significantly improved, the level of factual scientific knowledge in each item did 
display differences, ranging from 6% to 56% (see the last column of Table 5.2). 
The post-test survey found that the respondents answered on average 11.7 items 
out of 15 items correctly, with a range of answers between 7 and 15 points. The average 
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correctness rate progressed from 53.8% in the pre-test to 78.1% in the post-test (Figure 
5.2), which means that if it is a quiz, the students’ average performance improved from a 
failing score to a broadly satisfactory score. 
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Figure 5.2 The difference of the level of correct scientific knowledge and uncertainty 
in the pre- and post-surveys (n=18). 
In contrast, if reviewing the “do not know” option separately, it is found that the 
respondents did not know the answers on an average of 5.2 items in the pre-test, which 
means that they did not know one third of the 15 items (uncertainty rate: 34.4%). This 
uncertainty condition substantially decreased in the post-test—the respondents did not 
know the answers to an average 1.2 items (uncertainty rate: 9.3%) (Figure 5.2). In 
addition, the average percentage of respondents that did not know the answer per item 
declined from 6.2 (people per item) in the pretest to 1.7 in the post-test. 
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Moreover, the uncertainty was primarily improved on queries regarding scientific 
observation and future projection of climate change (item no. 5, 6, 9, and 10). More than 
half of the respondents did not know the answers to these items in the pre-test, but they 
were more confident in answering in the post-test. These items include the exact degree 
of sea-level rise (from 78% to 28%), the exact degree of global temperature increase 
(form 72% to 33%), future sea-level rise projection (from 61% to 22%), and the target 
and timetable of the Kyoto Protocol (from 61% to 6%). 
 
Individual Responses—Taiwan’s Commitment to Reduce GHG emissions 
The respondents were first asked about their personal opinions about whether Taiwan 
should commit to reduce its GHG emissions and the reasoning behind their choices. The 
pre-test survey found that all respondents except one thought that Taiwan should actively 
begin to reduce its GHG emissions. From a list of five reasons (respondents were allowed 
to select more than one reason), most of them (94%) supported the government’s 
commitment from an ethical perspective. 
Those who endorsed an ethical attitude argued that as a member of the global 
community Taiwan does not have a moral right to destroy the environment. In addition, 
76% of the respondents based their reasoning on Taiwan’s high GHG emissions per 
capita and high vulnerability to adverse impacts. Approximately half of them believed 
that the country would benefit economically from taking actions in the long term. Only 
29% argued their reasoning out of fear of facing trade sanctions from the rest of the world. 
This perception changed slightly in the post-response in which all 17 respondents 
selected the option of high GHG emissions per capita. 
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Individual Responses—Willingness to Change Behaviors 
The respondents were then instructed to self-evaluate their willingness to take certain 
personal behavior changes to reduce CO2 emissions on a 5-point Likert scale (a higher 
score indicates a higher level of willingness). Review of each action reveals a slight 
variation. The respondents expressed a high level of willingness to use less air 
conditioning and to drive fewer miles by personal vehicles (average 4.4 points), but they 
were not so enthusiastic about paying more for renewable energy (3.4 points) and showed 
only medium level of willingness (average 4.2 to 4.3 points) to take the rest of three 
actions (i.e., use electricity less, buy energy efficient products, and reduce their use of 
personal vehicles). 
Aggregating all six actions into a composite index, the pre-test result shows that 
respondents were quite willing to change their behavior to reduce CO2 emissions with an 
average rating of 4.2 points with individual ratings ranging between 3.5 and 5.0 points. 
However, the change of respondents’ preparedness to take climate-protection behaviors 
after the workshop was not significant. 
 
Individual Responses—Experiences 
The respondents were asked to indicate their own experiences with having taken certain 
actions on a 4-point Likert scale (a higher score means more frequently). The results 
suggest that they would conduct these actions fairly frequently with an average of 3.6 
points, ranging between 2.8 and 4.0 points. In addition, the respondents were more likely 
to use public transportation (3.8 points) than to turn off the lights when leaving a room 
(3.7 point) than to use air conditioning less and to turn off the computer (3.4 points). 
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Individual Responses—Willingness to Take Political Actions 
The respondents were further asked to assess their willingness to take certain political or 
social actions to motivate the government to act on reducing the country’s CO2 emissions 
on a 5-point Likert scale (a higher score indicates a higher level of willingness). Pooling 
all five actions into a composite index, the pretest results show that the respondents 
expressed a medium level of willingness to take political actions with a rating average of 
3.9 points with individual ratings ranging between 3 and 5 points. 
The respondents were fairly willing to sign a petition (4.2 points), to vote for a 
political candidate with a strong environmental record (4.2 points), to join an 
environmental group (3.9 points), and to attend a public hearing (3.8 points). However, 
they were somewhat reluctant to participate in a legal street marching movement (3.3 
points). Comparison of the pre- and post-responses finds no significant changes. 
 
Individual Responses—Policy Preferences Index 
The final part of this section examined respondents’ personal support for various 
climate-mitigation policies (e.g., a green industrial development plan, taxes and other 
economic incentives, a reforestation program, and a nuclear energy development plan). 
Consisting of seven initiatives, the Composite Policy Preferences Index (PPI) is measured 
on a 5-point Likert scale (a higher score indicates a higher level of support). The pre-test 
result showed that respondents displayed a medium level of support for these policies, 
with a rating average of 4.1 points with individual ratings ranging between 3.6 and 5.0 
points. 
The respondents basically supported all policies except the one asserting to use 
nuclear power as an alternative energy source. They showed a high level of support for a 
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policy that would shift government subsidies to less polluting industries (4.4 points) and 
that required consideration of GHG emissions as part of the environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) review process (4.4 points). In addition, the respondents scored on 
average 4.3 points in four other policies, namely a mandatory GHG regulation, financial 
instruments, a law regulating indoor temperature in summer, and a reforestation program. 
Finally, they expressed a neutral position (neither support nor opposition) about the 
nuclear power option (3.1 point). Comparison of pre- and post-surveys finds that 
although the respondents already expressed a relatively high level of support for 
mitigation initiatives in the pre-test, their support for six climate policies still increased 
after the workshop. The only exception was the nuclear power policy (Figure 5.3). 
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Figure 5.3 The difference of the level of support for various climate policies in the 
pre- and post-surveys (n=18).  
 
Summary of Findings 
This study of pre- and post-survey data aims to understand respondents’ concern about 
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climate change (i.e., attitudes, scientific knowledge, behavioral intentions, and policy 
preferences) and to assess the effectiveness of the IA focus groups in changing the 
participants’ overall level of understanding. The results show that after exposure to expert 
opinions and group interactions, these participants did change some viewpoints, such as 
their level of familiarity and concern, political priorities, and perceived personal 
relevance. 
In addition, although the respondents’ understandings of causes, consequences, 
and mitigation actions did not change, their factual scientific knowledge improved and 
their uncertainty decreased significantly. Moreover, the respondents’ support for climate 
policies was enhanced. Therefore, the integration of scientific experts did appear to 
enhance some people’s understandings of climate change quite effectively. 
 
5.2.4  Study 3: Web-based Survey 
Summary of Approach 
To investigate Taiwanese university students’ overall level of concern about climate 
change (i.e., attitudes, scientific knowledge, behavioral intentions, and policy preferences) 
and to explore the hypothetical relationships among these constituent elements, a 
larger-scale quantitative survey was carried out through a common medium for 
Taiwanese young people: the Internet. Potential respondents first received an electronic 
invitation that linked them to the survey site and they voluntarily selected to participate 
and to submit their responses via the online survey host SurveyMonkey (also see Section 
4.6 for the detailed method). 
Slightly modified from the pre- and post-survey, the web-based survey was 
designed using the same structure of four sections including general concern, scientific 
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knowledge, individual responses, and demographic information. To keep the completion 
time within approximately 10 minutes, the online instrument was shortened to a total of 
40 items. In addition to various respondent-friendly formats (e.g., navigation signs, a 
progress bar), all questions were designed to require answers—a respondent was not 
allowed to proceed to the next question without entering an answer. 
The study collected a total of 313 entries that started the survey and 28 out of 313 
entries were incomplete—the respondents dropped out from the survey. The survey only 
counts the rest of the 285 completed responses as valid samples (n=285). The 
comprehensive survey instrument and the response frequencies are provided in Appendix 
B. This section reports the descriptive statistics of the survey results and further statistical 
analysis (using the Minitab software) will be presented in the next section. 
 
Characteristics of the Respondents 
A total of 285 university students participated in this web-based survey. Table 5.3 shows 
the response count and the frequency of key characteristics of the respondents. First, 
among these respondents, 77.2% were young people between the ages of 18 to 22 years 
(a normal range of Taiwanese undergraduate students) and 22.5% were between the ages 
of 23 to 30 years. Only one respondent (0.4%) was above 30 years old. 
Second, female students (60.4%) comprised a larger proportion of the respondents 
than male students (39.6%). Third, a total of 81.8% of the respondents were 
undergraduates and 18.2% were graduate students (master degree: 15.1% and doctoral 
degree: 3.2%). 
Fourth, in terms of respondents’ academic majors, 34.7% of them had a 
background in scientific disciplines including science, engineering, and agriculture, while 
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a majority (51.2%) was specializing in the humanities, law, business, and social science. 
Additionally, 14.0% of the respondents identified their majors as “others” which include 
design, information, communication, and so forth. Finally, the hometowns of the 
respondents were geographically well-distributed across 23 out of 25 cities/counties in 
Taiwan. A total of 54.0% of the respondents were from 8 major metropolitan areas and 
46.0% were from the remaining 15 counties. 
Table 5.3 Response Count and Frequency of Key Characteristics of the Respondents 
(n=285) 
 Gender Class Year Academic Major 
 Male Female Undergrad. Graduate Science Non-science Other 
Count 113 172 233 52 99 146 40
Frequency 39.6% 60.4% 81.8% 18.2% 34.7% 51.2% 14.0%
 
Attitudes—Problem Recognition 
The respondents were first asked about their views regarding the reality of global climate 
change. The result shows that an overwhelming majority (96.5%) of Taiwanese university 
students (n=285) believed that global climate change is real and has already begun to 
become manifest (Figure 5.4). In addition, these respondents displayed a moderate level 
of concern about the potential adverse effects of climate change on a 5-point Likert scale 
(a higher score indicates a higher level of concern).68 The rating average was 3.7 out of 5 
points, which was slightly above a medium level. Examination of the response 
distribution further reveals that 57.5% of the respondents were very or mostly worried, 
34.7% were concerned, and 7.4% were somewhat concerned or not concerned at all 
regarding climate change impacts. 
                                                 
68 The response was scored on a scale of one to five points: very concerned: 5; mostly 
concerned: 4; concerned: 3; somewhat concerned: 2; not concerned at all: 1. 
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96.5%
0.0% 0.4%2.5% 0.7%
It is real and has already started to happen
(96.5%)
It will start happening within my lifetime
(2.5%)
It will start to happen, but not until 100
years from now (0.7%)
No, it will never happen (0.0%)
Do not know (0.4%)
 
Attitudes—Political Priority 
Figure 5.4 Percentage distribution of problem recognition (n=285). 
When the respondents were asked to select their top three policies for the Taiwanese 
government in terms of immediate actions to be taken, a total of 74% (n=285) selected 
the issue of environmental protection—the most recognized choice (Figure 5.5). In 
addition, three economic related issues (i.e., economic growth, gap between the rich and 
the poor, and unemployment) ranked, respectively, as the second (50.9%), the third 
(38.6%), and the fourth (31.2%) prioritized public policies. Interestingly, the other 
societal issues (e.g., education, social welfare, and health care) were considered less 
urgent and important (selected by less than 30% of the respondents). 
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Figure 5.5 Frequency of prioritized public policies in Taiwan (n=285). 
 
Figure 5.6 Frequency of prioritized environmental policies in Taiwan (n=285). 
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While most of the respondents placed the environmental protection issue as one of 
their top three policies, the issue of global climate change does not attract sufficient 
attention to be ranked as the top priority on the political agenda (Figure 5.6). The result 
shows that among ten environmental issues, a significant portion of the respondents (over 
50%) thought that the Taiwanese government should take immediate actions on the issues 
of air pollution and natural ecosystem destruction. It is interesting to find that the 
respondents distributed their choices rather diversely to other issues—global climate 
change (38.6%), water pollution (37.2%), and solid waste and recycling (30.9%). 
In addition, three global environmental problems (i.e., acid rain, climate change, 
and ozone depletion) did not draw much attention (average: 18.0%) compared with other 
local environmental problems (average: 34.9%). On the basis of these data, it can be 
inferred that although most Taiwanese university students recognize environmental 
protection as a prioritized policy, they tend to give greater attention to local 
environmental issues. 
 
Attitudes—Trust in Scientists 
The respondents were requested to identify one source of information that they tended to 
listen to if they had doubts about global climate change. A total of 77.9% of the 
respondents (n=285) indicated that they would turn to scientists or experts for 
enlightenment (Figure 5.7). The second most selected source of information was 
environmental activists (15.4%). Other sources (e.g., journalists, friends) were selected 
by less than 5% of the respondents. It is interesting to find that no respondents (0.0%) 
would listen to politicians’ opinion about climate change. 
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In terms of the degree to which scientists are trusted, a total of 60.7% of the 
respondents trusted this source of expert opinion at a high level (completely or mostly) 
and 29.5% trusted at a medium level (some), and 9.1% did not have much trust in 
scientists. On a 5-point Likert scale (a higher score indicates a higher level of trust), 
Taiwanese university students rated their level of trust with an average of 3.6 points. 
1.8%
1.8%
0.0%
77.9%
15.4%
1.1%
2.1%
Environmental activists (15.4%)
Friends and family (1.8%)
Journalists (1.8%)
Politicians (0%)
Scientists / Experts (77.9%)
I usually ignore my doubts (2.1%)
Others (1.1%)
 
 
Figure 5.7 Percentage distribution of the top trusting source of information (n=285). 
 
Attitudes—Blame and Responsibility 
Two rating-scale questions were designed to assess respondents’ level of agreement 
regarding the anthropogenic factors of global climate change and the distribution of 
responsibility between industrialized countries and developing countries. Taiwanese 
university students expressed a high level of agreement with a rating average of 4.3 
points on a 5-point Likert scale (a higher score indicates a higher level of agreement). In 
addition, a total of 86.7% of the respondents (n=285) concurred that human activities are 
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the main driving force behind the problem, while only 2.5% disagreed with the statement. 
The remaining 10.9% neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. 
When asked to evaluate opinions about the key concept of the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities, Taiwanese university students exhibited a 
moderate attitude with a rating average of 3.7 points. Moreover, 63.9% of the respondents 
agreed that industrialized countries should primarily be held responsible for global 
climate change and they should exert more individual effort to address the problem than 
developing countries. A relatively small number of the respondents disagreed with the 
idea (15.8%), but 20.4% neither agreed nor disagreed with the concept. 
The issue of citizenship was also observed when posing the question about which 
sector in Taiwan needed to bear primary responsibility to reduce GHG emissions. While 
14.7% of the respondents thought the industrial sector should be held liable for resolving 
the problem, a majority (83.2%) recognized that both they (household/consumer sector) 
and the industry sector were equally responsible. Only 1.8% of them placed the burden 
solely on the household/consumer sector. 
 
Attitudes—Economic Tradeoff 
When asked about their views with respect to a potential trade-off between economic 
development and environmental protection, 78.6% of the respondents thought that even 
though both environment and economic goals are important, the environment should be 
placed first (Figure 5.8). Another 14.7% gave the highest priority to protecting the 
environment even if it reduces economic growth. Only approximately 5% of the 
respondents valued the economy over the environment. Even though the question was an 
abstract scenario that did not require further comparisons and assessments, the result still 
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implies that Taiwanese university students tend to have a pro-environmental attitude 
because of their overwhelming preference in protecting the environment (93.3%). 
0.7%
1.4%
4.6% 14.7%
78.6%
Environment exclusive (14.7%)
Environment dominant (78.6%)
Economics dominant (4.6%)
Economics exclusive (0.7%)
Do not know (1.4%)
 
Figure 5.8 Percentage distribution of the economy-environment tradeoff (n=285). 
 
Attitudes—Personal Relevancy Index (PRI) 
The Personal Relevancy Index (PRI), a composite Likert scale of three items, was 
designed to measure how respondents evaluated the relationship between themselves and 
the issue of climate change in terms of causes, impacts, and actions. The respondents 
were asked to provide their personal assessment of the level of agreement with each of 
these three statements on a scale of one to five points (a higher score indicates a higher 
level of agreement and hence they feel more relevant to the problem). Table 5.4 illustrates 
the content of each item, the percentage distribution, and the rating average of these 
self-evaluated items. 
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Table 5.4 Percentage Distribution and Rating Average of the Personal Relevancy Index 
(n=285) 
 
A* 
5** 
SA 
4 
N 
3 
SD 
2 
D 
1 
DK 
m 
Rating 
Ave.
1. My daily activities contribute to global 
climate change 9.5% 62.1 20.4 7.0 0.4 0.7 3.7 
2. Global climate change may impact me 
personally in my lifetime 34.7 58.6 6.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 4.3 
3. There is still something a young person 
such as me can do to contribute to resolve 
the problem of global climate change. 
43.2 49.8 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.7 4.4 
*A: Agree, SA: Somewhat Agree, N: Neither Agree nor Disagree, SD: Somewhat Disagree,  
D: Disagree, DK: Do not Know 
** The scoring for each level was recorded from 1 to 5 points. DK was recorded as a missing value. 
 
Combining the choices of “agree” and “somewhat agree,” most of the respondents 
(n=285) agreed that global climate change may affect them personally in their lifetime 
(93.3%) and concurred that there is still something a young person can do to contribute to 
resolving the problem (93.0%). Interestingly, a relatively smaller portion of the 
respondents (71.6%) recognized that their daily activities contributed to the problem. 
Moreover, 20.4% held an ambivalent position—neither agreed nor disagreed with their 
personal contribution. These results reveal that majorities of the respondents concurred 
that climate change was relevant to them personally. 
The second way to evaluate perceived relevancy is via the rating average of each 
item and the composite index.69 This study designed the PRI as one of the indicators of 
attitude for further statistical analysis (i.e., testing the relationships among a person’s 
                                                 
69 Internal validation is defined as the process whereby the individual items composing a 
composite measure are correlated with the measure itself (Babbie, 1990). In other words, 
each individual item in a composite index should measure the same variable. Item 
analysis is an important test tool of the index’s validity by reviewing correlations between 
a single item and the composite index. A higher value of Cronbach’s alpha indicates a 
higher internal consistency. If an item is poorly correlated to the index, that item should 
be excluded from the index. Omitting the item will increase the Cronbach’s alpha value. 
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attitude, scientific knowledge, and responses) and it is essential to validate this composite 
index. Item analysis is employed to test the PRI’s internal consistency. The result shows a 
satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=0.59) with item-total correlations 
ranging between 0.35 and 0.40. Since omitting any item lowers the value of Cronbach’s 
alpha, the PRI retains use of these three items. 
The last column of Table 5.4 shows that the respondents displayed a fairly high 
level of perceived relevancy in terms of potential impacts and actions with the rating 
average of 4.3 and 4.4 points (out of 5). Similar to the percentage distribution, they 
scored relatively lower for the first item (3.7 points). The overall rating average of the 
PRI was 4.1 points with individual rating averages ranging from 2.7 to 5.0 points. These 
data imply that while Taiwanese university students recognize that climate change may 
affect them personally and that they can take some actions, some of them do not think 
their daily activities contribute to the problem. 
 
Scientific Knowledge—Scientific Understanding Index70 
The condensed online survey selected twelve dichotomous questions to assess 
respondents’ scientific understanding of climate change. The respondents were asked to 
answer whether these twelve scientific statements were true or false (Table 5.5). These 
statements primarily cover two dimensions: physical science (10 items) and policy 
science (2 items). Additionally, the physical science dimension was constructed with four 
variables: the greenhouse effect (item 1), causes (item 2, 3, and 4), adverse impacts (item 
5, 6, and 7), and mitigation strategies (item 8, 9, and 10). The remaining two items (item 
                                                 
70 Scientific Understanding Index is a 12-item composite index that measures the level of 
scientific knowledge of global climate change. Because the nature of continuous data, it 
does not proceed the item analysis. 
 285
11 and 12) were intended to test policy relevant knowledge (i.e., the Kyoto Protocol and 
Taiwan’s CO2 emissions). 
Table 5.5 Percentage Distribution of the Scientific Understanding Index (n=285) 
Scientific Statement Correct Rate 
Incorrect 
Rate b 
1. The greenhouse effect is due to the reabsorption of outgoing infrared 
radiation by atmospheric greenhouse gasses, such as carbon dioxide. 78.9% 21.1% 
2. Industrial manufacturers emitting greenhouse gases during the production 
process contributes to global climate change. 87.7 12.3 
3. Ozone layer depletion contributes to global climate change. a 35.1 64.9 
4. Deforestation contributes to global climate change. 90.9 9.1 
5. Increasing average global air and ocean temperatures are a potential 
consequence of global climate change. 95.1 4.9 
6. Global climate change has no effect on the change in precipitation volume 
(i.e., increasing flood and drought, water resource shortage). a 86.0 14.0 
7. Global average sea-level rise due to the melting glaciers and ice cap in 
mountain and polar region is a potential consequence of global climate 
change. 
96.1 3.9 
8. People using public transportation could likely moderate the effects of 
global climate change. 92.3 7.7 
9. Industries implementing carbon capture and storage technology (i.e., 
storing carbon dioxide underground or in the oceans) could likely moderate 
the effects of global climate change. 
64.6 35.4 
10. Power plants using sources of renewable energy instead of fossil fuels like 
oil and coal to generate electricity could likely intensify the effects of 
global climate change. a 
52.6 47.4 
11. The main purpose of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions in the industrialized countries. 90.2 9.8 
12. Taiwan’s carbon dioxide emission per capita (per person) is above the 
world’s average. 66.3 33.7 
Grand Mean 78.0% 22.0% 
a: Item no. 3, 6, and 10 are reversely worded: the selection of false is considered a correct answer. 
b: The selection of the option “Do not Know” is categorized as an incorrect answer. 
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These twelve statements comprise both actual and bogus queries. If a respondent 
successfully identified an actual query as “true” or selected a bogus query with “false,” 
the response was recorded as a correct answer. Table 5.5 reports the percentage 
distribution of the Scientific Understanding Index (SUI). It is important to mention that 
three reverse-worded items (item 3, 6, and 10) have been recoded so the correctness rate 
presented here indicates the percentage of respondents that answered the item correctly. 
Examining the response of each item, it was found that the average correctness 
rate for these 12 items was 78.0% with a range of 35.1% (item 3) to 96.1% (item 7). Most 
of the respondents (above 80%) were able to correctly answer seven items (item 2, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, and 11). In addition, a significant portion of the respondents (above 30%) 
mistakenly answered four items (item 3, 9, 10, and 12). The low correctness rate of the 
question regarding ozone depletion (item 3) suggests that Taiwanese university students 
have a tendency to confuse the problem of global climate change with the problem of 
stratospheric ozone depletion. 
In terms of average performance in the physical science dimension, a total of 
78.9% of the respondents correctly answered the question regarding the greenhouse effect 
(item 1). In addition, they answered with high effectiveness on the potential consequence 
aspect (item 5, 6, and 7) (92.4%), with modest effectiveness on the cause aspect (item 2, 
3, and 4) (71.2%), and low effectiveness on the mitigation-strategy aspect (item 8, 9, and 
10) (69.8%). Furthermore, a total of 90.2% recognized the main purpose of the Kyoto 
Protocol as reducing CO2 emissions in industrialized nations (item 11), and somewhat 
fewer respondents (66.3%) knew that Taiwan’s CO2 emissions per capita are above the 
global average (item 12). 
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Reviewing responses to the “Do not know” option, 22.1% of the respondents did 
not know the answer to two relatively difficult questions. These two items involved a 
specific technology (carbon capture and storage) (item 9) and specific information 
(Taiwan’s CO2 emissions per capita) (item 12). The higher uncertainty and the lower 
correctness rate (64.6% and 66.3%) for these two items imply that Taiwanese university 
students have less understanding of the detailed issues pertaining to climate change. 
The respondents correctly answered an average of 9.4 out of 12 items with a 
range between 4 and 12 items. Transferring to a scale of 100, the average score is 78.0 
points with a range of 33.3 to 100.0 points. A total of 4.9% of the respondents got a 
perfect score and 44.6% had an above average score (80-100 points). Another 39.3% of 
the respondents got a middling score (60-80 points) while 11.3% received a failing score 
(below 60 points) (Figure 5.9). 
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Individual Responses—Taiwan’s Commitment to Reduce GHG emissions 
The respondents asserted with nearly unanimous support (98.9%) that Taiwan should 
begin to reduce its GHG emissions. When asked about the reasons why Taiwan needed to 
reduce its GHG emissions (multiple answers allowed), a total of 83.0% of the 
respondents based their reasoning on ecological citizenship: as a member of the global 
community the country does not have the right to destroy the global environment (Figure 
5.10). The second and third most common reasons were concerns of risk from potential 
impacts resulting from global climate change (72.3%) and high GHG emissions per 
capita (53.5%). Pragmatic grounds like the long-term economic benefits and potential 
international trade sanctions were selected by very few Taiwanese university students. 
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Figure 5.10 Percentage distribution of reasons to reduce GHG emissions in Taiwan 
(n=282). 
 
Individual Responses—Willingness to Change Behaviors 
The respondents were asked to assess their level of willingness to change certain personal 
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behaviors to reduce CO2 emissions on a 5-point Likert scale (a higher score indicates a 
higher level of willingness). The Personal Behavior Index (PBI) is a composite measure 
of three items (i.e., conserving energy, using public transportation, and choosing energy 
efficient appliances) (Table 5.6). Slightly more than 80% of the respondents intended to 
conserve energy by reducing electricity consumption and by driving personal vehicles 
less and using public transportation. Relatively fewer respondents (74.4%) were willing 
to replace old appliances with energy efficient new models. 
Table 5.6 Percentage Distribution and Rating Average of the Personal Behavior Index 
(n=285). 
 W*
 
5** 
SW 
4 
N 
3 
SU 
2 
U 
1 
Rating 
Ave. 
1. Conserve energy by reducing my use of 
electricity 
34.0 48.1 17.2 0.7 0.0 4.2 
2. Drive my car/motorcycle less and use public 
transportation (e.g., trains and buses) instead 41.1 41.8 14.7 1.8 0.7 4.2 
3. Replace my older appliances with more 
energy efficient new models 32.3 42.1 23.5 1.8 0.4 4.0 
*W: Willing, SW: Somewhat Willing, N: Neutral, SU: Somewhat Unwilling, U: Unwilling 
** The scoring for each level was recorded from 1 to 5 points. 
 
The other way to evaluate the respondents’ willingness to support behavioral 
changes is via the rating average of each item and the composite index. The preliminary 
result finds that Taiwanese university students were willing to conduct these three 
behaviors with a rating average of 4.2, 4.2, and 4.0 points (see the last column in Table 
5.6). Administering the testing process of internal consistency, the result of item analysis 
of the PBI shows a satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=0.61) with 
item-total correlations ranging between 0.34 and 0.48. The test also suggests that omitting 
the third item (green consumption) improves the validity of the index (Cronbach’s alpha 
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slightly increases to 0.62). Thus, the revised index uses only the first two items for further 
analysis. The resulting rating average of the two-item PBI was 4.2 points (the individual 
rating average ranges from 2.0 to 5.0 points). 
 
Individual Responses—Policy Preferences Index (PPI) 
The respondents were instructed to rate their level of support for various domestic 
climate-mitigation policies (Table 5.7). This 5-item composite policy preferences index is 
measured on a 5-point Likert scale (a higher score indicates a higher level of support). 
The result reveals that the majority of the respondents (over 85%) supported policies such 
as shifting government subsidies to less polluting industries (item 1), regulating GHG 
emissions with mandated targets and timelines (item 2), and a reforestation program (item 
4). A total of 75.4% supported financial instruments to encourage GHG emission 
reductions (item 3). While only 37.2% endorsed the use of nuclear power as an 
alternative energy source (item 5), 43.5% took a neutral position. 
The second way to measure level of support is via the rating average of each item 
and the composite index. Among five policies, the respondents showed a high level of 
support for a reforestation program (rating average 4.6 points), an industrial structure 
adjustment policy that shifts the government subsidy to less polluting industries (4.3 
points), and a mandatory GHG emission regulation (4.3 points). They also preferred the 
financial instruments (4.1 points). The respondents expressed the least amount of support 
for the nuclear power alternative policy (3.3 points) (see the last column in Table 5.7). 
The result of the item-analysis test of the PPI obtains a satisfactory internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=0.55) with item-total correlations ranging between 0.15 
and 0.48. The result suggests that omitting the last item (nuclear power alternative) 
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enhances the validity of the index (Cronbach’s alpha increases to 0.63). Hence, the 
revised index uses the rest of the four items for further analysis. The revised four-item 
PPI result shows that the respondents supported these policies with an average rating of 
4.3 points (the individual rating ranges between 3.0 and 5.0 points). 
Table 5.7 Percentage Distribution and Rating Average of the Policy Preferences Index 
(n=285). 
 S*
 
5 
SS 
4 
N 
3 
SO 
2 
O 
1 
DK 
m 
Rating 
Ave. 
1. Encourage the development of less 
pollution and energy intensive industries 
and discourage the development of high 
pollution and energy intensive industries 
by shifting government subsidy 
programs 
40.4 48.1 10.2 0.7 0.7 0.0 4.3 
2. Implement a law regulating greenhouse 
gasses as air pollutants and requiring 
industries to reduce their emissions in 
accordance with legally mandated targets 
and timelines 
39.3 48.4 10.9 0.7 0.0 0.7 4.3 
3. Use taxes and other financial incentives 
to encourage reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions 
36.8 38.6 20.7 3.2 0.4 0.4 4.1 
4. Encourage the planting of trees 64.9 28.8 4.6 1.8 0.0 0.0 4.6 
5. Support the use of nuclear power as an 
alternative source of energy 13.7 23.5 43.5 12.3 6.0 1.1 3.3 
*S: Support, SS: Somewhat Support, N: Neutral, SO: Somewhat Oppose, O: Oppose, DK: Do not Know
** The scoring for each level was recorded from 1 to 5 points. DK was recorded as a missing value. 
 
Summary of Findings 
This larger-scale web-based survey aimed to investigate Taiwanese university students’ 
overall concern about climate change (i.e., attitudes, scientific knowledge, behavioral 
intentions, and policy preferences) and to explore the hypothetical relationships among 
these constituent elements. The results find that Taiwanese young adults endorsed the 
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reality of global climate change and demonstrated a medium level of concern. Although 
most of them recognized environmental protection as a prioritized policy, they tended to 
give more priority attention to local environmental issues. 
Scientists were the primary source of information through which the majority of 
the respondents would turn to resolve doubts with a medium level of trust. In addition, a 
majority agreed that anthropogenic forces were responsible for global climate change and 
the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities. The results of the survey also 
implied that while Taiwanese university students recognized that climate change may 
affect them personally and that they could take some actions, some of them do not think 
their daily activities contribute to the problem. 
While the level of scientific knowledge of Taiwanese university students was 
satisfactory (with an average of 78 out of 100 points), they had a limited understanding of 
detailed issues pertaining to global climate change and they tended to confuse global 
climate change with stratospheric ozone depletion. Moreover, the analysis finds that 
Taiwanese university students asserted that the country should begin to reduce its GHG 
emissions because of an ethical obligation. In addition, they showed a fairly high level of 
willingness to change personal behaviors to combat climate change and they generally 
supported climate-mitigation policies, except the nuclear power option. 
 
5.2.5  Concluding Remarks 
Three constituent studies (i.e., IA focus-group workshop, the pre- and post-survey, and 
the web-based survey) aimed to examine Taiwanese university students’ general concerns 
about global climate change (i.e., attitudes, scientific knowledge, behavioral intentions, 
and policy preferences) and to explore whether the experimental IA focus groups with the 
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integration of experts and citizens effectively enhanced the overall level of scientific 
understanding and policy making. 
The participants received information from the invited experts, as well as from 
fellow participants through interactive group discussions. A comparative analysis found 
that the participatory mechanism effectively enhanced some of the participants’ 
viewpoints, such as the level of familiarity, political priorities, and perception of personal 
relevance, climate-policy support, and so forth. Most importantly, the respondents’ 
factual scientific knowledge and uncertainty improved significantly even though their 
basic understanding of causes, impacts, and mitigation actions did not change. 
In addition, the IA focus-group participants contributed significant lay 
perspectives including some new ideas and concerns about compliance with related 
climate policies. Moreover, these three studies in combination provide valuable insights 
on Taiwanese young adults’ viewpoints about global climate change in terms of personal 
attitude, scientific knowledge, and individual responses. Based on the quantitative and 
qualitative information collected from these three interrelated studies, a comprehensive 
analysis of the public understanding of climate science (i.e., constituent elements and 
interrelationships) is discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
5.3  Analysis: Constituent Elements and the Relationships 
5.3.1  Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, key elements of the public understanding of climate science 
include attitudes, scientific knowledge, and behavioral intentions. By contrasting the 
research findings of three constituent studies and comparing the results with the 
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preceding literature, this section primarily provides an integrated analysis of each of the 
three constituent elements of the public understanding of climate science and on the 
relationships among these elements. The quantitative data collected in two surveys are 
analyzed and supplemented with qualitative dialogues from the IA focus groups. 
Before doing any analysis and or making any statistical inferences, it is worth 
mentioning that the research subjects are a group of young adults with a relatively high 
education level (mainly university students). In addition, due to the nature of voluntary 
involvement (self-selected in the studies), these respondents are probably interested in the 
issue of global climate change to a higher degree than their peers. 
Subsection 5.3.2 analyzes Taiwanese university students’ attitudes toward climate 
change from a variety of perspectives (e.g., problem recognition). Subsection 5.3.3 
examines the level of scientific knowledge of climate change in terms of causes, adverse 
impacts, mitigation strategies, and scientific facts. Subsection 5.3.4 explores respondents’ 
personal responses to the problem in terms of behavioral intentions and policy 
preferences. Subsection 5.3.5 analyzes the hypothetical relationships among these 
elements and the effects of demographic factors (i.e., gender and academic majors) on the 
public understanding of climate science. Subsection 5.3.6 discusses the effectiveness of 
the experimental IA focus groups. Subsection 5.2.7 provides a few concluding remarks. 
 
5.3.2  Attitudes 
General Awareness 
Hsu (2006) maintains that most Taiwanese college students first heard about the 
greenhouse effect and climate change in the mid-2000s. This level of familiarity was 
similar to the American public’s awareness of the problem in 2006 (Nisbet & Myers, 
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2007). While most Taiwanese university students may have been exposed to basic 
climate-change information (i.e., they heard about the issue), this study suggests that they 
are not very confident in their understanding of various climate-related terms and 
policies. 
On the basis of self-evaluated awareness in the pre-test of the IA focus groups, the 
respondents (n=18) displayed a medium level of familiarity with three commonly 
interchangeable terms (i.e., global climate change, global warming, and the greenhouse 
effect). By comparison, they were even less familiar with two associated policies (i.e., the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Taiwanese Greenhouse Gasses Reduction Bill (Draft)). Even 
though these results were assessed by the respondents themselves, the findings can serve 
as a reference to further investigate the level of their understanding of global climate 
change. 
 
Problem Recognition 
Kronsnick and colleagues (2006) argue that people who consider climate change to be a 
serious problem and support climate policies are the ones who believe in human-induced 
global warming and its adverse impacts with certainty. The results of the three studies 
find that most Taiwanese young adults have become convinced that global climate 
change is real and has already become manifested. This perception is consistent with the 
American public’s perception in 2008 (Nisbet & Myers, 2007; Gallup, 2008). 
However, while Taiwanese university students and the American public shared a 
similar level of regard for the reality of global climate change, they showed quite 
different viewpoints about the effects of anthropogenic forces. Approximately half of the 
American public (and 60% of the British public) doubt that global warming is caused by 
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human activities. The results of the three studies suggest that most Taiwanese university 
students (over 85%) believed that human activities are the main driving forces behind 
global climate change. 
In addition, Krosnick et al. (2006) argue that conviction in the existence of 
human-induced global warming positively influences people taking climate-protection 
actions. This perception appears to be a nonessential component for Taiwanese university 
students. The dialogues of the IA focus group suggest that the participants did not think 
that it is necessary to prove the corresponding relationship between anthropogenic forces 
and global climate change. They argue that humans need to take responsibility to resolve 
the problem regardless of whether climate change is driven by human activities. 
 
Trust in Scientists 
Nisbet and Myers (2007) argue that trust in scientists is a factor in public perception of 
scientific evidence pertaining to global warming. While only 32% of Americans trust 
scientists on the issue of the environment completely or a lot, Taiwanese university 
students displayed a higher level of trust in scientists. A total of 60.7% of the respondents 
trusted scientists on the issue of global climate change completely or mostly. In addition, 
scientists and experts are considered to be the most reliable source of information for 
Taiwanese university students compared to other sources (e.g., environmental activists 
and journalists). 
 
Risk Perception and Personal Relevancy 
While Americans have begun to recognize that global warming has already begun to 
occur, less than half of them worried about the problem and proposed immediate and 
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drastic remedial actions (Gallup, 2008). This attitude possibly resulted from the 
perception that they do not think that global warming will threaten them in their lifetime. 
In contrast to Americans who consider global warming as somewhat distant from them, 
most Taiwanese university students were concerned about global climate change and 
believed that the problem could impact them personally in their lifetime. 
In addition, the studies investigated respondents’ perceived relevancy in terms of 
their contribution to the problem and potential actions from young people. Interestingly, 
fewer Taiwanese university students acknowledged that their activities cause global 
climate change. This denial attitude (i.e., denial of responsibility) is an example of the 
tragedy-of-the-commons interpretation (i.e., I am not the main cause of this problem and 
some other people cause the problem as well) (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). 
One contradictory perspective about the efficacy of a young person was observed. 
Most Taiwanese university students expressed that climate change is beyond the control 
of a young person, but they also agreed that there is still something a young person can 
contribute to resolve the problem. This perception is consistent with the findings of the 
2008 UNEP survey in which young respondents believed that they could make a 
difference on the issue (UNEP, 2008a). Even though these young adults feel the same 
sense of helplessness and powerlessness that may give rise to a psychological barrier to 
engage with efforts to ameliorate climate change (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Stoll-Kleemann 
et al., 2001), they somehow displayed a positive willingness to actively prevent it. 
 
Blame and Responsibility 
While the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities has been asserted in 
many international environmental treaties, few studies have investigated what the public 
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thinks about the concept. Ironically, the idea of differentiating responsibilities between 
industrialized countries and developing countries has been manipulated by some 
politicians as an unfair rationale that justifies inaction. Given the fact that Taiwan is a 
newly-industrialized country (in the transition from a developing to industrialized nation), 
this doctoral research intends to explore lay perspectives about this controversial concept. 
This investigation uncovers some interesting perspectives. More than half of the 
respondents in the online survey concurred that industrialized countries are primarily 
responsible for climate change and they should exert more effort to address the problem 
than developing countries. Approximately one-fifth of the respondents (20.4%) neither 
agreed nor disagreed with the concept. It would be interesting for future research to 
explore how the general public perceives Taiwan’s international economic status: as an 
industrialized or developing country? 
Some of the IA focus-group participants based their argument on the 
technological and financial capacity of industrialized countries. In addition to agreement 
with the notion of common but differentiated responsibilities, they argued that the 
responsibility of each country should be proportional in terms of its aggregated GHG 
emissions (including historical emissions). Moreover, due to ongoing process of 
globalization, they raised the issue of responsibility of multinational corporations—they 
thought the GHG emissions of these companies should belong to the country where its 
headquarters is registered rather than where its manufacturing activities take place. 
 
Political Priority 
Compared with other environmental issues, global warming receives a relatively lower 
level of concern from Americans (Nisbet & Myers, 2007; Pew Research Center, 2008). A 
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similar situation has been observed in the United Kingdom where the public places 
domestic issues as higher priorities than climate change (Norton & Leaman, 2004; Kirby, 
2004; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). This doctoral research finds that Taiwanese university 
students had a tendency to select environmental issues as prioritized public policies for 
the government to take immediate actions. 
In addition, when asked about their preferences in an abstract scenario regarding 
the potential trade-offs between economic development and environmental protection, 
most of the respondents (93.3%) favored the environment over the economy. These data 
are higher than the result collected in the 2001 TSCS which revealed an approximate split 
perception (46% for the economy and 41% for the environment) (Tu, 2004). The high 
level of environmental concern observed in the sample population is possibly a result of 
the chosen sampling technique—potential participants self-selected in this doctoral 
research because the invitation message tended to attract people with interests in 
environmental matters. 
Although most Taiwanese university students place environmental protection as a 
prioritized policy, they do not view global climate change as the top issue and instead are 
likely to pay more attention to local environmental issues (e.g., air pollution and 
ecosystem destruction) (this is similar to the American and British public). A detailed 
analysis of individual attitudes with respect to personal behavior, the Kyoto Protocol, and 
domestic climate policies are discussed in Subsection 5.3.4. 
In brief, Taiwanese university students display a pro-environmental attitude in 
terms of political priority and potential conflicts with economic growth, but this 
perception does not necessarily relate to global climate change in comparison to other 
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environmental issues. Nonetheless, these young adults show an attitude of protecting the 
climate: they acknowledge the reality of human-induced climate change; they are 
concerned about the adverse impacts of climate change; they recognize the additional 
responsibilities of industrialized countries. Moreover, they trust scientists with respect to 
the issue of climate change. Even though Taiwanese university students are aware that 
climate change is personally relevant to them to some degree, some of them do not think 
their daily activities contribute to the problem. Interestingly, despite the helpless feeling 
of an individual’s power, they still believe that there is something a young person can 
contribute. 
 
5.3.3  Scientific Knowledge 
A Limited Scientific Understanding 
As discussed in Subsection 2.3.4, in contrast to an increasing level of awareness of global 
climate change, the public’s scientific knowledge of climate change is inconsistent—they 
recognize the anthropogenic causes better than the resultant impacts and possible 
interventions. A number of studies have found that the majority of respondents (e.g., the 
American public, British and Taiwanese higher education students) could correctly 
recognize the use of fossil fuels as a cause of climate change in the mid 2000s (Nisbet & 
Myers, 2007; Spellman et al., 2003; Reiner et al., 2006; Hsu, 2006). 
The majority of Taiwanese university students was able to correctly identify 
several direct causes (e.g., industrial GHG emissions, deforestation). The only exception 
was their failure to distinguish the problem of global climate change from the problem of 
stratospheric ozone depletion (a common misconception that will be discussed later in 
this subsection). This research finds that Taiwanese university students had a better level 
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of understanding of the adverse impacts of climate change (e.g., precipitation and 
temperature variation, sea-level rise) and had a poorer level of knowledge about 
mitigation strategies (e.g., public transportation, carbon capture and storage technology). 
Based on the survey data collected in the IA focus groups, while Taiwanese 
university students have a basic scientific knowledge of global climate change, they seem 
ill-informed about some advanced scientific factual knowledge, such as scientific 
observation and future projections of the consequences of global climate change. For 
example, these young adults recognize increasing temperature and rising sea-level as 
potential impacts of the growing accumulation of GHGs, but they did not know the exact 
extent to which the temperature and the sea-level have increased and may increase in the 
future. Moreover, they also display a limited understanding of specific technologies and 
information (i.e., carbon capture and storage, geo-engineering technologies, the exact 
goals of the Kyoto Protocol, Taiwan’s energy use and CO2 emissions per capita) 
 
Scientific Misunderstanding 
The results of this doctoral research suggest that Taiwanese university students have a 
tendency to confuse global climate change with stratospheric ozone depletion. They 
thought that ozone depletion causes global climate change. This misperception is 
consistent with the long-standing findings observed for the American public (Bostrom et 
al., 1994; Read et al., 1994; Nisbet & Myers, 2007) and with the findings collected in 
Taiwan as well (TEPA, 2006; Hsu, 2006). 
In addition to this common point of confusion, the results of the pre- and 
post-surveys found that Taiwanese university students mistakenly thought that if the 
global concentration of all greenhouse gases and aerosols had been kept constant at year 
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2000 levels, further warming could have been stopped. This misunderstanding is similar 
to the MIT studies by Sterman and Sweeney (2002; 2007) who found that people (even 
MIT students) tend to misguidedly believe that if GHG emissions decrease, the 
atmospheric GHG concentrations and the global average temperature would soon 
decrease. The global climate system cannot be reversed that quickly. This misconception 
may lead to a wait-and-see mentality which then delays policy responses. 
In brief, environmental attitude researchers argue that an individual’s knowledge 
and cognitive expression is an indicator of his or her behaviors (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). 
Bord et al. (2000) verifies the theory with the finding that a correct understanding of the 
causes of climate change is a significant determinant of climate protection behavioral 
intentions. However, few academic studies have been conducted to explore the public’s 
complete scientific understanding of global climate change. In investigating the extent to 
which Taiwanese young adults understand climate change (i.e., physical and policy 
scientific knowledge) and the depth of their knowledge (i.e., knowledge of scientific 
facts), this doctoral research finds that their level of scientific knowledge is extensive in 
basic science, but not in terms of detailed and specific scientific facts. 
 
5.3.4  Behavioral Intentions 
Public Support for GHG Emission Reduction Policies 
A majority of Americans support the Kyoto Protocol and thinks that the United States 
should reduce its GHG emissions regardless of the action of other countries (Leiserowitz, 
2006; Nisbet & Myers, 2007). Additionally, young people across five countries thought 
world leaders should do whatever it takes to combat climate change (UNEP, 2008a). This 
high level of desire for the government to take action was observed in Taiwan as well. 
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This doctoral research finds that despite the fact that Taiwan is not a signatory to the 
UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol, Taiwanese university students assert with nearly 
unanimous support that Taiwan should begin to reduce its GHG emissions. 
As to the public’s attitude toward various domestic climate policies, a couple of 
public polls conducted find that a majority of Americans prefer GHG emission reduction 
policies that target industries rather than households and consumers (Leiserowitz, 2006; 
Nisbet & Myers, 2007). Their tendency to oppose increased energy taxes (i.e., electricity 
and gasoline) on consumers suggests that Americans expect the problem to be solved by 
the government or industries without changes in their personal behaviors (Leiserowitz, 
2006). This mentality can be explained as two individual barriers to engage with climate 
change: 1) externalizing responsibility and blame on governments and industries and 2) 
reluctance to change lifestyles (also see Table 2.1) (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). 
This case study reports a somewhat different but nonetheless interesting finding. 
Taiwanese university students similarly support a variety of domestic climate mitigation 
policies with the exception of a nuclear energy alternative plan. However, despite the fact 
that the industrial sector comprises the majority of CO2 emissions in Taiwan, these young 
adults thought that household and consumers should also bear some responsibility. In 
other words, they did not pinpoint blame on industries and shed their own responsibility. 
 
Public Perception of Taking Personal Actions 
Bord et al. (2000) found that Americans were willing to change some, but not all, 
behaviors to combat climate change. For example, they were more willing to purchase an 
energy-efficient car and to install more insulation in their houses than to drive less and 
use less air conditioning and heat. In other words, while consumption-orientated 
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Americans have no problems purchasing green products, they show difficulties in taking 
behaviors that are seen as degrading their quality of life. This example can be explained 
perfectly by one individual barrier (i.e., reluctance to change lifestyles) and one social 
barrier (i.e., pressure of social norms) (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). It is difficult for the public 
to overcome these barriers and to shift to more sustainable lifestyles because 
consumerism and car ownership have been embedded as parts of American culture and 
lifestyle. 
In contrast, Taiwanese university students were more willing to conserve energy 
and to drive their personal vehicles less and use public transportation. However, they 
were not inclined to pay more for renewable energy and to purchase more energy 
efficient household appliances. Unlike the United States where personal vehicles are 
major transportation tools, the public transportation system is better established in Taiwan 
so people are likely to change their driving habits. However, another possible explanation 
is the unique nature of the youth population—a group of people who are in a relatively 
low economic status and have less latitude in their consumption choices. 
In brief, even though Taiwan is a not signatory to the UNFCCC or the Kyoto 
Protocol, Taiwanese university students asserted that Taiwan should begin to reduce its 
GHG emissions based on a sense of ethical obligation. In addition, these young adults are 
willing to change a variety of personal behaviors to combat climate change (except 
engage in actions associated with green consumption). Moreover, they support numerous 
climate-mitigation policies. The only policy Taiwanese university students are reluctant 
to endorse is the use of nuclear power as an alternative energy source. This perception 
may be the result of the long-lasting anti-nuclear movement in Taiwan. 
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Patchen (2006) argues that the public tends to take actions to combat climate 
change based on two justifications: utilitarian conceptions (i.e., the rational judgment of 
the net benefit) and emotional concern (i.e., the fear feeling of being threatened by 
climate-change impacts). Despite socio-cultural factors, people may heuristically measure 
the cost and benefit of certain actions and take the one with the greater net benefits. For 
example, increased gasoline and electricity prices may induce people to use public 
transportation or to save household energy.  
Unlike Americans who view global climate change as psychologically distant and 
as something that is unlikely to threaten them in their lifetime, Taiwanese university 
students believe that the problem would affect them personally. This sense of risk and 
urgency may also enable people to take potential actions that could lessen the severity of 
the problem. This case study of Taiwan suggests a third justification: ethical concern. 
These young adults exhibited a strong ethical attitude—ecological citizenship—that 
drives their willingness to take climate protection behaviors. This observation will be 
discussed further in Chapter 6. 
 
5.3.5  Relationships among Constituent Elements 
In addition to the first research objective (i.e., to examine general concern and scientific 
understanding of climate change of Taiwanese youth) that is introduced in Subsections 
5.3.2 to 5.3.4, the second objective is to investigate the interrelationships between 
respondents’ scientific knowledge and their behavioral intentions and policy preferences. 
Attitude-behavior theory claims that a person’s actions are influenced by external social 
norms and internal belief system (e.g., emotion, knowledge, and behavioral intentions) 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Dunlap & Jones, 2002). 
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As reviewed in Chapter 2, a number of studies have examined how various factors 
influence these constituent elements. Nisbet and Myers (2007) found that trust in 
scientists influences the perception of scientific evidence pertaining to global warming. 
Krosnick et al. (2006) argue that knowledge levels affect a personal certainty and 
seriousness of judgment of global warming and that the belief of human-induced global 
warming is a determinant of personal behaviors to tackle climate change. Bord et al. 
(2000) argue that a correct understanding of the causes of climate change is a significant 
determinant of climate protection behavioral intentions. 
Therefore, this doctoral research analyzes the hypothetical relationships among 
these three constituent elements of the public understanding of climate science including 
seven variables. First, several ANOVA were administered to investigate the effect of two 
demographic variables (i.e., gender and academic majors) on these dependent variables 
(i.e., general concern, trust in scientists, belief in human force, personal relevancy, 
scientific knowledge, personal behaviors, policy preferences). 
The results of these ANOVA tests reveal that gender and academic major do not 
have a significant impact on these variables. It means that the differences in these young 
adults’ responses are not statistically significant because of gender and academic major. 
The only exception is the effect of gender on personal behaviors. The results show that 
female students were significantly more willing to assume responsibility for personal 
behaviors with an average score of 4.3 points than male students were with an average 
score of 4.1 points (p=0.007). 
Furthermore, Pearson correlation analysis was conducted to determine the degree 
of the linear relationships between two variables among these seven variables (Table 
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5.8).71 A total of eight statistically significant good relationships are found (r>0.3 and 
p<0.01) (Figure 5.11). First, reviewing the relationship between variables in the attitude 
element, it is found that there are three positive relationships between the concern level 
and trust in scientists (r=0.366), between the concern level and personal relevancy 
(r=0.374), and between the belief of human forces and personal relevancy (r=0.397). 
In other words, people who trust scientists to a greater degree are possibly more 
concerned about the adverse impacts of global climate change. In addition, people who 
are concerned with climate change tend to think of the problem as more relevant to 
themselves in terms of individual causes, impacts, and actions. Moreover, people who 
believe in anthropogenic forces of climate change with more certainty are most likely to 
think of the problem as having high personal relevancy. 
Table 5.8 Pearson Correlations and P Value for Numerous Variables (n=285) 
 Concern Level 
Trust in 
Scientist
Human 
Force 
Personal 
Relevancy
Scientific 
Knowledge 
Personal 
Behavior
Trust in 
Scientist 
0.366
0.000  
Human 
Force 
0.049
0.406
0.224
0.000  Attitude 
Personal 
Relevancy 
0.374
0.000
0.222
0.000
0.397
0.000  
Scientific 
Knowledge 
Scientific 
Knowledge 
0.089
0.136
-0.014
0.821
0.016
0.783
0.193
0.001  
Personal 
Behavior 
0.414
0.000
0.169
0.004
0.167
0.005
0.336
0.000
0.172 
0.004 Behavioral 
Intention Policy 
Preferences 
0.337
0.000
0.197
0.001
0.223
0.000
0.388
0.000
0.186 
0.002 
0.455
0.000
Cell Contents: Pearson correlation coefficient (r) 
            P-Value 
Note: The value in bold indicates a significantly fairly good correlation (r>0.3 and p<0.01). The value in 
italic indicates a significantly weak correlation (r<0.3 and p<0.01). 
                                                 
71 Pearson correlation coefficient is denoted with the lowercase letter r. The value of 
correlation coefficient ranges from -1 to 1. A larger value of r indicates a larger degree of 
relationship. In addition, a small p value (less than alpha level) indicates that the test is 
statistically significant at a significance level (0.01 is a commonly used alpha level). 
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Figure 5.11 Relationships between variables of three constituent elements. 
 
Second, reviewing the relationship between variables in the elements of attitudes 
and behavioral intentions, it is found that the concern level and personal relevancy are 
two key determinants of personal behaviors and policy preferences. People who are 
concerned about climate change tend to display higher willingness to take climate 
protection behaviors (r=0.414) and to endorse climate policies (r=0.337). In addition, 
people who think that climate change is relevant to themselves are more willing to take 
climate protection actions (r=0.336) and to support climate policies (r=0.388). 
Third, a strong relationship between personal behaviors and policy preferences is 
found. People who are more willing to take climate-protection actions are more likely to 
support climate policies (r=0.455). 
Finally, in addition to these eight strong relationships, the level of scientific 
knowledge has statistically significant but weak relationships with personal relevancy and 
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behavioral intentions (see the dashed lines in Figure 5.11). People who are more 
scientifically knowledgeable tend to view global climate change as relevant to themselves 
(r=0.193), to take climate protection actions (r=0.172), and to support climate policies 
(r=0.186). 
In brief, the statistical ANOVA analyses find that gender (i.e., male and female) 
and academic majors (i.e., science and non-science) do not have a significantly effect on 
the attitudes, knowledge, and behavioral intentions of young adults in Taiwan. 
Furthermore, the correlation analyses suggest that the level of concern and the perceived 
relevancy about global climate change are two factors that determine a person’s behavior 
and policy preferences. In contrast, the level of scientific knowledge has relatively weak 
linear relationships with a person’s behavioral intentions. 
 
5.3.6  Effectiveness of the IA Focus Groups 
As highlighted in Section 4.2, the third research objective is to assess the effectiveness of 
an experimental participatory exercise in enhancing the public’s scientific understanding 
and in formulating climate policies (whether the level of support for climate policies 
increases). While the IA focus groups engaged scientists and citizens (i.e., young adults in 
this case) in deliberating some policy issues of climate change, it is of particular interest 
to observe the dynamic relationship among these two actors and how they cooperatively 
contributed to enhancing the quality of climate policies. 
On one hand, one key role of scientists in the political arena is as communicators 
that translate elite scientific knowledge to plain language for lay audiences (Susskind, 
1994; Hannigan, 1995). On the other hand, it is also essential for the public to understand 
science (e.g., Haldane, 1939; Durant et al., 1989). The integration of scientists into 
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citizens’ deliberation processes is generally expected to enhance the quality of both the 
lay public’s knowledge capability and the resultant policy decisions. 
 
Building Intelligent Capability 
The pre-survey found that prior to the IA focus groups the participants displayed a fair 
level of basic scientific knowledge of global climate change (i.e., causes, impacts, and 
mitigation strategies) and an unsatisfactory level of advanced scientific knowledge (e.g., 
the scientific phenomenon, scientific facts). This inadequate knowledge level may be the 
reason why some of the participants expressed a need to acquire information from the 
event. The results of the pre- and post-surveys and the IA focus groups suggest that this 
experimental participatory activity indeed helped the participants in bridging the gap of 
knowledge insufficiency to some degree. 
Although the participants’ understandings of the causes, consequences, and 
mitigation actions of climate change were not significantly changed, the level of factual 
scientific knowledge and the level of uncertainty did improve significantly after the IA 
focus groups (see Figure 5.2). In other words, these participants had a better 
understanding of the information they had no prior knowledge of, but their understanding 
remained unchanged with respect to the information they had previously acquired. 
In addition to the assistance of the invited scientific experts, the participants could 
receive some potentially valuable information from each other. During interactive group 
discussions, some knowledgeable participants were able to answer questions raised by 
their colleagues. Although these two experts were brought in to provide key scientific 
information (one-way communication rather than a two-way interaction), the participants 
relied on these scientists’ appraisal to a very high degree. While advancing their own 
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opinions, participants often cited information that they had gleaned from the experts. 
In brief, the participatory event with an integration of scientists did effectively 
enhance the public’s scientific knowledge in some aspects. The result suggests that while 
people have developed some common opinions regarding global climate change (e.g., 
fossil fuels are causes of climate change, the increasing temperature is an adverse impact, 
saving energy is a mitigation solution), their basic understanding did not change easily 
and was not subject to effortless improvement. What may change significantly is the 
information they do not know. Thus, it is interesting for researchers involved in work on 
the public understanding of science to study two transitions: 1) the transition form total 
ignorance to satisfactory literacy and 2) the transition from satisfactory literacy to 
outstanding levels. 
 
Enhancing the Quality of Policy Decisions 
One way to review whether the IA focus groups enhanced the quality of policy decisions 
is through the level of public compliance—a more highly supported policy would 
probably lead to a more effectively implemented policy. The result of the pre- and 
post-surveys finds that despite the fact that the respondents already expressed a relatively 
high level of support for several potential mitigation initiatives in the pre-test survey, 
their support for six climate policies still increased after the IA focus-group workshop. 
The only exception to this general pattern was the decreased support for the alternative 
nuclear power policy. In addition, policy makers in Taiwan should be aware of the 
unpopularity of the nuclear power option. 
The other way to evaluate the quality of policy decisions is through the valuable 
opinions collected from the participants. During the IA focus-group sessions, in addition 
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to some general issues (e.g., the national commitment, the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities), two domestic climate policies were discussed. Through 
group interaction, interesting comments were raised and different perspectives were 
exchanged. For example, the participants discussed numerous new ideas including the 
calculation of carbon-emission allowances for multinational corporations, the distribution 
of responsibility based on the retroactive liability principle, and the carbon labeling and 
certification of consumption goods. Moreover, these young adults provided some lay 
perspectives on the difficulties of compliance with the voluntary program on conserving 
energy and reducing carbon emissions. These comments represent valuable feedback for 
policy makers when drafting or implementing policies. 
 
5.3.7  Concluding Remarks 
From an individual psychological perspective, this doctoral research into the public 
understanding of climate science includes three elements: attitude, scientific knowledge, 
and behavioral intention. The study finds that Taiwanese university students recognize the 
existence of human-induced climate change and that they are aware that the problem is 
relevant to them to some degree. Although some respondents did not think their daily 
activities contributed to the problem and doubt the efficacy of an individual’s action, their 
strong ethical attitude made them believe that a young person can still contribute 
something. 
In contrast to pro-climate protection attitudes, this doctoral research suggests that 
Taiwanese university students’ level of scientific knowledge pertaining to global climate 
change is extensive in basic science, but not detailed in specific scientific facts. In terms 
of individual behavioral intentions, these young adults were willing to endorse a variety 
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of actions and mitigation policies to combat climate change in general. The only policy 
that they were reluctant to support is the use of nuclear power as an alternative energy 
source. 
Furthermore, correlation analyses were conducted to explore the interrelationships 
among these three elements. The result suggests that level of concern and perceived 
relevancy about climate change are two key determinants of a person’s behavior and 
policy preferences. In contrast, the level of scientific knowledge has relatively weak 
linear relationship with a person’s behavioral intention. Finally, this doctoral research 
also finds that the experimental IA focus groups with the integration of scientists and 
citizens effectively enhanced these young participants’ scientific knowledge and support 
for climate policies. Moreover, valuable lay perspectives were shared in contributing to 
the quality of climate policies. 
 
5.4 Summary 
The key inquiry in this doctoral research has been whether public understanding of 
climate-change science is a necessary prerequisite for effective policy making. To address 
this question effectively, three constituent studies (i.e., IA focus-group workshop, the pre- 
and post-survey, and the web-based survey) were designed in combination to achieve 
three objectives: 1) to examine Taiwanese university students’ general concerns about 
global climate change (i.e., attitudes, scientific knowledge, and behavioral intentions); 2) 
to investigate the interrelationship among these three elements; 3) to assess the 
effectiveness of the experimental IA focus groups in enhancing an individual’s scientific 
understanding and policy making. 
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First, these studies find that while Taiwanese university students have a tendency 
to maintain attitudes and behavioral intentions that could mitigate climate change in 
general, their level of scientific knowledge pertaining to global climate change is 
extensive in basic knowledge (i.e., causes, adverse impacts, and mitigation strategies), 
but limited in specific scientific facts. 
Second, the results of the correlation analyses suggest that the attitudinal element 
(the level of concern and personal relevancy in specific) is a more significant factor than 
the element of scientific knowledge in determining a person’s behavior and policy 
preferences. 
Finally, the experimental IA focus groups effectively improved young 
participants’ scientific understanding (factual knowledge in specific) and support for 
climate policies. Moreover, the participatory exercise provided an opportunity for policy 
makers to collect young adults’ valuable perspectives for the quality and implementation 
of climate policies. 
In summary, these findings raise two interesting issues worthy of discussion (see 
the detailed discussion in Chapter 6). The first observation is that Taiwanese university 
students display a strong ethical perspective: ecological citizenship. The respondents in 
this study asserted that Taiwan needs to reduce its GHG emission based on moral grounds. 
Moreover, although most of the IA focus-group participants recognized human influences 
on the climate system, they asserted that humans need to resolve the problem regardless 
of whether climate change is driven by human activities. Furthermore, regardless of 
whether the industrial sector comprises the majority of CO2 emissions in Taiwan, these 
young adults maintained that the public should also bear responsibility. This ecological 
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citizenship perspective may be influenced by distinctive Taiwanese national character and 
the eastern culture. 
The second focal issue worthy of exploration is public understanding of science 
for the issue of global climate change. Compared to numerous studies of public 
perception of climate change, few efforts have been made to investigate people’s 
comprehensive scientific knowledge. Even though this doctoral research finds that 
scientific knowledge may not be as influential as attitude in determining an individual’s 
behaviors, numerous questions remain to be investigated, such as the measurement of 
scientific literacy for specific issues, the integration of scientists and citizens, and so forth. 
While this doctoral research presents an empirical case study of Taiwan, the following 
Chapter 6 will discuss both issues in detail and conclude with important finalizing 
remarks. 
 
CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1  Overview 
To enhance contemporary understanding of the social dimensions of global climate 
change, this interdisciplinary doctoral research, titled The Public Understanding of 
Climate Change: A Case Study of Taiwanese Youth, seeks to explore the relationships 
among science, the public, and politics. By conducting empirical studies (i.e., IA focus 
groups and survey studies), this study investigated the extent to which young citizens 
understand climate change in terms of their attitudes, scientific knowledge, and 
behavioral intentions on an individual level and assessed interrelationships among these 
elements. 
The previous chapters in this dissertation have described the background of the 
problem (Chapter 1), the research rationale (Chapter 2), the contextual background of the 
case study (Chapter 3), the research methods (Chapter 4), and the research results 
(Chapter 5). This study presents valuable insights and uncovers some interesting issues. 
This final chapter considers two lines of inquiry and concludes with several remarks on 
this research. Section 6.2 first discusses possible factors that drive the ethical viewpoints 
of the Taiwanese youth that participated in this study and then considers several issues 
related to studying the public understanding of science from the standpoint of climate 
change. Section 6.3 concludes this dissertation with summaries of the findings, 
contributions, and recommendations for future research. Finally, Section 6.4 summarizes 
this doctoral research with some concluding remarks. 
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6.2  Discussion 
6.2.1  Introduction 
Chapter 5 reports the results of the empirical study of this dissertation in terms of each of 
the constituent elements of the public understanding of climate change science (i.e., 
attitudes, scientific knowledge, and behavioral intentions) and the interrelationships 
among these three facets. Two of the most prominent findings that were observed during 
the course of this investigation include 1) Taiwanese young adults display a strong sense 
of ecological citizenship and 2) scientific knowledge is not overwhelmingly influential in 
determining individual behavioral intentions. 
It is particularly interesting to explore the underlying reasons behind these two 
observations. First, why did Taiwanese young adults evince a strong sense of ecological 
citizenship? Second, the weak correlation between scientific knowledge and individual 
behavioral intentions found in this study suggests that scientific knowledge was unlikely 
a “necessary prerequisite” for effective policy making. The question then turns to what 
this finding suggests for research on the public understanding of science with respect to 
scientific literacy and the relationship between experts and society for climate change. 
Based on the contextual information provided in Chapter 2 and 3, this section 
discusses the above two inquiries in depth. Subsection 6.2.2 describes possible social, 
political, and cultural factors that influence the attitudes of Taiwanese young adults about 
both Taiwan’s and their own moral obligations to mitigate global climate change. 
Subsection 6.2.3 presents several interesting observations pertaining to research on the 
public understanding of science for a specific scientific issue like global climate change. 
The last subsection concludes with some insights that emanate out of this discussion. 
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6.2.2  Ecological Citizenship in Taiwanese Youth 
The results of the three studies suggest that Taiwanese youth have a strong sense of 
ecological citizenship and these sensibilities can be attributed to the following factors.72 
First, because its current diplomatic status excludes it from participating in official 
negotiations around international climate treaties, Taiwan is technically not obligated to 
reduce its GHG emissions. Even though its international commitment and participation is 
neglected, a near unanimity of Taiwanese youth thought that Taiwan should begin to 
address the problem of its relatively high releases. While the Taiwanese government 
positions itself as an active member of the global community that needs to fulfill its 
responsibilities with respect to protection of the global environment (TEPA, 2002), the 
young respondents in the studies reported here also justified their position on an ethical 
perspective—the country, as a member of the global community, does not have the right 
to destroy the environment. 
Second, while most Taiwanese youth recognize that humans have substantially 
changed the chemical composition of the atmosphere, the results of the IA focus groups 
suggested that they did not think that the unambiguous verification of the corresponding 
relationship between anthropogenic forces and global climate change was necessary. The 
respondents instead argued that humans need to take responsibility to address the 
problem regardless of whether climate change is driven by human activities. This strong 
moral obligation appears to have been shaped by the observed attitude of human 
superiority—the belief that humans’ exceptional intelligence and capability can overcome 
the challenge. 
                                                 
72 Ecological citizenship in this paper refers to the sense of the individual social 
responsibility toward protecting the environment in general. 
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Third, these studies suggest that fewer Taiwanese young adults recognize their 
personal responsibility in causing global climate change than the proportion that takes 
responsibility for attempting to resolve the problem. In other words, even though some 
respondents denied responsibility in causing the current situation, they were willing to 
take personal action to mitigate it. Moreover, most Taiwanese youth were of the mind that 
climate change is too overwhelming and beyond the control of a young person, but still 
agreed that there is something a young person can contribute to resolve the problem. It is 
thus interesting to find that although these young adults doubted the efficacy of a young 
person, they were willing to bear a degree of civic responsibility for mitigative action. 
Finally, even though Taiwanese youth recognized that the industrial sector is the 
primary contributor to Taiwan’s relatively high CO2 releases, they did not allocate 
obligations for reducing GHG emissions solely to industry. Rather, they thought the 
general public should also take responsibility. This finding suggests that Taiwanese 
citizens do not dismiss their personal role even if Taiwan’s GHG emissions are primarily 
generated from production-related activities. 
These observations accordingly imply that Taiwanese youth not only show a 
strong sense of ethical obligation for protecting the environment and reducing GHG 
emissions, but they also recognize the social responsibility of individual citizens. It is 
thus particularly interesting to explore potential factors that drive this response. Based on 
the contextual information reviewed in Chapter 3, this paper argues that the sense of 
ecological citizenship is likely shaped by the influence of the contemporary 
environmental movement in enhancing public environmental awareness. 
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The Influence of Contemporary Environmental Movement in Taiwan 
Mol (2001) argues that several drivers influence the globalization of environmental 
reform in Asian countries: international politics (e.g., the force of global environmental 
regimes, the role of international development assistance programs), international 
economics (e.g., the requirements demanded from global green markets), and 
globalization of environmentalism at a national level (e.g., strong national environmental 
NGOs that link to global activist networks). 
Take Taiwan as an example. From an international political perspective, Taiwan is 
not part of the global environmental regime and does not receive international financial 
aid. There are not, at least on the surface, any external political forces motivating the 
government to address global environmental issues. Nonetheless, due to its need to 
participate in international affairs, Taiwan anticipates gaining some diplomatic leverage 
by voluntarily fulfilling its obligations as a global citizen. This is likely one of the reasons 
why the government has actively undertaken the process of formulating mandatory 
climate policies ahead of other newly industrialized and developing countries. 
From the perspective of international economics, Taiwan, as a key exporting 
economy and a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), will probably need to 
comply with potential product standards that might be established by the WTO, particular 
countries, or regional confederations (e.g., the European Union). While the Taiwanese 
government has responded to global climate change on the basis of both political and 
economic factors, the results of this study suggest that young adults in the country tend to 
endorse an ethical justification that is similar to the one endorsed by the international 
coalition of climate action advocates (Lin, 2008). 
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Lin (2008) argues that this particular discourse is endorsed by environmental 
activist groups in Taiwan. This observation therefore implies that the strong sense of 
ecological citizenship displayed by the Taiwanese youth in this study has possibly 
developed alongside this growing general sense of environmental awareness originating 
out of the contemporary environmental movement in Taiwan. 
The surveys reviewed in Section 3.4 show that public environmental awareness in 
Taiwan has increased over the past three decades. People began to recognize their basic 
environmental rights to clean air and water, to prioritize environmental issues in 
comparison to other social problems, and to develop concern about the seriousness of the 
environmental impacts associated with some harmful economic activities. Even though 
the Taiwanese public displays inconsistent attitudes (i.e., while it tends to endorse new 
ideals of environmental value, it still believes in the benefits of technology and continued 
economic growth), a shift from a pro-development attitude to a pro-environment attitude 
seems to have become manifest during the period 1983-1999 (Hsiao et al., 2002). 
In addition to increased environmental concern, the 2006 Environmental 
Protection Knowledge Survey contained an interesting finding that is directly relevant to 
this emergent sense of ecological citizenship. It implied that most of the Taiwanese public 
was willing to lower living standards for the goal of environmental protection—a sign of 
willingness to compromise personal benefit and to accept individual environmental 
responsibility (TEPA, 2006). 
The 2001 Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) further revealed that even though 
the majority of the Taiwanese public was reluctant to take aggressive political action (e.g., 
protesting in front of the factory), there was an expressed readiness to take some basic 
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and moderate environmentally friendly actions within the context of daily consumer and 
household practices (e.g., recycling and not littering) (IOSSinica, 2002). The apparent 
unwillingness to endorse aggressive political participation may be a result of the fact that 
most Taiwanese people doubt the efficacy of a citizen in influencing political decisions. 
For instance, two-thirds of the Taiwanese public think that casting votes is an 
effective way to influence politics, but they still do not believe their opinions would be 
valued by government officials in the process of decision making (IOSSinica, 2009). The 
predisposition toward moderate behaviors (both political and personal actions) is 
interesting because it suggests that even though people are uncertain about the efficacy of 
citizenship, they would not avoid their individual environmental responsibility. In other 
words, they might not actively and vocally engage in activities regarding decision making, 
but they would still fulfill “their part” of the responsibility (e.g., recycling). 
One key factor that has shaped the Taiwanese public’s mentality of individual 
environmental responsibility has been the rise of the contemporary environmental 
movement in the country. As discussed in Section 3.4, due to increased opportunities for 
political participation since the late 1980s, the public started to take more proactive action 
regarding environmental matters. While these grassroots movements were primarily 
initiated by local residents fighting for basic environmental rights in response to 
increased health threats in their communities, they primed public thinking about the 
importance of ensuring the quality of the environment. 
Since then, numerous national environmental organizations have emerged and 
attracted societal attention for a broader range of environmental issues (e.g., wildlife 
protection, forest conservation, and water-resource preservation) and the number of 
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volunteers involved in environmental activities has increased as well (TEPA, 2009b). The 
focus of the environmental movement apparently extends beyond local demarcated issues 
and participation is no longer limited to residents of adversely affected communities. In 
other words, the issues that are now being advocated, as well as the interests that are 
involved, may not be directly related to the participants themselves. 
Because the issue of global climate change can be related to other environmental 
concerns (e.g., air pollution and forest preservation), many NGOs with different interests 
and missions work together and develop solid alliances. This type of cooperation has 
been called the “packaging effect” (Buttel & Taylor, 1994). For example, the Quebec 
Coalition on Climate Change gathers together NGOs from the transportation, energy, 
resource conservation, and environmental research sectors (Perron & Vaillancourt, 1999). 
This model of practice is also evident in Taiwan. Although most environmental 
groups in Taiwan focus on issues at a national rather than global level, they have 
managed to cooperate and to launch numerous campaigns aimed at increasing public 
understanding of global climate change. For instance, dozens of civil society groups 
collectively initiated several climate change-related campaigns (e.g., the “Anti-warming 
parade” and turn off the lights campaigns in 2007) (Lin, 2008). 
Moreover, the Taiwanese government has put forth substantial effort to implement 
programs that encourage citizens’ actions to combat climate change in terms of energy 
conservation. It is of particular interest to find that these campaigns primarily focus on 
the responsibility of citizens (and consumers). These citizen-centered movements may 
also explain why Taiwanese youth display such a strong sense of ecological citizenship. 
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Summarized Discussion 
While Patchen (2006) argues that two key motivations for people to take action to combat 
climate change include utilitarian concerns (i.e., rational judgment pertaining to net 
benefits) and emotional concerns (i.e., fear of being threatened by climate change 
impacts), this case study reports on a third justification: ethical responsibility. The 
Taiwanese young adults that participated in these studies exhibited a strong moral 
rectitude that drives their willingness to take climate-protection behaviors. This 
dissertation research discusses the strong sense of “ecological citizenship” in Taiwan and 
relates this disposition to developments around the contemporary environmental 
movement over the past three decades (in enhancing public environmental awareness). 
The finding is important because it provides a constructive source of traction for 
policy makers who are attempting to communicate and persuade the Taiwanese public to 
reduce its personal carbon footprint. Appreciation of the political and cultural context 
underlying the public’s attitudes, understandings, and behaviors is significant for policy 
makers in order to formulate acceptable actions. Global climate change may first and 
foremost be regarded as a scientific issue among scientists and policy makers, but it is 
viewed as an ethical issue by the general public. For example, one of the key messages in 
the film An Inconvenient Truth is the moral obligation to mitigate global climate change. 
This may be the reason why this film has successfully attracted the public’s attention 
around the world. 
 
6.2.3  Scientists, Citizens, and Policy Making 
As discussed in Subsection 2.2.5, research on the public understanding of science has 
developed over the past few decades in accordance with three primary research 
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paradigms: science literacy (i.e., the level of public scientific knowledge); public 
understanding of science (i.e., the relationship between attitudes and knowledge toward 
science); and science and society (i.e., the potential social and cultural factors that may 
influence people’s scientific understanding). Even though this case study finds that 
scientific knowledge is less influential than attitudes in determining individual behaviors, 
it merits exploring two lines of inquiry regarding research on the public understanding of 
science with respect to global climate change. 
 
Public Understanding of Specific Scientific Issues—Environmental Issues 
While the public in modern techno-industrial democratic society may for a variety of 
reasons need to have a better scientific understanding (e.g., practical functionality, 
democratic resilience) (Durant et al., 1989), the term “science” refers to a generalized 
concept that covers a wide range of scientific fields (e.g., chemistry, medical science, 
biology). The development of a scientifically literate citizenry is challenging because it 
requires a certain proportion of the population in a society (the level is uncertain) to have 
familiarity with a wide range of scientific subjects. Nonetheless, the public understanding 
of environmental issues raises several particular issues. 
First, one key reason for public ignorance of science is that people tend to 
perceive some factual knowledge as irrelevant to their needs and interests in their daily 
life (Turney, 1996). For example, understanding scientific facts like the earth orbits 
around the sun and electrons are smaller than atoms is perhaps important for the 
continuity of human culture, but the lack of this knowledge does not seem to affect 
people’s everyday life and policy decisions (for the purposes of practical functionality 
and democratic resilience). It is apparent that what privileged scientists assume people 
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need to know may not conform to what people think they need to know (and what they 
actually need to know). 
Regardless of varying personal interests in different scientific fields, it seems 
inevitable that some scientific subjects are more relevant to daily life and some are more 
distant from it. Among the range of scientific disciplines, it can be reasonably argued that 
scientific knowledge of environmental issues is relatively more relevant in terms of 
potential health risks (e.g., various forms of environmental pollution), quality of life (e.g., 
recreation in national parks), and individual environmental footprints (e.g., energy 
consumption). Although some local environmental problems are likely only relevant to 
people in nearby communities, everyone is entitled to express concern about his/her own 
surroundings. This reasoning implies that the public should be motivated to understand 
environmental issues. 
In addition, as discussed in Section 2.2, due to the increased scientific complexity 
and uncertainty of modern techno-industrial societies, problems have evolved from being 
conceptualized from the standpoint of the disinterested empiricist approach (the problem 
exists as an objective scientific phenomenon) to a multidisciplinary postempiricist 
approach (the problem is constructed by a variety of social interactions). This shift is 
particularly true for complex environmental problems. Take global climate change as an 
example. This dilemma is no longer recognized simply as a scientific issue. There is 
broad acceptance of the fact that the public needs to comprehend not only scientific 
aspects of the problem, but also other related aspects of it (e.g., political negotiations, 
economic impacts, and social inequalities). 
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Furthermore, the notion of socially constructing environmental problems raises an 
intriguing challenge for science communication. One of scientists’ functions in the 
policy-making process is education and communication. Although they may try to 
provide objective scientific expertise, it is difficult to remain impartial when discussing 
environmental issues because most of them are not value-free. When scientists observe 
potential threats and issue warnings to the public, they unavoidably convey, as part of the 
process, their own value judgments. For example, when a trend of increasing global 
average temperature is observed, the public would expect scientists to directly provide 
insight on the implications of this observation: is it good or is it bad? As a result, 
scientists may pass their values to the public when communicating the science of the 
problem. 
Finally, an interesting point of inquiry regarding the public understanding of 
science for environmental problems is that some policy decisions inevitably involve 
contradictions between technological and environmental objectives. A salient example 
concerns the controversy between the generation of nuclear power and the management 
of radioactive waste. Another centers on the debate between agricultural biotechnology 
and ecological ethics. On one hand, how should policy makers and scientists 
communicate these competing notions to the public? Do they give equal treatment to the 
advantages and disadvantages of both options? On the other hand, how might the public 
process this conflicting information? Are they making better decisions because they are 
well-informed or making poorer decisions because they are confused by competing 
information? Moreover, will there be a difference of attitudes about and understanding of 
competing scientific issues (they love and know one and hate and ignore the other one)? 
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While this case study does not address this issue, it would certainly be valuable to explore 
in the future. 
 
Integration of Scientists and Citizens in the Policy-making Process 
The paradigm of science and society not only investigates the level of public scientific 
literacy and the linear relationship between attitudes about and knowledge of science, but 
also explores the underlying social and cultural factors that can influence the public’s 
scientific understanding. The results of this case study reveal some valuable insights 
about the dynamic relationship between scientists and citizens in Taiwan. 
First, Taiwanese young adults demonstrate a high level of trust in scientists. 
Compared with other sources (e.g., environmental activists and journalists), respondents 
considered scientists and related experts to be the most reliable source of information and 
a majority of them trusted scientists on the issue of global climate change completely or 
mostly. This study argues that this strong regard for scientists is possibly an outcome of 
the significant cultural status of Confucius in Taiwanese society. Due to his influential 
role, teachers, scientists, and other purveyors of expert knowledge have traditionally 
enjoyed high respect in Taiwan. As a result, people tend to accept the opinions of experts 
with few reservations. However, this sword cuts two ways and a society that venerates 
elitism may undermine the lay public’s sense of citizenship, particularly when it comes to 
the expression of personal views. 
Second, in the case of global climate change (or other global environmental 
issues), the scientific information that the public in Taiwan (or any nation) receives is 
usually from second-hand sources (i.e., international scientific research agencies such as 
IPCC). It seems inevitable that the national media would only summarize and transmit 
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certain key findings of scientific research. Accordingly, news articles often lack 
comprehensive background regarding the scientific research and the relevant institutions 
that carried it out. It is therefore particularly interesting to explore whether the public is 
capable of distinguishing scientific uncertainties and making reasoned judgments on the 
basis of limited information—will they posit doubts or simply accept the disseminated 
information? 
Finally, the objective of scientist-integrated public participation practices is to 
reach well-informed and socially acceptable policy decisions by creating a platform 
where a variety of policy actors (e.g., citizens, scientists, and policy makers) can 
communicate and exchange opinions. The experimental exercise in this case study (i.e., 
IA focus groups) demonstrated a successful experience with several valuable findings. 
The dialogues observed during the group discussion suggest that the invited scientific 
experts were quite effective in enhancing participants’ scientific knowledge and the 
respondents were able to engage in meaningful deliberation. 
The participants contributed to the quality of domestic climate policies by 
providing several innovative ideas and feedback about compliance with certain policies. 
However, the key problem is how much policy makers value these lay perspectives. Do 
they take this input into consideration when making final decisions? Do they think these 
participation practices simply serve a symbolic purpose to justify democracy (an 
opportunity for scientists to inform people and an outlet for people to express their 
opinions)? The attitudes of policy makers become especially important for the 
democratization of Taiwan and the development of citizenship because the public has 
usually doubted the efficacy of citizen engagement. 
 330
6.2.4  Concluding Remarks 
This case study finds that Taiwanese young adults display a strong sense of ecological 
citizenship and that scientific knowledge is not especially influential in terms of 
determining individual behavioral intentions. This section discusses the social and 
cultural factors that underlie these two observations. First, this dissertation research 
argues that ecological citizenship in Taiwan is likely influenced by development of the 
contemporary environmental movement (in enhancing public environmental awareness). 
This study finds that scientific knowledge is not a necessary prerequisite for 
effective policy making due to the weak correlation between scientific knowledge and 
behavioral intentions. Nonetheless, there are two interesting points of inquiry regarding 
research on the public understanding of science for environmental issues and global 
climate change. Environmental problems are highly relevant to people’s daily life so the 
public should be more motivated to develop familiarity with the subject. In addition, 
scientists need to be cautious in communicating environmental issues to the public 
because these problems may involve multiple scientific disciplines and may easily 
involve personal value judgments. 
Moreover, the participatory exercise revealed several insights regarding the 
dynamic relationship between scientists and citizens. The high level of trust in scientists 
observed in Taiwanese youth is possibly influenced by a culture of venerating elitism. 
With the assistance of scientific experts, the participants were capable of undertaking 
meaningful deliberations over the development of informed policy decisions. The key 
challenge is to improve the attitudes of policy makers to respect lay perspectives. 
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6.3  Conclusion 
6.3.1  Introduction 
Global climate change is a challenging problem for human society because its 
identification and eventual solution involves a variety of academic disciplines and 
societal actors. Mitigation will require not only multidisciplinary collaboration, but also 
collective and sustained effort on the part of all nations. While obtaining domestic 
support is significant for effective international cooperation, it is important to enhance 
current understanding of the integration of science and the public in the domestic 
policy-making processes for global climate change. 
By employing three constituent studies (i.e., IA focus-group workshop, the pre- 
and post-survey, and the web-based survey), this case study investigates the human 
dimensions of the issue, ranging from its micro-individual aspects (i.e., exploring 
personal understanding of and responses to the problem) to its macro-structural aspects 
(i.e., examining underlying social and cultural factors in shaping the integration of 
science and citizens in the policy-making process). 
This section reviews some important results of this case study. Subsection 6.3.2 
summarizes several key findings regarding the constituent elements and the relationships 
pertaining to the public understanding of climate science that were observed in the 
empirical part of this doctoral research. Subsection 6.3.3 describes what this case study 
contributes with respect to several unique perspectives for further comparisons and the 
implications of domestic climate policies. Subsection 6.3.4 further discusses some 
inquiries that are of potential interest for further research. The last subsection concludes 
with some summarizing remarks. 
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6.3.2  Summary of Findings 
Three constituent studies (i.e., the IA focus-group workshop, the pre- and post-survey, 
and the web-based survey) were designed in combination to achieve three objectives: 1) 
to examine the concerns of Taiwanese young adults about global climate change (i.e., 
attitudes, scientific knowledge, and behavioral intentions); 2) to investigate the 
interrelationships among these three elements; 3) to assess the effectiveness of the IA 
focus groups in enhancing individual scientific understanding and engagement in policy 
making. These studies generate three primary and several secondary findings that are 
summarized below (also see Section 5.3 for detailed results and analyses). 
 
1. Most Taiwanese young adults display positive concerns about global climate change 
in terms of their tendency to endorse pro-climate protection attitudes and willingness 
to take pro-climate protection behaviors and to support climate policies in general. 
This research further suggests that these dispositions are based on a strong sense of 
ecological citizenship (i.e., individual social responsibility toward the environment) 
that is likely attributable to the contemporary environmental movement in Taiwan. 
y Most Taiwanese young adults are convinced that global climate change is real 
and has already become manifest and human activities are the main driving 
force behind this phenomenon. 
y Scientists and experts are the most reliable information source for these young 
adults who have a high level of trust and faith in elite forms of knowledge. 
y Most of these young adults are concerned about adverse impacts of global 
climate change and believe that the problem is relevant to them personally. 
y Most of these young adults agreed that there is still something a young person 
can contribute to resolving the problem even though they expressed doubts 
about the power and efficacy of a young person. 
y Most of these young adults display a pro-environmental attitude in terms of 
political priority and potential conflicts with economic growth, but this 
perception does not necessarily relate to global climate change. 
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y A near unanimity of Taiwanese young adults asserts that the country should 
begin to reduce its GHG emissions. 
y These young adults support a variety of domestic climate-mitigation policies 
except the nuclear energy alternative. 
y These young adults are willing to change a variety of personal behaviors to 
combat climate change except actions associated with green consumption. 
 
2. The level of scientific understanding of most Taiwanese young adults with respect to 
global climate change is extensive in basic knowledge, but limited in specific 
scientific facts. This research further finds that scientific knowledge is not especially 
influential as a positive attitude in determining individual behavioral intentions. 
y A majority of Taiwanese young adults are able to correctly identify several 
direct causes of global climate change. They have a better level of 
understanding of adverse impacts of climate change and have a poorer level of 
knowledge about mitigation strategies. 
y While these young adults have basic scientific knowledge of global climate 
change, they display a limited understanding of advanced scientifically factual 
knowledge, specific technologies, and specific policy information. 
y Most of these young adults have a tendency to confuse global climate change 
with stratospheric ozone depletion. 
y There is a positive relationship between the belief in anthropogenic climate 
change and the level of perceived personal relevancy. 
y There are positive relationships between attitudes (i.e., the level of concern 
about climate change and the level of perceived personal relevancy) and 
behavioral intentions (i.e., personal behaviors and policy preferences). 
y There is a positive relationship between willingness to take climate protection 
behaviors and the tendency to support climate policies. 
y There are statistically significant but weak relationships between the level of 
scientific knowledge and the level of perceived personal relevancy and 
behavioral intentions. 
 
3. The experimental exercise in public participation involving the integration of 
scientific experts (i.e., IA focus groups) enhanced individual scientific understanding 
and policy making. This research suggests that this process can provide a platform 
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where participants can exchange opinions and share valuable lay perspectives (e.g., 
innovative ideas and difficulties of compliance with related policies). 
y The experimental IA focus groups helped the participants to bridge to some 
degree the gap of scientific illiteracy of global climate change. Although 
participants’ basic understanding of causes, impacts, and mitigation actions 
were not significantly changed, the level of factual scientific knowledge and the 
level of uncertainty did significantly improve after the IA focus groups. 
y The IA focus groups also enhanced the participants’ level of support for climate 
policies. 
 
6.3.3  Contributions of this Research 
While Chapter 1 briefly highlighted the expected potential contributions of this doctoral 
research, the discussion here reviews the actual contributions in accordance with the 
results that were generated during the course of the investigation. First, this research 
represents completion of a successful case study on the human dimensions of global 
climate change in Taiwan. This is a valuable achievement in light of the fact that most 
extant social scientific studies on this issue have been conducted in North America and 
Europe. As the focus of mitigation responsibility begins to expand to developing 
countries (mostly located in Asia, Africa, and South America) during the post-Kyoto 
period, it will be important to know how people in these regions perceive the problem 
and evince preparedness to respond to it. Their voices deserve to be heard. This study 
reports on the views of Taiwanese youth and the results turn out to be quite 
surprising—people are reasonably concerned about climate change and are fairly willing 
to implement measures to address the problem. 
Second, a case study of Taiwan holds value because the society has several 
noteworthy characteristics that make the results comparable with studies conducted in 
other countries that may share similar characteristics (e.g., high responsibility or high 
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vulnerability). Cross-country comparisons are potentially beneficial for the success of 
international agreements because valuable lessons can be learned and shared. For 
example, Taiwan may be the first newly-industrialized and developing country that 
attempts to implement mandatory GHG emissions regulations. While the government has 
initiated this effort, environmental groups have played a significant role in enhancing the 
public’s environmental awareness and sense of individual social responsibility. 
Third, this research is especially meaningful because young adults, the targeted 
study population, represent not only a sizable subpopulation, but also bring to bear the 
perspectives of a younger generation on implementing policies consistent with 
sustainable development. These young adults ground their sensibilities in an ethical 
justification. This finding is particularly interesting from the standpoint of the 
relationship between intergenerational justice and sustainable development. 
Fourth, this research successfully executed a process of public participation 
whereby policy decisions were deliberated within a cost-effective framework (i.e., IA 
focus groups). Supplemented with the pre- and post-surveys, the IA focus groups 
demonstrated their effectiveness in terms of enhancing individual scientific understanding 
and facilitating the design of socially acceptable policies. In addition, respondents made 
numerous comments and provided valuable recommendations during the process of 
discussion. This exercise is an encouraging experience and holds potential for further 
implementation on a larger scale in Taiwan and elsewhere. 
Finally, Taiwanese young adults appear to be motivated by a unique disposition 
that prompts their attitudes about pro-climate protection and behavioral intentions: 
ecological citizenship. While this dissertation suspects (may require further investigation) 
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that a culturally embedded form of Confucianism may have influenced and shaped the 
sense of strong individual social responsibility, it would be interesting to see whether 
similar sensibilities are observable in other Asian societies. Given that Taiwan shares a 
similar ancient culture with China, a notable contribution of this case study is that it can 
be regarded as an exploratory investigation for future social science research on the most 
populous and economically dynamic country in the world. 
 
6.3.4  Directions for Future Research 
While this case study has addressed several inquiries and made some contributions, it 
also triggers many ideas for future investigation. First, due to the need to maintain the 
feasibility of the field work, the research methods were designed to be carried out with 
limited human and financial resources. Not only were the IA focus groups experimental 
and of small scale, the quantitative survey relied on the Internet and 
convenience-sampling techniques. The self-selected respondents that participated in this 
research may represent a group of people that displays an unusually high level of 
environmental concern. Accordingly, future research should extend the scope of the study 
to a larger sample size that has been assembled on the basis of randomized selection. 
Second, this case study was targeted to the perspectives of youth with respect to 
global climate change. The unique perspectives of young adults can (and should) in the 
future be compared to the viewpoints of other age cohorts and other major civil society 
groups. A comparative study of different age cohorts would help to shed light on possible 
intergenerational differences. Moreover, a research project geared toward considering 
different civil society groups could be useful in establishing a comprehensive 
understanding of different societal viewpoints. 
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Third, the IA focus groups in this study were designed on an experimental basis. A 
shortcoming was the lack of involvement of policy makers in the deliberative process. In 
contrast to recent civic engagement projects in Europe, the notion of public participation 
in Asian societies is still a relatively underdeveloped idea. Further research should be 
pursued to explore how institutions respond to the actors, the mechanisms, and the 
outcomes of public participation in the policy-making process at a macro-structure level. 
Fourth, this study offered a preliminary appraisal of the influence of 
Confucianism on the Taiwanese people’s sense of citizenship and attitudes toward 
scientific experts. This purported relationship opens up opportunities for research in the 
field of political sociology and cultural studies on the public understanding of science in 
Asian societies. For instance, how does the public value science and technology (a 
concept usually associated with modern western societies) in traditional eastern societies? 
Finally, this case study demonstrates that a high level of scientific understanding 
of climate change is not necessarily a prerequisite for effective policy making. In other 
words, people do not need to know a lot to care about the future of the planet or to take 
actions to change course from the current trajectory. There are without question 
underlying social, political, and cultural factors that influence public attitudes and 
behaviors. Subsection 6.2.3 discusses several intriguing lines of inquiry that can be 
considered with respect to research on the public understanding of science (e.g., the 
relationship between attitudes about science in general and attitudes about science as 
applied to in specific issues). 
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6.3.5  Concluding Remarks 
This research finds that Taiwanese young adults have a tendency to endorse attitudes and 
behavioral intentions that mitigate global climate change and that their level of scientific 
understanding of the problem is extensive in basic knowledge, but limited in specific 
scientific facts. In addition, attitudes (the level of concern and personal relevancy) are 
more significant factors than scientific knowledge in determining personal behavioral 
intentions and policy preferences. In other words, scientific knowledge does not appear to 
be a necessary prerequisite for effective policy making. 
This case study of Taiwan provides several contributions that are relevant for 
purposes of future comparison: the views of young adults in a newly-industrialized Asian 
society with high responsibility for and high vulnerability to global climate change. In 
addition, this research marks completion of a successful exercise in public participation 
and in deliberating public policy decisions (i.e., IA focus groups). This case study is 
moreover potentially useful as an exploratory investigation for future social science 
research on the human dimensions of climate change in China. 
Despite these valuable outcomes, this research triggers many questions for future 
investigation including a larger-scale national study, a comparison to other age cohorts 
and other major civil society groups, a contrast with public participation studies in other 
societal contexts, a review of public understanding of science from the standpoints of 
political sociology and cultural studies, and a formulation of in-depth studies on the 
public understanding of science and the role of scientists and citizens in the 
policy-making process. 
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6.4  Summary 
Global climate change is a pressing and challenging issue with high scientific 
complexities and uncertainties. To effectively mitigate the problem (from the point of 
identifying the problem by assembling scientific evidence to formulating and 
implementing policy interventions) will require intense and protracted interdisciplinary 
cooperation and collective efforts from all nations. One decisive factor for the success of 
international regimes and cooperation is obtaining sufficient domestic support. Therefore, 
it is important to understand how various social, economic, and political factors affect 
society’s support in individual countries. 
Global climate change is the collective result of individual activities (though at 
different intensities) around the world. The problem can only be ameliorated if a 
significant proportion of the human population begins to act personally and politically. 
Individual actions are not only purely personal responses (i.e., to change lifestyle 
choices), but also broader political responses—being active participants in the political 
process (i.e., to change laws and policies). If people are part of the problem, there is little 
questioning that that they should be part of the solution. The foremost step is to initiate 
public awareness and recognition of the necessity for responsible action. Science 
communication and social learning will be essential parts of this process. 
The public must be engaged in the policy-making process to ensure compliance 
with policy decisions. However, meaningful public participation in the pursuit of societal 
consensus over controversial decisions inevitably requires scientific experts to 
communicate privileged information to lay people as part of deliberative processes. This 
study found that scientific knowledge is not a significant determinant of personal 
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behavioral intentions. Accordingly, underlying factors (e.g., social, political, and cultural) 
and social relations (e.g., the relationship between scientists and citizens) need to be 
addressed regarding the level of public understanding of science. 
Interestingly, while Taiwan is technically not obligated to reduce its GHG 
emissions, the results report with near unanimity that Taiwanese youth think that the 
government should begin to reduce its GHG releases. In addition, these young adults 
display a unique view—ecological citizenship—that contends that there is a need to 
assume individual social responsibility and to maintain moral obligations toward 
environmental protection. This case study concludes that the ethical justification is likely 
driving Taiwan’s pro-climate protection attitudes (e.g., concerns about adverse impacts, 
and personal relevancy) and behavioral intentions (i.e., personal behaviors and policy 
preferences). 
Decades after the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were negotiated, 
human-produced GHGs are still growing. As the Kyoto Protocol is about to expire in 
2012, each nation (both industrialized and developing countries) should arguably begin to 
take more proactive actions to address the problem. Although Taiwan’s meaningful 
achievement in reducing its GHG emissions needs to be monitored into the future, this 
case study demonstrates how an industrialized Asian society can incorporate scientists 
and citizens in the domestic climate policy-making process. 
 
APPENDIX A 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR THE PRE- AND POST-SURVEY (ENGLISH) 
 
Survey on Global Climate Change 
 
Section I 
 
1. Indicate your familiarity with the following terms and policies. 
 
 Very 
Familiar
Mostly 
Familiar Familiar 
Somewhat 
Familiar 
Not Familiar 
At All 
Global Climate Change      
Global Warming      
Greenhouse Effect      
Kyoto Protocol      
Taiwanese Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Bill (draft)      
 
 
2. When people talk about climate change, what kind of change do you think they are talking about? 
<You may select more than one option> 
 
 Increase/decrease in air pollution 
 Increase/decrease in atmospheric oxygen concentration 
 Increase/decrease in precipitation (e.g., rain) 
 Sea-level rise/fall 
 Change in seasonal variability 
 Stratospheric ozone depletion 
 Rise/fall in local temperatures 
 Increase/decrease in ultraviolet light intensity 
 Change in daily weather 
 Do not know 
 
 
3. In your opinion, which of the following conditions has Taiwan experienced during the past decade? 
<You may select more than one option> 
 
 Summer is hotter 
 Summer is cooler 
 Summer is longer 
 Summer is shorter 
 Winter is warmer 
 Winter is colder 
 Winter is longer 
 Winter is shorter 
 Droughts are longer  
 Droughts are shorter 
 Precipitation intensity (i.e., the volume of precipitation in a short time) is stronger 
 Precipitation intensity (i.e., the volume of precipitation in a short time) is weaker 
 None of the above  
 Others: _________________ 
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4. Which one of the following statements comes closest to your own point of view about global climate 
change? 
 
 It is real and has already started to happen. 
 It will start happening within my lifetime. 
 It will start to happen, but not until 100 years from now. 
 No, it will never happen. 
 Do not know. 
 
 
5. How concerned are you about the potential for adverse effects resulting from global climate change? 
 
Extremely 
High Level of 
Concern 
Fairly High 
Level of 
Concern 
Moderate 
Level of 
Concern 
Fairly Low 
Level of 
Concern 
Extremely 
Low Level of 
Concern 
Not 
Concerned 
at All 
      
 
 
6. Provide your assessment of the following statement: “Human activities are the main driving force 
behind global climate change.” 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Do Not 
Know 
      
 
 
7. Select your top three policy priorities for government action from the following list of issues in terms 
of the level of urgency and importance. 
 
 Economic growth 
 Educational opportunity 
 Energy (supply) security  
 Environmental protection 
 Gap between the rich and the poor 
 Health care 
 National security 
 Public safety 
 Social welfare 
 Unemployment 
 Others: _______________ 
 
 
8. Select your top three priorities for government action from the following list of environmental issues in 
terms of the level of urgency and importance. 
 Acid rain 
 Air pollution 
 Biodiversity 
 Disease and public health 
 Global climate change 
 Hazardous and radioactive waste management 
 Natural ecosystem destruction 
 Solid waste and recycling 
 Stratospheric ozone depletion 
 Water pollution 
 Others: _______________ 
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9. Provide your assessment of the following statement: “Industrialized countries (i.e., Japan, Germany, 
and the United States) are responsible for global climate change and they should take more 
responsibility to resolve the problem.” 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Do Not 
Know 
      
 
 
10. Select from the following list the three entities that you think have primary responsibility for resolving 
global climate change? 
 
 Environmental Groups 
 Every citizen 
 Industries 
 Media 
 National government 
 Scientists 
 No specific entity 
 Others: __________ 
 
11. Provide your assessment of the following statement: “My daily activities contribute to global climate 
change.” 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Do Not 
Know 
      
 
 
12. Provide your assessment of the following statement: “Global climate change may impact me 
personally in my lifetime.” 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Do Not 
Know 
      
 
 
13. Provide your assessment of the following statement: “The problem of global climate change is so 
overwhelming that it is really beyond the control of a young person such as me.” 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Do Not 
Know 
      
 
 
14. According to some experts, environmental issues involve difficult trade-offs with the economic 
objectives. Which one of the following statements best describes your own view? 
 
 The highest priority should be given to protecting the environment, even if it reduces economic 
growth. 
 Both economic and environmental goals are important, but the environment should come first. 
 Both economic and environmental goals are important, but the economy should come first. 
 The highest priority should be given to promoting economic growth even if it causes harm to the 
environment. 
 Do not know. 
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Section II 
 
1. Select from the following list the activities that contribute directly to global climate change. <You may 
select more than one option> 
 
 Individual automobile and motorcycle drivers 
 Industrial manufacturers emitting greenhouse gases during the production process 
 Industries using electricity to manufacture products 
 People using aerosol spray cans 
 People using electricity in their households to operate, for example, air conditioning 
 People using chemicals to deter insect pests 
 Thermal power plants using fossil fuels like oil and coal to generate electricity 
 Nuclear power plants 
 Human destructing forests 
 Human destructing the ozone layer by emitting Chlorofluorocarbons 
 
 
2. Select from the following list the potential consequences that are contributing directly by global 
climate change. <You may select more than one option> 
 
 Increasing average global air and ocean temperatures 
 Increasing chances of skin cancer due to exposure to excessive ultraviolet light 
 Increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather 
 Increasing pesticide residues in food products 
 Increasing radioactive waste 
 Change in precipitation volume (i.e., increasing flood and drought, water resource shortage) 
 Decreasing agricultural productivity 
 Decreasing biodiversity 
 Decreasing vector-borne diseases 
 Global average sea level rise 
 Melting glaciers and ice cap in mountain and polar region 
 
 
3. Select from the following list the actions that could likely moderate the effects of global climate 
change. <You may select more than one option> 
 
 Industries implementing carbon capture and storage technology (i.e., storing carbon dioxide 
underground or in the oceans) 
 Industries developing more energy-efficient products 
 Government planting trees 
 Government deploying large mirrors to reflect some solar energy into space 
 People reducing usage of chemicals to deter insect pests 
 People conserving energy/electricity 
 People reducing usage of aerosol spray cans 
 People using public transportation 
 Power plants reducing nuclear power generation 
 Power plants using renewable energy source instead of fossil fuel source 
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4. Yes or No Question. Please indicate whether the following statement is correct. Do not worry if you do 
not know the answer as this is not a test. If you do not understand the item, you may leave it blank. 
 
 Yes No Do Not Know 
1. The greenhouse effect is a natural phenomenon that moderates the 
earth’s average surface temperature within a relatively comfortable 
range. 
   
2. The greenhouse effect is due to the reabsorbion of outgoing 
ultraviolet rays by atmospheric greenhouse gasses.    
3. The global atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has 
increased 35% since the Industrial Revolution during the middle 
of the nineteenth century. The increase exceeded the range of 
natural variability in the earth history. 
   
4. The most important and abundant anthropogenic greenhouse gas is 
carbon monoxide.    
5. The average global temperature has risen 0.76 degrees Celsius 
over the past 150 years.    
6. The global average sea level rise during the twentieth century is 
estimated to have been 0.17 meters.    
7. If the global concentrations of all greenhouse gases and aerosols 
had been kept constant at year 2000 levels, further warming could 
be stopped. 
   
8. If humans continue to use fossil fuels and to emit greenhouse 
gasses at or above current rates, the global average temperature is 
projected to rise approximately 4 degrees Celsius by the end of the 
current century. 
   
9. If humans continue to use fossil fuels and to emit greenhouse 
gasses at or above current rates, the global average sea level is 
projected to rise 0.26-0.59 meters by the end of the current 
century. 
   
10. The main purpose of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions in the industrialized countries by an average 
5.2% below their levels in 1990.  
   
11. Taiwan has ratified the Kyoto Protocol.    
12. The majority of Taiwan’s energy supply is derived from nuclear 
energy.    
13. The major contributor of carbon dioxide emissions (including 
direct emission and indirect electricity consumption) in Taiwan is 
the industrial sector. 
   
14. Since 1990 the total carbon dioxide emissions of Taiwan has 
stopped increasing.    
15. Taiwan’s carbon dioxide emission per capita (per person) is above 
the world’s average.     
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Section III 
 
1. Do you think that Taiwan should actively begin to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions? 
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 2 in this section and skip Question 3) 
 No (Proceed to Question 3 in this section) 
 
 
2. Taiwan should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions because the country _______________ <You may 
select more than one option> 
 
 May face trade sanctions from the rest of the world. 
 Has relatively high greenhouse gas emissions per capita (per person). 
 Will be affected by the adverse impacts resulting from global climate change. 
 Will benefit economically from action to reduce its emissions in the long term. 
 Is a member of the global community and does not have a moral right to destroy the environment. 
 Others: _______________________ 
 
 
3. Taiwan does not need to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions because the country ______________ 
<You may select more than one option> 
 
 Has not signed the Kyoto Protocol. 
 Does not have very high overall emissions in comparison with other countries like the United 
States and China. 
 Will not be affected by the adverse impacts resulting from global climate change. 
 Will not benefit economically from action to reduce its emissions in the long term. 
 Will have future generations to devise a solution 
 Others: _______________________ 
 
 
4. Below are several statements about possible personal behavior changes that some experts suggest 
could help to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Fill in the response that most 
closely reflects your views in terms of willingness to take each action. 
 
 W SW N SUW UW Do Not Know 
1. Use my air conditioning less 
in the summer       
2. Conserve energy by reducing 
my use of electricity       
3. Drive my car/motorcycle less 
and use public transportation 
(e.g., trains and buses) 
instead 
      
4. Replace my older appliances 
with more energy efficient 
new models 
      
5. Pay more for my energy if it 
was generated from 
renewable sources 
      
6. Purchase a car/motorcycle 
that gets better gas mileage       
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5. Fill in the response that indicates your experiences taking each of the identified actions. 
 
 Frequently Sometimes Rarely Never Do Not Know 
1. I use air conditioning less in the 
summer.      
2. I turn off my computer when I am 
not using it.      
3. I use public transportation (e.g., 
trains, buses).      
4. I turn off the lights when I leave a 
room.      
 
 
6. Below is a list of actions that some people suggest could motivate the Taiwanese government to take 
action to reduce the country’s emissions of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Fill in the response that 
most closely reflects your views in terms of your willingness to participate. 
 
 W SW N SUW UW Do Not Know 
1. Attend a public hearing       
2. Sign a petition or participate 
in a signature-gathering 
campaign 
      
3. Vote for a political 
candidate with a strong 
environmental record 
      
4. Join an environmental group       
5. Attend a legal street 
marching movement       
 
 
7. Below is a list of several possible initiatives that could help to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide into 
the atmosphere. Please fill in the response that most closely reflects your views in terms of your 
support for each activity. 
 
 Strongly Support Support
Neutr
al 
Oppo
se 
Strongly 
Oppose 
Do Not 
Know 
1. Encourage the development of 
less pollution and energy 
intensive industries by shifting 
government subsidy programs 
      
2. Implement a law regulating 
greenhouse gasses as air 
pollutants and requiring 
industries to reduce their 
emissions in accordance with 
legally mandated targets and 
timelines 
      
3. Implement a law that requires 
consideration of greenhouse gas 
emissions as part of the 
environmental impact 
assessment review process 
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 Strongly Support Support
Neutr
al 
Oppo
se 
Strongly 
Oppose 
Do Not 
Know 
4. Use taxes and other financial 
incentives to encourage 
reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions 
      
5. Implement a law requiring all 
public buildings (e.g., offices, 
schools) to maintain air 
conditioning at temperatures of 
26-28 degrees Celsius during 
the summer 
      
6. Encourage the planting of trees       
7. Support the use of nuclear 
power as an alternative source 
of energy 
      
 
 
Section IV 
 
1. Please provide the following personal information. At no time will any of this information be used to 
publicly identify you with a specific set of responses. 
 
1. Age  18-19     20-21      22~23    24 or older 
2. Current Educational 
Status 
 Freshman       Sophomore  Junior    Senior   
 Graduate School 
3. Gender  Male       Female 
4. Academic 
Major/School 
 Physical Sciences   Engineering  Agriculture   Law 
 Management  Literature  Social Sciences  Others:__
 
 
2. From what sources do you normally obtain information on issues related to the environment? <You 
may select more than one option> 
 
 Internet 
 Friends 
 Magazines 
 Newspapers 
 School 
 Television 
 Others (specify): __________ 
 
 
3. Have you seen either of the following films? 
 
   The Day After Tomorrow      Yes   No  
   An Inconvenient Truth        Yes   No  
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION 
FOR THE WEB-BASED SURVEY (ENGLISH) 
 
Survey on Global Climate Change 
 
Section I 
 
1. Which one of the following statements comes closest to your own point of view about global climate 
change? 
 
 It is real and has already started to happen. (96.5%) 
 It will start happening within my lifetime. (2.5%) 
 It will start to happen, but not until 100 years from now. (0.7%) 
 No, it will never happen. (0.0%) 
 Do not know. (0.4%) 
 
 
2. How concerned are you about the potential for adverse effects resulting from global climate change? 
 
Very 
Concerned 
Mostly 
Concerned Concerned 
Somewhat 
Concerned 
Not Concerned 
at All 
Do Not 
Know 
 (23.5%)  (34.0%)  (34.7%)  (7.0%)  (0.4%)  (0.4%) 
 
 
3. In general, when you hear scientists talk about global climate change, how much do you trust what 
they are saying? 
 
Completely Mostly Some Not much Not at All Do Not Know 
 (8.8%)  (51.9%)  (29.5%)  (9.1%)  (0.0%)  (0.7%) 
 
 
4. In general, if you have doubts about global climate change, whose opinions will you usually tend to 
listen to? 
 
 Environmental activists (15.4%) 
 Friends and family (1.8%) 
 Journalists (1.8%) 
 Politicians (0.0%) 
 Scientists / Experts (77.9%) 
 I usually ignore my doubts (2.1%) 
 Other: __________ (1.1%) 
 
 
5. Provide your assessment of the following statement: “Human activities are the main driving force 
behind global climate change.” 
 
Agree Somewhat Agree 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree Disagree 
Do Not 
Know 
 (46.0%)  (40.7%)  (10.9%)  (2.5%)  (0.0%)  (0.0%)
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6. Provide your assessment of the following statement: “Industrialized countries (i.e., Japan, Germany, 
and the United States) are primarily responsible for global climate change and they should exert more 
individual effort to address the problem than developing countries do.” 
 
Agree Somewhat Agree 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree Disagree 
Do Not 
Know 
 (20.7%)  (43.2%)  (20.4%)  (13.3%)  (2.5%)  (0.0%)
 
 
7. Provide your assessment of the following statements: 
 
 A SA NAND SDA DA DK 
a. My daily activities contribute 
to global climate change 
 
(9.5%) 
 
(62.1%)
 
(20.4%)
 
(7.0%) 
 
(0.4%) 
 
(0.7%)
b. Global climate change may 
impact me personally in my 
lifetime 
 
(34.7%)
 
(58.6%)
 
(6.0%) 
 
(0.7%) 
 
(0.0%) 
 
(0.0%)
c. There is still something a 
young person such as me can do 
to contribute to resolve the 
problem of global climate 
change. 
 
(43.2%)
 
(49.8%)
 
(6.3%) 
 
(0.0%) 
 
(0.0%) 
 
(0.7%)
 
 
8. According to some experts, environmental issues involve difficult trade-offs with economic objectives. 
Which one of the following statements best describes your own view? 
 
 The highest priority should be given to protecting the environment, even if it reduces economic 
growth. (14.7%) 
 Both economic and environmental goals are important, but the environment should come first. 
(78.6%) 
 Both economic and environmental goals are important, but the economy should come first. (4.6%) 
 The highest priority should be given to promoting economic growth even if it causes harm to the 
environment. (0.7%) 
 Do not know. (1.4%) 
 
 
9. Select your top three policy priorities for Taiwanese government action from the following list of 
issues in terms of the level of urgency and importance. 
 
 Economic growth (50.9%) 
 Educational opportunity (29.5%) 
 Energy (supply) security (18.6%) 
 Environmental protection (74.0%) 
 Gap between the rich and the poor (38.6%) 
 Health care (11.2%) 
 National security (13.7%) 
 Public safety (9.5%) 
 Social welfare (17.5%) 
 Unemployment (31.2%) 
 Other: ___________ (5.3%) 
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10. Select your top three priorities for Taiwanese government action from the following list of 
environmental issues in terms of the level of urgency and importance. 
 
 Acid rain (6.3%) 
 Air pollution (54.4%) 
 Biodiversity (30.9%) 
 Disease and public health (20.7%) 
 Global climate change (38.6%) 
 Hazardous and radioactive waste management (16.1%) 
 Natural ecosystem destruction (54.0%) 
 Solid waste and recycling (30.9%) 
 Stratospheric ozone depletion (9.1%) 
 Water pollution (37.2%) 
 Other: ______________ (1.8%) 
 
 
Section II 
 
1. Yes or No Question. Please indicate whether each of the following statements is correct. Do not worry 
if you do not know the answer as this is not a test. If you do not understand the item, you may leave it 
blank. 
 
Scientific Statement Correct Incorrect DK 
1. The greenhouse effect is due to the reabsorption of outgoing 
infrared radiation by atmospheric greenhouse gasses, such 
as carbon dioxide. 
 
(78.9%) 
 
(17.2%) 
 
(3.9%)
2. Industrial manufacturers emitting greenhouse gases during 
the production process contributes to global climate change.
 
(87.7%) 
 
(10.2%) 
 
(2.1%)
3. Ozone layer depletion contributes to global climate change.  (59.3%) 
 
(35.1%) 
 
(5.6%)
4. Deforestation contributes to global climate change.  (90.9%) 
 
(8.1%) 
 
(1.1%)
5. Increasing average global air and ocean temperatures are a 
potential consequence of global climate change. 
 
(95.1%) 
 
(1.4%) 
 
(3.5%)
6. Global climate change has no effect on the change in 
precipitation volume (i.e., increasing flood and drought, 
water resource shortage). 
 
(11.9%) 
 
(86.0%) 
 
(2.1%)
7. Global average sea-level rise due to the melting glaciers 
and ice cap in mountain and polar region is a potential 
consequence of global climate change. 
 
(96.1%) 
 
(2.8%) 
 
(1.1%)
8. People using public transportation could likely moderate 
the effects of global climate change. 
 
(92.3%) 
 
(4.6%) 
 
(3.2%)
9. Industries implementing carbon capture and storage 
technology (i.e., storing carbon dioxide underground or in 
the oceans) could likely moderate the effects of global 
climate change. 
 
(64.6%) 
 
(13.3%) 
 
(22.1%)
10. Power plants using sources of renewable energy instead of 
fossil fuels like oil and coal to generate electricity could 
likely intensify the effects of global climate change. 
 
(33.0%) 
 
(52.6%) 
 
(14.4%)
11. The main purpose of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions in the industrialized countries. 
 
(90.2%) 
 
(4.6%) 
 
(5.3%)
12. Taiwan’s carbon dioxide emission per capita (per person) is 
above the world’s average. 
 
(66.3%) 
 
(11.6%) 
 
(22.1%)
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Section III 
 
1. Do you think that Taiwan should begin to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions? 
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 2 in this section and skip Question 3) (98.9%) 
 No (Proceed to Question 3 in this section) (1.1%) 
 
 
2. Taiwan should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions because the country _______________ <You may 
select more than one option> 
 
 May face trade sanctions from the rest of the world. (20.6%) 
 Has relatively high greenhouse gas emissions per capita (per person). (53.5%) 
 Will be affected by the adverse impacts resulting from global climate change. (72.3%) 
 Will benefit economically from action to reduce its emissions in the long term. (36.5%) 
 Is a member of the global community and the country does not have the right to destroy the 
environment. (83.0%) 
 Other: ________ (2.1%) 
 
 
3. Taiwan does not need to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions because the country ______________ 
<You may select more than one option> 
 
 Has not signed the Kyoto Protocol. (0.0%) 
 Does not have very high overall emissions in comparison with other countries like the United 
States and China. (33.3%) 
 Will not be affected by the adverse impacts resulting from global climate change. (33.3%) 
 Will not benefit economically from action to reduce its emissions in the long term. (66.7%) 
 Will have future generations to devise a solution. (0.0%) 
 Other: ___________ (0.0%) 
 
 
4. Which of the following groups in Taiwan bear primary responsibility for reducing their greenhouse gas 
emissions? 
 
 Industrial sector (14.7%) 
 Household/consumer sector (1.8%) 
 Both are equally responsible (83.2%) 
 Do not know (0.4%) 
 
 
5. Below are several statements about possible personal behavioral changes that some experts suggest 
could help to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Fill in the response that most 
closely reflects your views in terms of willingness to take each action. 
 
 W SW N SUW UW DK 
1. Conserve energy by reducing 
my use of electricity 
 
(34.0%)
 
(48.1%)
 
(17.2%)
 
(0.7%) 
 
(0.0%) 
 
(0.0%)
2. Drive my car/motorcycle less 
and use public transportation 
(e.g., trains and buses) 
instead 
 
(41.1%)
 
(41.8%)
 
(14.7%)
 
(1.8%) 
 
(0.7%) 
 
(0.0%)
3. Replace my older appliances 
with more energy efficient 
new models 
 
(32.3%)
 
(42.1%)
 
(23.5%)
 
(1.8%) 
 
(0.4%) 
 
(0.0%)
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6. Below is a list of several possible initiatives that could help to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide into 
the atmosphere. Please fill in the response that most closely reflects your views in terms of your 
support for each activity. 
 
 S SS N SO O DK 
1. Encourage the development 
of less pollution and energy 
intensive industries and 
discourage the development 
of high pollution and energy 
intensive industries by 
shifting government subsidy 
programs 
 
(40.4%)
 
(48.1%)
 
(10.2%)
 
(0.7%) 
 
(0.7%)
 
(0.0%)
2. Implement a law regulating 
greenhouse gasses as air 
pollutants and requiring 
industries to reduce their 
emissions in accordance with 
legally mandated targets and 
timelines 
 
(39.3%)
 
(48.4%)
 
(10.9%)
 
(0.7%) 
 
(0.0%)
 
(0.7%)
3. Use taxes and other financial 
incentives to encourage 
reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions 
 
(36.8%)
 
(38.6%)
 
(20.7%)
 
(3.2%) 
 
(0.4%)
 
(0.4%)
4. Encourage the planting of 
trees 
 
(64.9%)
 
(28.8%)
 
(4.6%) 
 
(1.8%) 
 
(0.0%)
 
(0.0%)
5. Support the use of nuclear 
power as an alternative 
source of energy 
 
(13.7%)
 
(23.5%)
 
(43.5%)
 
(12.3%) 
 
(6.0%)
 
(1.1%)
 
 
Section IV 
 
1. Please provide the following personal information. At no time will any of this information be used to 
publicly identify you with a specific set of responses. 
 
Age 18 
Gender  Male (39.6%)      Female (60.4%) 
Current 
Educational Status 
 Freshman (25.6%)   Sophomore (13.0%)    
 Junior (27.4%)       Senior (13.3%)       
 Above Senior (2.5%)   Graduate School (Master) (15.1%)  
 Graduate School (PhD) (3.2%) 
Hometown                  
Academic 
Major/School 
 Physical Sciences (16.5%)    Engineering (11.9%)  
 Agriculture (3.5%)    Medical Science (2.8%)  
 Literature (10.5%)   Business (15.8%)  Management (14.7%) 
 Law (0.7%)   Social Sciences (9.5%)   Others:_____ (14.0%) 
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